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Abstract 
This research uses a case study of Xinjiang to challenge China' s reform by addressing the 
problems rooted in its partiality and regionalisation. The reform started in the field of 
political administration and toleration of decentralisation and marketisation in the economic 
sphere has generated economic prosperity in some regions. But economic reform was not 
necessarily accompanied by political transformation. Most characteristics of socialism have 
been retained, including political discretion and economic bailout. Both are regarded as 
major causes to economic weakness in some sectors and some provinces. The central 
argument for the continuation of the partial reform is decentralisation of decision-making to 
the local political state, enabling local government to give a "helping hand" in facilitating 
change. But the partiality of the reform drives local governments in those regions with 
political sensitivities to become a "political defender", holding back the progress of the 
reform there. Such unbalanced and unparalleled developments amongst the regions and 
institutions has create imbalances in provinces such as Xinjiang, challenging the success of 
China' s reform overall. In politically sensitive regions, the Communist Party has retained an 
administrative stranglehold and development has stagnated, not only calling into question the 
sustainability the reforms but also potentially threatening China' s unity and political stability. 
The thesis uses Xinjiang, which is politically very sensitive, because of its ethnicity and 
strategic resources, to argue this point. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Significance of the Research 
This research, using a case of Xinjiang, China's north-western province, tries to reveal the 
particular problems fostered by China's partial refOlTIl in which a restructuring of political 
institutions has not accompanied economic decentralisation. The shortcomings in China's 
reform have resulted in an unbalanced development between China's coastal and inland 
regions, especially those with large ethnic minorities, such as Xinjiang, in which the local 
political state could not act independently to facilitate economic reform. The inequality in 
regional development, combined with institutional uncooperativeness, challenges China' s 
partial reform and her national stability. In this respect, the thesis attempts to address the 
problems that have emerged in the middle and recent period of reform in order to debate its 
fitness for purpose and its sustainability. 
China has undertaken major economic reforms for nearly three decades now since 1978 and 
her policies are usually seen by outside observers as flexible and gradual, with rapid 
economic growth generated by economic decentralisation but with political institutions that 
have not experienced such a rate of change. Therefore China's reform is rather different from 
the "shock therapy" of most of the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe, which relied 
on advice from prestigious western scholars, such as Kornai (1986, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1997, 
2000, 2002). In fact China' s reform has been constantly criticized as by no means "a 
transition strategy" (Kornai, 1990: p.130) in which "economic returns remain at the mercy of 
political predation" (Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1996: p.50). It has been said that ''the 
incompatibility of market allocation with state ownership" (Walder, 1996: p.5) will always 
allow the occurrence of soft budget constrains (SBCs), a familiar cause of failure in socialist 
economies (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast, 1996; North, 1990; Kornai, 2000). 
Although there have been negative aspects, the experience of reform in China has been 
without too much social, economic and political disruption. Unlike those former East 
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European socialist countries which are struggling with economic recession and political 
unrest, China's reform is continuing through trial and error and is still making significant 
progress even with the deliberate delay of marketisation and privatisation of key sectors. 
What factors led to the success of China's partial reform and its continuation, especially the 
rapid economic growth of the coastal regions? And how far can the reform go? 
This ushers in a discussion led by Qian(1994, 1996, 2000); Montinola, Weingast and Qian 
(1995); Weingast and Qian (1996, 1997); XU and Qian (1998); Che and Qian (1998); Qian 
and Roland (1998); Qian, Roland and XU (1999); Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005) who, based 
on the theories of Douglas North's institutionalism and Kornai ' s SBCs, argued that China's 
successful reform can be explained as a restructuring of political governance - a vertical 
decentralisation that provides incentives for profound reform. This explanation is examined 
in a theory of 'Market Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style' by Qian, Weingast, Roland 
(1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). Because of this incentive restructuring, local government 
emerges to play an important role in local economic growth and has become a middle agent 
encouraging a continuing urge for China's further reform. 
In the view of Qian and Weingast (1997), the Chinese state has made a clear commitment to 
economic growth. In order to meet her promise, China has had to adapt the institutions in 
terms of the economy as well as politics to some extent. Therefore, although the reform 
retains a largely unchanged political system, it undergoes a decentralisation of decision-
making from the central to local governments. Unlike the approach of the Soviet Union, in 
which local political institutions were bypassed and decisions were directly transmitted down 
to the basic economic units, Chinese reform employs a form of vertical decentralization of 
power within its political regime, which empowers the local state to act as a "political 
middleman" (Goodman, 1994: p.4; Chueng, 1998b: p.13). On the one hand, local 
government is a policy guard acting for the centre to retain politically centralised control 
including the guidance of local economic growth, implementing central policy and 
maintaining the party line and social order. On the other hand, it is also a pioneer of reform 
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and a region's defender acting for the locality to protect local wealth, to tackle the restrictions 
of central policy and to pursue the economic interests of its particular region. 
China's choice for the vertical decentralisation is especially important to China's reform, as 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rejects other alternatives for the decentralisation and 
feels that it must retain the key features of the Maoist political system and maintains the 
domination of Marxist-Leninist ideological doctrine in order to guide economic 
liberalisation. At the early stage of Chinese partial reform, local government undertook the 
crucial role of reconciling conflicts between political conservatism and economic radicalism 
and of harmonising economic reform at a time of stagnation in the political environment. 
This represents the state's economic commitment within the rigid political system without 
paying high transaction costs. 
In the Chinese case, fiscal reform provides a decentralisation mechanism that allows vital 
power to be gained by the local state via fiscal independence, and some local governments 
have been able to act with real agency to lead local economic units successfully. Economic 
reform was initiated in the regions because political restrictions to economic reform were, 
firstly, easy to be relaxed and, secondly, where large numbers of non-state-directly-controlled 
enterprises were presented. Both conditions are equally important and especially the latter 
one can foster the authority of local state over property rights in the regions to utilise the 
local resource to serve economic growth. 
Oi (1995: p.I132) in particular claimed that China's economic growth is led by ''local state 
corporatism". In her view, the key feature of the economic success presented in China's coast 
is the rapid growth of township-village enterprises (TVEs), which have a "fake collective" 
(Oi, 1995: p.I135) ownership to foster property rights for the region. Therefore "the state is 
responsible for much of this growth, as local governments treat enterprises within their 
administrative purview as one component of a large corporate whole. Local officials act as 
the equivalent of a board of directors and sometimes more directly act as the chief executive 
officers" (Oi, 1995: p.I132). For example, the role of making decisions for local enterprises 
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at the country village level is specifically taken by the party General Secretary (GS) of the 
village. 
In Montinola, Qian and Weingast's argument (1995), local government' s involvement has 
effectively put a stop to phenomena predicted theoretically by Komai and North - the 
potential problems of SBC and political discretion. Both are regarded as key dangers in 
relation to political constraints on economic liberalisation, eventually crystallising into a 
cause for reversing the reform. China' s reform started in the rural economy, a sector that was 
administrative weak. The strategy implies low transactional costs to the current polity, but 
the economic success achieved by the local enterprises is not secure, as there is no legal 
system outside the party-state regime to protect their success or foster the mobilisation of 
economic factors such as property rights. Therefore economic success will always be "at the 
mercy of political predation" (North, 1990). However, as the local governments have been 
made in effect the representatives of local economic units, they therefore hold responsibility 
for the locality to act against central predation in terms of wealth confiscation, property 
mobilization and state financial misbehaviour. This provides political protection and 
incentives for the continuation of local economic success as well as the continuation of the 
reform. On top of this, as the semi-leader of local economic units of the regions with large 
non-state economic sectors, local governments have realised that vital power can be gained 
from their financial authority. China' s fiscal reform ensures that the power gained by the 
local leaders in return disciplines local government financial behaviour and preserves 
marketisation, and it effectively stops the phenomenon of SBCs, which has been a common 
feature in socialist countries and directly results in the failure of partial reform. 
The local political state 's involvement in economic growth, especially for localities, is 
significant in two ways. Firstly, according to Hayek' s (1945) theory, economic efficiency 
depends on local actors who can utilise local information to provide the services and goods 
better than the central state. That requires the decentralisation of decision power from the 
centre. The decentralisation authorizes the local government to steer the local economy. 
Therefore a region' s economic growth depends on the competence of its local leaders and the 
unity of the government in understanding the regional conditions to take action in terms of 
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invo.lving in the lo.cal eco.no.mic perfo.nnance and making effective and efficient po.licies fo.r 
the regio.n and regio.nal eco.no.my to.ward harmo.nio.us develo.pment and prosperity. This can 
be examined in two. discussio.ns: first, lo.cal-o.rientatio.n to. pro.ducing effective and sufficient 
develo.pment po.licies in terms o.f cultural preservatio.n and evo.lutio.n, social justice and well-
being, and eco.no.mic develo.pment efficiency. These po.licies include macro-po.litical co.ntro.l 
and administratio.n in tune with the state's requirement fo.r natio.nal unity, po.litical stability 
and eco.no.mic gro.wth; justified planning fo.r lo.cal econo.mies in reso.urce utilisatio.n and 
wealth gain in market eco.no.my; and co.mpensatio.n to. the regio.n fo.r unfair treatment in the 
central plans. 
Seco.ndly, local state-enterprise cooperates in pursuit o.f lo.cal eco.no.mic efficiency. This 
requires lo.cal go.vernment to. be flexible and managerial in handling its relatio.nship with 
Io.cal enterprises. On the o.ne hand, lo.cal go.vernment has to represent its enterprises in o.rder 
to. recruit funds fro.m no.n-state and state so.urces, bargain with the centre fo.r mo.re eco.no.mic 
advantages, including the decentralisatio.n o.f pro.perty rights and decisio.n-making powers and 
fo.r increased reso.urce allo.catio.ns. On the o.ther hand, lo.cal go.vernment needs to. guide lo.cal 
enterprises fo.r their perfo.nnance in China's transitional eco.no.my in terms o.fmarketising 
o.peratio.n, productivity promo.tio.n and financial discipline, that all give local go.vernments 
greater sco.pe fo.r entrepreneurship and make them in China "fully fledged eco.no.mic actors" 
o.perating fo.r the benefit o.f the regio.n (Oi, 1995: p.1137). 
The lo.cal state no.t o.nly has better info.rmatio.n than mo.st small enterprises but also. has 
privileges in adapting the current political system fo.r coo.peratio.n with lo.cal enterprises 
witho.ut generating to.o. much political resistance. Especially at the beginning o.f the reform, 
tho.se Chinese provincial o.fficers who. had been trained in Mao.'s era were highly disciplined 
in handling central policy through the hierarchy o.f go.vernmental bureaucracy and were 
therefo.re no.w experienced in applying certain political principles. They alSo. had the talent, 
co.mpetence and skills to. adapt Mao.'s institutio.ns to. the new reality, fo.r the sake o.f 
themselves and their respective regio.ns, and to. exploit the bureaucratic netwo.rks to. lo.bby the 
upper leaders fo.r the policy modificatio.ns (Oi 1995). They were different fro.m the 
bureaucrats o.f Africa and Latin America, who. are mired in swamps o.f bureaucratic 
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corruption and lack economic and organisational capability and experience (Qian and 
Weingast, 1996; Walder, 1996; Oi, 1995). As discussed by Cheung (1998b: p.14), the initial 
policy was recommended by the top leaders in Beijing, but it still needs to be supported, 
justified and implemented by the local leaders and governments, who opened up 
opportunities for experiments in the "policy window". Provincial leaders take up and even 
expand the opportunity to influence the policy-making process "by acting as 'policy 
entrepreneurs '" (Cheung, 1998b: p 14) on behalf of their regions and themselves, which in 
return benefits regional development. According to Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988: p.344), 
"the provincial level is a gatekeeper guarding and providing access to the local levels." It 
provides an effective and efficient "system" of incentives to adjust institutional faults and to 
control the reforms. Therefore, local state involvement in regional economic growth can be 
seen as the starting point of China's political institutional change. 
In this way, the CCP in fact turns some of its components at local level into economic 
institutions in order to participate in the economic transition and to undertake decision-
making decentralisation against the grain of the established politico-centralised system. This 
proves China' s reform is Path Dependence and to some extent appeals to North' s 
requirement for political institutional adjustments to economic Liberalisation (Oi, 1995; Qian 
and Weingast, 1997). During economic decentralisation, the CCP also participates itself in 
the political administrative liberalisation, the ultimate success of which requires a reduction 
of political intervention and an increase in governmental administrative integrity, rationality 
and efficiency, thereby inculcating a desire for reduction in political guidance by the CCP 
itself and for further political administrative efficiency, which appeals to Weber's ideal 
rationality of bureaucratic administration. According to Max Weber's theory (Mhammad, 
2004)(see chapter 2), under certain circumstances a reduction of intervention by politicians 
may provide scope for greater efficiency in governmental administration and discipline of 
bureaucratic behaviour, which together make the government cohesive, task-focused and 
flexible. 
China has a vast territory which not only provides geographical variations in many respects 
within and between her provinces but also shapes the geo-politics and requires specific 
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political administration for each individual province. So, detennining the degree of partial-
transition undertaken by each province depends on the geo-political position of the region in 
China' s framework and depends on the impact of its particular economic transition on the 
country's political unity. It is the local government and provincial leaders who, in 
understanding the special characteristics of the region, and also the principle of survival in 
China 's political struggles, accordingly and willingly shape their bureaucratic behaviour and 
administrative methods, and, by balancing their dual roles as both political administrator and 
economic director, skilfully steer the region through the rough waters of Beijing's prejudices 
and whims. The discretion of local government plays a substantial part in determining the 
depth of partial-reform in their region and its economic outcomes. 
However, China's vastness and variation also determines that some regions have political 
sensitivities, as major factor, such as ethnicity, or alternatively large key sectors run by state 
owned enterprises (SOEs), that could not undergo the same decentralisation as the others. 
The degree of decentralisation in these regions will differ from those with fewer political 
problems and large numbers ofTVEs, such as the coastal regions. Firstly, Beijing would not 
allow itself to commit to a political institutional relaxation in cooperation with economic 
decentralisation in those regions. The unchanged political institutions hold back the fostering 
of a dynamic economic role by local government in its bureaucratic administration. 
Secondly, large numbers of SOEs remain in such regions and their weak perfonnance under 
state ownership meant no power to be gained by the local state but in fact greater incentives 
for SBC. Without the vital power combined with the state' s financial protection, these local 
governments are not able to act as a real economic agency to involve themselves in the local 
economy and to lead it toward growth. In this regard, the theory of 'Market Preserving 
Federalism, Chinese Style' ofMontinola, Qian and Weingast (1995); Qian and Weingast 
(1996) is invalid and the explanation of China's partial reform by this theory can be 
challenged for its incomplete and has a narrow region-specific bias. On top of this, the 
sustainability of China's partial reform is thus also arguable. 
This thesis focuses on an inland region, Xinjiang .in northwest China. Xinjiang, as China's 
westernmost frontier province is typical of Central Asia, geographically as well as culturally, 
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having a large Muslim population of multiple minorities, dominated by the Uyghur, a people 
descended from ancient Turkic stock. Because of its ethnicity, Xinjiang was given "regional 
autonomy", a Chinese form of political administration specially designed for minority 
regions. However, the political administration ofthese minority regions is in particular 
required to gear up for the party's dominance over every aspect of the region's affairs. As a 
result, the mission and performance of local government and its leaders have been heavily 
framed, affected and weighted by this type of political administration. Central policy toward 
Xinjiang's development is to maintain political control through the reinforcement of the 
CCP's power while the economy is sustained by heavy subsidies from central state funds and 
resources. 
Choosing Xinjiang as a case study is not only because of its inland location but also due to its 
political sensitivity and natural wealth, which makes the region very different from any of the 
other Chinese provinces. Xinjiang is also different from other minority regions like Tibet, 
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Guangxi, and Yunnan, in which the "regional autonomy" has been 
granted also because of their ethnicity. Inner Mongolia is historically, geographically and 
religiously closer to Han China than the other two regions: in history, Mongolian took 
control of China for three hundred years during the Yuan dynasty. Both Guangxi and Yunnan 
have no particularly dominant minorities. Han culture has been strong in Inner Mongolia, 
Ningxia, Guangxi and Yunnan for centuries, but for Xinjiang and Tibet, they are not just 
distant in terms of geographical location, but also in culture and religion from Han influence. 
Therefore taking and holding political control in the latter regions has had more added value 
than in, say, Inner Mongolia Xinjiang is arguably more crucial than Tibet because of its rich 
natural resources. 
Coincidentally, Xinjiang' s huge land reserves various natural resources, including oil, and 
its geopolitical location is just next to Kazakhstan, an oil-rich Central Asian country. Since 
China became an oil-importing country in ] 993 securing sufficient oil supplies and reserves 
has been a big concern to the central state and critical to fuelling China's fast growth, both at 
present and in future. Under these circumstances, the CCP' s domination has two 
implications: political and economic controls. Xinjiang's natural wealth characterizes the 
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regional economic pattern ofa resource-based industrial economy. Much of the local 
economy is controlled by the state, in a very different manner from the TVEs, and its oil 
industries are all SOEs, through which a fixed property right entitles the central state to take 
control of production of this strategic resource. 
Since the reform of 1978, on the principle of economic efficiency, the regions with 
comparative advantages like the coastal regions have been able to develop rapidly and 
impressively, while the inland regions in relative terms have stagnated with their large state 
sectors and unfavourable market conditions. The increasing gap between China' s eastern and 
western provinces in their economic development has alarmed the central government. In 
contrast, eastern China' s wealth has made western China's poverty difficult to bear, 
especially in Xinjiang where the minorities see resource-exploitation as a drain on their 
regional wealth for the sake of eastern China' s prosperity. Resentment towards the Han 
Chinese has resulted in violent separatist protests, which make Beijing eager to ease the 
escalating political tension in Xinjiang, by improving the region' s economic situation (Sisci, 
200 I). Taking into consideration its political-economic geographical location, natural 
resources and its ethnicity, Xinjiang' s regional development is not only central to its regional 
perspective and to the nation' s wealth due to its resource base, but is also crucial to national 
unity and social stability. 
China has attempted to narrow the otherwise increasing gap of unbalanced development 
between the coastal and inland regions. The factors affecting the less developed inland region 
are usually discussed in terms such as: geo-economic disadvantages, late entrance to market 
economy, less advanced economic sectors, and unfavourable central policies. There is rarely 
a discussion of the efforts by local institutions, especially the inland local governments, as to 
whether they have been able to act like their counterparts on the coast in releasing local talent 
toward wealth creation, overcoming their locational disadvantages skilfully tackling the 
restrictions of central policy and institutional constraints, and solving bureaucratic 
inefficiencies for the benefit of these poor regions. There are many Chinese scholars, policy-
makers and local bureaucrats who have pointed out that the less developed inland regions do 
not just lack all of the competitive market elements but also lack a development of politico-
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economic institutions. The latter is much more dynamic and important as, without removing 
institutional constraints and providing incentives, talent in the regions, no matter how much 
potential there is, cannot be released. China's past has proved this point. It is high time to 
undertake a systemic analysis of the local state and in particular the governments of the 
lagging regions, especially in the minority regions. 
In examining the functioning of Xinjiang' s local government, its transitional politico-
economic institutions, and its management and entrepreneurship in conducting an economic 
growth for the region, we need to raise the question as to whether the local government under 
the circwnstances of political domination and state economic protection is able to act in the 
same way as its counterparts in the Han provinces in effectively removing constraints on 
economic growth, in securing local resources and releasing the local talent towards 
generating wealth, and in skilfully tackling all restrictions in the best interests of the region. 
This raises the issue as to whether China's partial reform, with its continuing political 
restrictions, can be made to work, as has happened in the coastal provinces, by removing 
most economic institutional constraints and also some political ones. Most important here is 
that the action of local government toward radical reform, for example foreign investment in 
the coastal region, should not be thought of as fostering a great threat to national unity and 
jeopardising political control. However, in politically sensitive regions like minority 
provinces, partial reform implies that local government cannot remove institutional 
constraints such as party control and the state' s domination of economic development, and, at 
the same time, enhance its own role. This undermines its own entrepreneurial ambitions. 
Without the dynamic economic role of local government in regional development, how can 
local economic efficiency in a market transitional economy be achieved? Without local 
government acting as a counter weight to central policies, how can a locality protect its 
wealth and provide incentives to continue development? Again, without such harmonious 
development in China's minority regions, the reform will be difficult to carry through and, 
most importantly, the social unrest in the minority regions will place the reform in danger 
and possibly reverse all progress. So, we need to find out whether the dynamic role oflocal 
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government in the economic development of the minority regions can take place in a region 
with such a political environment. 
1.2 Scope of the Research 
1.2.1 Aims 
This thesis focuses on studying the way in which Xinjiang's government and leadership have 
been shaped by the specific political administrative system of the region, and how regional 
economic policies based on the central reform strategy have been shaped by the local 
government, and how the dynamic role of local governmental in local economic growth has 
been blocked by institutional constraints in which the local economic actors have no 
incentive to make efforts. The aims of the thesis are to understand the weak development of 
Xinjiang province, to identify the causes of this underperformance, and to propose ways in 
which its development might be enhanced in future. 
1.2.2 Objectives 
1) Investigation and definition of those problems in Xinjiang's economic development that 
result from the Chinese Party-state political administration and Chinese semi-politico-
economic transition; and an examination of the origin of the problems in terms of Chinese 
governmental administration specific to this particular inland area. 
2) Examination and discussion of regional policies produced by local government in response 
to the central government's development strategy, in order to judge the competence and 
capability of the local government in managing regional economic growth in a transitional 
economy, and to find what institutional constraints shape local government s role in this 
particular region. 
3) A discussion of the administrative orientation oflocal government as framed by Beijing's 
policies toward the ethnic provinces in the national strategic framework in order to address 
the resultant problems involved in the construction and unity of local governmental teams. 
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4) An examination and criticism of the provincial government in terms of its structure, 
responsibility and suitability for Xinjiang's development in order to define its integrity, self-
dependence and capability in managing the regional economy during the transition. 
5) A definition and demonstration of the critical role played by Xinjiang's provincial CCP 
and governmental leaders through an analysis of their personal backgrounds in order to 
understand the specific leadership in this particular region and the impact of the leadership on 
local economic development and political unity during the course of economic transition. 
6) An examination of local economic promotion in terms of financial management and 
productive sectoral development to define the capability of local government in managing 
economic self-reliance of the region and to reveal the results of institutional constraints on 
the local state' s dynamic role in China's transitional economy. 
7) A discussion of the management of relations between China' s regional policy and 
provincial government institutional development in the course of local reform, in order to 
recommend future regional policies for the province of Xinjiang. 
In this thesis, I will focus on three issues in order to anal yse the perfonnance of the 
provincial government of Xinjiang and, in relation to the institutional constraints, the impact 
of the performance oflocal government on the regional development of Xinjiang. 
First, there will be a discussion of governmental political administration, structure and 
leadership. With regard to ethnicity of the region, the political administration granted to the 
region will be specially discussed in order to address the difference of Chinese regional 
autonomous administration from that of Han regions and to highlight the consequences of the 
differences for orientation, rational and efficient performance and structure of institutions. 
The specifically political nature of the administration has meant that its units and leadership 
act differently from the one required by economic transition. Leadership and performance of 
the local state and the party leaders will be analysed through discussion of their personal 
backgrounds, leadership orientation and their crafting of the local refonn strategy. 
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Second, I will analyse local governmental economic management in terms of financial 
management and the promotion of sectoral development contributions to local economic 
growth. Since the 1978 reform, many Chinese regional economies have been dramatically 
improved from the growth started in socialist, institutionally thin sectors. This growth 
strategy attempts to switch away from the traditional economic production affected by the 
poor performance of SOEs towards greater market efficiency and growth incentives by 
fostering mobile factors such as property rights to protect local wealth, exploiting 
comparative advantages, decentralising production choice to local enterprises and promoting 
revenue producing economic sectors for the locality. It gives autonomy and authority to local 
governments in decision-making, a rise of power specifically from local financial seLf-
reliance and bargaining strengths against central predation, which provides incentives for 
economic actors, especially local governments, continually to make efforts for local 
economic growth as well as seeking the removal of all institutional constraints. I will 
examine Xinjiang's economic sectoral development to see if the emphasis on promoting the 
locally most productive sectors under the domination of SOEs can meet the requirements for 
generating local wealth and raising power and autonomy of local governments. I will also 
examine local financial management under two headings. First, the economic 
decentralisation of decision-power to a locality is in practice represented by the financial 
autonomy of local government gained from a series of fiscal reforms since 1978. So, local 
government not only has power in making plans but also has the power to implement plans in 
its own interests. Second, local government can retain surplus budgetary revenues and 
reinvest the region ' s capital independent of the centre, although Beijing insists that it also 
must take responsibility for the greater inherent risk. It also helps with solutions to common 
problems involved in a socialist economy, such as SBCs. This can strengthen the financial 
self-reliance and independence of local government as the major economic unit and reduce 
the existing complacency of government bureaucratic behaviour created by the state' s 
financial protection and so increase the discipline of governmental institutions in financing 
the local economy that provides great incentives for local governments to perform their 
critical role well. This thesis will determine if Xinjiang's government has reached this stage 
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and will address what institutional constraints have limited local governmental capability. 
This will help to understand Beijing's attitude toward to the region. 
Third, I will look at provincial reform strategy and policy to see whether provincial 
government has produced justified local policies and formed a locality-based reform strategy 
for the region in response to the central plan. These policies and strategies provide a test of 
the capacity, capability and competence of the local state in managing local economic growth 
in the transition economy and in adopting Mao ' s institutional system or removing 
institutional constraints for local economic growth (Cheung, 1998b). Since the 1978 reform, 
and especially after the decentralisation of decision-making power to the locality as a sign of 
institutional change, local government has gained greater freedom and authority, by means of 
economic success and financial independence, to adjust central policy to fit local conditions 
and to compensate the region for the unfair treatment it would otherwise receive from 
Beijing. The local economy is thus the focus of local government. The examination of local 
policies will display the orientation, willingness and competence of the local state and the 
exact institutional constraints on the local state in releasing the talents of local state 
authorities for economic growth in the interests of the locality. In this regard, the thesis will 
examine Xinjiang's regional policies and development strategies in terms of sectoral 
development spatial development and will examine the results of the strategies for the local 
economy and environment in order to assess local policies to see whether the local 
government is capable of acting as do their counterparts on the coast. 
1.3 Design of the Research 
Chapter one is the introduction to the thesis and defines the scope of this research and 
explains its significance. 
Chapter two will construct the conceptual framework to form the basic argument of the 
research by introducing the theories of Komai s SBCs North' s institutionalism, and Weber's 
ideal-rational bureaucracy. Through addressing the differences between the coast and inland, 
especially minority regions, in undertaking China's characteristic reform, the chapter will 
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discuss the issues raised by Kornai, North and Weber to test the validation of the theory of 
Chinese Market Preserving Federalism and to question the sustainability of China' s partial 
reform by using a case study of Xinjiang. 
Chapter three will describe how the research was approached and completed with multiple 
approaches in data collection and analysis during fieldwork. The approaches are comprised 
of quantitative and qualitative researches including the analysis of official and unofficial 
statistics, field trips, interviews, participant observation and data archive searching, etc .. The 
outcome of these approaches and an explanation of how the results were analysed are also 
presented in this chapter. 
In chapter four, I will examine the special features of the region in terms of its geographical 
location, ethnic society and ideology and discuss the minority politically autonomous system 
granted to the region in consideration of its differences. The chapter reveals the implications 
of the autonomous system and its practical implementation, especially in relation to the 
country' s unity and political control over the region. Therefore, we will try to address the 
political framework through the practice of the autonomous system granted to the region in 
which all activities oflocal state have been orientated and framed. 
Regional government political administration, structure of the governmental institutions, and 
local leadership will be examined and discussed in chapter five. Chapter six will focus on the 
examination of local government ' s financial behaviour and productivity allocation in terms 
of economic sectoral promotion. Finally, the regional policies made by the local government 
in response to the central strategy and consequently the local economic achievements of the 
reform as a result of policy implementation, will be discussed in chapter seven. These three 
chapters will address the major argument on the test of local government institutional change 
and the resultant bureaucratic role of local government in managing economic self-reliance 
and growth for the region, which will serve to support the main argument of the thesis. 
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Chapter eight contains the conclusions and summarises the significant discoveries of the 
research in this thesis and makes recommendations for solutions that might help with China' s 
partial reform in future. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Review and Debates 
2.1 China's Partial Reform and its Theoretical Implications 
2.1.1 Characteristics of China's Transition 
China' s transformation from the world' s most inward-looking nation to an open, market-
oriented, economic state has been gradual and partial, and its path is criticised by many 
western scholars. This is because, in truth, little has changed in her political institutions, in 
which the communist party has maintained its sole authority intact and continues to dominate 
the country' s political beliefs and economic refonns. This has led to a trajectory rather 
different from the simultaneous transition, namely the "shock therapy", favoured by those 
western scholars and adopted both by the Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries, 
in which there was a rapid economic privatisation and liberalization, accompanied by 
political democratisation (Nolan, 1996, 1999; Rawski, 1994, 1996; Walder, 1995, 1996). 
China's exceptionalism is understood by Lin (1989: p.lOO) to be "a result of a process of 
open-ended reform unique among the central planned economies in which the most 
distinctive aspect of the Chinese reform is that they have proceeded without a detailed reform 
blueprint or coherent theoretical formulation" . Given its huge land and massive population, 
China has been hard to influence from the outside and her understanding of transition is 
based on her perception of her own exceptionalism, resulting from past political struggles, 
economic stagnation and regional geographical variations, with marked socio-cultural 
differences and unbalanced development. The method of trial and error in the reform was 
described by China's chief reformer, Deng Xiaoping (1993): "we are crossing the river on 
stepping stones" and "walking on a path of Chinese style socialism". 
A few features in China s transition will be examined here: 
Firstly in the political sphere (Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1995· Liu, 2001): 
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1. Chinese polity since the refonn has remained largely at a standstill, with a centralised, 
hierarchical governmental regime under the monopoly-control of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), in which political and governmental administrations are intertwined in their 
handling state affairs. For example, the party-state bureaucratic apparatus is integrated into 
the key economic sectors, thereby guiding economic growth largely with the help of market 
regulation to serve political proposes. 
2. The party-state government still makes strong but selective political interventions in order 
to steer and foster economic growth, change the direction and control the pace of economic 
reform and confiscate the property of successful enterprises with force when it is "necessary" 
(Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1995). The phenomenon is best found in the Tiananmen 
Square Incident, which was fundamentally triggered by conflict between reformist radicalism 
and political conservatism among the Chinese elite as to whether a rapid refonn was 
desirable towards the free market and democracy in China (Burns, 1989). Despite the 
existence of such strong party-state government, political control has been much relaxed to 
an extent which commits the political administration to economic growth. Bramall (2000: 
p.415-458) names it an "economic growth promoting state" . Nolan and Ash (1996: p.36) 
comments in their analysis that "the outcome for China was to release the potential 
concealed within the Stalinist system. Meanwhile, the maintenance of an authoritarian 
political system allowed the gradual development of market forces , helped facilitate fiscal 
stability, provided a stable environment for large-scale foreign capital inflows and provided a 
means of intervention in areas of market failure. " 
3. There is no proper commercial law beyond the authority of the party to protect and secure 
the property rights of non-state economic units, to tenninate unlawful wrong-doing by the 
party-state, and to maintain a justified institutional environment for the economic reform 
(Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1995: p.50; Bramall, 2000). Economic success is always 
vulnerable to political predation without the support of a non-political attached, legal system. 
Secondly, in the economic sphere (Walder, 1996; Kornai, 1990, 2000): 
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4. China's economic reform is gradual and flexible, with constant adjustments by a series of 
guiding policies to pursue economic marketization, such as: the correction of distorted prices; 
the opening of domestic markets; fiscal and investment reforms; growth of non-state-owned 
enterprises; the transformation of state-ownership; and periodic reform strategy-making, 
including the Five-Year Plans (FYPs), Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and preferential 
policies for specific regions. Thus China's economy since the reform has gradually become 
one "in which the market and non-state-owned enterprises dominate economic life" (Shirk, 
1993: p.346). Naughton (1994: p.472-3) has said that it is the "the fact that certain economic 
forces and institutional conditions shaped a chaotic and inconsistent set of policies into a 
coherent process, which makes the Chinese reform interesting". In this regard, Lin (1999: 
p.674) remarked that China' s politico-economic system should be categorized as a market-
rational or market regulatory type. 
5. The core economic sectors, dominated by the massive, problematic state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), have remained in the domain of the central state. The existence of SOEs 
not only continues the rigid operation of major productive units and provides incentives for 
soft budget constraints (SBCs) to continue their market failure, but guarantees that the state 
will put their interests above those of the localities in which they are located. This blocks 
market incentives and undermines the release of local initiatives. 
There are heated arguments about the different possible interpretations of China' s refonn 
path in comparison with reforms in the fonner Soviet countries. One of the main arguments 
relates to the deeper question of how far China' s partial refonn could go. 
China's transition is, paradoxically, a process in which economic marketization and 
privatization are not accompanied by parallel political liberalization (Walder, 1996; Rawski, 
1996 and Oi, 1996). In political terms, a lack of commitment to a political democracy could 
kill economic reform, reverse the refonn process and put the economic achievement at the 
mercy of political predation (Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1995: p.50). This point comes 
from North (1990, 1991), who, based on the historical development of European trade in the 
19th century, develops a broad argument known as institutionalisID. He thinks that polity and 
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economy are inextricably linked - Path Dependent - in shaping and fostering a certain 
performance of economy. North states that in European history, in order to gain more 
incentives for trade expanding, economic organizations required the cooperation and 
integration of political institutions to capture the potential benefit for trade. In exchange for 
getting more revenue from trade increasing, the rulers of the state had to provide certain 
services, including decentralizing power and introducing representative bodies for constituent 
groups in order to continue their trades. The representative bodies eventually developed into 
legislative bodies, the origin of parliaments, representing multiple interest groups. And such 
political institutional reform led to the evolution of polities toward democracy. According to 
North, the evolution of the polity is propelled by the needs of productivity development and 
shares in the economic wealth. An appropriate polity will fuel economic productivity along 
an upward path. This is because a properly developed polity not only fosters property rights 
for economic units and protects their profits, reduces transaction costs and so provides 
incentive structures for the best performance of economic units, but also and more 
importantly, the rulers of the state share out the economic bounty and this leads them to 
commit to restructuring the institutional framework and establish a state with a growth-
promoting ideology. 
In democratic governments the rule of law and decentralization of power has allowed citizens 
to hold the government to account for efficient property rights to provide incentives for 
economic growth. Governments, in return for tax revenues, have to establish a proper 
institutional framework to reduce uncertainty for economic activities. The implication is that, 
in fostering economic growth, adjusted political institutions are necessary and a cooperative 
relation between polity and economy must be developed that will result in fostering the 
mobilization of factors of economic success. Incentives are, moreover, the key to propelling 
economic performance and political institutional evolution efficiently (North, 1990; Bramall, 
2000: p.447). 
In particular, in the modem world, considering that democratic governments have to provide 
opportunities for their people to be involved in the decision-making process, there is less 
likelihood that politicians can stifle economic success. According to North and Weingast 
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(1987), there is no guarantee that democracy is best for property rights but it definitely stops 
political arbitration (cited by Bramall, 2000: p.435). In less democratic societies, not all 
parties have equal access to decision-making and the power is concentrated in the hands of a 
few rulers. These rulers are likely always to give preference to their own interests over 
economic growth when institutional development looks unfavourable. So, the efficiency of 
the political environment is a key. More importantly, reducing the political arbitration over 
property rights and ensuring best economic performance can only be guaranteed by a 
democratic society (North, 1990, 1991 ). 
In this sense, China has not provided a polity that could be described by the theory as having 
an institutional framework to ensure the continuation of economic growth and enable 
economic liberalisation to be completed. Indeed, the party continually practices a form of 
political domination that is unfriendly to private ownership and the market mechanism 
(Komai, 2000; but see Guthrie, 1999, 2006). 
In the economic respect, Kornai (1980, 1986, 1989, 1990, 2000a and 2000b), Komai, Maskin 
and Roland (2002) establishes the theory of SBCs to explain the economic failure of socialist 
system. He thinks that the domination of politics over economic performance and the 
existence of state ownership will always be an excuse for letting SBCs occur for political 
trade-off to bail public economic organisations out of their problems. Because of this, the 
organisations invariably increase their dependence on state protection and therefore lose any 
initiative to make their own efforts to compete in a free market. In order to save face for its 
"bad" investments, the state lets SBCs take place continually, eventually resulting in 
investment waste and resource shortages, which leads to the collapse of entire economies. 
Komai ' s (1986, 1989) works came from the failure of Hungary' s early reform that "market 
reform in a socialist economy creates new problems (such as inflation and liquidity crises) 
without curing the underlying defect of central planning".! 
In this regard, Komai (1990: p.133) argued against the idea of market socialism and 
considers the partial reform is a process "without a justified blueprint". He stresses that "a 
I Wong, 1986a, cited by Walder, 1995: p.5 . 
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gradual reform of public ownership simply cannot work, not even as a transitional strategy" . 
For him, the relationships between state-ownership and market coordination, and between 
private ownership and bureaucratic coordination, can be characterized as weak linkages. The 
state ownership will protect the SOEs against "economic natural selection" and provide 
incentives for the enterprises to withdraw from market competitions, which leave 
marketization incomplete. In this incomplete marketization, the competition is always not 
fair to private ownership, which is always vulnerable in political arbitration. The two 
components can't prosper simultaneously because of their incompatibility. Therefore there is 
no alternative to making a choice between the two forms of ownership: private or state. 
China's economic success started with a partial removal of rigid economic institutional 
constraints from agriculture, stimulating marketization and commercialization in the rural 
economy. This was symbolized by the development of non-or semi-state-economic sectors. 
For example, some of them are apparently in the form of township and village enterprises 
(TVEs), which have capitalist characteristics in terms of ownership defined as collective or 
non-state ' s ownership which provides no incentives for SBC taking place. This effectively 
improves the efficiency of operation of these economic units. The success of TVEs propels 
reforms in terms of the semi-privatization and marketization ofmarginalized sectors of 
industry, largely in the state' s ownership, which eventually embark on an overall economic 
growth specifically in the areas with large TVE economies, for example, China' s coastal 
regions (Wei and Fan, 2000; Wei, 2000a and b). Rawski (1996: p.194) commented that the 
Chinese reform's characteristics were viewed as: "the decentralized nature of Chinese 
economic planning, the pre-reform growth of rural industry, the dispersion of large scale 
manufacturing facilities, and the availability of commercial information, technical knowledge 
and funds from overseas Chinese communities - in propelling a virtuous circle of 
institutional change, market competition, financial pressure, innovation and further 
incremental reform." 
However, state ownership still dominates the large and key economic sectors, such as the 
strategic resource industries, which are well protected by the socialist system. Importantly, 
the remaining large bulk of SOEs is always presented as problematic, with rigidly inefficient 
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operations, large state investment and a shortage of market competitive incentives. They are 
a cause of continuing SBCs, which are hindering overall China's transition to a free market 
economy, and which result in a series of problems seen as threats to macroeconomic stability, 
including investment shortages, inflation, bureaucracy, bankruptcies and massive layoffs in 
the SOEs, and increases in social crime (Wong, 1986a). All have been predicted by Kornai 
(1980, 1986, 1989, 2000a and 2000b). Heated debates on the reform of SOEs, specifically 
with regard to property rights, focus on the need for the reform of ownership and for change 
in the political institutions, and some Chinese scholars also suggest that separation of 
political administration and economic institutions would be a solution to the inefficiency of 
SOEs (Lin, Cai and Li, 1999). Moreover, with regards to the less developed regions, in 
which, coincidently, regional economies have been dominated by SOEs as the legacy of 
Mao 's planning economy, their regional economies have been largely at a standstill since the 
reform, thus exacerbating the unequal nature of development across the country. With 
China's economy becoming more and more market-orientated, in order to possess a capacity 
to improve the regional economy and reduce the poverty and unbalanced development, the 
need has become pressing for an appropriate ownership transition of the SOEs and a 
clarification of property rights in order to provide incentives for regional economic 
improvement. 
Unlike those former communist Eastern European countries in which the reforms are 
staggering under the weight of economic recessions and political unrest, China has achieved 
a steady economic growth, with one of the strongest increasing rates ofGDP in the world and 
an economic transition without much political friction or social cost. In the view of Naught on 
(1995: p.16-23), a "big bang transition inevitably involves large short-run adjustment costs, 
generally including discontinuous changes in the price system and sharp increases in 
maintain both inflation and open urban unemployment within fairly narrow limits ... The 
Chinese have acted as if minimizing short-run adjustment costs at the expense of prolonging 
the overall adjustment process were an important argument in the overall transition strategy". 
Before taking a new step toward the profound reform of its fiscal system and state enterprise 
ownership in 1994, which is a difficult task supposed to have been undertaken twenty years 
earlier, China had already seen her economy struggle, in particular in SOE-dominated 
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regions and economic sectors2• Specifically, many inland regions whose economies are 
dominated by traditional resource industries headed by SOEs with their inefficient operation 
and problematic performance, as a result, face severe economic recession. The result is 
marked uneven development between China's coast and inland. This unbalanced 
development further brings social unrest and national insecurity, a big concern for the central 
state. 
Despite China' s survival of the turbulence of 1989 and other upheavals, and despite her 
transition being praised nationally and internationally, the central state still has to respond to 
and fi nd a promising way to tackle all of those problems and to alleviate hardship in order to 
carry out a profound transition. As said in the statement that "China' s socialist character will 
not be changed in fifty years ' time."(Deng Xiaoping, 1993d), it seems unclear in which 
direction the country' s politics will eventually head. In a sense, due to the political 
institutions being rigid (this point contested by Guthrie, 1999, 2006), the economic 
institutions, based on ownership still under political arbitration, cannot be adjusted for any a 
further economic liberalization. Therefore the phenomena of Kornai ' s SBCs and North' s 
institutional inefficiency will be continually present, resulting in economic inefficiency and 
unbalanced development - a great challenge to the success of China' s reform. 
So, Kornai argues that to reduce the discussion to a choice between "gradualism" and "shock 
therapy" is wrong. The real decision is less about the speed of reform than the path of reform. 
"The transition from socialism to capitalism has to be an organic development. It 
cannot be done otherwise. It is a curious amalgam of revolution and evolution. It is 
a trial-and-error process, which retains or liquidates old institutions, and tries out, 
accepts or rejects new ones. Each element in the process might be very rapid, fairly 
rapid or slow. Each has its own appropriate speed. Some episodes call for a one-
stroke intervention. Many other processes advance by incremental changes" 
(Komai, 2000a: p.64). 
2 The economic sectors here refer to those operated under the state ownership but marginalized by the state 's 
investment and development plans. 
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2.1.2 Major Theories Challenging China's Partial Reform 
2.1.2.1 Kornai' s Theory of SBC 
The SBC theory was originally developed from a study of the failure of Hungarian economic 
reform. Janos Kornai (1980, 1992); Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2002) observed the SBC 
phenomenon in the Hungarian transition of the 1970s, an experiment of introducing market 
economy into a socialist system, resulting in the kind of basic problems confronted by 
transitional economies, for instance shortages and inefficient investment, which in his view 
explains the failure of economic reform that is unaccompanied by parallel political 
liberalization. From observation, Kornai recognized that, as the fundamental feature of a 
centralized economy is the dominance of the state sector, there is a major problem in socialist 
transitional economies in the lack of financial discipline of investment in the state sector. 
This lack of discipline derives from the unenforceability of bankruptcy threats together with 
various subsidies, credits, and price-supports, implying that state firms can always count on a 
bailout by the state even after suffering serious financial deficits. 
Based on Kornai's description, I will briefly explain, firstly, how the SBC theory interprets 
the failure of economic development under a socialist system. Suppose there is a state-owned 
enterprise which generally has a budget constraint (BC) to confine its expenditure that is set 
by its initial endowment and revenue. If it makes a loss and the deficit persists, it cannot 
survive unless financial support is given by a supporting organization (S-organization) to 
cover the deficit and continually sustain its activities. The motives of the BC-organizations 
seeking rescue can be explained as a lack of strict budgetary control along with a shortage of 
profitable assets. Here are some of the most typical reasons to explain why the S-
organization would like to help out a problematic BC organization: 
• continuing support in order to recoup past investments (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995); 
• paternalism ( Kornai, 1980); 
• reputational concerns from the high level to prevent financial failure (Bai and Wang, 
1996); 
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• avoidance of an economic spillover effect and dishonest relationships between S and BC 
organizations (Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2002). 
The SBC phenomenon has a broad application to, as Kornai has summarized, enterprises 
under state ownership; banks and other financial intermediaries relying on the support from 
the state; not-for-profit organizations, such as hospitals, schools and universities; indebted or 
insolvent local government authorities; and, finally, international organizations. In most 
socialist countries a supporting role is played by the state and its financial organs, with the 
intention of bailing enterprises out of crises, in order to allow them to continue operating. 
Besides profitability, the objects of government's bailout of financial deficit enterprises 
include the continued supplies of scarce inputs to other enterprises; the maintenance of full 
employment; the funding of pensions and medical insurance; and the provision of housing 
and social services. The means of bailout include subsidies from the state budget or tax 
concessions, and credit, such as loans, etc .. 
After Kornai's (1980) identification of the SBC syndrome in socialist economies, there was 
an assumption by him that the role of the S-organization is usually played by the central 
state. The central state financially sponsors its state enterprises to run economic programmes. 
Owing to obvious political considerations besides profitability, the state has continually to 
provide financial support to its own enterprises, driven largely by paternalism, in order to 
keep the programme operating, even though there is indeed a loss produced by the operating 
units. This is due to "the desire of a paternalistic state to avoid socially and politically costly 
layoffs" and to avoid the economic spillover effect, and so on (Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 
2002: p.21-22). Without a strong bankruptcy threat, those state enterprises are hard to 
discipline in their performance, especially with regard to finance, thereby resulting in low 
efficiency of economic management and social shortages across the nation. 
Kornai emphasizes less the causes than the consequences of SBCs. These include chronic 
shortages, due to the misallocation of resources, delays in project completion, queuing, 
hoarding, rent-seeking, etc and the failure of innovation. Qian (1994: p.146), by developing 
the model of Dewatripont and Maskin (1990), argues that shortages are a phenomenon 
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peculiar to socialist economies, because state firms expect to receive continual funding to 
maintain bad projects (again the SBC problem), and so resource allocation has to move funds 
from household consumption to the inputs of firms. Therefore, by means of increasing 
market prices, social welfare is reduced and shortages are created as an "equilibrium 
phenomenon". In the long run, this affects the whole progress of social development and 
results in a collapse of the social economy. China's economy in the pre-reform period 
displayed a good sample of such social shortages affected by SBCs. 
Komai, Maskin and Roland (2002: p.l3) also discuss the consequences of SBCs on 
enterprises: "an influence over the life and death" of enterprises and thus "over economic 
natural selection". In general the survival of an enterprise depends on its adjustment to 
market selection, as described as Schumpeter's (1911) theory of creative destruction, but, due 
to the intervention of S-organizations during the financial deficit occurring to SBC-
organizations, the process of market determined destruction of troubled enterprises, which 
would otherwise collapse under hard budget constraints, is averted. Therefore, as a result, the 
SBC directly reshapes the expectation and behaviour of SBC-organizations: providing some 
managerial slack to actors. When there is no restriction to the reduction of costs, a SBC-
organization is unlikely to make efforts to maximize profits, improve managerial effort, and 
technologically innovate. All of this reduces the efficiency of organizations affected by 
SBCs. "Soft budget constraints directly influence the efficiency of the state sector through 
their effort on the expectation of state-firm managers" (Maskin and Xu, 2001: p.2). 
The SBC also contributes to the explanation of persisting problems in transitional economies 
where political liberalization is determined by the top elites of the state. In Kornai' s work, he 
has suggested an incompatibility between an efficient market economy and state ownership 
because firms are not incentivized to pursue hardening BCs. In order to apply the HBCs to 
firms, there is a need to transform the ownership of the fmns from public to private, that is to 
say, there needs to be a revolution in the social system, instead of weak "market socialism". 
Only by doing so can firms cut off government intervention in their operations and operate in 
a purely independent environment (Komai, 1990). Market socialism doesn't go so far, as its 
inconsistency and bureaucracy hinder efficiency and competition. Kornai (1990: p.133), 
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commenting on the variation of economic transformations under socialism, pointed to "whole 
societies proceeded to cross the deep water without accurate knowledge (a blueprint) about 
the final destination by a process of moving from one stone to another" and "the weakness 
and inner inconsistency of market socialism reject itself to be the ideal." Ten years later 
(Komai, 2000a) he continued to criticize market socialism and advocated the necessity of the 
transformation of socialism to capitalism and specifically the transformation of ownership, 
namely by privatization. 
2.1.2.2 North's Theory of Institutionalism 
North's (1990, 1991) institutional ism examines the nature of institutions and the 
consequences of institutional change for economic or social performance. His argument starts 
from the definition of institutions and organisations such as: institutions are constraints 
shaping human behaviour and organisations are a group of people bonding together for a 
special purpose, which includes all types of social organizations like political parties, 
government, business firms, etc .. Institutions construct constraints including informal rules 
(customs, traditions) and formal rules (laws, property rights) to human interaction. North 
then further examines the efforts - transaction costs - that are the consequence of the 
institutional framework and the consequence of the organisation in constructing that 
framework. More specifically, he tries to reveal the difference between organisations and 
institutions and the interaction between these two in shaping institutional change. The 
institutional role is to reduce uncertainty by providing an efficient structure in which people 
can capture the expected results. Institutional change thus comes from the relationship 
between these two regimes that ' 'have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure 
provided by those institutions and the feedback process by which human being perceive and 
react to change in the opportunity set" (North, 1990: p.7). 
In respect of economic activities, the profit-maximising and bargaining behaviours could 
drive economic organisations to use the polity to provide efficient institutional frameworks to 
enhance productivity, which in return changes the means of acquiring productivity that 
propels institutional changes to maintain that productivity. But institutions may also push 
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economic organisations to devote their effort to unproductive activity, for example: fiscal 
crises, asset confiscation, and lead to the failure of economic performances. Therefore, North 
exploits institutionalism to explain that the performance of the economy is differentiated by 
the role of institutions in cooperatively constructing an efficient institutional framework to 
capture wealth from economic activities. Economic performance thus is determined by the 
efforts made by institutions on the costs of transactions and production. Political constraints 
determine economic constraints, seen as property rights and human contracts, which are 
specified and enforced by political decision-making. Efficient property rights result in low 
costs of political transactions and the guided action of actors to maintain efficiency. Efficient 
property rights encourage successful economic performance: individuals capture rights and 
devote their resources to this capture. Here political efficiency is especially emphasized and 
presented as, firstly, the polity will reduce institutional constraints to let economic actors 
make the best choices and possess useful information; secondly, political parties have to have 
equal access to information and have the correct model to guide their decisions. If not, 
monopolies will direct decision-making toward the profitability of one particular party which 
has privileged access to information. So, property rights need to be monitored by a third-
party, the legal system. According to North (1990: p.129), "the shackling of arbitrary 
behaviour of rulers and development of impersonal rules that successfully bound both the 
state and voluntary organisations were a key part of this institutional transformation". This 
legal system or institutionalised regulation will be sufficient to stop the state' s predation, for 
example the confiscation of assets or tax revenue extracted by the use of "coercive power". 
In politically centralised countries, enterprises can never be certain that their economic 
success will be secured from "politically arbitrary" actions and protected against "powerful 
rights" at the "margin of the law" and at the "mercy of authority" (Coatsworth, 1978: p.94-
99). 
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2.2 The Theory of Market Preserving Federalism Chinese Style in 
Explaining the Success in China's Partial Reform 
2.2.1 The Theory of Market Preserving Federalism Chinese Style 
Further to North' s theories on political predation and Kornai ' s on SBCs, Montinola, Qian 
and Weingast (1995); Cao, Qian and Weingast (1999) have developed their own explanation 
of China' s success with the partial reform. Qian and Weingast (1996) think it is due to the 
decentralization of economy in terms of decision-making and institutions, that is processed 
with the gradual reform of political institution propelled by the economic decentralization. 
On examining China 's reform, Qian and his fellow researchers state that, in order to manage 
economic growth, Beijing has gradually removed certain political institutional constraints 
and formed a new structure of governance within the centralized party-state regime to 
accompany economic reform. In this regard, to some extent China' s reform is considered not 
as an example of Path Independence but of Path Dependence, which appeals to the 
description of North ' s institutional corporatism (Oi, 1995). Qian asserts that essentially it is 
the CCP that has made a commitment to economic growth, thereby modifying traditional 
Maoism' s emphasis on political priority over the economy and removing all possible 
institutional constraints in order to meet her promise. In the words of Nortb (1990: p.lIO), 
"Ideas and ideologies shape the subjective mental constructs that individuals use to interpret 
the world around them and make choices," and it is this commitment that has provided an 
ideological foundation to limit political intervention and guarantee the decentralization that 
secures Chinese economic marketization. This can be viewed in Deng' s (1993) famous 
words: "How good a cat is does not depend on whether is white or black, but on whether it 
can catch mice", which implies that China is determined to pursue economic growth, so any 
possibility will be considered even if it does not live up to the purity of socialist ideology. 
China' s partial reform started from authorizing economic power in terms of decision-making 
in financial freedom and allocation of national resources to local government, which 
transforms the local government into major economic units to lead regional economies. This 
was seen by some as a kind of economic federalism (Goldstein, 1996) and specifically 
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regarding market preserving federalism Chinese-style by Montinola, Qian and Weingast 
(1995). Firstly, federalism is in general a political institution involving local and central 
governments in decision-making. However, China's polity has not yet reached the stage of 
political federalism in principle. But her economy in the reform, during which local and 
especially provincial governments became involved in decision-making and were granted 
liberties in financial management and resource distribution, fonned a de facto Economic 
Federalism: one of three principles of federalism of lnman and Rubinfeld (1997). According 
to Jnman and Rubinfeld (1997: p.45) "the principle of economic federalism prefers the most 
decentralized structure of government capable of internalizing all economic externalities, 
subject to the constitutional constraints that all central policies be decided by an elected or 
appointed 'central planning"'. Oates 's (1972) classic Fiscal Federalism "provides the most 
complete description of economic federalism" in considering local and central government 
being assigned responsibilities for their own domains, and China's economic 
decentralization, through a series of fiscal reforms to authorize local government, meets its 
basic criteria. 
Secondly, the Chinese economic federal system has its own character. To understand the 
economic function of federalism, we need to understand 'market-preserving federalism' , 
which is rooted in the second generation of federalism theories. Federalism builds on a 
certain degree of decentralization. According to the discussion of Montinola, Qian and 
Weingast (1995); Qian and Weingast (1996); Cao, Qian and Weingast (1999), there are four 
types of decentralization: complete centralization, administrative delegation without 
authority, decentralization with authority: federalism and complete decentralization. In 
between the two extreme types of decentralization: complete centralization and complete 
decentralization, there are two types with the differences in the degree of decentralization. 
Administrative delegation without authority represents decentralization to the locality with 
authority on implementing policies and administrating tasks but no authority on policy-
making. There is indeed no virtual autonomy but delegation for the locality. It is unlike 
complete decentralization in which the central government is a form of administrative 
organization without any power. Decentralization with authority: federalism represents 
systems sharing authority among different levels of government. There is no fixed one but 
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various systems based on certain political and economic arrangements (Qian and Weingast, 
1996). 
The central arguments in federalism concern the achievement of economic efficiency. In this 
regard, local factors such as information can be best utilized by local actors, such as local 
authorities, to provide better service and goods than the central authority (Hayek, 1945) and 
the jurisdictional competition that drives the local actor to "better match goods and services 
with customer's needs" (Tibebout, 1956: p.422; Oates, 1972). However, the first generation 
of economic theory of federalism ignored the incentives to shape the type of governance 
required by economic performance and to drive government to provide public services and 
preserve the market. The government itself can be an obstacle in particular to economic 
wealth if there is no incentive to monitor its behaviour and to force it to make a commitment 
to preserve market competition. The mechanisms developed by decentralization, including 
the rule of law and horizontal power shared by different parties, are not enough (Montinola, 
Qian and Weingast, 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1999). The second generation of federalism 
emphasizes the governance structures of the state, which can provide incentives for an 
effective state in terms of efficient policies (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997). More particularly, 
the second generation of federalism tries to find out "the certain type of decentralization and 
federalism" which can provide government with better incentives to support market 
development and secure economic prosperity (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997; lin, Qian, and 
Weingast, 2005: p.1720). The incentives are seen mainly as decentralizing certain powers 
down to the local government that could provide privileges to the local government to have 
authority over the local economy that therefore preserve market competition. Competition 
among jurisdictions drives local government not only to make a commitment to secure 
property rights, preserve markets, share local interests and act against the central 
interventions but also to discipline their financial behaviour. In this regard, it is called 
"market preserving federalism"(Qian and Weingast, 1997). 
On examining the system of market reserving federalism, there are some important features 
involved (Qian and Weingast, 1996; 1997): 
1) A hierarchical government with a decentralized authority to all levels of government. 
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2) Local government has authority over the local economy. 
3) The central government has power to control the common market and ensure the free 
flow of goods and capital among regions. 
4) A financial system that forces both central and local governments to face hard budget 
constraints. 
5) The decentralization of authority and responsibility has been institutionalized with the 
certain arrangement between central and local governments so that it won't be subject 
to anyone of two regimes. 
Using defined criteria, Qian and Weingast (1997) have examined federal systems in several 
countries to see if they fall into the category of market preserving federalism. On 
examination, Brazil, India and the former Soviet countries to a large extent fail to meet the 
second and fifth criteria. Their case studies imply that "the political discretion and authority 
retained by the central government in their systems greatly compromises their market-
preserving qualities" (Qian and Weingast, 1997: p.85). There is no structure in their system 
to allow the local state to be a "helping hand" in economic performance and to allow market 
preserving federalism. Although China has a totally different political system from these 
three countries and decentralization without horizontal power divisions, nevertheless her 
decentralization, according to Qian and Weingast (1996, 1997), provides arguable evidence 
of a market preserving federalism in a Chinese style. 
Montinola, Qian and Weingast (1995); Qian and Weingast (1996); Cao, Qian and Weingast 
(1999) argue that the decentralization in China's reform in terms of information and power 
from the central state to locality is achieved through a vertical instead of horizontal 
decentralization by passing on a considerable degree of decision-making power down to the 
sub-national level of the hierarchy and ignoring the request for power to be shared by several 
parties. This fully meets the second criterion, though the horizontal decentralization is absent. 
Chinese vertical decentralization without horizontal decentralization is especially precious, 
because the government rejected the other alternatives to reduce their political discretion due 
to high political transaction costs. In this regard, China's case should be understood as an 
internal institutional restructuring within the Chinese party-state regime without necessarily 
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mvolving an overall political reconstruction. This not only reduces the transaction cost but 
also creates mechanisms to eliminate the problems noted by North and Komai by providing a 
representative middle agent - local government - from inside the ruling regime to work for 
the outside against the regime itself and to promise economic reform. This, combined with 
the traditional Chinese administrative hierarchy, typically meets the ftrst criterion, and 
political domination of the economy meets half of the third criterion, in which government is 
able to control the common market but there has not yet been a free flow of goods and 
capitals across all regions. The restructuring political institution replaces some actors in 
economic performance from purely economic entrepreneurs in the conventional debates with 
politicians. Those politicians have to work on both areas. The new arrangements between 
local and central governments on their respective shares of tax responsibilities and revenues, 
along with the restructuring of resource allocation and enterprise ownership and the 
increasing use of economic growth as a criterion for the promotion of government personnel, 
together provide a mechanism for change in local government, which will increasingly 
become an agent representing its region, an entrepreneur responsible for the regional 
economy and for policy choices, and a representative of the state committed to competition 
and marketization. The negotiation and deals between the local and the central states over 
ftnancial arrangements and the apportionment of property rights in their separate domains 
provide mechanisms both to limit state predation and harden the budget constraints for both 
the centre and the localities, though such arrangements have not been institutionalized and 
therefore represent only a partial reform of China, as we have discussed before (Qian and 
Weingast, 1996). This indicates that half of the fourth and ftfth criteria have been met. 
In this regard, the reform is primarily characterized as market reserving federalism in a 
Chinese style. Central to this system is the "political durability of the built-in arrangement" 
between central and local governments about the degree of decentralization of decision-
making. Montinola, Qian and Weingast (1995); Qian and Weingast (1996, 1997); Cao, Qian 
and Weingast (1999) argue that, with the completion of Chinese-style federalism, economic 
reform is able to continue and success can be secured in this centralized, non-liberalized 
polity by building a new incentive structure and exploiting local government as an instrument 
for overcoming the political and economic institutional constraints within the political 
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regime, seen largely as problems of North's political predation and Kornai ' s SBCs. To some 
extent, this reform strategy provides an effective political environment in terms of 
ideological development and adjustable institutions for economic growth, and it guarantees 
the continuation of economic transition in China case without bringing high transaction costs 
and what might otherwise be thought to be the necessary political democracy (Goldstein, 
1996; Qian and Weingast, 1996; 1997). 
Instead of the conventional concern about the relationship between the centre and local 
enterprises during decentralization, Chinese federalism lays more emphasis on the 
relationship between the central and local governments and on the organizational 
development of local government. In the Chinese case, reform to date has enhanced the 
autonomous power of local government, redefined the politico-economic administrative 
responsibilities of local government, reshaped the relations of central and local governments, 
and invited the participation of each locality through its local government as bargainers with 
the centre over decision-making. The central state also uses this middle agent powerfully to 
guide economic performance and shows no sign of a willingness to lose power in its control 
of the common market, the locality and local government through its hierarchy of political 
administration. According to Brarnall (2000: p.470), "the lesson from transition-era China is 
rather that selective interventionism can work - but only if the state is 'strong' . If the state is 
weak, then an interventionist strategy is bound to fail because the state will be captured by a 
series of rent-seeking coalitions pursuing their own interests, rather than the goal of growth 
promotion." Similarly, Oi (1995: p.1147) said that "China's experience suggests that one 
should disaggregate the ' state' into its component parts to distinguish between levels of 
government and the incentives for different levels to perform. There is a need for strong state 
capacity .. . at both the local and the central levels". Montinola, Qian and Weingast (1995); 
Cao, Qian and Weingast (1999) nuanced account suggests that consideration of China' s 
partial reform might help to break through the boundary of conventional debates on politico-
economic decentralization and transition, and provide a new theoretical framework. 
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2.2.2 Reviewing China's Transition to Test the Theory of Chinese Style Federalism and 
its Impact on the Evolution of Role of the Provincial Government 
2.2.2.1 The Path of Chinese Partial Reform 
In Mao's era, the CCP and the government comprised intertwined but not identical 
organisations, both operating in the centralised and hierarchical government administrative 
bureaucracy and having interactive determination in their respective sub-units (Figure 2.1) 
(Schurmann, 1966; Unger and Chan, 1995; Liu, 2001). Within its decision framework-
centre, province, locality to the territorial organisations: school, factory and village commune 
- the CCP and its officials, headed by the General Secretary (GS), were always dominant and 
acted as the chief executive officers, especially relative to those without party membership 
(Oi, 1995). Through this Party-state network, the party controls society by utilising the levers 
of government (Schurmann, 1966). The State Council (SC) (Figure 2.1), the equivalent of the 
Cabinet in many countries, has the same rank as the CCP's Political Bureau and Standing 
Committee, is responsive only to the chief party GSs and facilitates the CCP's control over 
the country' s economy. The SC, headed by the Prime Minister and comprised of the various 
ministries and commissions handling their specific economic and cultural affairs and 
planning, could possibly operate on the bottom line units through the vertical departmental 
network. " In studies of existing socialism, a socialist state has long been characterized by the 
predominance of the state bureaucracy over both the appropriation and distribution of 
economic surplus, as well as over the society as a whole. Many scholars would not hesitate to 
call this totalitarian" (Brus, 1975: p.21-30). As a result, local government at all levels from 
macro-region to the province, from sub-province to the town, had little to say on economic 
activities within their administrative territory (Breth, 1978; Zbao and Kwan, 1995 cited by 
Li, 2000: p.169). The conflict between "lines" (tiaotiao) and "area" (kuangkuang) was 
suppressed by giving priority to the national strategy at the expense of local interests 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Li, 2000: p.169). With SOEs, though local government 
played a less influential role in their production, housing and land renting, water and 
electricity supplies, and other facilities provided by the localities, certain responsibilities 
have been devolved from their respective ministries to the local level and this has entitled 
local governments to maintain a certain supervision of these enterprises. Although the 
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centreflocality conflict has frequently been commented on as the cause of inefficient and 
problematic SOEs, this is due rather to their operation under too many administrative 
supervisors (Huang, 1996: p.656). The analysis above indicates that the rigid framework of 
the Chinese party-state centralised polity has, in its political framework the economic 
performance, been subject to, and badly affected by, political discretion. 
Figure 2.1 The State Structure of the People's Republic of China 
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The Chinese government's institutional role is always characterised as an agency integrated 
by economic management and political administration (Yan, 1999). Owing alternatively to 
3 Existed between 1949-1981 , after 1981 , the GS was only the top leader of the CCP. 
4 On most occasions the Chainnan of the Military Commission, President of the PRC and GS of the CCP were 
taken by one person. 
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the lack of or restrictions on any type of non-government organisations (NGOs) being 
established in China, their absence, especially at the grass root level of the locality, has 
enhanced the domination of the multi-institutional functions of local government (Yan, 
1999). However, in a SOE-dominated industrial economy, in the absence of local 
government in decisions on property rights, fiscal control and resource distribution, its role 
was largely confined to agriculture and alternatively to the less influential locality-based 
manufacturing and service sectors. In such a framework, local governments could be seen by 
and large as the transmitters and political administrators of central state policy. Local 
governments have regarded their locality-based enterprises as one component of their 
corporate-like political bureaucracy. The limited economic role of local government was 
further undermined by the close supervision of the central state through the centralised 
planning and fiscal systems. Furthermore, the rigid, inefficient commune system in 
agriculture before 1978 concealed productive elements and left no incentives to peasants and 
no effective mechanisms could be applied by the local government to reinforce their 
economic role. Moreover, in securing their cadre career, on most occasions local officials 
remained silent having seen Deng Xiaoping, the vice prime minister in 1972-76, prosecuted 
for trying to overthrow the commune system against the politically received wisdom. In 
short, China' s centralised politico-economic system and decision-making mechanics 
restricted the dynamic economic role oflocal government in Mao' s era when it was regarded 
as little more than an administrative delegate with limited authority. 
After Mao ' s death, the Chinese realized his failure in managing economic growth, and this 
alerted the new government regime under Deng Xiaoping' s leadership that the continuation 
of this failure would jeopardize the authority of the CCP and so generate political as well as 
social instability. Lessons from the past, the influence of Western theories, and inspiration by 
the economic successes of neighbouring East Asian countries led Deng' s regime to a "more 
flexible and realistic" approach towards economic transition (Fan, 1997; Lin, 1999). 
China' s economic transition is summarized by Wei (2000b: p.24), as a tripartite process of 
decentralization, marketization and globalization. The transition emphasized efficiency 
instead of self-reliance and a clearly efficiency-orientated economy has to rely on market 
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forces in order to compete (Yang, 1997). Goodman (1989: p.21) argues that decentralization 
in China seems desirable because of the failure of the centralized command economic system 
and because of her size and ethnic mix. China' s regional variety can be handled most 
efficiently by the locality appealing to the idea of Hayek (1945). At the outset, the reformists 
adopted a strategy of decentralizing economic control initially for agriculture by re-
introducing marketization. The three thoughts behind this strategy were, first, that if the rural 
reform failed, the CCP would suffer a minor loss economically and politically as the urban-
based industrial sectors were more important in Mao ' s economy (Oi, 1995); second, the rural 
economies in China' s broad countryside had been on the periphery of the politico-economic 
administration and were partly rural-fair-based and always commercially active even in the 
Maoist planning era (Shirk, 2000; Wei, 2003); third, starting with a fundamental reform of 
the vast population-intensive agricultural sector, which was the legacy of Mao 's revolutionS, 
could at least solve the urgent need for daily goods supply and improve the basic living 
standard of consumers, who were still experiencing material shortages ten years after the 
Cultural Revolution (Naughton, 1994). The most important implication of the strategy of the 
early phase of Chinese decentralization was that economic liberalization would not be limited 
by political sensitivity, which laid crucial ground for the later stages of the reform. 
Despite the debates, as argued by Bramall (2000), that agricultural success in the post-Mao 
era was attributed to a series of actions taken by the state, such as team farming, the 
relaxation of procurement quotas and improvements in modem agricultural technologies, 
etc. , there are many other scholars who still think that decollectivization was fundamental in 
connection with China' s promotion of efficiency (Lin, 1992). Fanners received considerable 
decision-making power and became responsible for their own activities, and towns and 
villages could produce goods and diversify production according to market demand (Chow, 
2001). This was an initial shift of autonomy gradually from the centre to the locality and 
from respective economic ministries to the enterprises6. 
5 Mao ' s communist revolution started from the countryside, where the political administration was weak. 
6 The Bright Daily (CCP' s Newspaper): Oct. 4. 1981 , cited by Solinger (1993). 
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When the reform was launched, the decision-making power in farm production and in the 
rural-based industries returned to local government through the reintroduction of market 
regulation of the rural economy and the replacement of the commune system with "contract 
responsibility systems", which not only released productivity but also required the local 
government intervention to channel local talent toward production growth in a semi-market 
economy. It is in particular in the lighter resource industries and less SOE dominated regions 
that local government was able to play an economic role more than simply a political 
administrator and to act as a real economic agent. The rural enterprises at the state's 
administrative periphery provided a "system-grey zone" for local governments to reestablish 
their economic authority. It is said by Huang (1994) that Chinese local states have resources, 
techniques and organization, that were lacking in the Soviet reform, to take and enlarge the 
opportunities of the decentralization. 
On the frontline, the village GS was the first to receive decision-making power and 
responsibility for the whole community's economic activities. According to the new 
responsibility system, the land remained in the hands of the state but the ownership for 
production and marketing by local farms and farming-based-collective industries was passed 
on to the local authorities. Thus the village GS was not simply the leader of the party but also 
the manager of village farming business in handling day-to-day production. This is termed by 
Oi (1995: p.1132) as 'local state corporatism' and seen as evidence for North' s (1990: p.107) 
institution: "the underlying determination of the long-run performance of economy". After 
handing in the required quotas to the state, in contrast to the past when they had to remit most 
income, the village was now allowed to retain any surplus income, which inevitably 
stimulated the peasants, including the GS and other leaders, to seek more incentives, such as 
bonuses, increasing income and other perks. This "sharing economic wealth" and the 
consequent incentives (North, 1990) bound the cadres themselves to economic improvement 
and drove them to optimize their economic management and remove as much bureaucracy as 
possible, an initial form of hardening of Komai's SBCs. Apart from these lucrative 
incentives, the cadres' capability in managing economic growth could be also rewarded by 
the possibility of promotion, whereas the Maoist bureaucratic legacy had been to select 
higher level cadres from the grassroots level by judging how they expressed their political 
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attitude and responded to a new policy (Oi, 1995; Edin, 2003). The principal criteria of 
promotion in the Post-Mao era were reformulated and applied to all departments, units and 
regions: political integrity (de), competence (neng), diligence (qing), and achievement Vi). 
Within the four criteria, work achievement accounts for 60-70 per cent and this now refers 
mostly to the economic improvement by the local officials instead of their political 
expression (Edin, 2003: p.37). A good example is Mr. Zhao Ziyang, who won his promotion 
and moved to the SC in 1980 after he, as the governor of Sichuan province, had bravely 
experimented with a contract system in local rural economies, thereby improving the local 
economy of this agriculture-based province (Goodman, 1994: p.14). According to Oi (1995: 
p.ll33): "for China the issue was not whether its bureaucracy was capable of generating 
economic growth but whether it had the incentive to do so." These redoubled incentives have 
improved the performance of local government and forced local government and their leaders 
to be both economic entrepreneurs and political agents, who, for the sake of the locality, 
bargain with the central government for further institutional relaxation, which has also 
influenced the behaviour of the higher levels of government (Edin, 2003). 
Along with farming agricultural improvements, the rural economy was upgraded to profitable 
industrialized and commercialized levels, thereby stimulating the growth of rural industrial 
enterprises and leading to remarkably differentiated economic growth rates among the 30 
regions and contributing to China' s reform distinguished from other countries. From two 
dimensions we can discuss the implications of the rapid rise of rural enterprise in China's 
reform. Firstly it lays a ground that could smoothly usher in an economic transition in terms 
of ownership privatization, economic marketization and operation efficiency into the 
industrial sector, the nation' s economic core. China' s rural enterprise is a different and mixed 
organizational form - "midway along an evolutionary continuum from state to private 
ownership" (Walder, 1995: p.264). It provides an institutionally ambiguous and a policy-
unclear, alternative ownership in socialist China, in which property is not completely within 
the socialism system nor wholly in private control. This makes the hardening of budget 
constraints and marketization operation of enterprises more efficiently and much easily 
applied. Many enterprises involved in the agricultural sector have been in the hands of 
private or semi-private and collective owners since Mao's era. With the nature of profit-
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seeking and semi-private ownership that terminated the state's bailout, few among these 
enterprises operated under SBCs, especially after the reform. Walder (1995), Kwong and Lee 
(2000) argue that Komai's SBC, remaining serious at higher levels of government 
jurisdiction, was minimal in China's rural sectors. As TVEs, since the refonn, have expanded 
further from agricultural to industrial sectors involved in mostly non-core, manufacturing and 
light industries, the application of HBCs and marketization operation and the self-
determination of production, sale and distribution via these enterprises therefore is passed on 
to the operation of China's major economic sector. This breaks through the rigidity and 
inefficiency of the socialist command economy over China's industrial production and 
terminates the symptoms of SBCs, thereby reviving efficiency of industrial economy, which, 
most importantly, not only enhances China's economic growth and preserves market 
economy, but also propels the institutional change of ownership of industrial sector largely 
dominated by SOEs. And such a definition of property rights as collective-ship diversified 
the conflict forcing concerns about socialist ideological purity, which provides a ground of 
political toleration for the reform in industrial privatization. 
During the initial price reform around 1982, these non-state owned rural enterprises were 
able to decide the price of their own products that not only did they bring a high income and 
rapid improvement in productivity and efficiency to each involved individual, but they also 
created new mechanisms of agency without necessarily privatizing ownership, setting a 
model for the state enterprises to follow eagerly (putterman, 1996). The prosperity 
experienced by the collective enterprises inspired local, small-sized, state-owned enterprises 
to undergo transfers to collective status and eventually initiated the massive transformation of 
ownership of the country's large, non-core public sectors into various "semi"-state or private 
ownership such as collective, state shareholder-ship, etc., without triggering socialist 
defensiveness and steadying China's public sectors transfers (Naughton, 1994; Bramall, 
2000). Therefore, the economic transition has been "easier, evolutionary and less costly" than 
it might otherwise have been (pei, 1998: p.31). "During the economic transition, the property 
rights form of the non-state rural sector over assets could be much better defined, without 
changing the form of ownership and only changing the principle of delineating rights from 
command/obey to voluntary negotiation, and transaction costs in this sector could be both 
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rapidly and considerably decreased" (Pei, 1998: p.31). The low cost of transactions of the 
increasingly large non-state sector significantly reduced the transaction cost of China's 
refonn overall. 
The refonn in China has meant that non-primary industry grew faster than primary industry 
and that non-state owned enterprises grew faster than state-owned enterprises in the coastal 
regions (Pei, 1998). Regions with a high proportion of fast-growing industries in their 
economic structure could expect to have faster growth rates than regions with a high 
proportion of nationally slow growing industries. China's success in her transition is 
apparently a rapid economic growth in the eastern and southern regions, in which the 
development of TVEs in Jiangsu province, private enterprises in Zhejiang province, and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) generated joint ventures in Guangdong province, were key 
economic sectors. Table 2.1 indicates the fast growth of GDP per capita of these regions 
since 1978. It isjust as Walder (1995: p.263 and p.265) argued: "in China's vast public 
sector, the fastest growth in output and productivity has occurred where government 
ownership rights are clearest. .. , which enables officials to ... monitor the finn and enforce 
their interests as owners." "The most industrial growth occurs in areas in which the transition 
to a market economy is closer to completion." Again this sets another example for other 
inland regions to follow and stands as remarkably different from the refonn in the fonner 
European countries. 
Secondly, it creates a mechanism that enables the local party-state, including both township 
and provincial governments, to be involved in a local economy that embarks on the changes 
of its administrative role and initiates the refonn on China's overall governmental institution. 
As the TVEs themselves are under the domain of local state's administration, with China's 
decentralization of fiscal administration, the perfonnance of the enterprises becomes a big 
concern to the local state. If the enterprises have done well, it would not only provide 
increasing revenues for local government to enhance its authority over local economy but 
also bring in economic prosperity, which is viewed as a political credit both for local 
government to bargain for more autonomy and for local leaders to win promotion. Again, due 
to the ownership ofTVEs within the local administration, the local leaders could naturally 
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practise managerial and authority powers over the enterprises, and share and respond to the 
revenues submitted by the enterprises. Both incentives drive local states to be deeply 
involved in the affairs of local enterprises. 
Table 2.1 Tbe Growtb of Provincial GDP per capital, 1978 and 1994 
GDP per capita in 1978 Percentage of National Average 
and 1994 (yuan) 1978 and 1994 (%) 
Provinces 1978 1994 Change Index Index Change 
1978 1994 
Beij ing (metropolitan city) 1267.8 4148.3 2880.5 334.5 306.6 -27.9 
Tianjin (metropolitan city) 1160.0 3435.3 2275.3 306.1 253 .9 -52.2 
Centre: 
Shanxi 365.0 1097.3 732.3 96.1 81.1 -15.2 
Inner Mongolia 317.0 1047.0 730.0 83.6 77.4 -6.2 
Jilin 381.0 1369.2 988.2 100.5 101.2 0.7 
Hei 10ngjiang 564.0 1405.8 841 .8 148.8 103.9 -44.9 
Anhui 244.0 871.3 627.3 4.4 64.4 0.0 
Jiangxi 276.0 1051.3 775.3 72.8 77.7 4.9 
Henan 232.0 913.3 681.3 61.2 67.5 6.3 
Hubei 232.0 1271.8 939.8 87.6 94.0 6.4 
Hunan 286.0 870.0 5844.0 75.5 64.3 -I 1.2 
East: 
Hebei 364.1 1325.9 961 .8 96.1 98.0 1.9 
Liaoning 677.0 2125.6 1448.6 178.6 157.1 -21.5 
Shanghai (metropolitan city) 2498.0 8044.9 5546.9 659.1 594.6 -64.5 
Jiangsu 430.0 2381.3 1951.3 113.5 176.0 62.5 
Zhejiang 331.0 2214.9 1883.9 87.3 163.7 76.4 
Fujian 273 .0 1677.7 1404.7 72.0 124.0 52.0 
Shandong 316.0 1543.8 1227.8 83.4 114.1 30.7 
Guangdong 370.0 2321.8 1951.8 97.6 171.6 74.0 
Hainan* 1589.0 11 7.4 
West 
Guangxi 227.0 732.0 505.0 59.9 54.1 -5.8 
Sichuan 253 .0 953.9 700.9 66.8 70.5 3.7 
Guizhou 175.0 576.4 401 .4 46.2 42.6 -3.6 
Yunnan 225.0 786.1 561.1 59.4 58.1 -1.3 
Tibet 375.0 918 .7 543.7 98.9 67.9 -31.0 
Shannxi 294.0 1001.2 707.2 77.6 74.0 -3 .6 
Gansu 348.0 \029.6 681.6 91.8 76.1 -15.7 
Qinghai 428.0 90.9 502.9 112.9 68.8 -44.1 
Ningxia 370.0 1017.5 647.5 97.6 75.2 -22 .4 
Xinj iang 313.0 1244.8 93 1.8 82.6 92.0 9.4 
National Average 379.0 1353 97.4 100 100 0.0 
(Note: *Hainan used to be part of Guangdong province and became a separate province in 1988. 
Source: National Statistics Bureau: China Statistical Yearbook, 1997) 
Kwong and Lee (2000: p.516) used a principal-agent framework to explain the relations 
between local government at the county level and the township-village enterprises. They 
comment that the overlapping interests of government and enterprises have fostered local 
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government' s business-like behaviours that resulted from China's fiscal reform and that 
encouraged them to prompt local TVE and marketization developments. The local TVEs 
provided revenue increases to allow the local government to have a vital power to make their 
own decisions and in return the local government provided preferential aid to the enterprises 
in the form of tax and credit privileges, which have alleviate the problems of the principal-
agent, as coined by Rose (1973). Thus, the more power the local governments have over 
financial decisions and production, the more responsible they feel for the TVEs in their 
territory, an incentive for changing their own local governmental behaviour and the more 
ground they could stand on to act against the central predation. Within this corporate-like 
system, the incentive shift the local governments into coordinators or mediators - middle 
agents - between upper governments and local enterprises and between enterprises and their 
foreign investors or business partners. At the township level, this middle agent acts more like 
a locality defender. 
They have to respond to the performance of local enterprises in terms of resource allocation, 
enterprises operation, financial discipline, capital investment recruitment, product sales and 
promotion, and worker performance. Changes in the economic management and bureaucratic 
service of local governments indicate that local, especially township, governments have 
started playing a critical role as economic entrepreneurs in regional economic development 
and have in effect become representatives of local enterprises and local interest against the 
centre. Walder' s (1995) analysis complemented and supported the same idea through 
examining the relations between local governments and enterprises. He (1995: p.267) 
concluded that "China' s rapid industrial growth has been spearheaded by the management of 
public finDs and, to some extent, even by local government officials acting as 'market-
oriented agents' who compete fiercely on regional, national, and even international product 
markets." 
When local and national inte!ests were in conflict, they have the responsibility to negotiate 
with the state on the local side to minimize losses. As the semi-owner of the local enterprises, 
local governments have to bribe the central government or their upper leaders for better or 
fairer treatment in the best interests of their sponsoring local enterprises. Local governments 
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not only provide services in terms of institutional relaxation and securing information and 
resources to the local enterprises, but also negotiate for more institutional cooperation by 
removing politico-economic constraints from the upper tiers of governments. Such agency 
completes a new political governing structure of China's economic institutions, promising a 
more relaxed political environment - political efficiency - for the continuation of economic 
reform. 
In experiencing economic management, they enhanced their responsibility for the protection 
of local economic achievements and market competition, in the interests of the region and for 
themselves. This is especially the case in regions where there are few major industrial 
enterprises directly owned and controlled by the central government but there are large-scale 
TVEs. Even in regions with state-detennined economies, local government goes to great 
lengths to bargain with the state for possible ownership of SOEs and, as soon as those 
enterprises are under their administrative domain, they transform them into a semi-privatised 
form in order to get rid of their rigid systems of operation. This to some extent "defines" 
property rights within the domain of local actors to protect the reform successes, provide 
incentives for economic efficiency and tenninate central arbitration, as described by North. It 
is a "fake collective", only using the collective label for protection and economic benefits 
(Liu, 1992; Oi, 1995: p.1135). 
In order to enforce the economic role oflocal state's administration, the local governments 
themselves have changed their bureaucratic behaviour to become more entrepreneurial, 
managerial and efficient, such as commitment to economic instead of political 
administration, undertaking financial discipline of local governmental budget, bureaucratic 
rationality and non-political attachment in governmental administration. Their behaviours 
influence the performance of their upper governmental units and form a driving force for the 
reform of national governmental bureaucracy and irreversible politico-economic institutional 
change toward autonomy of decision-making. 
Mao's traditional regional development created self-sufficiency and self-reliance within 
macro-regional units, and this resulted in China becoming a "cellular" economy and polity in 
60 
which local governments cooperated with local operating units, gaining a capability for 
thwarting and subverting 8eijing's demands on the eve of reform (Donnithome, 1972). The 
argument by Liu (1992: p.294) developed from Wenzhou' s case, stated that "a study oflocal 
deviation from state policies and its historical roots also inevitably raises the questions about 
the degree of control of a socialist state ... the concept of a sporadic totalitarian state, which 
denotes a state with strong despotic power but weak infrastructural power." Weak 
infrastructural power creates a possibility for local government to develop their economic 
role and change their bureaucratic behaviours and results in the possibility of local 
governments ' involvement in the economy in the reform era. 
In addition, "[T]wo of the most important institutional changes that prompted local 
government to become entrepreneurial and develop rural industry were the decollectivization 
of agricultural production and fiscal reform" (Oi, 1995: p.113 7). Let us now turn to look at 
the impact of fiscal reform on local government. As we know, in the past the central state 
held tightly on to national investment and budgetary control. Local governments had no 
permission to retain any surplus revenue in their respective regions and they financed their 
region ' s expenditure according to funds allocated by the centre. The fiscal reform started 
with permission being given to some preferential regions, such as Guangdong and Fujian, to 
retain a fixed sum of surplus annual revenue, which made a great contribution to generate 
those regions ' rapid economic growth. Using these retained extra funds, local governments 
are able to make investments on their own terms. A good or bad investment decision 
obviously displays their skill in managing and sustaining the local economy. Poor 
investments by local governments would entail them being burdened with the losses from 
their protected enterprises and sponsored projects without any bailout from the central state; 
on the other hand, correct decisions would entitle them to enjoy larger amounts of extra-
budgetary non-tax revenue. China has a "dual" fiscal system, in which two official budgetary 
funds exist at the same time: one is called the budgetary fund, which is used to finance 
generally national expenditures controlled by the finance ministry; the other is called the 
extra-budgetary fund, which is set as a flexible fund for government departments. The extra 
budgetary funds were set up with the aim of providing small flexible funds outside budgets, 
for localities and enterprises initially, but they have expanded rapidly after the reform and 
61 
were largely controlled by the local governments to use for a variety of purposes. The 
increasing extra budgetary funds mark an enhancement of local governments' power to make 
their own decisions, and so all levels of government make every effort to recruit the extra 
budgetary funds. This they do, either by helping local, productive enterprises to grow rapidly 
in order to increase local revenues, so as consequently to increase the retained revenues and 
strictly discipline the provincial budgetary behaviours, or by bargaining with the central state 
to reduce remittance rates in order to raise in relative terms the retained surplus revenues 
(Wang and Liu, 2000). It is this fiscal incentive that explains the local governments ' 
enthusiastic involvements in rural reform and enterprise growth and in institutional 
decentralisation (Ho, 1994; Oi, 1995: p.l138). The substantial amounts of extra budgetary 
funds mean a lot to local government: the power for making decisions and the capacity to 
make strategy for local development. The financial behaviour of local governments not only 
forms the initiative for hardening soft budget constraints to the centre as well as localities 
themselves in securing resources in their respective domains, but also efficiently stops central 
economic "predation" over local wealth. 
In summary, the development ofTVEs accompanied by fiscal reforms leads to a 
governmental institutional change where the local governments of especially coastal regions 
with large TVEs were seen, not just as simple political guides, but also as economic 
managers capable of reviving governmental entrepreneurship by involving themselves in 
local economic growth. This involvement encouraged local government to adapt Mao 's 
political institutions for economic corporation in order to tackle the state' s policy restrictions 
on the economic system and preserve marketization (Oi, 1995; Wei, 2000b, 2002), which are 
explained by North (1990) as the restructuring of institutional frameworks to secure the 
economic success that to some extent is seen as the initiation of China's political institutional 
reform. This institutional change has been firmly stressed by Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 
(1995); Qian and Weingast (1996); Cao, Qian and Weingast (1999) in the theory of Chinese 
Style Federalism as a mechanism to prolong the partial reform. The central key is that local 
government started playing an important role. In addition, the development of TVEs has 
encouraged the uneven regional development between the coast, with its large number of 
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TVEs dominating the local economy, and those regions, such as in inland, where large SOEs 
persist. 
After the accomplishment of the rural and agricultural economic transition, as confidence 
grew and experiences gained, China was ready to undergo a profound transition right across 
the country, with an emphasis on privatizing the SOEs that have dominated urban and 
industrial economies for nearly fifty years (Walder, 1996a) (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 The Order of Institutional Transfer 
II Reform 
ofSOEs 
I Reform of 
Agriculture TVEs 
~ Illustration: the movement of refonn from step I to 4 
I, 11 The pace of the refonn 
(Source: compiledfrom Wang and Chang, 1998) 
Chinese urban reform started in 1984 after the Twelfth Central Committee' s Third Plenum 
and targeted the industrial sector (SOEs), which used to operate strictly within the state 
distributive system of material supply and demand. The reform emphasized four areas: the 
planning system, management, prices and wage policy. In effect, the planning system gave 
way to "guidance" directives focusing on profitability instead of plan fulfilment, and market 
forces started influencing production, particularly of manufacturing units which had less 
bearing on the national economy. Enterprises were allowed to retain surplus profit after 
handing in a fixed quota. The managers of state enterprises were assigned new authority to 
handle product marketing, to purchase materials and inputs outside state distribution 
channels, and new responsibility for the operation of their units. In 1987, a new system of 
management was introduced in 75 per cent of China' s 12,398 larger state-owned industrial 
enterprises, known as the "contract responsibility system", in which managers have a right to 
employ workers and to discipline their behaviour according to the contract (Solinger, 1993). 
The new wage system, replacing grade-fixed payments, justified the incomes of the workers 
and managers according to their ability and actual workloads. The new price policy corrects 
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the disconnection between state plan and market prices (Solinger, 1993). However, despite 
much having been done to SOEs in the reform of their management and operation, their 
ownership is still under the jurisdiction of government administration.7 As there has been no 
reform of the property rights of SOEs, problems persist in their operation that consequently 
result in a weakness in market competition, in slow structural adaptation, and in their 
inefficient operation. These problems may be viewed as: insufficient incentives and decision-
making power for operators; soft budgetary constraints and no clear definition of the 
responsibilities of managers for state property, observable as the state having neither concern 
for property rights nor guidance for enterprise operation, and the enterprises showing little 
responsibility for the preservation, effective operation and profitability of assets. As by 1994 
SOEs account for 35-40 per cent ofGDP, take up 50 per cent of national enterprises above 
the town-level and centre in the major public sectors of infrastructure, energy, transportation, 
and other core industries, such remaining problems within the SOE sector hinder the 
continuation and completion of China' s transition (Gao and Chi, 1997). The economies of 
regions mainly relied on the existing large SOEs, for example, the Northeast regions, China' s 
traditional industrial base, have been seriously affected, which resulted in their economies 
being less progressive than that of the coastal regions and remaining at a standstill. 
Moreover, local government's economic institutional role in the areas with SOEs dominated 
economies is contradicted and handicapped by the intervention of the central state, with its 
predominantly political concerns, in the local economy via SOEs. 
In addition, during the transition, China also launched an open door campaign and located 
Special Economic Open Zones (SEOZs) in the coastal provinces, so that a favourable 
environment was created for promoting foreign trade and attracting large-scale overseas 
investment. In these SEOZs many political restrictions were lifted and firms and enterprises 
were able to operate under a semi-market economic system. FDI and joint ventures were 
especially welcomed. Led by labour-intensive export-orientated manufacturing industries 
influenced by classic western export-based theory, these regions ' economies experienced 
rapid growth. 
7 On April 13, 1988, the state-owned industrial enterprise law of the PRC was adopted in which it clearly 
defined the nature, right and duties of SOEs. 
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In accordance with marketization and globalization, China, though retaining state 
intervention in the major public sectors, has decentralized relative economic autonomy and 
this has inevitably weakened central political control over local governments, which has 
therefore increased their responsibility for local economic growth (Huang, 1996). In the 
SEOZs, both state and private enterprises, in collaboration with local governments, are able 
to act as real economic institutions. As the semi-owner of these enterprises, the local political 
administrative government has become more entrepreneurial and liberated, which also 
reflects a further requirement for change in political institutions. In other words, globalization 
and marketization have made China adjust her political system to be more conducive to 
economic growth. The term "socialist market economy" was thus coined to describe the 
economic transition (Deng Xiaoping, 1993). Naughton (1994, cited by Goldstein, 1996: 
p.147) described key characteristics of China' s transition as having a few features: first, a 
massive growth of rural enterprises which broke through the state monopoly control over 
industrial sectors in the form of collective enterprises and foreign trade, that bring in market 
competition "both among state firms, state and non-state firms"; secondly, government 
monitoring of state-owned firms and central planning is still in practised but minimized to a 
certain extent. More importantly here, these two features fundamentally constitute empirical 
evidence for Qian, Weingast and other fellow scholars to construct and argue in the theory of 
Federalism Chinese Style for the success of China' s partial reform (Qian and Weingast, 
1996; Cao, Qian and Weingast, 1999). 
2.2.2.2 Fostering Provincial Government's Dynamic Institutional Roles in China' s Regional 
Development and its Significance to China' s Reform 
China' s regional development used to be strongly the state' s determination through policy as 
instruments to manipulate growth especially for the selected regions. China' s regional 
development in the Mao' s era embodied an approach of redistribution of industrial 
production that was accomplished through resource transfers, economic self-reliance, and 
close-to-resource Soviet heavy industries construction. On reviewing China's regional 
development in the pre-reform period, a phase of the socialist planning system used the top-
down centralized policy of resource distribution to pursue the regional development and this 
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approach hardly took into account the factors of local initiatives and many initiatives in fact 
had been concealed by the rigidness of the planning system. However, since the reform, as 
efficiency plays domination, local initiatives have been strongly emphasized. Many scholars 
think that the cause-effect relationship between preferential policy emphasizing resource 
distribution and regional growth determines the development of China's regions, but to a 
large extent other factors involved in generating regional development have been paid much 
attention. 
As China's transition was regarded as a "bottom-up" process (Fan, 1995), the cause of rapid 
development on the coast is not simply attributed to the state resource distribution but is 
multi-faceted with largely local efforts driving the reform. The "bottom up" approach with a 
semi-free market system had to involve initiatives. It is local state that willingly triggered 
these initiatives, released local talent and exploited the reform opportunities to generate 
regional and national growth. The role of local governments has been emphasized by Shieh 
(2000); Gu, Wong, Shen and Zhen (2001) in their study of the rapid growth on the coast 
using a case study of Guangdong and Fujian provinces. Wei (2000,2003 : p.46) also suggests 
that: "China's process of reform can be best understood as a triple process of 
decentralization, marketization, and globalization; and consequently multiple mechanisms -
the state, the global investor and the locality - are shaping the uneven regional 
development. .. in particular the role of localities". 
China's transition has removed many political constraints on the revival of regional 
productivity. However, when the transition was introduced to a region, it could not be 
pursued top-down by the state without the collaboration of local authority and institutions. 
What is left of Mao' s political system still requires local governments to be the dominating 
institutions, acting as political guides and economic agents to the region. They stand between 
the central government and local social units serving as "political middleman", dealing both 
with transmitting the central policy to the region and responding to regional development 
(Cheung, 1998b: p.13; Shieh, 2000). It is the local government which decides whether its 
region should take a bold reform before others or open a "policy window" before it is 
accepted by the rest of China. To guide local reform against the established ideologies, local 
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governments have to rely on the integrity, cohesion and coordination of the government 
regime and also rely on the leaders' "perception, attitude, preferences or instincts" and 
commitments to refonn. As China's transition is complicated across the country and varied 
from region to region, without an integrated blueprint, each individual provincial government 
is constantly challenged by seeking and undertaking suitable strategies for its respective 
region in reducing constraints and exploiting opportunities. Mao's self-reliance strategy 
meant no support between regions and no interdependent network established among all of 
the provinces. The success oflocal reform really depends on the local government's 
willingness, integrity, experience and capability. 
As China' s decentralisation distributes decision-making power to the locality, regional 
development has to a large extent related to the performance of major economic actors. 
Within the governmental hierarchy, the central government is the top level of decision-
making; the provincial governments are the second, undertaking tasks of transmitting, 
modifying and implementing policies to their respective localities and sub-levelled 
government at township; then the local units, including village communes, non-or state 
enterprises, are the final level of the operating network. The decentralisation of power to the 
locality has diversified the roles of local, especially provincial government, as, on the one 
hand being part of state's governmental regime, the local government facilitates its political 
control and helps with the effectiveness of central policy implementation to the regions -
guardians of central policy - and, on the other hand, being local leaders they have to stand up 
for their region and produce local policies against inappropriate initiatives from Beijing, 
though Yang (1995) thinks that few leaders are willing to risk their careers for the sake of 
purely local interests. However, China's political administration technically places those 
local leaders in the middle of the bureaucratic hierarchy. In order to achieve their personal 
interests, the leaders of provincial governments must act in the interest of the region first to 
ensure they receive credit for their actions from the centre. That effectively drives these 
leaders to involve themselves in local economic affairs. 
Hausner, Kudlacz and Szlachta (1997: p.207) stress the importance oflocal governments as 
semi-independent in the restructuring network in Poland's reform, and they claim that the 
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establishment of local self-government marked a breakthrough in the construction of the 
democratic state structure, and it is necessary to develop such complex but coherent system 
of agents at the intermediate, regional and local levels, which indicates that one of major 
local actors, represented by the public administration at the provincial level, is able to 
perform independently and effectively. This is required by market development for 
appropriate instruments and institutions based on a locality to handle the varied problems 
created by an individual region in implementing state's regional policy. Pickvance(1997: 
p.306) also argued that, in a transition, local government is a key mediating institution having 
an ambiguity of meanings, since "it can be seen as simply implementing central government 
policy", termed "passive transmitting", or "as providing scope for local political force to 
modify the implementation of central policies" - "actively shaping". It gradually takes 
control of resources and establishes or adapts old into new networks to exercise increasing 
economic and political power. Only those local key actors represented by local governments 
through the gain of authority over local resource could produce the best performance of 
locality than the central government (Hayed, 1945). It is said by Yang (1994: p.65) that "a 
government's capacity to manage the economy depends not only on the amount of resources 
it directly controls but also, in the case of an economy becoming more and more market-
oriented, on whether it possesses the appropriate economic institutions for undertaking such 
management. " 
The institutional approach to regional development, emphasizing the significance of non-
economic factors, looks at the source of regional advantages which lie in the character of local 
social, cultural and institutional arrangements (Amin, 1999: p.369). It improves the traditional 
top-down policy affected by Keynesian theory's focus on income redistribution, welfare policy, 
and state incentives to the less favoured regions, and by the neo-liberal theories approving 
investment in training, transport, communication infrastructure, and technology to stimulate less 
favoured regions. "Explanatory weight is given to the effects of formal and informal 
institutions, ... to value and rationalities of action ensconced in networks and institutions; to the 
composition of networks of economic association, especially their role in disseminating 
information, knowledge, and learning for economic adaptability; and to intermediate institutions 
between market and state which are relatively purposeful and participatory forms of 
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arrangement" (Amin, 1999: p.368). He suggests that the orientation of regional policy should 
emphasize not only the "supply base", including advanced transportation and communication 
system, but also the "institutional base" including business agencies and political representation 
(Amin, 1999). 
China's regional development planning underlain by Chinese versions of growth pole 
theories of the "Third Front" or the "Three Ladder Step", has given the impression that 
concentration of resource distribution and large investments are the major method to generate 
or maintain the identified regions ' economic growth and are the major component of state 
regional policies. Given the size of China and its various economic conditions, the central 
policy-makers are always troubled by the balance between transferring scarce national 
resources and funds to a targeted region in order effectively to generate growth in the 
national interest, and the need to minimize unequal development among regions in order to 
alleviate the side-effect of these transfers. "In a socialist system which accords the ultimate 
power of resource allocation (especially investment to the state), China' s leadership is 
constantly confronted by allocation dilemmas - by choices between national integration and 
stability, and between efficiency and equality. "The policies that ensue thus constitute 
negotiated outcomes between conflicting ideals" (Fan, 1995: p.421). In the framework of 
Chinese political strategy, only regions whose growth has political significance can be 
treated preferentially and be the target of policy preference, which leave the rest of regions to 
struggle with their own resources and to cry out that their resources are being ''taken away". 
Despite Beijing' s strategies for national development dominating the development policies of 
each individual region, certain institutional structures established in Mao 's period provide an 
opportunity for local governments. When a new policy is adopted nationally, it is always 
experimented with in one or more regions first on a trial basis. Obviously the selected trial 
regions have to fulfil certain preliminary conditions in order to achieve the expected results 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988). In the region with these conditions, the decision on 
whether they will be a trial region or not depends on the local leaders ' efforts, their 
connections with central leaders, and their negotiating leverage at the centre. If a region is 
selected, the gains will not only be benefits from abundant resource allocation and 
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preferential policies, but also recognition of the local leaders' competence. If the trial is 
successful, the local leaders might either be promoted to high office or remain in their 
original post but with future bargaining clout for reform or better treatment. For example, in 
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China's national fiscal reform in the mid-1990s, the Primer Minister had to negotiate with the 
governor of Guangdong (Qian and Weingast, 1996). As for promoted leaders, they intend to 
or are asked by their original regions to "take care of their regions". In this rapport alliance 
network, the region will always be in the good care of their former leaders. For example, 
after Guangdong's successful reform, in 1992, one of six members of the CCP's Political 
Bureau was posted by the current GS ofGuangdong's CCP: Mr Xie Feng, and he 
undoubtedly influenced the central decision in favour of Guangdong's development (Hook, 
1996). Such reform "pioneer" success and bureaucratic networks provide a negotiable 
political environment in terms of bureaucratic administration to pursue institutional 
relaxation for economic liberalisation. 
Liebertbal and Oksenberg (1988: p.3) in their research have systemically examined ''how the 
bureaucratic structure of the state, policy processes, and outcomes are interrelated in 
contemporary China". The research revealed that, from the outside, Chinese bureaucratic 
apparatus and power chain appeared as unified and hierarchical but, on the inside, turned out 
to be divided, fragmented, segmented, and stratified, which promoted a "system of 
negotiations, bargaining and the seeking of consensus among affected bureaucracies" (Ibid., 
p.3). Chinese decision-making is a complex process: considering an initiative among the 
leaders; announcing the initiative; discussing the requirement for allocated funds and 
material resources within the plan; scheduling and regulating construction; and ensuring 
measures to make the plan produce the expected result. Any project, before being proposed, 
requires large participating units and personnel to undertaking a series of approval research 
studies in terms of feasibility, design, technology, and fmance. China's power elite at the top 
level of the decision-making system is confined to 25-30 people within the SC, who enjoy 
influence in formulating a national policy, and the prestige of one or two core leaders (for 
example Deng Xiaoping) necessitates casting their own personal policy preference in terms 
of the national interest; but the elites cannot control or monitor policy being implemented 
effectively and cohesively by sublevel units. Every step involved in the outcome of the final 
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version of a plan and the results of implementation is the result of bargaining among the 
participating units. In the first place, at the level of the SC ministries and commissions, the 
officials and the operating procedures of the organisation become very powerful in shaping 
the final version and issuing, transmitting and implementing the policy down to lower levels 
of operating units in targeted regions. Ministries and bureaux have particular interests on 
their side in seeking supplementation attached to the draft in order to express their views and 
rationalise the formulation of policy. They have to turn to the top leaders for support and 
understanding of their expertise and contribution in terms of both their units' and the national 
interests. They make efforts to influence the decisions of the top leaders to reach the final 
agreement on any substantive policy. Such approaches shape the bureaucratic behaviour and 
their results are passed on to officials and units at all lower levels of government. In the end, 
the policy reaching the operating level has always been heavily adapted from the initial one 
(Figure 2.3). Again, at the implementation level, all sub-levels of operating units and officials 
can interpret the policy with their interests in mind in accordance to the bargaining agreement 
with their respective upper level authorities. For example, on the agreement of fiscal reform 
in 1980-84, it turned out that as many as 14 instead of an initial 7 provinces actually received 
subsidies from the Centre. In realising such a process, the central state can only set forth 
goals or instructions on what should be done, but there are no detailed implementations and 
regulating documents accompanying the main policy of the kind normally written by higher-
level decision-making in western countries. Such a non-cohesive policy-making process 
indicates a loose control by the state over the lower operating units and provinces: at the top, 
the leaders have always a strong commitment to the policy, but at the bottom, the policy is 
presented and implemented divergently from the original intentions. 
Therefore in this weak infrastructuraI control, central-provincial relations are viewed as 
characterized by intense bargaining between both sides concerning their own interests and 
resources. In pursuit of a consensus among the many involved officials and organisations 
before it is possible to get action, a complex bargaining process takes place in the decision 
system, which enhances the ability of various provincial and operating units at all levels to 
make their own decisions and amend central policy (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988). 
Lampton (1992: p.37) said ''bargaining is one of several forms of authority relationship in 
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China, that it has been of central importance in the Chinese policy process throughout the 
Communist era that it became increasing important in the first decade of reform in the post-
Mao era." For him the systematic causes of bargaining are as follows: first, Chinese policy-
making has too many, parallel, interdependent territorial and departmental units with 
divergent and varied interests involved but no effective legal measures to stop negotiation 
and bargaining among those units; second, Chinese policy-making still sits in a context of a 
bureaucratic-oriented polity with limited market coordination; third, policy is distortedly 
implemented by the localities in favour of their own interests, the so-called "implementation 
bias" (Naughton, 1987, cited by Liberthal and Lampton: p.38); fourth, the ideology of 
equality is still driving bargaining between the upper and lower officials in favour of 
compensation from the centre. However, importantly, the implication of bargaining across 
different levels of government is that the bureaucratic structure in the policy-making process 
does provide a mechanism to allow decentralization of power to take place from central to 
local government. 
Figure 2.3 Commanding and Bargaining in Decision Making System 
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(Source: compiled after Lieberthal and Oksenberg. 1988) 
Bargaining represents a reinforcement of local governmental involvement in local economic 
management, and expresses the intentions of local leaders in tackling the restrictions of the 
centre and in seeking more local autonomy and decision-making power. And most 
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importantly, bargaining presents the mechanism providing a space for local authority to make 
own policies and to increase or enhance their competence and skill in removing all 
constraints to steer local economic development. 
In order to make justified local policies, there are certain elements required for local 
governments. Firstly, understanding the region is a prerequisite to make policy for utilising 
local condition to maximise economic success. We will discuss this from two viewpoints. 
First, the policy-makers of the local government have to be equipped with adequate 
knowledge, experience and skill in understanding local conditions in terms of local society, 
natural environment, resources and economic development in order to produce justified 
policies. This requires personnel who are economic or administrative professional 
technocrats. 
The theory of technocracy indicates that "modem socio-economic chaos could only be 
reduced by application of the physical sciences ... thus the government, which was supposed 
to handle all types of problems, should consist of technicians ... and scientists" (Howard 
Scott, cited by Liu, 2001: p.88). Max Weber said that contemporary politics is formed by two 
groups of "new elites: technically trained professional career administrators and professional 
party politicians" (Liu, 2001). Recently studies of technocrats in government have stressed 
highly trained professionals who can formulate or produce high quality policy and effectively 
implement the policy because of their professional experience (Lande, 1976, cited by Liu, 
2001). So, recruitment becomes an essential consideration. 
Second, the local governments have to understand the geopolitical orientations of their 
regions and the weight of their economic growth in the framework of China 's national 
development as a whole. Beijing puts great emphasis on the national development and unity 
as their priorities and they will not allow preferential policies for selected regions to 
undermine these goals. The development of each individual region has to serve the central 
goal first, if necessary at the expense of local interests. 
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Having experienced Mao's political discipline and class struggles in the past, provincial 
governments are schooled with the know-how of modifying the state's policy in its 
implementation at their discretion to accomplish national as well as local goals, without 
necessarily toeing the state line, and they also know best how to exploit the local economic 
initiatives beyond the restrictions of state policy (Lill, 1992). Local governments, including 
the GSs and governors, are firstly responsible for maintaining political as well as a social 
well-being and then to foster local economic growth. For example, in Zhejiang and Jiangsu 
provinces, which have large non-state-owned enterprise sectors, the provincial governments 
reduced controls and encouraged and protected the privatised collective enterprises so that 
they would grow rapidly, but they also ensured that their sponsorship of politico-economic 
society was maintained as stable and inoffensive to the centre (Lin, 1998; Cheung, Chung 
and Lin, 1998). Although the regional leaders have to understand Beijing's political 
intentions and their region's political significance in that strategic framework before taking 
action against appropriation of the state's strategy, the power of decentralisation enables 
local government to modify the Maoist system (Oi, 1997). It is just as Goodman (1989: p.29) 
said, that decentralisation in China is not equalised: "recent research has pointed to the 
significance of several factors: a locality'S political cohesion and integration, its economic 
importance, and the personal connections of its leaders." 
The second element for the local government to make policy is to make a commitment to 
bureaucratic administration conducive to local economic growth. The commitment of local 
government and leaders determines the choices of local governments in their administration 
and determines too the performance of the organisation. Despite the central state's 
commitment to reform, there are still many local leaders hesitating. This group of local 
leaders is called by Cheung (1998b) the laggards. 
The third element is the capacity of local government in making policy for growth. The 
allowance for competence gained by the local government is institutional decentralisation. 
The vital power gained from the decentralisation is through financial independence to 
possess resources seen as, in the case of China's reform, funds available outside the central 
budget for dynamic local authorities capable of acting in their own terms. To recruit funds for 
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the region is more dependent on local economic self-reliance, which means local 
economically significant growth supplies extra-budgetary revenues, which in turn reduces 
Beijing's financial domination. 1bis requires efficient bureaucratic rationality by local 
administration. 
All in all, the institutional role in development requires provincial government to be seen as 
individual unit possessing not only economic experience and capability in terms of financial 
self-reliance and independence to make their own choices for development policy, but also 
bureaucratically administrative efficiency reflecting on organisational integrity, cooperative, 
professional team members and rational leadership. Provincial governments have become 
agent-like, locality-orientated organizations. Their entrepreneurial capability in terms of 
financial discipline and reform strategy helps better regional integration of local government 
in terms of bureaucratic efficiency and competency, now increasingly viewed as rational and 
professional. 
It is especially important to reconstruct Chinese government bureaucracy in terms of re-
orientating administrative tasks, transforming governmental functions, and increasing 
efficiency by reinforcing cohesion, cooperation and high quality of members and leadership. 
With the evolution of the institutional role of provincial government, a parallel reform of 
governmental bureaucratic administration has been pressed in order to increase the efficiency 
of the bureaucratic and personnel quality of the administrative elites. There have been 
attempts to achieve these through a series of institutional and governmental reforms since 
1978, which have been aimed at reducing Party intervention and Party-state bureaucracy and 
at recruiting professional technocrats. After 1982, the CCP, under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping, launched administrative reforms in both regimes, including the elimination of 
'bureaucratism' by curbing party interventions in every affair of the state and preserving only 
its supervisory role at the national scale (Liu, 2001); by downsizing overlapping organs and 
personnel in order to reduce slackness and increase efficiency; and by promoting the 
recruitment and training of young, professional technocrats. This reform happens to meet 
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some of the criteria of Weber's ideal-rational theory, which was originally presented as a 
general discussion of the efficiency of the government organizations (Liu, 2001). 
Weber thought that modem officialdom should function in such ways that the hierarchical 
structure of a bureaucratic institution and all its operations should be based on a rational rule 
with regard to its interactions with society, so as to reach a maximum degree of rationality 
and efficiency (Weber, 1958; Mommsen, 2004). This rational rule is believed to be one of 
permanently and rationally established laws and the leaders and officials are appointed in 
accordance with these laws (Bendix, 1960; Freund, 1966). The institution should be operated 
in a hierarchical system in which there is a supervision of the lower officers from the 
respective leaders, and subordination is required for all officers (Weber, 1958; Bendix, 
1960). The administration of the institution should be run by these professional, managerial 
staff beyond their own personal interests and they must stick to the rules, and not be co-opted 
by or transform themselves into a specific honorific class (Levine, 1991 ; Mommsen, 1989, 
2004). These are the fundamental themes of Weber' s Rational-Legal Theory. 
Weber's Ideal-type model of bureaucratic administration does not represent "an average of 
all existing political governmental structure", but predicts a successful politics dependent 
solely on "the belief in the formal legitimacy of enacted rules and the right of those elevated 
to governmental offices to exercise power according to these rules" (Mommsen, 2004: p.112-
113). Wilson (1987, cited by Liu, 2001: p.83) said that: "administration lies outside the 
proper sphere ofpolitics ... the field ofadrninistration is a field of business." Gulick (1937, 
cited by Liu, 2001: p.83) thought that the separation of political and administrative 
institutions is necessary; otherwise it is impossible to produce efficiency. 
As noted above, the CCP penetrates all levels of government by intertwining the party units 
into the governmental organs and utilizing their power to control the entire society. In the 
party's hierarchical bureaucracy, each Party cell within the governmental organs serves the 
party first. Whoever are the leaders and members of the party committees are superior to the 
administrative leaders and officers in terms of decision-making. So the distinction between 
the party's and governmental functions is blurred and difficult to define. 
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In this respect, Schurmann (1966: p.1 09-111) discussed the Chinese form of administration 
that Mao and his followers used in the CCP to express "the will of people", "to root it in 
society" and to "lead the work of government". Finally, "the Party actualises the control of 
the society over the state". Shrik (1992: p.60) said that, although the CCP is intertwined with 
the state and the society, "it is a distinct political institution". The party leads the state and 
society, and drives the state and society to serve the goals of the party. So the party became a 
ruling institution over Chinese society. This is not a law-based rule but a party-led, moral-
based regulation within the Party-state regime that runs the society and the state of China. 
Schunnann (1966: p.72) applied Weber's theory to explain conflicts between the Chinese 
Party leadership and administration in the pre-reform era. In order to achieve the goals based 
on their personal perceived ideologies, the leaders used the single Party system of political 
monopoly to attack middle level administrators of government and so run the government 
and the society against the grain of western notions of legitimate administration of a state. 
Liu (2001) has suggested, in her work on China's administration reform after 1978, that the 
reform of the Chinese administration to some extent appeals to Weber's Legal-Rational 
Theory in terms of seeking administrative power outside the party domain. In China's 
governmental bureaucratic reform, the efficiency of the governmental bureaucracy has 
largely increased by recruiting professional administrative experts and technological 
technocrats from the outside the party and by dismantling Party core units within the 
governmental regimes in some regions. However, due to a lack of institutionalized separation 
in politician-bureaucrat relations in the administrative and independent legal systems 
monitoring polity-state administration, political influence on bureaucracy has to a certain 
extent been minimized but it has not been eliminated and might be recur during a political 
crisis, such as the Tiananmen incident, when the party's superiority returns to centre stage. 
The efficiency and rationality of governmental operations is still a challenge to improving 
administrative efficiency and institutional professionalism of local government in China's 
one-party state, especially with respect to increasing integrity of local government in 
conducting local economic growth. 
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In this section I have discussed the evolution and the implications of local government 
institutions in regional development. This shows that, instead of focusing on incentive 
endowments and resources, regional development has relied on the dynamic of institutional 
evolution in China's economic transition. In this institutional evolution, provincial 
government as a bureaucratic organisation has played an important role and major actor in 
securing incentives and propelling economic growth for the locality. Rather than assuming 
that provincial governments are agents only for the central political institutions determining 
the policy process and policy outcomes, we have examined how provincial governments 
have shaped their policy agendas, coped with institutional constraints, and attempted to bring 
about economic change within a large hierarchical, Leninist political system and how 
provincial governments make use of the new opportunities created in the reform era and 
confront the new policy challenges facing their provinces. Hence, we see provincial 
governments not only as participants in national government and politics, but also as active 
players in a provincial political system that involves coordinating, bargaining and mediating 
with sub-provincial units and the upper central state as well as promoting local social and 
economic development (Cheung, Chung and Lin, 1998). The discussion on the dynamic role 
of provincial government and its effective strategies and active performance in generating 
growth has reshaped the traditional focus and emphasis of regional development on to the 
social-institutional context. 
We have reviewed the path of China' s partial reform and evolution of the role of the local 
state during the reform, and revealed the relations between economic reform and the 
performance of local government. China's bottom-up reform was helped by the local state, 
which eventually has developed into a middle agent both for the centre and locality and has 
became an agent assisting economic growth and forwarding central policy. With this helping 
hand, China's reform is able to tackle the problems foreseen by both North and Komai, and 
provide arguments for state commitment to economic wealth in support of the arguments of 
Qian and others on the formation of market-preserving Chinese federalism. 
Local government involvement in the regional economy of China, termed "local state 
corporatism"(Unger and Chan,1995; Oi, 1995: p.l132), explains the difference of her 
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transition process from that of the former Soviet Union and East European countries and her 
greater closeness to the Newly Industrial Countries(NICs). In East Asia, the NICs, led by 
Japan, there is a type of intensive development in which states take a role, not at all like the 
laissez faire minimalist states nor the centrally planned Leninist ones, but having elements of 
both: in the relationship between the state and the recognised associations, the state 
dominates the decision power but leaves some degree of autonomy to the organisations 
"within each of their respective spheres of operation" (Unger and Chan, 1995: p.30). Though 
China has a different polity from the NICs, reform has generated a similar approach: a state-
led economy committed to the market but remaining under a Party/state leadership. We can 
see that China's reform is Path Dependent. China's reform success at this stage can be 
viewed as the result of state involvement in incentive structures and growth commitment. To 
enhance the involvement of the state, a crucial role is played by local government, but in the 
evolution of the institutions of her polity, safe to say, it is China' s political state that has 
allowed the evolution of its components to become a part of the reform, and this has 
propelled the entire institutional reform and economic growth. 
Walder (1996a) and Oi (1996) have argued that, unlike the reform in the Soviet Union and 
some Eastern European countries, where the local government is bypassed by a strong 
ministerial system and plans are transmitted directly to enterprises, and, as a result, 
government is crippled and has withdrawn from the economy, China's Maoist bureaucracy 
retained its key features but has been modified and has evolved towards a market economy 
through a series of changes: the provision of incentives and stimulating local leaders to 
involve themselves in the local economy; and the upgrading of bureaucratic efficiency. There 
has been a reinforcement oflocal government's role as economic-corporate-like political 
administration, and it has been entailed in the semi-ownership of locality-based enterprises 
and collectives, etc. The transition has allowed the state to retain its central control over the 
macro economy, while leaving the localities and local government with a broad autonomy for 
operating and managing the economy of political capacity. All told, this is close to the 
description of a "guided economy" (Ma and Liu, 1994, cited by Li, 2000: p.179). 
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2.2.3 Weber's Theory of Rational-Ideal Bureaucracy 
To Max Weber, all complex human actions take place within organisations with structure, 
and actions are constrained by authority. Organizations have an individual as a chief at the 
top of the structure to exercise authority and the members act to fixed administrative 
routines. This constitutes a bureaucratic administration. There are three types of legitimate 
authority conceived by Weber: legal authority, traditional authority and charismatic 
authority. Legal authority depends on the legitimacies of the authority established and the 
leaders and appointed in accordance with law. Traditional authority depends upon belief in 
the sanctity of traditions like religions and the leaders who thus have authority. Charismatic 
authority results from the willingness of the majority to give their obedience to the authority 
of an individual because of his/ her ''holiness, heroism or exemplariness". In the modem 
western world, rational-legal authority is regarded as the most approved form, in which the 
authority is excised lawfully by an office according to legitimated law. The action of the 
office is subject to the rules and not to the interests of any individual or ruling class and the 
rules themselves are legitimized by a legally authorised agent. 
Bureaucracy is a type of legal authority with regards to its functioning, with principles 
appealing to the definition oflegal authority. Max Weber's definition of bureaucracy may be 
quoted as follows: 
"From a purely technical point of view, a bureaucracy is capable of attaining the 
highest degree of efficiency, and is in this sense formally the most rational known 
means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in 
precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus 
makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the 
organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive 
efficiency and in the scope of its operations and is formally capable of application to all 
kinds of administrative tasks" (Weber, 192111968).8 
8 Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society. Max Rheinstein (ed.). Translated by Edward Shils and Max 
Rheinstein. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954. 
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In Weber's words "The purely bureaucratic form of administrative organization, that is the 
monocratic variety of bureaucracy, is, as regards the precision, constancy, stringency and 
reliability of its operation, superior to all other forms of administrative machinery and for 
those who are affected by it. Owing to the intensity and the scope of its operations, it is 
capable of being applied to all kinds of administrative tasks, hence it is, in a purely technical 
sense, capable of attaining a maximum of efficiency and therefore, in all respects, formally 
the most rational form of exercising authority over human beings." (Weber, cited by 
Mommsen, 2004: p.112) 
The bureaucratic efficiency is examined in Weber' s Rational Ideal of bureaucracy with 
features such as: 
1) A hierarchical structure is necessary to guarantee obedience from junior to senior 
officers and responsibility for the effective action and decisions of civil servants. 
2) The operation of the organization will follow a rational and legitimate rules and 
regulations in order to retain its original objects. 
3) Bureaucratic efficiency depends upon the people who operate the administrative 
machinery and they must adhere strictly to the rules. 
4) The administrators form a special group who are detached from the ruling classes and 
from personal influence, and they must be professional and devoted to their 
administrative skills and specialised knowledge. 
5) The bureaucratic administration has to achieve a consistent rationality with social 
interaction applicable to all levels of society. 
Weber tried to formulate a model of bureaucratic administration based upon efficiency. The 
model requires the operation of bureaucratic institutions on the basis of rule-obedience, 
emotionless decision-making and technical qualification: "a considerable degree of formality, 
rationality and impersonality is prescribed by the classic bureaucratic organisation in intra-
organisational relationships, in inter-organisational relationships and in the relationship 
between the bureaucracy and its clients" (Weber, 1987, cited by Liu, 2001 : p.82). In order to 
maintain the rationality and efficiency of bureaucratic administration, professionally trained 
administrators should be recruited to run the organization and to act according to rule-based 
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and impersonal administrative system. In this regard, technocrats are recommended (Liu, 
2001). 
Although Weber's theory deals with a pure type of bureaucracy, its application to 
governmental administration is challenged by the relationship between politics and state 
administration. Despite Weber's theory considering the necessary distinction between two 
regimes in order to raise rationality and efficiency by getting rid of political influence, it is 
difficulty in reality as Weber himself said, because politicians make policy and the 
administrator implements it. Weber therefore defined bureaucratic domination as legal 
domination by requiring the administrator to stick to "a continuous rule" in conducting 
"official business" and the construction of bureaucratic domination is conjunct with the 
"political function of the state" (Schluchter, 1991: p.371). Therefore legitimation tackles the 
relation between ruler, the administrators, and the ruled, and the relation between politics and 
administration (Schluchter, 1991). 
2.3 The Limitations of China's National Unity Framework on Institutional 
Evolution of Provincial Government 
2.3.1 Unequal Decentralisation 
As we have discussed previously, the state' s commitment to economic growth allows 
decentralization in China through political incentive restructuring seen as the development of 
the local state institutions that provide political cooperation and efficiency to regional 
economic growth and national reform as a whole. However, among the factors listed above, 
the most crucial of all is the degree of decentralization, which has varied from region to 
region and from sector to sector. For example, when Beijing started to decentralize state 
control to selected provinces and economic sectors in 1978 they purposively chose those 
having the least economic and political risk for the nation, for example the provinces like 
Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong, and sectors like agriculture and commerce, were allowed 
to undertake rapid reform. But a core region like Shanghai, though it is geographically next 
to Zhejiang, owing to her key economic position of China, was not allowed to implement the 
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same reforms until 1992 when pennission was finally given by the President Deng Xiaoping 
after he saw the success of the reform experiment in Guangdong (Li, 2000). Among China's 
economic sectors, up to now, the decentralization of state control has taken place in those 
less strategically important sectors such as manufacturing industries rather than strategically 
important resources such as refining. "The extent and exercise of local autonomy is thus not 
an automatic feature of Chinese political life, but depends rather on each area's relationship 
with other localities, with the centre, and with the nation as a whole" (Goodman, 1989: p.29). 
Politically sensitive regions and sectors with high transaction costs were avoided in the early 
experiments because Beijing needed guarantees to ensure the success of the reform. Nearly 
thirty years after the reforms of 1978 this mentality has still not changed. 
The fundamental point here is the essential nature of state commitment in terms of the degree 
of decentralisation. It doesn't really matter in launching a reform strategy of "bottom up" or 
"top-down" development, whether the decentralisation is vertical or horizontal, or whether 
the GS or chief director of economic units, successfully or skilfully heads the reform in their 
respective domains. Success depends rather on the incentives for change made by the state 
and subsequent action taken to remove constraints. The CCP has made a commitment to 
decentralisation in order to release the latent energy in the nation's economy, but the reform 
is not genuinely and wholeheartedly radical where change might jeopardize national unity 
and social stability or undermine the leadership of the CCP itself. 
Deng said in the initial time of the reform: "economic development is the centre of party 
work" and "we must firmly maintain the Four Cardinal Principles - namely, keeping to the 
socialist road, upholding the people's democratic dictatorship (that is, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat), upholding leadership by the Communist Party and upholding Marxism-Leninism 
and Mao Zedong Thought. No-one should be allowed to undermine these principles, and they 
should be codified in an appropriate form." (Deng Xiaoping, 1993b). 9 
9 Deng's Speech: "Implement the Policy of Readjustment, Ensure Stability and Unity" at a Central Working 
Conference on December 25, 1980. 
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In 1978, the reforms were targeted at the coastal area due largely to comparative economic 
advantages. Despite its share of total fixed assets falling from 72 per cent in 1952 to just 47 
per cent in 1983, the coastal region still produced nearly 60 per cent of the national gross 
industrial output value. We cannot deny the fact that the coast regions have traditionally been 
the centre of market, resource, labour, technology, production and investment for centuries 
and have many comparative advantages in terms of non-state investment, agricultural 
productivity and transportation convenience. But we need to acknowledge the fact that the 
coastal share of national GDP grew from 50.66 per cent in 1980 to 58.94 per cent in 1994 
because of the coastal economic actors knowing how to integrate their localities into the 
market economy and knowing how best to reveal local initiatives in the transitional market 
economy. That could be done only with the commitment of the central state to 
decentralization, with the cooperation of the local state, and with the marketization of these 
regions. The "three-ladder-step" set the pace for the differential development between the 
inland and coastal areas, as well as orders for greater openness and politico-economic 
liberalization, and many interior areas have as a result lagged far behind. The encouragement 
of the coast to undertake openness and politico-economic institutional changes helped to 
reinforce the country' s unity via the wealth gained from the regional reforms. 
However, in the regions with political sensitivity or with strategic economic sectors, the state 
commitment to marketization and institutional relaxation has been limited, and incentives 
weak. In this sense, Komai ' s prediction on the incompatibility ofmarketization and state-
owned SOEs is presented in the economic performance of these regions. The institutional 
inefficiencies may be seen as a combination of North' s predation and Komai ' s SBC plus 
Weber' s irrationality and far from being eliminated, these were enhanced. Therefore, Qian's 
argument, which is underpinned by the central commitment and decentralization eliminating 
"predation" and SBCs, is questionable. It is a geographically biased and narrow interpretation 
in terms of its application to variations of China's regional reforms. When looking closely at 
those regions, all the criteria comprising the evidence for a Chinese style of market-
preserving federalism falls apart. Unequal decentralization in those regions thus challenges 
China' s partial reform and invalidates Qian' s theory of Chinese-style market-preserving 
federalism. Because of this, it is interesting to examine those ethnic regions where the state ' s 
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commitment to local decentralization is weak, not just in relation to their economic 
endowments but also their institutions, in order to test whether China's refOITIl is sustainable. 
2.3.2 The Ethnic Region in the Framework of China's Macro Decentralisation 
In China' s western regions, the refonn toward regional development has not undergone quite 
the same path as in the east: a completely vertical decentralisation. There are more 
restrictions and limitations attached to economic liberalisation here. Many poor interior areas 
do not just occupy geographically distant locations from China's core, as well as lesser 
development historically, but also they have large minority populations and are situated 
along China's inland borders, such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi and Yunnan 
provinces, in which local people have close ethnic connections with the neighbouring 
countries. Furthennore, given the variations of these regions' minorities in terms of their 
locations, histories, ethnic structure, religions, political or economic relationships with their 
bordering countries as well as with Beijing, the centre's ethnic policy toward them has varied 
from one to another. This depends on how the local leading minorities recognize their ethnic 
identity under the Chinese advocacy of "a multi-ethnic state". Given these circumstances, it 
is easy to understand why the centre will be more careful in handling the affairs of provinces 
like Tibet and Xinjiang than ofYunnan and Guangxi. This increases great political sensitivity 
in the political administration of these regions in relation to national unity and the control of 
non-Han populations. These factors have affected Beijing' s regional policy in terms of 
political deregulation by comparison with Han dominated regions. As China' s economy is 
always in the shadow of her political discretion, the degree of economic liberalization in 
these ethnic regions with regard to openness, foreign trade, fiscal deregulation and ownership 
is also accordingly affected and differentiated from the others. 
In the economic respect, ironically, these ethnic regions, in common with other inland 
regions, have large-sized strategic SOEs dominating their local economies, as a result of 
Stalinist industrialization in the past. This reinforces a double institutional constraint: 
political and economic. In particular, in regions which have strategic resource and related 
processing industries in the fonn of SOEs in the refonn period, central control is not released 
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at all and state predation is common. This is especially damaging to a province such as 
Xinjiang, where most of the economy relies on these SOE resource industries. 
As a result, there is a lack of sufficient resources to generate local economic growth and there 
is a lack of incentive for local actors, such as the "helping hand" of local government, to 
make their own efforts. Neither do the regions have the ability to attract FDI and transform 
local traditional economies into competitive market ones, nor the experience, consciousness 
and determination to open up and compete in domestic and international markets. These 
factors all lead to a frustrating standstill of the interior economy, despite it being in transition. 
In order to reduce the widening gap of unbalanced development between the interior and 
coast, the centre has continually had to grant more financial support to the interior in order to 
sustain its economy, especially because of the problematic state enterprises. As a result, 
Kornai's SBCs are formed. 
It took nearly ten years after 1978 to involve the ethnic regions in the market economy. This 
cannot be simply explained as late openness for interior areas that have been economically 
less developed in history. It is due largely to a lack of commitment by Beijing in terms of 
decentralization and of incentive restructuring of regional institutions, and, as mentioned 
before, a lack of political efficiency. The political sensitivity of the ethnicity of these regions 
requires local actors, especially provincial governments, to have a greater focus on political 
unity and administrative considerations than on economic prosperity, which clearly defines 
the scope of decentralization in the region and retains incentives. 
2.3.3 Challenge to China's Partial Reform in Terms of Provincial Governmental 
Performance in Chinese Ethnic Region 
Cheung, Chung and Lin (1998) have studied the dynamic roles of local leaderships in 
China's regional reform. They looked at eight provinces to compare and contrast them in 
order to test the degree to which provincial leadership counts for the success of local reform. 
It is undeniably the fact here that local leadership as well as the provincial government is 
very important to regional development but it is necessary to stress that, in addition to the 
capability and integrity of local government, the political orientation of a region is 
86 
fundamental, defining the degree of the centre's toleration of decentralization and the scope 
of these regions' local governmental decision-making power to reshape local government 
performance. Cheung and others, including Qian, Weingast and Roland with their theory of 
Federalism Chinese Style, only target the provinces having more or less similar political 
perspectives and they neglect those regions which have fundamentally different politics 
rooted in ethnicity, key strategic resource sectors or sensitive geopolitical locations, which 
thus shape the regional political geography differently from the coastal provinces. Beijing 
treats these regions differently in terms of policy, institutions and the decentralization of 
power, and the preliminary condition for arguments about the capability of local government 
is changed. 
As mentioned before, bargaining represents a mechanism to allow local governments to 
make their own decisions. The effectiveness of provincial leaders ' bargaining with the 
central leaders in reality depends variously on the degree of control by the centre over the 
province in question, its wealth and potential strategic significance, and "the personal 
connections, ambitions and acumen of the leaders" (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988: p.139). 
These differentiate the performance of provincial governments and leaders in how they act as 
economic-corporate like administrative institutions in the development of their territorial 
economy. This has resulted in starkly different development performances among provinces. 
Before the provincial leaders approach the centre to bargain for more decentralised decision-
making power and more local autonomy, they have to understand whether their regional 
politico-economic setting in the opinion of Beijing lays a foundation allowing them to do so. 
Without understanding this principle, despite the existence of other explicit advantages, the 
bargaining will not lead to the expected result and, moreover, any bargaining beyond the 
boundary of political unity is forbidden. I will use a diagram (Figure 2.4) to illustrate how 
local leaders could see the possibility of decision-making autonomy based on their region' s 
political and economic core-periphery relations in China' s overall strategic framework. 
When experiencing a particular phase of reform under this strategic framework, a region may 
be viewed as politically insignificant (situated in regime I or 11 in the diagram), the leaders of 
regions may be able to gain more decision-making power than those leaders of regions 
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regimes III and V. Provinces like Zhejiang with less state-dominated enterprises and a 
politically peripheral location had local governments more empowered at the beginning of 
China' s reform to take actions than others such as Shanghai (Liu, 1992; Wei, 1995, 2001 , 
2003), and provinces like Guangdong, with a record of great economic success, were able to 
influence central decisions and bargain for more openness without worrying too much about 
bringing political risks to the nation or to themselves (Hook, 1996; Chu and Yeung, 1998). 
"It appears that localities which are politically distant from the centre have greater autonomy 
than those whose existence looms larger-for whatever reason, be it defence, a substantial 
national minority population, or the importance of economic output - in the centre' s political 
mind. Thus, despite the physical distance, Tibet and Xinjiang in the far west of China are in 
fact politically closer to Beijing and thus less autonomous than provinces such as Shanxi or 
Shandong" (Goodman, 1989: p.28). A region's politico-economic orientation sets the degree 
oflocal economic autonomy and defines the capacity of regional leaders ' decision power and 
once more reinforces or undermines local government's capability for managing the 
economy from region to region. 
Figure 2.4 Region' s Political and Economic Core- Periphery Relationship 
II III 
core 
Economy 
periphery I V 
periphery core 
Politics 
(Source: author, 2004) 
Because of this, many interior regional governments have held back local reform for fear of 
making mistakes in relation to the centre (Cheung, Chung and Lin, 1998). Any profound 
reform has been cautiously undertaken by deliberately postponement until it can be fully 
justified. Such a constant reference to politics undermines the development of local 
government entrepreneurship and bureaucratic efficiency and undermines the dynamic of the 
local state' s institutional role. It also restricts the transformation of the government 
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institutional role as a middle agent representing the locality. Largely because of political 
restrictions, local government in these ethnic provinces is unable or unwilling to become an 
agent as in the coastal or Han regions. 
In this case, the local governments in these regions can be described as administrative 
delegation without autonomy. Most importantly, while the economic role of bureaucratic 
administration of local government has been largely confined, the political-administrative 
role is thus reinforced. Many local governments have been clearly aware that the political 
sensitivity of their regions' ethnicity requires them to act as "central defender" rather than 
"local defender" and to pay attention more to the "political administration" rather than 
"economic conduction" in order to maintain the integration of the regions with China as a 
whole. Therefore North's "political predation" via local governmental political 
administration will continually play its role in the development of these regions and Weber' s 
ideal rational bureaucracy is unlikely to influence the performance of these administrations. 
Since the reform, the central government has passed the fiscal authority and responsibility on 
to local government and clarified financial responsibilities between the centre and localities 
with the aim of reducing central intervention and increasing local economic self-reliance and 
financial discipline. Decentralization has also meant the supervisory power of local 
government over state enterprises. However the advanced coastal regions possess more TVEs 
and collective enterprises (semi-owned by the state) with a clear boundary of ownership, and 
that provides mechanisms for the local governments there to take part in the HBC, while the 
less developed interior regions possess more SOEs, which not only limits provincial 
authority over the SOEs located within their territory but also provides no means for local 
government to pursue financial self-reliance and to utilize local resources to best serve local 
economy. 
Therefore the primary responsibility for economic development by local governments in their 
respective jurisdictions has been reduced or is limited. Moreover, without vital power gained 
from the decentralization plus the political administrative orientation, these local 
governments in the minority regions in particular will not make any effort to remove all 
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restrictions on growth. This explains why local government of the interior hasn' t achieved its 
potential by comparison with the coast. The resultant standstill economy in the interior 
requires the central state continually to offer financial assistance and to bail the local 
economic institutions out of their poor management. 
Since the Chinese Communist government was founded, the centre has always aided ethnic 
regional development and has spent a great deal of money to maintain local economies and 
social stability, and the regions which have large minorities (including Xinjiang, Qinghai, 
Tibet, Gansu, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi and Ningxia) have constantly received government 
subsidies and retained all revenues regardless of their economic performance. "The ethnicity 
variable is a strong predictor of whether a provincial unit receives fiscal subsidies from the 
centre" (Yang, 1997: p.92-93). Compared to the other ethnic provinces, Xinjiang, Yunnan 
and Tibet have always enjoyed more subsidies from the centre (Yang, 1997). They are, as 
some Chinese academics have claimed, "blood transfusion economies" and "outside 
assistance economies" (Yang, 1997). As a result, the availability of central funds enables the 
top elites of these ethnic provinces to count on more financial support from the centre rather 
than making efforts to raise funds from their local economic productions and continually to 
perform as political defender without worrying about punishment for economic failure 
(Huang, Liu, Wu and Zhu, 1990). Komai ' s theory ofSBC explains why the central 
government' s assistance or protection weakens local governmental self reliance in financial 
management, which in turn undermines local institutional capability. 
In such a framework, the stagnant economies of these ethnic regions are attributable, besides 
the un-favourable policy and harsh natural conditions, to a lack of experience, to narrow-
minded local institutions, to the lower integrity and capability of provincial government in 
adapting the region to a market economy, and to the lack of commitment and unwillingness 
oflocal government to readjust its administrative role to serving the best interests of the 
region. "This is why it is vital that regional actors ask whether their decision-making 
processes constitute an obstacle to institutional renewal, away from a culture of hierarchy and 
rule-following, towards one that focuses on informational transparency, consultative and 
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inclusive decision-making, and strategy-building on the basis of reflexive monitoring of 
goals" (Amin, 1999: p.373). 
The evidence to be presented in the thesis supports the argument that the problematic local 
government structures created by China's limited decentralization contribute to the 
economically lagging nature of some regions in China's semi-transition, particularly ethnic 
provinces such as Xinjiang. Therefore, protection from Beijing helps to explain the 
inefficiency of local government in responding to local economic transition. The limited 
vertical decentralization in ethnic regions provides no incentives for marketization or new 
institutional frameworks to capture wealth. The local actors have lost interest in taking risks, 
in taking the initiative and, more importantly, in supporting profound reform. On examining 
the government's financial performance of Xinjiang in the following chapters, the evidence 
for this will be clearly presented. 
All in all, in the ethnic provinces, many former politico-economic features still remain. The 
productive local economic enterprises and dynamic governmental institutions are incomplete 
due to the stalled ownership reform and due to political restrictions on local economic 
liberalization, and therefore the provincial government has not been able to increase its 
competence for conducting growth in a market economy and its efficiency in bureaucratic 
administration, unlike their counterparts in the non-ethnic provinces. Even though there is 
huge local economic potential existing and there has indeed been certain decentralization of 
power to the regions, the provincial government has not known or done enough to rely on 
their own efforts instead of central assistance. Although the newly promoted Western 
Development Project (WOP) seems to offer many opportunities to the region by bringing in 
large investments, its success is doubtful owing to the slow paced semi-transition and owing 
to the insignificant deregulation permitted in the region. The injection of large investments 
granted by the series of new policies is obviously important, but, on the other side, it lays the 
foundation of a potential failure of the region's development. 
The challenge to China's regional development and central control is seen here to be, given 
all the possibilities and economic potential, that the development of an economically 
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marginalised region cannot simply rely on the possession of all its resources and capitals, but 
also on its ability to reveal these through initiative; on the local actors having a great desire, 
capability and knowledge for the development; on the empowerment to local active 
institutions in releasing and making the best use of those local talents, thereby breaking the 
ties of hierarchy and dependency on state provision; and on the rationalities of the actor 
networks oflocal government as economic agents (Amin, 1999). So, we see that the state's 
regional strategy, embodying the decentralization of economic autonomy without too many 
political strings attached to the regions, is essential and necessary, and also explains the rapid 
growth of the coast on the eve of Chinese reform. 
This thesis uses Xinjiang as a case study of local government and regional development - the 
relation between regionalized partial decentralization and the resultant incentive structure 
that shapes the performance of provincial government in China's transition. Xinjiang is made 
significant by its minorities, its border location and its reserves of resources that support 
China's development as a whole. Xinjiang's transition has been especially slow and cautious 
because of its ethnic makeup. "Socialist characteristics have not changed much" is a 
summary of what was said to me by many local people and officials during my fieldwork. 10 
Central control still dominates. As a result, the role of local government is different from its 
counterpart in the eastern regions: heavily politically-orientated, resulting in administrative, 
bureaucratic, organizational incoherence, and less economic activity and entrepreneurship by 
local government. We will examine the Xinjiang provincial government's performance in 
order to understand the less dynamic role oflocal government in China's underdeveloped 
ethnic regions due to the limited decentralization within the partial reform, supported by the 
three theoretical frameworks of Kornai ' s SBC, North' s institutional ism and Weber' s ideal 
style. 
Despite nationwide intent of these reforms, the results in practice have been differentiated 
and regionalized. In a region such as Xinjiang, with a very heavy political emphasis on its 
administration, the superiority of CCP leadership, rather than being confined, has been 
reinforced. 
10 lnterviews, 2002 and 2003 
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The rationality and efficiency of local government bureaucratic administrations has been 
affected and consequently the expected increase of economically managerial competence and 
cohesive organization of government teams is questionable. Because of this, Xinjiang's 
economic development has been largely held back and remains at a standstill, which fuels 
social unrest and political instability. It constitutes a major threat to China' s partial reform. 
The following chapters will, based on the debates stimulated by these three theories, explore 
the crucial role oflocal (particularly provincial) government in China' s regional development 
through examining the institutional role of local government in a lagging region. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Research Questions 
This research addresses the problems created by China's partial reform in order to shed light 
on its sustainability and effectiveness. The major problems are seen by Walder (1996) and 
Komai (2002) in terms of an institutional reconstruction that allows economic 
decentralization to local units while reta.ining political ' non-liberalisation' through one-party 
control and a legal system that cannot act outside the party' s interests. The reform thus puts 
"economic successes always at the mercy of political discretion" (Komai, 1997, 2000; North, 
1990; Qian, Weingast and Montinola, 1995: p.50). However, Qian and his fellow colleagues 
use a model of 'Federalism Chinese Style' that explains China's vertical decentralization as a 
Path Dependence, where local governments are empowered to protect their success from 
central political discretion. According to this model, local, especially provincial, 
governments play a crucial role in China's reform. On the one hand they steer regional 
development in a market economy, and on the other hand they remove all institutional 
constraints on regional economic growth, protecting marketisation and prolonging the partial 
reform. In my research I conclude that the theory of Qian, Weingast and Montinola only 
captures one part of China's reform - the successful story of China's coast, in which large 
semi-state owned enterprises and fiscal independence provide incentives for local 
government to take the initiative, and where political administration is also weak. In the vast 
inland region, there are not only large state owned enterprises remaining but also, in some 
regions with large minorities, strong political restrictions. Therefore China's partial reform 
can be viewed as regionalized and a contributor to the country's uneven development 
between the inland and coastal regions. This phenomenon of uneven development is so 
severe that it may eventually challenge not only the basis of the reform itself but, even more 
fundamentally, the very basis of national unity and stability. 
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This research uses a particular case study of Xinjiang to argue that the integrity of provincial 
governments and the enhancement of governmental competences in managing local 
economic growth have both been undermined by the experience of political domination in 
the province's history. The thesis explores the key factors that have affected Xinjiang' s 
economic development and evidence is brought to bear to challenge Qian and his fellow 
scholars' theory, which is a narrow interpretation of China's reform. 
The main procedure of the research is through the analysis of large quantities of quantitative 
and qualitative data in order to examine the experience of Xinjiang' s regional development 
and to elucidate the political-institutional constraints on local reform by analysing the 
performance of provincial government in steering the region toward prosperous and 
harmonious development. 
3.1.2 Research Strategies 
With regard to the methodology and nature of the research, the thesis chooses two main 
strategies: Archival Analysis and Case Study (Walliman, 2001: p.228) as means of collecting 
and analysing empirical evidence in pursuit of the research task. 
As noted before, my positionality is one of a Han Chinese researcher who has insight into 
Xinjiang as a long-time resident of Ururnqi and a former employee of the local state. While 
these characteristics set me apart from researchers who might be, say, of Uyghur ethnicity or 
British nationality, nevertheless I have tried to stand on neutral ground in my interpretations 
of the research topic and to deliver professional understandings. This is important when 
considering that information collected from China's media is always clouded by its political 
slant and the reliability and accuracy even of official data is doubted by many westerners. 
The principle of neutrality has encouraged me to think that it is possible to adopt professional 
methodologies in pursuing research, including theoretical analysis and explanation, and 
systematic data collection. First, through literature reviews of west em scholars ' work on 
China's development, I have tried to construct a conceptual foundation with theoretical 
arguments to define the research targets and approaches and to construct the research 
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methods. This has helped me to organize systematic data collection and analysis, authentic 
discussion and practical action involvement. Thus many activities are involved in library 
research before the stage of field research. Second, the fieldwork was used to gather evidence 
to test the justification of applied theories, reduce the division between theoretical hypotheses 
and practical realities, and to construct arguments for debate. I have used both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods. Quantitative research has been used in the collection and 
analysis of official and unofficial statistics, as a means of compiling evidence. This 
systematic and "non-biased" analysis of data is based on assumptions of objectivity and to 
some extent helps with the enhancement of neutrality of the research. However, as many 
statistical analyses rely on statistical comparison, the complex packages like SPSS were not 
used. Qualitative research was also a major method in this PhD. Evidence and data collected 
from qualitative research came from interviews, participant observation, historical archives, 
fieldtrips, etc .. 
According to Rose (1980, cited by Flowerdew, 1997: p.54), a particularly appropriate 
approach with five steps can be creatively used in doing research: 
"A. 171eory. What theory is being tested or developed in the report? 
B. Theoretical Propositions. How has the theory been translated into propositions 
(or hypotheses) to be investigated? 
C. Operationalization. What has been done, in practical terms, to shed light on the 
validity of these propositions? 
D. Fieldwork. What practical problems were encountered in trying to carry out the 
research? 
E. Result. What has been found out about the theoretical propositions, and what 
implications are there for the theory?" 
Choosing west China's regional development as the focus of my research, I faced difficulties 
arising, firstly, from the absence of an adequate theoretical and academic context. Although 
there are research studies specialized on China's institutional change, most have focused on 
the east, neglecting regions like Xinjiang, and especially its governance. Defining a suitable 
theoretical framework and academic model to describe Xinjiang's economic growth seems 
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challenging: the heavily studied politico-economic systems found in the occident are quite 
different from that of China, and Xinjiang' s particular ethnic conditions only add complexity. 
So intensive research on the literature relating not just to China as a whole, but also to 
Xinjiang, is a priority and defining a theoretical framework to support the argument is 
crucial. 
Although helping local government research on regional development, especially on 
Xinjiang' s economy, was my career in China and although, as a member of local 
governmental staff, I possessed an understanding of institutional functions and governmental 
organisation, still I needed to work on theoretical as well as empirical literature to understand 
the relation between institutions and regional development and to seek a theoretical 
framework to support my arguments. Therefore at the outset I sought to understand the 
relevant work done by western scholars, who, detached from the influence of Chinese 
politics, have developed advanced theories and methodologies to interpret China' s 
development. That helped me to shape my ideas theoretically and to construct a conceptual 
framework. 
I have attended a number of seminars, conferences, and panel discussions held in the UK and 
China that had the common theme of economic and political developments in China. Library 
researches at the School of Oriental and African Studies, the British Library, the Royal 
Geographical Society and Durham University have been important too. In this way, a large 
amount of material, including theoretical and empirical research works of western and 
Chinese scholars on Chinese' s partial reform, institutional changes, bureaucratic 
administration and regional development and policies, etc., has been collected. In addition, I 
also engaged in archival analysis of available published materials such as documents, annual 
reports including Year Books, newspapers, and non-academic journal articles. 
Through those large literature reviews and archival analysis, I have come to recognise that it 
is because of China's huge land area and the social complexities varying from region to 
region, that all reforms and decentralisation have been undertaken in various forms and at 
differing speeds according to each region ' s specialities. At the macro-scale, this has 
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exacerbated uneven development between the inland and the coast. The models and theories 
advanced to interpret the ' successful ' story of the reform are in my view normally incomplete 
and inadequate for the entire country and are invalid for some specific regions. For example, 
institutional cooperation is facilitating growth in the coastal regions but not inland. By 
seeking the fundamental problems arising from a region ' s special features, the models are 
invalidated, but I have then used the same theories to explain why, under certain 
circumstances, some regions cannot reproduce the success of their counterparts. This is an 
implicit criticism of the partial reform, which has resulted in many inconsistencies. 
According to Walliman and Baiche (2001: p.128), "a deductive argument is said to be valid 
when its premises, if true, do provide conclusive grounds for its conclusion; and, the other 
way round, when promises and conclusions are logically related in such a way that it follows 
that the premises could not possibly be true ifthe conclusion was not true". That is why the 
thesis can exploit the same theories to construct the conceptual framework. Gradually a 
framework has evolved in my mind that helps me situate my theoretical understanding of 
partial reform within a regional context and helps me subsequently to determine the research 
questions to be answered in the research. Three distinct but interrelated research areas have 
emerged: institutional development in China's reform, governmental performance and 
regional development. 
Through the literature review of development studies on China, I have extracted a lot of 
relevant materials. Just as argued by Walliman and Baiche (2001: p.41) after Wiersma (1986) 
and Leedy (1995), I found that: "Reviewing the literature is essential, not only in providing a 
context for the research subject and specifically limiting and identifying the research 
problem, but also in providing you with important information for subsequent parts of the 
research investigation." 
The second phase of study was fieldwork in China. The tasks here were not only data 
collection through qualitative and quantitative methods like interviews and participant 
observation but also the continuation of archival research, whose aim was to enlarge my 
knowledge and enhance my understanding in the field of regional studies contributed by 
Chinese academic counterparts. Some statistical data and evidence were also collected 
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through quantitative research in the fieldwork. The aim was to collect evidence and analyse 
facts to address whether Xinjiang' s local government is capable of managing the region 's 
economy and acting just like its coastal counterparts, described by Qian and Weingast 
(1996), as a key to the regional economic growth in a transitional economy. So a few 
questions need to be answered: 
1) How has Xinjiang's economic development evolved since 1949? What are the most 
productive economic sectors of the region and how large is their contribution to the 
regional economy? What are the local and central state's preferential policies with 
regard to sectoral development? 
2) What are the state' s political and economic institutions in the region and how and 
why have they been constructed? What are relations between the institutions and local 
government, between the institutions and the local economy, and between the local 
government and the local economy? 
3) How does the local party-government regime operate and how is it constituted in the 
region? What are the policies of recruiting its members and organising the regime? 
The information collected from the field aims at fulfilling the following objectivities: 
I) Investigation and definition of characters, especially the institutional changes seen in 
China' s partial reform. 
2) Investigation and definition of the regional character of Xinjiang, including its population, 
location and society, and these characters in relation to regional institutional development, 
especially during China's transition. 
3) The compilation of sufficient data and materials to explain the problems emerging from 
the Chinese economic reform and preferential policies specific to this particular inland 
area 
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4) The provision of sufficient infonnation, including all original documents and reports 
describing and analysing the changing pattern of Xinjiang's regional economic 
development in the past fifty years, and how economic development relates to the 
performance of local government and with the constitution of local institutions. 
5) The discussion of cases to demonstrate and analyze why Xinjiang's local government is 
lacking the skills, experience, and ability to manage the region's economic growth in a 
semi-free market economy, and institutional constraints confining the expansion of 
capacity of the local government and economic institutions in developing the region. 
6) To gain insights into the working ability, institutional administration, personnel structure, 
job duties and inter-relationships, etc of the various local governmental civil service 
departments in order to understand how the local government works for the region and 
what is its major mission and functions. 
3.1.3 Role of Researcher 
As to my personal background, my own experience of having been a senior policy-maker in 
one of the departments of Xinjiang' s government for three years enabled me to conduct the 
fieldwork in my hometown more easily than would have possible for others. I have certain 
skills to contact and deal with people, tackle unexpected encounters, and reach the data 
sources directly. 
Simply by writing this thesis I am taking an active part in the debates on China's regional 
development: this is of some significance, since many researchers working on the field have 
little chance immersing themselves entirely in a local community. My role is seen as: Insider, 
Outsider and Researcher, that is the tripartite role presented in this research. 
As an insider, a Chinese growing up within the local community, knowing it inside out and 
learning the culture, economy, polity and society, etc. throughout my own upbringing, there 
are no barriers of language (dominated by Chinese in the region) or cultural setting in the 
100 
fieldwork, which benefited me enormously, not just in the perception of the society, but in 
acceptability by the community during the fieldwork. I am not simply a researcher or 
observer but a member of this community, a participator. Mohammad (200 I: p.1 0 I) says that 
"an 'insider' ... was from and hence 'belonged' to the ... 'community'. This belonging was seen 
to endow me with a superior, almost organic knowledge of the ' community' not accessible to 
'outside'''. It was the same in my case. 
Firstly, my personal experience and upbringing in the region can be regarded and used as 
"organic" evidence to be presented in the thesis. For example: the experience in the 
"Bombing in 1992,,11. Secondly when approaching interviewees, especially Han Chinese, I 
was perceived as a colleague, an acquaintance, a counterpart, a compatriot, etc. varying from, 
but never falling out of, the community circle. This built an inherent rapport, which makes 
the information gained from their part more reliable and the product of generosity. 
Subconsciously, they were communicating with me without hiding their true opinions and 
frankly answered my questions on most occasions, though they were well aware of me as a 
researcher from abroad. Thirdly, specifically in the Chinese way, any job can be best done 
through personal ties with others: a "Social Net". This "Social Net" enables us to get our 
tasks done sometimes without being restricted by rules. This Chinese social connection 
creates a privilege certainly for Chinese, compared to foreign researchers, and allows 
Chinese researchers more easily to undertake research in China. They know the "rule" of 
accessing information sources, searching for the right interviewee and then organizing 
interviews. I used my privilege extensively during the fieldwork, 12 especially in getting 
access to senior bureaucrats, most of whom had no objection to my request for an interview. 
However, as an insider, a couple of disadvantages exist too in some respects. The 
predominance of my feeling of belonging to the society could divert my judgements away 
from impartiality and increase the likelihood of a personal interpretation. Being acquainted 
with interviewees could have lost the neutral ground and I might have taken in their words 
uncritically. My Han Chinese identity certainly barred access to the true thoughts of the 
11 Details in Chapter 5 
12 See discussion in Section 3.2 
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Uyghurs. In order to minimise these negative consequences, I used many approaches, for 
instance identifying myself and acting as an outsider or observer. 
There are two grounds for acting as an outsider. Firstly, the thesis is attempting to arrive at a 
better understanding of the cause of problems in Xinjiang's regional development. A few 
years of studying in the UK has equipped me with a broad view of China's reform. After 
making comparison with well developed European countries, and especially studying 
western scholars' work on China' s contemporary development, I am able to apply western 
theories to assess China's development from a different angle and on neutral ground. My 
opinion and judgement are no longer influenced or dominated by my former idealism. 
Secondly, in my years of absence, many changes and developments have occurred in China, 
which has left a gap for me to rediscover the updated reality. That motivated my eagerness 
and desire for new academic adventure. 
Acting as an outsider gave me benefits in many aspects during the fieldwork. I was able to 
examine the data critically and to assess the viability of the information in order to extract 
valuable material for my research. A large number of Chinese research studies on my field 
are available, although the method, philosophy and political expectation applied in those 
studies is unhelpful. Generally such studies are descriptive and lacking in theoretical 
explanation and argument. Chinese researchers focus on "where" rather than "what" and 
"how" in their analyses (Fan, 1997: p.633). In order to be free of influence and bias in pursuit 
of my own research, I have had to look behind the official voice and view them differently. 
So, when I observe a phenomenon in local bureaucratic administration or policy making and 
implementation by the government, I no longer consider it at face value but analyze the 
phenomenon deeply and beyond Chinese ideological expectations, and seek the causes and 
the best possible explanation. 
The disadvantage of the outsider showed in contacts with high ranking officials or even 
ordinary people, when conversations and behaviours had invariably to be restricted to a 
certain degree and the interviewees took a great caution and avoided telling me 
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"inappropriate" facts. I was not completely an outsider but labelled as "an internal outsider", 
which prevented me twice from approaching officials of the top rank. 
Where problems arose, I changed my strategy in approaching targeted people from formal 
interviews to informal ones or just a 'chat'. Knowing their concerns and, in order to alleviate 
the tension and caution that would prevent the interviewees from telling the truth, and also to 
pay respect to interviewees as they could feel threatened and insecure, I didn't use a tape 
recorder but used note-writing to record the conversation. Sensitive questions were avoided 
or indirectly asked. I kept the interviews mostly unstructured and the questions open-ended. 
For missing key information I used alternative sources, for example, as mentioned before, 
seeking the true voice of the Uyghurs by conducting interviews overseas. 
Nevertheless, I constantly shifted my roles from insider to outsider, although my priority 
reminded as a researcher, bearing in mind that I had all the time to be aware of the main 
purpose of the research and of the key information I tried to gain. That required me to 
prepare well for the interviews with lists of interviewees, key information and the basic 
structure of each interview prior to its commencement, though many changes took place after 
that. At the very least, I had to be aware of the personal background of the interviewee before 
I started the interview. The information therefore gathered from interviews as a whole has 
constructed the basic framework of the thesis. The detailed information needed to fill in this 
framework has been extracted from the collected data and documents. 
" In dealing with the ways in which you end up playing your roles as participant 
and/or observer in your research, many aspects of your identity will inevitably 
end up being played off against each other in various contexts as your appearance, 
ideas, intentions, feelings, politics, ways of doing things, and so forth (have to) 
change through the experience of setting up and seeing through your project" 
(Cook, 1997: p.137). 
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"In amongst all of these concerns, for many researchers the ideal role to adopt 
is that of an 'intelligent, sympathetic, and non-judgementallistener' to all of 
its members" (Cassell, 1988, cited by Cook, 1997: p.140). 
3.1.4 Research Limitations 
The research touches on many sensitive issues. Xinjiang itself is already a sensitive place to 
undertake research on her political and economic or even cultural development, and there is 
strong element of politics in my project. I integrated it into the research, rather than seeing it 
as a part of the process of political mobilisation. 
Sensitivities made it impossible to access some materials and gaining genuine information 
from the interviews with Uyghur. No Uyghur would like to risk themselves to reveal their 
true thoughts. Besides, there is hostility and distrust remaining in the relations between local 
Han Chinese and Uyghur. "Prejudice and discrimination held by both Chinese and Uyghur 
undermine the region's peace and stability", according to one professor in Beijing13 . As I am 
a Chinese, the Uyghur won't trust me and I could feel this deeply when I approached and had 
chatted with them for their true opinions on the perfonnance and bureaucratic administration 
of Xinjiang's CCP and government, on the state's preferential policies toward Xinjiang' s 
ethnicity, and on the Chinese political institutions in this region. 
No Uyghur interviewees answered my questions frankly, even though interviewing those in 
the UK and those are political silence seekers. Many of the silence seekers simply required 
for the independence of Xinjiang and ignored any opinions given to the adjustion of policies 
and institutions. Those interviewed by me in China either found an excuse not to answer the 
questions sensitive to them or gave me empty talks. The infonnation will never be authentic, 
as they view me simply as a Han. Such organic information is unreliable. Two high ranking 
Uyghur leaders (one had retired already) gave a blank refusal to my request for interview. 
13 lnterviews, 2003 
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Secondly the research draws on published, and unpublished but official, internal materials. 
The latter are crucial to my research because they often contain information that is 
occasionally more reliable than published data. These unpublished materials in general are 
not available in any country other than China. Under such circumstances, though I was 
granted access to the original unpublished documents recording the past and current 
development of the region, I was only able to bring out limited copies. Meanwhile, the 
reliability of those documents is doubtful too as they were produced for a political purpose 
and the truth behind contemporary historical events might not be interpreted neutrally and 
impartially and might not ever be released. As a result, one is often thrown back on 
secondary sources, particularly reports by western scholars. 
3.2 Dynamic of Research: Fieldwork 
The most significant experience within the research process was the fieldwork in China. In 
the schedule, periods of fieldwork in the first and second years of my research were planned. 
The total duration was five and half months. 
In order to answer the questions of the research, the activities took place as follows: 
1) The interviews with people who work for various civil service departments of the local 
government and with specialists who have research interests in this region's development. 
2) Document and data-base searches in local civil service departments and library research at 
Xinjiang' s and Beijing' s academic institutions. I accessed historical reports and documents 
by visiting local File Bureau and the National Library in Beijing. 
3) Talks with local residents whose lives have been directly affected by the refonn of 
politico-economic institutions. 
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4) Visits to field sites and investigations in order to aid understanding of institutional 
operation at sub-provincial levels and make comparison with other regions in the 
economic management of local government. 
5) Participant observation in a local governmental organisation in order to gain insights on 
Xinjiang's governmental organisation. 
3.2.1 Participant Observation 
Participant observation was not just to facilitate the research in the field but also to enhance 
the understanding of reality from the researcher' s own experience. As claimed by Holliday 
(2001), "Ethnographers also often carry out their research during the course of normal jobs or 
roles within society. For them, the 'dual role ' is ' (1) to engage in activities appropriate to the 
situation and (2) to observe" '(Spradley 1980, cited by Holliday, 2001: p.26). Especially in 
studies on governmental institutional change in terms of bureaucratic behaviours and 
decision-making process, much of the evidence gained from observation in a governmental 
office is more valuable than written reports. Therefore, I decided to choose my previous 
office to conduct participant observation. Due to the object of the thesis being local 
government, my former working place was convenient because its remit is in that area. It was 
the best platform to undertake participant observation on bureaucratic behaviours. Firstly, 
they have plenty of materials available on the broad issues relating to my research, such as 
some un-published statistical data indicating the economic growth of not only the region but 
also China as a whole; and original documents on specific policy making and 
implementation. Copies of all types of five-year plan were accessed in this way. Secondly, 
although as a former member of local governmental institutes, I have already gained great 
knowledge of Chinese provincial governmental performance in its infrastructure and 
bureaucratic administration, still there were issues to be examined and confirmed in order to 
update my knowledge in terms of new rules on personal recruitment and the proportion of 
Han and non-Han membership, and age groups, etc .. The relevant documents on local 
governmental infrastructure and construction were also available. Thirdly, I could easily find 
out and then contact the potential interviewees through the "social nets" of former 
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colleagues. I was easily able to approach them as I was presenting myself on these occasions 
as an "insider". 
I travelled from one department to another within my former office to watch the operation of 
each department and talk to all directors and key members in their respective fields: 
economy, industries, agricultures, transportation, finance and investment, personal 
administration, and CCP affairs. Through these interviewees, I got further contacts with 
others unit in the same field, such as the financial department of the local Financial Bureau. 
On contacting these units, I not only undertook interviews with key informants and searched 
for available published materials in the unit's file office and database, but also observed the 
operation of the units in order to gain "organic" information. 
I acquired a large amount of evidence on governmental behaviour and organizational 
infrastructure through participant observation. The method provided the maximum up-to-date 
and organic information on the transition in managing regional the economy and China's 
transition as a whole. In my view, it enhances the authenticity of the thesis. 
3.2.2 Interviews 
The aim of the interviews was to gain information relevant to the issues and debates on 
China's regional development, institutional development in decentralization, Chinese policies 
in terms of ethnicity, regional development, and government institutional reform from the 
viewpoint of researchers or officials. The interviews were set up by approaching four groups 
of people: retired bureaucrats and government planners; currently employed bureaucrats and 
planners; scholars and Uyghurs (Table 3.1). There are 45 interviews in total conducted and 
44 individual interviewees selected according to their duties and any interests they had that 
were related to my research. I found that they were able to come up with helpful explanations 
of the causes of China's decentralisation, uneven regional development and ofXinjiang's 
economic standstill. Two forms of interviews were used throughout the fieldwork: semi-
structured interviews with individuals and unstructured interviews with focus groups. The 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with key interviewees, including academic 
experts, professors, specialists, policy-makers and government officials. These individuals 
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were selected within Beijing and Xinjiang according to the relevance of their academic work 
or official job to my project. 
Table 3.1 The List of Interviewees 
Interviewees Career Location and Institute 
I Director Department A of Local Governmental Institute I , Xinjiang 
314 Planning Bureaucrats 
1*2 Planning Bureaucrat Department B of Local Governmental Institute I , Xinjiang 
I Planning Bureaucrat Department C of Local Governmental Institute I , Xinjiang 
I Vice Director Department D of Local Governmental Institute I, Xinjiang 
I Vice Director Department E of Local Governmental Institute I, Xinjiang 
I Planning Bureaucrat Department F of Local Governmental Institute I, Xinjiang 
I Director Local Governmental Institute I, Xinjiang 
I Director (retired) Local Governmental Institute I , Xinjiang 
I V ice Director Department A of Construction Bureau, Xinjiang 
I Director Department A ofXAPG, Xinjiang 
I Planning Bureaucrat Department A ofCCP Commission, Xinjiang 
I Planning Bureaucrat Department B ofCCP Commission, Xinjiang 
I Vice Director (retired, Uyghur) Department C ofCCP Commission, Xinjiang 
I Vice Director Department A of National Land Usage Bureau, Xinjiang 
I Director Department A of Financial Bureau, Xinjiang 
I Director Department A of Institute I of XPCC, Xinjiang 
I Vice Commander XPCC, Xinjiang 
2 Vice Governors Manas County, Xinjiang 
I *2 Planning Bureaucrat (retired) Local Investment Bank, Xinjiang 
I *2 V ice Director Urumqi Oil Chemical Manufacturing Company, Xinjiang 
I Director (retired) Economics Department, China Social Science Academy, Xinjiang 
I Director Ethnic Studies Department, China Social Science Academy, Xinjiang 
I Director China Social Science Academy, Xinjiang 
I Professor Xinjiang University 
I Professor Xinjiang University 
I *2 Professor Xinjiang Teacher Training University 
I Professor Regional Studies Department, Remin University, Beijing 
I Senior Lecturer Regional Studies Department, Remin University, Beijing 
I Senior Lecturer (Eric) Ethnic Studies Department, China Social Science Academy, Beijing 
I Director (Korean) Ethnic Studies Department, Centre University for Nationalities, Beijing 
I Professor (retired) Industry and Economics Department, China Social Science Academy, Beijing 
4 Professors China Science Academy, Beijing 
2 Political Silence Seekers (Uygh ur) UK 
I Student (Uygh ur) UK 
I Lecturer Durham Universi!}" 
I Lecturer School of Oriental and African Studies 
6 (a group Retired Bureaucrats Local Residents, Xinjiang 
interview) 
.. (Note: Mmonttes m blue; department A, Band C refers to the dIfferent department; *2 means: had mtervtews 
twice 
Source: author, 2003) 
Based on their careers, the key interviewees are divided into two groups: ones from the 
academy (including retired scholars), who are currently (or used to be) involved in research 
14 One of three planning bureaucrats had been interviewed twice. 
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on regional development and policy-making, and the others (including those retired) from 
governmental civil service departments, who are (or used to be) responsible for regional 
economic development in their specific fields. Normally I made a request particularly 
mentioning an individual, face-to-face interview prior to its taking place. In general, they 
were very open and friendly when I interviewed them with key questions. However, when 
interviewed by a researcher who is studying abroad, the people of the second group 
restrained their conversation. 
In order to create a friendly and relaxed atmosphere for the interviewees and explore the 
possibility of getting unexpected information, two forms of interview were used throughout 
the fieldwork: semi-structured and unstructured interviews with open-ended questions. The 
semi-structured interviews were used for key interviewees including: academic experts, 
professors, specialists, policy-makers and governmental officials. 
I arranged one focus group interview with six local residents. This was of benefit to the 
information collection in terms of authenticity and reliability. The information was linked to 
searching the truth of the historical events affecting China's policy-making and obtaining 
people's opinions and attitudes toward state policies and Xinjiang's regional development in 
the past. 
"the aim of an interview is not to be representative ... but to understand how 
individual people experience and make sense of their own lives. The emphasis 
is on considering the meanings people attribute to their lives and the processes 
which operate in a particular social context" CV alentine, 1997: p.112). 
The specially selected group of academic interviewees all have long undertaken research on 
the regional development of Xinjiang or on China as a whole. They have mastered a large 
amount of information and their publications frequently employ data sponsored by the state 
and published within the internal circle. Censorship can prevent contradictory results of 
research from being published in China, but it cannot prevent them from speaking out. After 
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my experience of working with them, they showed their generosity to my request for 
research materials and for the truth. They were my key interviewees. 
Because career concerns and personal backgrounds differ between officials and specialists, 
so does their attitude towards academic researchers from a foreign country. Unambiguous 
and non-oblique responses to the questionnaire, and a large quantity and reliable information 
were gained from interviews with specialists or local residents rather than with officials. The 
academics were eager to express their resentment towards bureaucracy and the mechanics of 
governments and offered their own suggestions for change. Such information gained from 
these interviews could never have been gleaned from written documents. 
A cross-section of interviewees was used, with a variety of race, career and educational 
levels and ages 35-65, in order to obtain different views on the political and economic 
changes that have occurred throughout the life times of these individuals. The interviewees 
were also selected with regard to the fact that they have seen and experienced changes and 
those changes have directly affected their personal life in the past fifty years. 
Apart from Han Chinese, other minorities including Uyghur, Kazakh, Mongol, and Korean, 
etc., have been involved as interviewees in both forms of interview. As a requirement for the 
necessary quality of interview, most of interviewees have been selected with high levels of 
education and with fluent Mandarin. Special thanks are due to two interviewees whose 
nationalities are Korean and Eric l5 ; they both acted as a third party to present their opinions 
on how better to solve the worsening relationships between Han Chinese and Uyghur. 
In addition, after the completion of fieldwork in China, I continued to have a few interviews 
in the UK as an extension of the fieldwork. The reason for this as mentioned previously, 
there is great difficulty in obtaining the views of the Uyghur inside the country. Even though 
I pointed out that I had no political agenda and that my research was confined to the region's 
economic development, they did not feel able to reveal their true opinions freely in Xinjiang. 
As far as I am concerned, it is unfair to neglect the voice of local people. Uyghur have a right 
15 A minority that is genetically connected to the Mongolians. 
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to give their opinions and the research would be incomplete without the involvement of the 
local minorities especially the Uyghur, who make up the majority of local population and are 
the main actors in Xinjiang's economic performance. Missing information from their part is 
filled by my own observations in Xinjiang and by four interviews undertaken afterwards in 
the UK with western researchers who have interests in Xinjiang and with Uyghur students 
studying here. 
Three major types of information were gained from interviews: comments and 
recommendations on Xinjiang's regional development in terms of economy, society and 
institution, and the way and orientation of development of this region in China' s politico-
economic framework; policy-making on issues of national and regional economic growth and 
ethnicity and satisfaction with policy implementation; and the truth behind historical events 
in China and in the region in particular and their impact on policy change and uneven 
regional development. 
3.2.3 Chats 
An alterative for gathering information on general or even sensitive issues was to chat with 
local people such as taxi drivers, factory workers, park keepers, etc .. Unknowing the purpose 
of my approach and regarding me as an ordinary person no different from others, they were 
able to tell me their opinions and expectations of regional development and all the changes 
directly affecting their life. Despite being unsysternatic and random, chatting with local 
people constructs another primary information source: voices from grass roots level in 
considering China's development. There is no doubt about its authenticity. On the most 
occasions, I deliberately directed the conversation to my interests. The information enriched 
the data collection and provided unexpected discoveries, for example, during my visit to 
Shandong, a coach driver kindly pointed at all advertisements displayed along the sides of 
highway and told me which ones are financially sponsored by the local government. This 
was impressive evidence of the great efforts made by the government in that province to 
sustain their region's economic growth. 
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3.2.4 Library Research 
I undertook library research in China, based in Beijing and Xinjiang, particularly in the 
capital, Urnmqi, where the leading regional universities and academic institutes are located. 
In Beijing, there are many outstanding universities, such as Beijing University, People' s 
(Renmin ) University, the National Ethnic University, and national academic institutes, such 
as the Institute of China Sciences Academy, which can conveniently provide a lot of relevant 
and up-to-date data. Library research in Xinjiang included Xinjiang University, Xinjiang 
Teacher Training University and the Institute of China Science Academy ofXinjiang. In 
those libraries, many Chinese scholars ' research works are available and extremely valuable, 
for example Lu' s works (2000, 2001 , 2003), from China Science Academy, and Wang' s 
(1999a, b and c), from Xinjiang China' s Social Science Academy (XSSA). They did not just 
present a deepened understanding of China' s uneven development and the course of 
Xinjiang' s development over the years but also a large amount of reliable data. Both of these 
scholars ' works have also been quoted by western researchers. Through the recommendation 
of one interviewee, I obtained copies from its library of surveys done by the XSSA on 
ethnicity at or below county level, and the religious faith, education and cultural reservation 
of local Muslim communities and the relations between Han and non-Han. This turned out to 
be key data in looking at the problems of the local political and bureaucratic administration. 
The information gained from library research also included copies of China' s Five-Year 
Plans (FYPs) and other development plans and policies; copies of documents, report or 
academic materials to supplement the information on China' s FYPs, Xinjiang' s regional 
development plans and ethnic policies; China' s statistical data and other social-economic 
development indexes. 
3.2.5 Fieldtrips 
Fieldtrips were the most dynamic part of my work in China, because they provided me not 
only with a visual interpretation of regional economies being developed and local 
government's efforts to manage economic growth, but also, through my investigation onsite, 
insights into how the growth is managed and maintained, and its constraints, reflecting the 
capability of local governments. The fieldtrips can be regarded as a sort of participant 
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observation. The information gained includes organisational infrastructure and administrative 
behaviours of Xinjiang's local government at township level in managing the local economy 
and tackling bureaucratic institutional changes; comparisons of provincial governmental 
behaviours in managing local economic growth between Xinjiang and Shandong; and 
contrasts in the uneven regional development of Xinjiang, Shandong and Hebei. 
A. The first trip was undertaken in my first spell in China (Map 3.1). 
One field site was targeted: the north-facing slope of the Tian Shan Mountain, an area 
designated to be Xinjiang's major Special Economic Zone (TNSEZ). The line of the Tian 
Shan Mountains horizontally divides the region of Xinjiang into north and south. The 
northern slope of the mountain range contains the best natural conditions in terms of living 
and farming for its inhabitants. The new development after 1979 has transformed it into the 
TNSEZ, considerably advanced in industrialisation, transportation and urbanization. The 
capital, Ururnqi, and the second biggest city, Shihezi, which is the administrative capital of 
the Bingtuan (the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCCs)), are both situated 
within the zone. Xinjiang's major railway line is routed along the slope ending westward at 
the border. When I travelled along the zone, I stopped at four major developed cities: 
Shihezi, Kuytun, and, Dushanzi and Karamay. Dushanzi and Karamay were founded and 
expanded by the oil refining industries developed in Xinjiang as a result of the escalated 
demand for oil consumption in China's east. Shihezi, Kuytun and Dushanzi form "an 
economic golden triangle", owing largely to the advanced transportation and natural 
conditions. Shihezi, which has received substantial investment from the XPCC via the State 
Council (SC), is the second hi-tech industrial town and the second Han Chinese dominated 
cultural and educational centre and has a large population of immigrants from Shanghai. 
Kuytun is administrated too by the XPCC and has been economically affected by China' s 
economic transition. 
The visit has provided me with an opportunity to investigate economic development at sub-
provincial level within Xinjiang and the result shocked me enormously. The site is 
representative of the most advanced economic development in Xinjiang, but the impact of 
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Being accompanied by a local official, I had a round-the-town tour to see major developing 
industrial parks and farming plantations. Manas is located on the slope of north Mountain 
Tian Shan within the territory of the TNSEZ and geographically close to Urumqi and 
Shihezi. The best agricultural conditions and convenient transportation have developed an 
industrial conglomeration in a designated Park, where food manufacturing and wine brewing 
dominate the assemble lines. Both state and private companies have located plants there and 
the products have started to be popular all over China. The county has been regarded as a role 
model for the region. However, the town still faces a shortage of investment and low 
profitability. 
Apart from its economic performance, I observed and investigated the local government' s 
performance in managing economic growth, trying to discover any direct links between 
economic success and the capability of government. 
C. The third fieldtrip to Shandong province, the richest province in China's northern 
region (Map 3.2). 
Shandong has a long coast line along the Yellow Sea, facing South Korea. From 1994-2000 
its development reached a peak, as a result of huge profits gained from business and 
commercial links with South Korea. I went to three coastal cities: Qingdao, Yantai, and 
Weihai, and the capital, Jinan, an inland city. Impressively, Qingdao is much more 
economically advanced and socially developed than Jinan. Yantai used to be a military 
harbour but now is a medium-sized, open industrialised city famous with and economically 
supported by a pillar industry: the nationally known winery, Zhang Yu , whose production is 
equipped with German techniques and machines and sponsored by the local government. 
Qingdao is famous for its brewing, under the brand Qingdao Beer, and mechanical 
engineering in the form of a refrigerator manufacturing enterprise, Haier. These two products 
and others have been popular throughout China for years. 
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Hebei is well-known for its geographical and political proximity to Beijing. It has followed 
every step of Beijing's political direction. Although it is close to Beijing and has a coast line, 
the economic achievement here is far less impressive than that of Shandong. 
These visits gave me a simple basis for making a comparison between developed and 
developing regions. Shandong, Hebei and Xinjiang are physically situated in their respective 
economic zones - coast, inland and west - according to the division of the "Three-Ladder-
Step" programme and have shared the common culture of "China's north". As a result of 
uneven economic development, Shandong's economic prosperity stands out remarkably and 
indicates the benefits undeniably gained from policies granted by the centre and political 
institutional relaxation. In spite of the one-day trip in Hebei, the contrast was obvious and it 
struck me that China's wealth is unfairly shared and regionally divided. 
3.3 Data 
The sources of materials and information include the information gathered from un-
structured and structured interviews, chats, observations and from unpublished and published 
documents and reports, academic books and journals, web sites, etc. (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Data Collected in the Fieldwork 
Sources Description 
Documents • Governmental IO-and 5- year planning policies 
• Central and local government's reports on political and economic development 
• Publications of central and local government 
• Official publications 
Archival Records • Television documentary 
• Articles on newspaper and journal 
• Books, journals having historical reviews and reports 
• Statistics Books ofXinjiang and China 
• News and information on websites 
• Papers from seminars, conferences, talks, etc. 
Interviews • With individuals being economic experts, professors, specialists and officials 
• With focus group interviewees recruited from local residents 
Chats • With local residents 
Observations • Visiting local offices 
• Visiting field sites 
• Visiting local factory plants and plantations 
(Source: author, 2003) 
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3.3.1 Data Sources 
3.3.1.1 Primary Sources 
There is no clear boundary for distinguishing the data from primary or secondary sources in 
the research. Some materials obviously are classified as secondary ones, for example the 
suggestions and comments in academic articles that have been interpreted and cited by their 
authors. The information adduced from interviews, chats, observations and investigation, 
archival searching is attributed to the primary materials. "The essence of a primary source of 
information is that it involves the researcher in direct experience and observation of the real 
world, in so far as that term has meaning" (Preece, 1994: p.SO). A few copies of hand-written 
or typed documents, which recorded the historical events or reported facts to high authorities, 
were found in those departmental file-keeping offices. I categorised these among the primary 
sources, as the presentation of those documents have already proved themselves to be historic 
evidence, acting both as reference and primary materials. 
My research areas cover reasonably broad issues, such as: policy, policy-making and 
implementation, governmental capability and governance, institutional change and 
development studies, ethnic studies, etc .. When collecting the data from primary sources, 
especially selecting interviewees, a particular method used was sampling. Sampling is a skill 
of "collecting the information representative of the total quantity of cases of the type which 
are the subject of your study. When you want to assess the opinion of large number of 
community, you will have to devise some way of selecting a sample of the members who you 
are able to questions, and who are a fair representation of all member of the union"(Walliman 
and Baiche, 2001: p.232). As there are various subjects involved in the research, I chose the 
interviewee who must be in charge of or responsible for hislher respective field each from 
academic and governmental departments. The number of interviews for each subject depends 
on the weight of those subjects in the research, for example: more people than others selected 
from the field of policy-making, a method as Purposive Sampling (Walliman and Baiche, 
2001: p.234). 
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3.3.1.2 Secondary Sources 
Apart from the information collected from primary sources, I also collected books and 
newspapers, copies of various up-to-date reports and documents, news and data from Chinese 
websites and databases, including Xinjiang's FYPs, key information on each of China's 
FYPs, and the SC documents announcing the launch of China' s Great West Development 
Campaign (WDP). 
Academic books now emerging in China discuss the varied issues in her economic growth 
and regional development, and the debates, results and data they deploy will accordingly be 
referred to and selectively used in this thesis, though their method and philosophy are 
suspect. For example, most Chinese documents and academic data are characterised by 
political bias. They are instruments in the politics of regional development and of debates 
about development process. Being aware of this, my thesis has to be completed beyond this 
constraint and circumscription. 
I have kept close eye on any useful news or information from websites during the course of 
this research, which has helped me with updates and further reference. Nowadays major 
changes are reported on the web and some commentaries appear too. For example, I found 
web news about the construction of an oil pipeline to be shared between Russia, China or 
Japan, following every step of the negotiations. Apart from websites, libraries and 
government departments and file bureaux have been my targeted secondary sources. 
For first hand information about Uyghur true opinion on sensitive issues, I resorted to 
websites designed by Uyghur refugees abroad and from there I obtained a considerable 
amount of information. 
Statistics include both the regional and national Chinese Statistical Yearbooks published 
since 1950, which are authoritative sources, providing large amounts of survey information 
and economic indicators. The regional statistical yearbooks for Xinjiang, Shandong, and 
Guangdong are also of particular interest. Xinjiang and Guangdong are geographically and 
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economically classed each in the third and first steps in China' s "Three Ladder Steps" theory, 
the Chinese version of the growth pole theory (Wei, 1999). Drawing comparisons between 
these provinces, which represent the two macro-regions in China' s spatial division, will give 
a clearer picture of how the state' s preferential policies affect the regional development 
differently. The Year Books, containing a broad range of economic indicators, reflect these 
differences, and thus I shall rely upon them as a main source. However, owing to the ten 
years of "Cultural Revolution"(CR), the Yearbooks of the periods of 1965-1980 do not exist. 
Even if they did exist, the information would probably not be very reliable and complete. 
They were published as political propaganda rather than as research references. In this case, I 
have to gather statistics of the period of 1965-80 from other sources, such as economic 
research books and journals such as: China Quarterly, etc. , focusing on the mainland China 
development published in Taiwan and the United States. 
With regard to the issue of accuracy and reliability of data in China' s Statistical Yearbooks 
officially published by the National Statistic Bureau (NSB), a few western scholars ' 
comments need to be considered. According to Gale (2002), who is concerned about 
agricultural statistics, China's statistics have always been politicized and exaggerate growth 
and understate losses. Since the decentralisation, due to a loosening of government control 
and growth of the non-state sector, the accuracy of China' s statistics is becoming 
questionable, although modem survey and data-collection technologies have been introduced 
to counter this trend. Sinton (2001) comments that the quality of China' s energy statistics has 
been declining since the rnid-1990s, as the result of loosening control over reporting systems. 
However, Sinton also said that it does not mean all data should be rejected but should be 
handled with caution. Holz (2003 : p.162) has made a systematic analysis on the reliability of 
Chinese output and economic growth statistics and argues that "they are both more and less 
reliable than the critics think. They are more reliable in that the NBS is unlikely to be 
purposefully falsifying data." Toops ' comment (2004a) in particular on the reliability of 
Xinjiang' s Statistical Yearbooks is an important corrective: 
"These are the best statistical resources available to the researcher. Demographers such 
as John Aird, ... have utilised the statistical bureau publications in their analyses of 
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China population developments. For more than thirty years between 1949 and the early 
1980s - statistical data was an instrument of political propaganda and manipulation or 
not available at all. In contrast, much of the data from the 1982, 1990 and 2000 
censuses are up to international standards. Data from the 1982 and 1990 censuses are 
readily available. The Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook constitutes an invaluable resource 
for the analysis of regional variations in Xinjiang's overall demographic 
pattern"(Toops, 2004a: p.241). 
As far as I am concerned, based on personal experience, despite politicization and 
decentralization resulting in increasing inaccuracy in official statistics, China has tried to 
present her statistical data in a way to meet international standards. The major statistical 
yearbooks are published in English in order to let foreign researchers directly access the data. 
This is a signal that, in order to meet the requirement for high standard and reliability of data 
for international researchers, the state has had to improve its statistical methods and to 
present highly quality, original data. Since the beginning of the fast acceleration in GDP, 
many scholars have tried to question the reliability of all statistical data indicating growth. As 
stated by Nemets and Torda (2002), there is no faked statistical data hidden or contradictory 
to growth. China needs to prove to the world her economic success by presenting reliable 
data. Holz (2003: p.163) also says "The recent reforms in the statistical system show that the 
Chinese leadership and the NBS are responding well to the challenge ... recent refonn 
measures are likely to a strengthening of professional statistical practice across the country." 
Fortunately I have insights into the reliability of data in the statistical yearbooks through my 
privileged position. As Gale (2002) said, historically China has always had duplicative 
reporting systems and much reliable data is only available to government officials. Through 
the "social network", I have been able to access these data, generally considered as more 
reliable than those in the published Yearbooks. In addition, I will also refer to statistical data 
collected from the published works of western scholars to compare, select or detennine the 
accuracy of data from the statistical yearbooks. In those ways I will try to minimize the 
uncertainty about China's statistical data. 
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This thesis discusses some political scandals in relation to local governmental performance 
and leadership before the reform. Although such the events can be found on the records of 
the China or Xinjiang Year Books, the truth behind events in the CR and in the beginning of 
the post GS period had been unrecorded in China or distorted for political reasons. Western 
scholars such as McMillen (1979) have discussed the truth in their books, China Quarterly 
has provided largely useful data up to the fITst FYP and I have also resorted to the 
biographies and autobiographies of important political leaders such as Burhan and Wang 
Zhen as sources for the truth of those events. Alternatively, through interviews with older 
people in the region, I have gained further information about the relevant events. 
3.3.2 Data Analysis 
Because the analysis of data has to be linked to the aims and theoretical framework of the 
research, the data collection was a combinative process of data establishment and analysis. 
The preliminary analysis through data establishment is to categorize data by using a coding 
system, compiling memos and an interim summary. The process illustrated in figure 3.1 
shows: all of the collected data - the corpus of data - can be used in the research, but it is 
messy originally and will need to be made sense of, shifting, organising, cataloguing, 
selecting, determining, themes - processing the data - in order to develop the sense of the 
argument. According to Holliday' s (2001: p.103) suggestion, a thematic approach is applied 
to organise the data: "some studies, certainly, use a purely thematic approach in which all the 
data is taken holistically and rearranged under themes which emerge as running through its 
totality". "Different research projects are driven in different ways, with different intensities 
of argument; but it has to be recognised that the development of themes and the organisation 
of data are interconnected with the development of an argument. The whole purpose of 
organizing the data is to serve and structure the argument in the written study" (Holliday, 
2001: p.104). 
New evidences can be discovered and extracted from the data for the argument to support 
theoretical hypotheses. Consciously, all discussion and analysis are restricted to the 
theoretical framework and the research objectives. According to Grounded Theory, the 
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process of data categorizing and analysis aims to discover, develop and test a theoretical 
hypothesis from field data - the process of qualitative analysis. The importance of qualitative 
analysis is to develop theory from data rather than "merely to test prior theory" (Walliman 
and Baiche, 2001: p.259).In this case, "with the further development of the hypotheses, 
continuing collection of data and theoretical reflection, the developing theory is again tested 
in the field" (Wallirnan and Baiche, 2001: p.259). There is a dual aspect in the process of 
data analysis (Figure 3.2). One aspect is data collection and the presentation of extracts as 
evidence. Another is the through discussion and argument. In the sectional analysis and 
extraction, the implication and significance of data in each section is discussed. 
Figure 3.1 From Data to Text 
la) Corpus of Raw Data 
Rationalised sections of messy reality 
Once removed from 'reality' 
Ib) Thematic Organisation of 
Data 
Political Institutions 
Economic Institutions 
Comparative 
(dis )advantal!es 
Policies 
~----------------~~ 
Historical Events 
I Documents; 2 Archival records; Further removed from ' reality' 
3 Interviews; 4Statistics; 5 observation 
(Source: compiledfrom Holliday, 2001) 
Figure 3.2 A Dual Process 
Data 
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(Source: compiledfrom Holliday, 2001) 
le) Text or Data Analysis Section 
or Chapter 
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Comment 
Noting what this 
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significant 
Discussion, 
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A body of data was established after fieldwork, which includes a large quantity of historical 
development materials, statistical surveys and official documents and they have been 
subjected to analysis. I firstly arranged them into a new structure under different thematic 
headings, such as: 1) political institutions, including the CCP and governmental bureaucratic 
administration at state, provincial and township levels, administrative refonn, and leadership, 
personnel training, recruitment and appointment; 2) economic institutions including 
ownership and fmancial distribution of local industrial and agricultural sectors; 3) locally 
comparative advantages or disadvantages including: geographical conditions, infrastructure, 
and social factors in tenns of ethnicity; 4) all development policies including state and local 
FYPs and other policies; 5) records on key events in the local contemporary history; 6) 
evidence of Xinjiang' s economic development over the past 50 years since 1949; etc .. Each 
heading abstractly reflects the research aims under the structure of the chapter plan. In this 
way, the data was grouped into different sections related to these headings. 
Secondly, each section was then focused on, and the data was further examined, grouped, and 
extracted to recognise and discover the signification and difference of data and to turn the 
raw materials into qualitative data to serve the argument (Figure 3.1). The process of 
sectional analysis can be demonstrated through an example: the analysis of political 
institutions. The examination of political institutions, which the autonomous state and the 
CCP leadership established for Xinjiang, reveal the different degrees of political 
decentralisation and administration here from that in other regions. In the thesis I have tried 
to find out, by combining the results of the sectional analyses, the impacts of the political 
institution in the region upon perfonnance, orientation, bureaucratic administration and 
infrastructure construction of Xinjiang' s local government. A summary is displayed in figure 
3.3. This provides further material for the argument about local governmental competence in 
Xinjiang' s development. The sources illustrated in table 3.1 - the raw data - will be 
processed into text fonn at the end of sectional analysis to explain the contribution of the data 
of each section to the main argument. 
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Figure 3.3 Network for tbe Data Analysis 
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(Source: author, 2005) 
In addition, in one or two data sections there are reports on local financial management in 
relation to local governmental authority in decision-making. As these data are only needed to 
draw attention to whether local government can gain authority from economic self-reliance 
and revenue from local enterprises in their domain, complicated statistical analysis will not 
be necessary for financial budgetary analysis. I simply use diagrams or tables to interpret the 
facts by exploiting local financial budgetary and annual reports based on the data collected 
from fieldwork and the data from provincial or national statistical year books. 
The interconnection between the sections will be developed and tested by identifying 
common themes and functions in order to answer research questions and test theoretical 
hypotheses. Again this can seen in an example: analysing the interrelated functions of 
economic conditions and economic institutional constraints on the performance of local 
government. The examination of economic institutions revealed that economic 
decentralisation is different from other provinces. The results, combined with the results of 
an analysis of local economic comparative advantages of disadvantages, will be used for 
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pursuing their impacts on the behaviour of local government in gaining decentralised 
economic power for producing justified policy to steer local economic development. 
Through this process of data analysis, the large, "messy", quantitative data is organised into a 
systematic network to form argument for the thesis (Figure 3.3). The network is also 
described the relation of each group of data and their interconnected action on the argument. 
Based on the direction of the network and the presence of sufficient refined data refined, the 
thesis writing could start. 
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Chapter 4 Major Institutional Constraints on Xinjiang's 
Economic Development 
This chapter will examine the constraints on Xinjiang' s development in terms of 
geographical location, social environment, and political administration. We will also try to 
understand the major problems created by the region' s geo-politics and this will be picked up 
in the following chapters on regional governmental institutions and economic performance. 
4.1 Xinjiang's Location, People and Society 
In this section we need to look into the major geographical factors in terms of location, 
population and society of Xinjiang, which are generally regarded as major constraints on the 
development of this region. 
Xinjiang is situated deep in the centre of the Eurasian continent and on China' s north-western 
frontier, geographically on the margins of both Asia and Europe. There are eight countries 
bordering this region: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on the west, Mongolia and 
Russia on the north, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India to the southwest. This location is 
responsible for an extremely dry climate and fragile natural environment with gigantic 
mountains and sandy desserts barricading the region from the outside world, but it 
encouraged the evolution of the nomadic life-style of its local residents, who look to 
neighbouring countries and to their Muslim co-religionists for spiritual and cultural ties, thus 
distinguishing them from the majority Han who dominate the rest of China. 
Xinjiang takes up one-sixth of the total land of the People' s Republic of China (Map 4.1) but 
her population represents only 1.2 per cent of the national total. There were basically 13 
major nationalities, 12 minorities plus the Han Chinese, inhabiting the different parts of the 
region before 1949. After the leading group, the Uyghur, the Han have been second in 
population since 1955, and then there are the Kazakh, Hui (Han Muslim Chinese), Kirghiz, 
and Mongolian and other minorities, who make up the rest (Table 4.1). The Uyghur is a 
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like the Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Uzbek, Tatar, etc., the Uyghur constitute an Islamic society 
and have strong bonds historically with the other central Asian countries. The Hui are a 
group of European descent who converted to Islam but share a culture and demographic 
proximity with the Han, as a result of long-term assimilation. Some Chinese settled in the 
region long ago, in the first half of the second century BCE and again when the Great Khan 
during the Yuan Dynasty in 1200 brought his control and the influence of Mongolian culture 
to Xinjiang (Harris, 1993). Many places still retain their Mongolian names such as Ururnqi, 
meaning "beautiful farming land". Buddhism also has its share in the region's culture 
through the Han, Mongol, Xibo, Manchu, and Daur, etc .. 
Table 4.1 The Ethnic Structure of Population in 2000 
I Ethnicity I Population ~I 
I I i I Uyghur I 8,256,661 : 46.08 I I Han 1 7,023,910 139.21 
I Kazakh 11,277,474 : 7.13 
I Hui 1 813,023 1 4.54 
I Kirghiz I 159,584 ! 0.89 
I Mongol 1 156,892 ! 0.87 
I Tajik i 39,642 1 0.22 
I Xibo 39,238 i 0.22 
I Manchu 1 22,329 ! 0.12 
I Uzbek i 13,198 1 0.07 
I Russian i 10,598 I 0.06 
I Daur 16,405 ! 0.04 
I Tatar \ 4,695 : 0.03 
I Others j91,81 0 10.51 
(Source: Xinjiang Statistics Bureau (XSB): Xinjiang Statistical Year Book, 2001) 
A large-scale Han Chinese immigration to Xinjiang began after 1950, changing the local 
population structure away from Uyghur domination. By 1960 the proportion of Chinese had 
reached 25 per cent, compared to 7 per cent in 1952 (Table 4.2). This reduced the local 
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shortage of skilled labour and brought hundreds and thousands of technicians and 
administrative personnel to the locality; on the other side it caused the escalation of 
resentment from the natives for fear of losing their cultural identity and regional resources. 
These multiple nationalities have led to complexity and confrontation in terms of politics, 
religion, and language, especially since massive Han immigration after 1949. It will be no 
surprise that tensions have arisen. 
Table 4.2 Xinjiang's Output and Population in Selected Years 
Years GDP per XPCCGDP Population Han Han Culti vated 
capita Share % (million Population Population Land 
(million persons) (million Share (%) (thousand 
yuan) eersons) hectares} 
1952 170 15.1 4.65 0.33 7.1 1543 
1955 207 13.5 5.12 0.55 10.7 1690 
1960 314 24.1 6.86 1.94 28.3 3145 
1962 217 25.8 6.99 2.08 29.8 3054 
1966 305 26.3 8.38 3.10 37.0 3330 
1969 210 29.1 9.44 3.71 39.3 3167 
1971 249 31.3 10.10 4.05 40.1 3160 
1974 202 29.9 11 .26 4.66 41.4 3143 
1975 229 15.3 11 .55 4.78 41.4 3147 
1978 292 21.7 12.33 5.13 41.6 3185 
1980 338 22.6 12.83 5.31 41.4 3182 
1985 574 21.5 13.61 5.35 39.3 3083 
1990 810 19.9 15.29 5.75 37.6 3087 
1995 1286 16.5 16.61 6.32 38.0 3128 
2000 1699 16.6 18.46 7.50 40.6 3417 
(Source: Wiemer. 2004) 
Religion is a fundamental key to the cultural and political differences of the region from the 
rest of China. Most of Xinjiang's ethnic populations are Sunni Muslims of the mainstream 
Hanafi School (Harris, 1993). The religious practices, beliefs and codes have spread widely, 
persisted and penetrated the society just like other Islamic countries with "religion-state-
integrated" institutions. Even though Xinjiang is under the control of the CCP, the clergy 
have more power than CCP leaders in some remote areas (Mackerras, 2003), and religious 
ideology remains the principle of life and polity. The Uyghurs and Kazakhs especially regard 
the Muslim religion as a means to express their identities, to form political and social 
discipline, to construct cultural heritages and lifestyle and to unify their peoples (Liu and 
Felrningham, 1998). However in Chinese society religion has had a weakened role since 
1949 and is regarded as a weapon for "class struggle" in Communist politics to "mobilize 
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support for the State" (Lee Ill, 1964: p.162-l64). Chinese Communism requires the 
ideological purification of people centered on Chinese Han culture and takes for granted that 
Muslim people in Xinjiang should accept that their religious faith is inferior to Chinese 
political doctrine, thus contradicting the fundamentalism of the Muslim faith of local people 
and causing offence and discontentment among local people towards the intervention of the 
Chinese Communists and to the immigration of the Han Chinese. The Muslim religion in 
Xinjiang is thus a political barrier, both for ideological doctrine and for any chance of 
integration into a Han China. 
Traditionally, the Chinese perceive the image of their culture, represented by Confucianism, 
to be culturally superior to others. They describe others ' cultures as barbaric and in need of 
education by the Han (Harris, 1993: p.llS). Such cultural bias results in a lack of respect by 
the Han towards 'others'. In Xinjiang the local minorities see the Han as dishonest, 
materialistic and unfriendly. The Chinese cannot tolerate the Uyghur' s lifestyle and view 
them as "primitive", cunning, stubborn, and obsessed by religion. Conflict between two is 
very easily generated by their unjustified attitudes towards each other, driven by their 
concerns in their own interests. "The cultural gap between Turkic and Han could hardly be 
wider. Turkic look to a mythological past in which their ancestors were suckled by wolves, 
like Romulus and Remus, the founders of Rome. The Chinese look to the rain-making spirit 
represented by the dragon, with whom their emperors identified. Both are proud creatures 
who cannot inhabit the same domain" (Tyler, 2003: p.269). 
Xinjiang has numerous languages, with four major different scripts: Arabic, Chinese, 
Mongolian and Cyrillic. Chinese and Uyghur are regarded as the province' s two official 
languages, both appearing in the public and local state media, though there are TV channels, 
radio stations, and newspapers specifically designed for non-Han and non-Uyghur speaking 
minorities. The local educational institutes, science research councils and local governmental 
departments apply a bilingual system for people who can communicate in one of the two 
languages on formal occasions. However, these services and departments are by and large 
found and run by the Han immigrants possessing advanced skills which were lacking among 
local people. Han language is particularly dominant in urban areas. The Uyghur language 
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was originally derived from the Aramaic/Arabic alphabet but was changed in 1959 to a 
Cyrillic and then Latin alphabet, considered by many as the Chinese Government calling for 
the "Uyghur Language Reform". However, the truth behind the reform is that in the early 
years the teaching materials came largely from the neighbouring Soviet Union and were in 
the CyriUic alphabet. There were not sufficient texts in Arabic script for the Uyghurs and 
other ethnics. Obviously there was also partly a political reason, alongside a practical 
consideration in calling for reform (Schwarz, 1960; Benson, 2004). This decision was 
rescinded in 1987 and Arabic script returned. At a stroke, the refonn made a generation of 
Uyghurs born in the later 1960s and 70s illiterate in their traditional alphabet. There was a 
similar reform in the Kazakh language. 
Xinjiang has experienced a long history of outside control and has never been recognized as 
an independent country (Millward and Perdue, 2004). The Uyghurs regard the land as home 
because they have been living there for centuries, while the Han Chinese consider the land as 
a part of China according to the fact it has been under Chinese rule for centuries. 
The Uyghur at large are the leading group taking action against Han domination and 
assimilation. They are keen on preserving the purity of their nationality and persisting in their 
religious faith, but some also promote protectionism and separatism, making the region 
potentially a centre of political crisis. The local oil industry is said to have been supporting 
the coastal boom, accomplished through Beijing' s western development plan. Comments 
have been made that the Han are taking Xinjiang' s resources to serve the central purposes 
while leaving the region itself poorly developed. The Uyghurs feel that China' s current 
prosperity is not fairly divided. They worry that they are not just losing their property and 
wealth but also their culture and national identity. Especially after the Cultural Revolution 
the Uyghurs have been encouraged to revive their own culture and allowed to read their own 
history, literature and language 16, and they have been able to re-establish their old Central-
Asian connections. This has encouraged them to seek their own national identity and to 
dream of a geopolitical reorganization. 
16 Hu, Yaobang, who was candidate for national GS, during a visit to Xinjiang for two weeks in 1980, 
speculated on giving real autonomy to the ethnic regions and encouraged the revival of ethnic culture 
(Interviews, 2003 and comment by Bovingdon, 2004). 
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4.2 Autonomy in Xinjiang 
Officially, Xinjiang has been recognized as part of China for three or four centuries, but until 
1949 Chinese control was weak due to the region ' s strong bonds to Central Asia culturally 
and geographically and due to the expensive task of controlling this land distant from the 
court in Beijing. However, as Xinjiang had been regarded by the Chinese as a strategic 
defence "door" to the enormous western part of their realm and, in the same way, as a "door" 
to the Far East by the Russians since the Qing Dynasty, there were struggles between China 
and Russia for control. In the first half of the twentieth century, Russian influence, following 
the establishment of the Soviet Union, was increasing, making many people in Xinjiang 
prefer Soviet to Chinese control even after the advent of Chinese communism, particularly 
because living standards on the Soviet side of the border at that time were perceived to be 
higher (Ferdinand, 1994b: p.272-273). 
For fear of resurgent Russian control over the area and to take the land under the firm control 
of communist China, the new government after 1949 developed an autonomous institution 
for political governance of the region and they encouraged a large number of Han Chinese to 
settle down here accompanied by huge state investment in the region. 
Xinjiang was thus made into the Xinjiang UYghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), headed by 
the People ' s Government of XUAR (XAPG) in 1955, six years after it had peacefully 
accepted the take-over of the People ' s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1949. According to 
Chinese Ethnic Autonomous Constitution (CEAC), a region with a large ethnic population 
can establish its own local autonomous government under the unified supervision of the 
CCP. This regional autonomy is a compromise between the desires of Beijing for tight 
control over Xinjiang and the requirement of the Uyghurs for a federal system. Therefore, all 
levels of government and authority in any organization in the region have leaders from the 
leading minority to handle their own affairs and the Han Chinese remains in charge of the 
CCP. The regional autonomy of Xinjiang was reconfirmed in 1984 and 2001. A number of 
important features within the institutions of autonomy will now be examined. 
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4.2.1 Autonomy under the Leadership of the CCP 
As we discussed before in chapter 2, the CCP and its General Secretaries (GSs) penetrate 
government regimes at all levels and dominate decision-making. Notwithstanding Xinjiang' s 
politically and ethnically distinctive features, its autonomous government institutions 
resemble or are even specially required for the same "party-determining" administration as in 
China's other provinces, even though it is under the title of an "autonomous region". The 
CCP and the GSs have been granted a superior authority over the autonomous government 
and governors in decision-making in terms of the political and economic administration of 
the region. Second, all the leaders of different levels of government are required to be from 
the ethnic minorities, while the GS positions at all levels of government-party regimes are 
taken by Hans. Therefore, the top leaders of Xinjiang in any civil service department are 
represented by two people having very different backgrounds, interests and missions. Han 
members of the Party-state regime make the key decisions and the ethnic minority governors 
implement policies. In particular in Xinjiang the governments and their governors are chosen 
carefully for their obedience and cooperation in handling party decisions. 
Xinjiang has also worked out a recruitment policy to appoint, train and promote Uyghur 
cadres working in the CCP and all levels of government departments. The CCP in Xinjiang 
in the 1950s discovered the necessity of establishing an efficient administration in which 
there would be sufficient numbers of minority cadres to cooperate with Han members and 
implement Beijing's policies. Xinjiang therefore encouraged carefully selected Uyghurs to 
join the CCP and sent them to Beijing or other places to receive training and advanced 
education. Since then any recruitment, promotion and training programme for cadres in 
Xinjiang' s government and state enterprises has had to have a large quota for minorities. The 
Central Institute located in Beijing runs programmes from six months to two years for 
minority cadres. The crucial criterion for their selection for promotion or appointment is their 
political inclination rather than their technical skill qualifications for the job. 
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4.2.2 Multi-level Political Autonomous System 
With regards to the region's administration of geographical division, Beijing has granted an 
extended autonomy to other minorities at the sub-provincial level - "a condominium of 
nested autonomies" (Bovingdon, 2004: p.13) or "small to large" (Wang, 1999c: p.249). This 
can be described as horizontal via vertical autonomy, which means that the Uyghur can ' t 
solely claim the land for their own nationality but have to share with the other minorities who 
also have rights to claim autonomy in their own territories. The Uyghur autonomous 
administration is thus fragmented and surrounded by the multi-level autonomous 
administrations of other minorities. 
On examination, the geographical structure of administration is complicated. Up to 2005, 
there were a total of 12 sub-provincial divisions at the second administrative level after the 
province, including five autonomous prefectures, three cities and four sub-regions. They are 
Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture including Yining, Altay and Tacheng Regions; Changji 
Hui Autonomous Prefecture; Bortala Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture; Bayingolin 
Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture; and Kizilsu-Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture; the cities 
ofUrumqi (the capital), Shihezi (the symbolic hometown of the Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corp (XPCC)), and Karamay (the centre of Xinjiang's oil industries); and the 
sub-regions of Harni (including Turpan Region), Aksu, Kashigar, and Hotan (Map 4.2). 
Kashigar and Hotan, Turpan and Aksu have large populations of Uyghur and most of the Han 
Chinese are settled on the northern slope of the Tian Shan. The largest prefecture in the area 
is Bayingolin Mongolian Prefecture, taking up one fourth of the land. Although political 
administrative divisions, Turpan Region and Yining, Altay and Tacheng Regions are in 
reality sub-regions administrated by their respective upper regions, Hami Region and Di 
Prefecture. However, in their economic operation, these four regions are considered 
independent units on equal tenns with the sub-provincial regions. Within each autonomous 
prefecture or sub-region there are one or two autonomous counties in which the governorship 
and key leadership have to be drawn from the local dominant ethnic group. In Hami Region, 
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for instance, there is Balikqueen Kazakh autonomous county, Bukesary Mongolian 
autonomous county is in Tacheng, and Tashikuerga Tajik autonomous county is in the 
Kashigar Region, etc .. Xinjiang' s sub-regional administrative autonomy gives equal rights to 
non-Uyghur ethnics and diversifies the domination of one large ethnic group in this 
multinational area. This is obviously a strategy in tenns of national unity designed to 
preserve the central state control, but it imposes difficulty and complication on to the XAPG 
for its administration and policy implementation. 
Map 4.2 Xinjiang Administrative Divisions 
MONGOLIA 
KAZAKSTAN 
KYRGVZSTAN 
GANSU 
nBET 
(Source: compiled from Starr, 2004) 
Secondly, due to Xinjiang' s frontier location, the establishment of the Xinjiang Production 
and Construction Corps (XPCC) in 1954, as a special military-based governmental 
organisation, consolidates the political control of the region. However, it is also responsible 
for the fragmentation of the administration of the local government. The XPCC is not simply 
a unit within the military apparatus, but, as a large-scale specific productive institute, it also 
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takes direct instructions from the State Council (SC). Moreover, the XAPG also has a right to 
insert its supervision on the XPCC. This changes and complicates the general bureaucratic 
administrative structure l7 in Xinjiang (Figure 4.1). The XPCC has also become a large-scale, 
Han-organised institute absorbing Han immigrants from central China. The institute has been 
systemically constructed with its own production sections along with military sections, 
including agriculture, industry, tertiary, and its civil service departments in which are 
provided complete educational and social services, not only to its members but also to the 
people outside the XPCc. The members of the XPCC and their families serve under semi-
military-rule but also enjoy benefits. There is a need for permission to leave or get a transfer 
from the XPCC to other local institutes. The XPCC receives financial support both from the 
Chinese military and the SC and submits its revenues to the state, the central military union 
and the locality. After the Cultural Revolution (CR), Production and Construction Corps 
(PC Cs) in other frontier regions were abolished in 1975. However, with the escalation of 
separatism in Xinjiang, the SC not only confirmed the existence of the PCC in Xinjiang in 
1982 and reinforced its function, but also promoted the XPCC by singling it out from the 
XAPG' s apparatus for direct administration and financial sponsorship. Up to now Xinjiang is 
the only region retaining this semi-military and semi-production type of institute and its ten 
divisions are spread over the region, further complicating the XAPG's administrative 
structure (Table 4.3). Local people and members ofXPCC are mingled, living in the same 
areas, but they are administered separately. In many areas of Xinjiang with large populations 
of the XPCC, local governments have to share administrative responsibilities with the 
headquarters of the local XPCC division. Shihezi provides a typical example. As a symbolic 
hometown to the XPCC and second biggest industrial city in Xinjiang, it has the major 
population registered in the 8th division of the XPCc. The Headquarters of the 8th division 
have been stationed in Shihezi since 1950 and functioned as the city' s government until 
1985. After that the Shihezi People' s Government was founded in 1985, comprising the 
headquarters of the division and local civil departments cooperatively acting as one body 
under the supervision ofShihezi 's CCP. The practice of the XPCC is meaningful politically 
as well as economically in this region. 
17 See in chapter 2 figure2.1 . 
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Figure 4.1 The Political Structure of Xlnjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
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Table 4.3 The Location of XPCC Divisions in Xinjiang 
No. Re 'on5 
1st Aksu 
r d Kor1a 
3n1 Kashigar 
4th Yining (in fli) 
5th Bole 
6th Urumqi, Changji 
7th K uytun 
8th Shihezi 
9th Ermin (Tacheng) 
lOth Tachen , Alta 
(Source: based on the information from : thefifty Years of New China, 1949-1999: the Volume of XPCC. 2000) 
4.2.3 Preferential Policies for Ethnicity 
To harmonize the system of autonomy under the tight political control of the central 
government, according to Xinjiang' s social variation, Beijing has granted a series of 
preferential policies for minorities in terms of their religious, cultural and political spheres of 
life. 
First, there are policies of political equality. One feature reflecting political equality is shown 
by Beijing granting regional autonomy and minority cadre cultivation. The policies state that 
there must be no oppression and discrimination in any field against any nationality in 
Xinjiang, no matter what the religion, customs or size of population. Sustaining traditional 
minority lifestyles and allowing free religious practice, and the granting of religious and 
raditional festivals as local holidays, are also components of these policies. Any anti-Muslim 
;entiment is clearly forbidden and respect is required for Muslim customs, for instance lamb 
md pork must not be displayed on the same shelf in grocery stores. This is all a significant 
reversal of recent contemporary history, when religions were broadly forbidden and attacked 
in the eR period and in Xinjiang 90 per cent of mosques were closed. For example, in the 
Kashigar Region mosque numbers reduced from 5500 to 392 in the 1970s. 4700 mosques 
were then rebuilt in 1980-81 and by 1999 the officially registered number of mosques in 
Xinjiang as a whole had reached 23,000, and many Muslims now undertake the Hajj since it 
was re-allowed and they are able to travel on business to Arab countries. 
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Second, policies of social development have also been granted to minorities in tenns of 
education, family planning and employment. It is understandable that organizing a modern 
educational system including the preparation of text books in the very different scripts is 
complicated, as is the training of ethnic teachers equipped with sufficient knowledge. In fact, 
education as a whole has been a difficult task for Xinjiang's local government over the years, 
not having had any modern educational system at all before 1949. Xinjiang has successfully 
established two separate language systems in elementary and high schools - minority schools 
teaching in their native languages and Chinese in Han schools. Minority students can study 
and use their language in schools, local universities and even local firms. Therefore the 
native language can be preserved in this way. However, as a large number ofHan immigrants 
are arriving and the modern educational system was constructed and dominated by the Han 
and, as the quality of teaching especially in science subjects and the level of knowledge 
achieved in minority schools are lower, not only the ethnic elite but also nearly all urban 
families prefer Han schools for their children's education and better future, in the hope that 
they will eventually head for top universities in central China. Nevertheless, the parents 
constantly complain that the education in their own language and literature in these Han 
schools is inadequate. In 1984, the current GS, Wang Enmao, proposed a campaign aiming to 
promote Han teaching in Xinjiang's ethnic primary and middle schools, and to encourage 
ethnic students to attend Han schools in an attempt to improve the overall education standard 
of the minorities. As a result, many Uyghur or non-Han-speaking ethnic students studying in 
Han Chinese schools, especially in Xinjiang's northern areas, now have a good knowledge of 
Chinese but their capability for writing and reading in their first language is declining. In 
1996, the XAPG promoted a campaign and launched a policy to improve ethnic students' 
knowledge of Chinese and suggested that they should take a Chinese test before entering 
university. Ethnic students who have not attended a Chinese medium school, and do not have 
a good knowledge of Chinese, have to take a two year Chinese-language foundation course 
before they start university. 
Since 1980, when universities reopened to all school graduates, Xinjiang's policy of 
enrolment has clearly favoured the minorities. There is a nearly equal quota in each province 
for school graduates to get a place, and in Xinjiang the quota, divided 7:3 before the 1990s 
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has been increased to 6:4 between non-Han and Han. Because of the language barrier, 
minority students are only required to achieve a minimum score in the university entrance 
examination, while Han students in Xinjiang have to achieve a much higher score than the 
national average to get a place in university. For example, in 1985, the minimum score to 
enter university set for Xinjiang' s Han was 400, while for the Uyghur it was under 200, and 
for comparison in Beijing it was only 380. Although governmental efforts are made, 
including subsidizing minority students for their studies at university, and despite instituting 
compulsory primary and high school education, the percentage of minority students enrolled 
in universities out of the overall population is still low. This has been attributed partly to high 
education fees and linguistic difficulties, driving minority students away, and partly to many 
minority families placing less emphasis on education than Han families (Bovingdon, 2004: 
p.4I). 
On the principle of equality driven by these policies, employment opportunities have been 
increased for minorities who have had advanced education. At the beginning of the XUAR, 
Beijing set a special policy to transfer large numbers educated young university graduates 
and cadres, and technicians into Xinjiang to help out with shortages of skilled labour, though 
this transfer was eventually developed into a massive emigration with 3 million people 
settling in over 30 years by 1978. The minimum age for marriage by law for minorities is two 
years earlier than that for Han. The "one child policy" in the reform period only applies to the 
Han, while several children are allowed in minority families. Before the profound reform in 
1990, many minorities found it easier than their Han counterparts to be allocated a job in the 
SOEs and government institutions (Sautman, 1997). Many minorities indulged in the 
preferential policies without undue effort, even though sometimes they are less qualified and 
capable. This is despite socialist-based equality policies being abolished all over China. 
Many Uyghurs are not interested in jobs with longer hours and rigid work discipline, 
compared to the Han and are now being fired firstly at SOEs and also find difficulties in 
getting a job in private companies.20 
20 Interviews, 2003 and comment by Boviogdoo, 2004. 
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Third, for policies of economic development, the Beijing government adopted production 
redistribution and financial subsidies to help with Xinjiang's economy. This can be viewed 
through examining Xinjiang' s economic development in four dramatically changing periods. 
Early on it benefited from the initial policy of China's regional economic development, based 
on the First Five-Year Plan (FYP), with its emphasis on balancing regional growth between 
the interior and coast and in developing heavy industries as priorities. Xinjiang gained a 
steady rate of economic growth. During the period 1951-1956, Beijing distributed one-third 
of its 156 major construction projects to the west region. These projects were all large-scale, 
capital intensive, industry- and energy-based, and assisted by Soviet aid. Among the projects 
allocated to the western region, there were a few given to Xinjiang, such as the construction 
of the railway track linking the capital Urumqi to the nearest central province and to the 
Soviet border, and the construction of oil and other resource industries newly developed in 
Xinjiang' s north. With this project allocation and state subsidies, including Soviet aid, 
Xinjiang' s economy achieved more than self-reliance (Lo, 1961) and presented a resource-
based industrial profile. 
The period of 1957 -1977 witnessed a series of political movements and international 
scandals, such as the launch of the "Great Leap Forward"; the "Third Front" campaign 
caused by the worsening Sino-Soviet relations and US involvement in Vietnam War; and 
then the CR. Xinjiang' s economy was affected, especially when the 1969 Sino-Soviet border 
clashes closed the border completely, and, as a result, railway construction in Xinjiang was 
terminated. All trade crossing the border was forbidden and the government investment in 
Xinjiang' s basic construction and resource industries was withdrawn. Xinjiang became a 
dead corner economically: "a closed border triggers a syndrome of disadvantageous features 
characterized by a slower pace of economic life and diminution of the attractiveness of the 
area by artificially restricting the possibilities of growth and blocking potentially 
advantageous directions of cooperation"( Ciechocinska, 1992: p.198). Over the decade 1967-
1977 Xinjiang' s GDP only increased by 33 per cent (National Statistical Bureau, 2000), and 
the local economy had to be completely subsidized and sustained by the state. 
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In the reform period, although as one of the inland regions, Xinjiang has not provided fertile 
ground for implementing export- and opening-oriented policies, however, its ethnic politics 
and its reserves of rich and various mineral resources determined that Xinjiang could not be 
ignored completely by the state and it has continued to receive state funds and planning 
aimed at restructuring the resource industries and improving transportation to build up the 
local economy (Table 4.4). Table 4.4 shows since 1984 Xinjiang received investment of 103 
yuan per capita, 31 yuan lower than the amount in 1982 and it remained unchanged until 
1988. In 1990 the investment then increased to 120 yuan per capita, due large to the request 
for energy industries deVelopment in Xinjiang. Xinjiang' s economic development over the 
two decades since reform has remained in the leading group among the northwestern regions, 
though its achievements are less impressive compared to the coastal regions. The economy of 
Xinjiang in the context of the nation overall has to be seen as steadily increasing in the first 
ten years since the reform (Table 4.5). This growth has strong ties to central state 
investments, specifically in local resource industries. According to the indication of net 
inflows to Xinjiang over the period of 1980s to 90s, economic growth has showed positive 
relation to the state's huge fund transfers (Table 4.6, Figure 4.2). 
After twenty years of reform, the West Development Programme (WDP) was launched in 
1999 to balance the economic growth between China 's west and east, and to stabilize the 
lagging regions, especially the regions with ethnic minorities. Xinjiang is at the centre of the 
programme. Economic growth in Xinjiang is expected to be accelerated in the period of the 
tenth FYP (2001-2005) with a focus on the promotion of key sectors through economic 
structural readjustment to concentrate on the development of the eight pillar economic 
sectors: oil and gas production, mineral exploitation and manufacturing, cotton and textile 
industries, husbandry, forest, paper manufacturing, tourism, and cross-border trade21 • By 
promoting these sectors, it is hoped that the region can establish its own economic 
development pattern, take up local comparative advantages, and generate rapid economic 
growth. The region also wishes to take advantage of the opportunities brought by the WDP, 
including increased funds from FDI, private and state allocations to the region. Beijing put 
21 Interviews, 2002 
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$30.7 billion into Xinjiang under the WDe and the tenth FYP calls for an additional $51 
billion of central government spending for Xinjiang22 . 
Table 4.4 Total Investment per capita 1982-1990 (yuan, national average = 100) 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 Trend 
Eastern (mean) 147 147 147 155 155 
Beijing 334 360 325 329 378 liD 
Tianjin 315 265 241 204 208 HC 
Hebei 58 65 67 80 61 
Liaoning 129 116 139 140 136 j 0 
Shanghai 470 368 341 420 363 H C 
Jiangsu 49 93 112 116 III liD 
Zhejiang 47 75 94 109 125 li D 
Fujian 50 59 65 62 74 liC 
Shandong 44 74 81 91 82 liC 
Guangdong 84 106 113 124 133 li D 
Guangxi 32 33 41 38 33 
Central (mean) 63 71 68 61 61 
Shanxi 79 110 104 77 87 
Inner Mongolia 70 83 63 55 62 1 D 
Ji1in 83 80 79 79 79 
Hei10ngjiang 135 113 105 91 96 H C 
Anhui 33 52 57 50 45 liC 
Jiangxi 37 45 43 43 39 
Henan 34 46 57 50 50 liC 
Hubei 57 64 59 60 54 
Hunan 38 48 50 46 40 
Western (mean) 78 68 71 67 68 
Sichuan 35 39 44 43 42 j C 
Guizhou 30 33 29 31 29 
Yunnan 49 42 49 42 46 
Shannxi 61 56 59 56 63 
Gansu 52 50 51 51 52 
Qinghai 180 140 123 128 102 H C 
Ningxia 81 84 107 83 91 j C 
Xinjiang 134 103 103 102 120 H C 
National Average 228 418 542 608 488 
(in 1990 constant 
price) 
(Note: jincrease by 5%, li increase by 10%, l decline by 5%, H decline by 10%, -little change, C or 0 
converge or diverge to the national average 
Source: Fan, 1995) 
22 See: http://www.usatodav.comlmoney/worldl2004-10-06-china-west x.htm. accessed on I SI November, 2004. 
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Table 4.5 Total Output per capita 1980-1990 (yuan, national average = 100) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 Trend 
Eastern (mean) 162 161 159 156 158 157 
Beijing 300 284 291 256 258 256 H C Tianjin 275 279 264 250 254 208 H C Hebei 65 63 64 66 70 72 i C Liaoning 155 149 146 152 152 144 H C Shanghai 559 528 489 448 411 400 H C Jiangsu 104 108 119 136 148 143 li D Zhejiang 83 93 109 118 126 123 li D Fujian 56 62 64 68 74 77 li C Shandong 58 69 76 80 89 97 li C 
Guangdong 84 89 93 99 109 118 li D 
Guangxi 46 49 42 42 42 43 
Central (mean) 66 68 69 71 69 69 
Shanxi 68 73 78 74 70 73 
Inner Mongolia 53 58 58 59 61 63 i C 
Jilin 89 87 95 93 96 90 i C 
Heilongjiang 109 108 103 106 94 99 ! C 
Anhui 46 50 54 60 57 54 i C 
Jiangxi 56 53 51 54 54 54 
Henan 46 46 47 53 54 55 i C 
Hubei 68 73 79 83 81 77 i C 
Hunan 60 62 59 61 56 55 
Western (mean) 53 53 53 55 55 56 
Sichuan 46 48 49 52 53 53 i C 
Guizhou 30 33 36 35 35 34 
Yunnan 39 42 43 41 41 45 i C 
Shannxi 55 55 55 57 57 58 
Gansu 58 53 53 57 56 57 
Qinghai 75 69 67 68 67 63 H D 
Ningxia 61 58 60 64 62 63 
Xinjiang 59 63 65 66 72 77 i C 
National 2277 2467 2984 3446 3902 3078 
Average (in 
1990 constant 
Erice) 
(Note: iincrease by 5%, li increase by 10%, !deC\ine by 5%, H deC\ine by 10%, - little change, C; D converge 
or diverge to the national average 
Source: Fan, /995) 
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Figure 4.2 The Comparison of the Growth between Output and Investment (yuan) per capita of 
Xinjiang 1982-1990 
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Table 4.6 Net Resource Inflows (billion yuan) 
GDP (I) Final Capital Net Inflow Fiscal Foreign 
Consumption Formation (1 +2-3) Subsidy Capital 
(2) (3) 
1981-85 40.5 32.43 19.14 11 .05 7.49 0.09 
80.0% 47.2% 27.3% 18.4% 0.2% 
1986-90 96.17 70.87 48.75 23.45 12.2 0.99 
73 .7% 50.7% 24.4% 12.6% 1.0% 
1991-95 274.26 164. 11 173.58 63.42 16.6 10.84 
59.8% 63.3% 23 . 1% 6.0% 4.0% 
1996 91.21 57.97 45.7 12.45 5.91 2.21 
63.6% 50.1% 13.6% 6.5% 2.4% 
1997 105.01 64.03 56.49 15.5 6.84 0.72 
61 .0% 53.8% 14.8% 6.5% 0.7% 
1998 111.67 67.72 68.58 24.64 8.01 1.34 
60.6% 61.4% 22.1% 7.2% 1.2% 
1999 116.86 74.52 58.16 15.82 9.4 1.16 
63.8% 49.8% 13.5% 8.0% 1.0% 
2000 136.43 89.99 59.07 12.63 11.9 0.16 
86.0% 43.3% 9.35 8.7% 0.1% 
(Sources: Wiemer, 2004 and XSB: Xinjiang's Glorious Fifty Years, J999b) 
Theoretically, China's minority policies are rooted in Marxist-Stalinist thinking about the 
evolution from capitalism to communism. According to this, ethnic groups should be 
integrated with each other and with the majority in the transition to communism. However, 
how to orientate or to what extent to confine local nationalism in order to ensure a peaceful 
integration of minorities, is troublesome for the central government (Zhou, 2001). Despite its 
preferential policies toward the minorities ofXinjiang and praise from international 
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scholars
23
, the satisfaction of local minorities, especially the Uyghur, has never been 
achieved, not to mention the fact that the local Han Chinese also resent unfair treatment by 
those policies and regard them as providing unfair competition and sacrificing any benefits to 
local Han people (Moneyhon, 2003; Bovingdon, 2004). The main explanation to this can be 
traced back to the discussion on the origin of the establishment of autonomous political 
institution in the region. 
4.3 Implications of Autonomy in Xinjiang 
There are a few discussions on China 's autonomy in the ethnic regions, especially Xinjiang. 
Moneyhon (2002), for instance, applies international constitutional law to define Chinese 
autonomy; and Bovingdon (2004) analyzes autonomy in terms of the relations between Han 
nationalism and Uyghur regionalism. 
Cornell (2002: p.246) has commented on regional autonomy as a source of conflict in itself 
rather than the solution to the self-determination of minorities. Contra theorists like Kjell-
Ake Nordquist (2001), see autonomy as "territorial control linked to ethnicity", "a self-
governing rule to ethnic population in an intra state region" that provides "a conflict-solving 
mechanism" which is a "theoretical" as well as "practical option for the parties in such 
conflicts". Cornell (2002: p.247) argues that the institution of regional autonomy can also 
"foster the ethnic mobilization", "increase the secessionism" of ethnicity and region and 
reinforce conflict. He uses the cases of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia to 
demonstrate that, on most occasions, autonomous regions develop opportunities for the 
"institutionalization" of their "distinct identities" and this provides the basis to seek 
independence. This may be examined from two sides. The central state provides the 
institutions such as a clear boundary division and political institutions that within the territory 
foster cohesive autonomous governments and parliaments that can act independently again 
the central laws and unjustified policies, and control their local media to work for their own 
propaganda and perhaps seek foreign support. On the other side, it is local independent 
groups that may be willing and sufficient to enforce local distinct identities. However, 
23 lnterviews; field research, 2003 and comment by Bovingdon, 2004. 
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Corn ell comments that there is no clear theoretical framework or case evidence to know 
when regional autonomy will be a conflict-solving or a conflict-generating mechanism. 
In this regard, Bovingdon (2004) thinks that the Chinese are trying to solve Cornell ' s 
problem by carefully adopting a series of ethnic policies targeting assimilation rather than 
disintegration in promising autonomy to her minorities. Moneyhon (2002, 2004) suggests 
that Chinese policy is effective and efficient in taking control of Chinese minorities in their 
territories and this has reflected a contradictory combination of "pluralism" and 
"conservative assimilation". He comments that Mao took note of Sun Yat-sen 's comment on 
Chinese nationalism as family-ism or clan-ism but not real nationalism, thus creating a less 
cohesive society. So Mao realized that, in order to get society to support the revolution, the 
CCP had to unify all forces possible from all classes, all nationalities and all ideological 
doctrines. Therefore, they attempted to constitute a ''big fraternal and cooperative family" , 
the Chinese Republic State. In this family, all nationalities have equal rights and self-
determination in politics, religion and culture and act cooperatively but are not 
discriminatory against each other. 24 In reality, in the implementation of the policy in the 
minority areas, the Han as leader in political ideology is acting more as a "big brother" who 
patronizingly comes to help "young brothers" with their equal rights and nationality 
development. This is described by Eberhard (1982) as an inflection of Han cultural 
superiority and assimilation. 
In this framework, the CCP is the political leader and all the minorities, along with their 
religious faith and nationalism, have to serve the nationalism of the Han Chinese as a whole, 
so any kind of development of one minority along with its territory that could distinguish its 
nationalism and further promote separatism, is thus "prohibited". Bovingdon says that China 
looks to the Soviet model for its ethnic policies but is skilfully withdrawing any real political 
autonomy by providing no political institutions and mechanisms for local people to develop 
secessionism, seen as the CCP' s superpower over autonomous government and multi-level 
autonomous system. China has provided some self respect and identity for local minorities, 
24 Common Programme of the Chinese People' s Political Consultative Conference, art.50 (Sep. 29, 1949), 
quoted by Moneyhon, 2002: p.132. 
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for instance through the naming of nationalities and regions and by granting certain non-
political privileges to ethnic groups, but self government, the most important factor for 
autonomy, has been carefully avoided by unification within the overall framework of the 
Chinese polity. In order to compensate the local minorities for self-determination, therefore 
preferential policies toward ethnicity were designated with economic and "cultural 
sustainability" on the one hand and "individual nationalism suppression" on the other hand 
(Moneyhon, 2002). The ethnic preferential policies are built on a foundation of "toleration" 
(Lee Ill, 1964: p.166), in returning to serve Chinese political integration. I think here a 
Chinese term, qui tong cui yi, meaning "allowing differences for the common good" can best 
describe the Han 's method of tackling their relationship with the other nationalities by 
granting preferential policies to consolidate the republic. In this respect, Moneyhon (2002) 
said that Chinese ethnic autonomy is a game of "take and give" through "giving" self-
determination and autonomous rights to minority areas and "then tying executing the rights 
to central governmental approval" to "take away" the rights for minorities (Moneyhon, 2002: 
p.137). Autonomy in China is thus regarded as a "fake" self-determining institution by many 
western scholars such as Moneyhon (2002). 
To the Chinese, autonomy constructs a "legitimate" institution not only to terminate local 
appeals for independence and separation but also for the Han-Ied CCP extensively to practise 
its political domination. Dealing with any local affairs in association with ethnicity has to be 
heavily framed by political correctness and national security. Autonomy thus becomes an 
instrument for political integration and cultural assimilation. 
Therefore in reality there are many limitations to the implementation of the policies. 
Religious policy, for instance, seeks to manipulate religious associations for political 
purposes. The Chinese government sees the Islamic religion as an inspiration for the rise of 
separatism in Xinjiang, and so the practice of religion is closely watched and there are many 
regulations on practitioners in terms of age, political belief, etc .. Also, many of the 
preferential policies granted to minorities in terms of ethnic culture, language and custom 
imply greater assimilation of the Han and non-Han and less ethnic enhancement. Such Han-
Party-Minority Autonomy constitutes an institutional constraint on the region and has 
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obviously "exacerbated" the region 's conflicts and deepened the Uyghurs' "discontent" 
(Bovingdon, 2004). 
Economic policy has been used in an attempt to bring the minorities out of poverty, to 
achieve economic self-reliance and to share the economic wealth with what the coastal 
regions have gained. In fact Xinjiang's economic growth is manipulated by Beijing via large 
subsidies to achieve a middle level in China and always the best in the west, which is 
regarded as assisting in the political integration of China and accomplishing political stability 
in the region (Mackerras, 2003). During the process of economic growth, the policies bind 
the region tightly economically and financially with the rest of China. Beijing on the one side 
subsidizes the region, on the other side it takes away most of the profits made by the region's 
most dynamic economic sector, oil, a strategically important industry to China, and they 
tightly control this sectoral production via state ownership, which has crippled the capability 
of the local economy to achieve self reliance. 
China 's ethnic policies and autonomous institutions are constantly challenged and sometimes 
violated by the contradictions inherent in China 's reform. This requires political 
decentralization for economic development, and this has to some extent been granted in the 
coastal regions. However, full decentralization in the minority autonomous regions can by no 
means be approved, as it could be easily and extensively be used by local people for political 
self-determination, eventually increasing calls for secession. In the framework of Chinese 
autonomy, any radical institutional reform is stifled. This is the example set by Xinjiang. 
Without some political relaxation, there cannot be any efficient and effective political 
institutions, including a dynamic governmental role in economic management, accompanied 
with economic institutional development. This brings a big challenge to Beijing in how 
effectively to encourage the local economy to participate or to compete in an increasingly 
market-orientated national economy. Simply relying on subsidies to achieve local economic 
growth is unrealistic as it will never satisfy the locality and is a burden to Beijing. In 
addition, the subsidy obviously lays a fundamental ground for Komai's Soft Budget 
Constraint (SBC), which is seen as the key cause to the failure of reform. 
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As to the transition of local government in its bureaucratic role, the local party-state 
government has been completely framed in Xinjiang's autonomic institutions and has been 
used for political enhancement rather than as an instrument for economic development. So, 
all performances of local government in regional economic management are undermined and 
the regional defender role of local government (discussed in chapter 2) is deliberately 
ignored, which is bad for any initiatives for adjusting the political institution taken by the 
region itself for economic liberalization. For example, in the economic transition to free 
markets, preferential policies do not fit with market selection, because employee recruitment 
by private firms must be based on hard work and skill, not on ethnic quotas. As a result, a 
large number of state-owned enterprises, because they are not skill-focused, produce no 
economic wealth for the region and local government has gained no real power in managing 
the local economy. Xinjiang's local government takes no action to rectify this by 
withdrawing or modifying those preferential policies, because of the political priority of 
Beijing's minority policies. This all leads to the frustration of regional development in 
Xinjiang, to discontent among local minorities, and to more conflict. 
In sum, we may say Chinese autonomy constitutes a political framework granting a "fake" 
self-determination to minorities and restricting institutional reform in ethnic regions and, 
without some adjustments, this may become a source of conflict in itself, as described by 
Comell (2003) and may contribute to increasing separatism by minorities in provinces such 
as Xinjiang. 
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Chapter 5 Institutional Construction of Xinjiang's 
Government in Regional Development 
In China's reform, there is great significance in the decentralisation of decision-making from 
the centre to the local level. Local initiative and local comparative advantages are now better 
utilized, and provincial government structures and the CCP have been reformed to act 
responsively, semi-independently and discreetly in making strategies conducive to regional 
growth. Provincial government is now required to be dynamic, efficient and cohesive in 
steering the region, as we discussed in chapter 2. 
In this chapter the discussion will focus on examining the construction of Xinjiang's 
provincial government, and in particular its administrative system, institutional construction 
and leadership. We will investigate the degree to which Xinjiang's government has been 
developed as an efficient institution fit for its new purpose in China ' s transition. 
Apart from the discussion previously that administrative efficiency depends upon a non-
politically attached performance, Weber's theory also states that running an organisation 
must be according to strict rules in pursuit ofthat efficiency. In the words of Weber himself: 
"the fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organisations 
exactly as does the machine with non-mechanical modes of product. Precision, speed, 
unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, 
reduction of friction and of material and personal costs- these are raised to the optimum 
in the strictly bureaucratic administration" (Weber, 1914-1920, cited by Mommsen, 
2004, p.I13). 
Again according to Weber's theory, superior administrative efficiency also depends on the 
promotion of technically trained, professional, career administrators. It requires the 
government organisation to act accordingly to recruit, promote and appoint members on the 
basis of their merit and technical competence. Mommsen (1992) suggests that success in 
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bureaucratic administration is due largely to those actors who operate the administrative 
machinery and who are professional civil servants or managerial staff. ' 'They are expected to 
devote their full energy to the fulfilment of their obligations, but they have to operate strictly 
according to rules and must never let personal motives, emotions or inclinations influence 
their decisions .. . Impersonal performance of prescribed duties is expected from them, not 
individual initiative or subjective reasoning" (Mommsen, 1992: p.113). These are all reflected 
in a series of Chinese reforms and decentralisations on bureaucratic administration since 
1978 aimed at giving a rise to the efficiency and rationality of government at all levels in its 
transactional roles. 
However, due to the lack of separation in politician-bureaucrat relations in the administrative 
system, the efficiency and rationality of governmental operation is still a challenge for 
China's top reformers, as well as for the political institutions, especially in a region such as 
Xinjiang with a very heavy political emphasis on its development. 
5.1 The Political Administration and Construction of Local Government 
5.1.1 Xinjiang's CCP and its Regime of Governing Xinjiang 
China established her government administrative system in 1949 within an institutional 
apparatus that, from the centre in Beijing to all of the provinces, has CCP committees as 
supervisory organs intertwined within governmental departments at the various levels. These 
party committees are powerful and legitimate agents in decision-making and personnel 
planning. Although the committee members do not "lead" the work of their respective 
offices, they "assist" the leaders of departments in improving the job, implementing polices, 
and monitoring that departments operate in pursuit of the Party' s goals. As we said before, 
the Chinese governmental operation is not based on Weber's legal-rational administration but 
on the principle of a one party state. The administration can easily be subjected to the 
specific interests of the party. Therefore we can see why recruitment and promotion policies 
are driven as much by candidates ' loyalty to the Party and their determination to see its work 
through, as upon their administrative expertise or subject specialism. Liu (2001) cites the 
works of Derek WaIler (1972, 1973) and Robert Scalapino (1972) in a discussion of the 
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absence of a developing technocracy in Chinese bureaucracy in the pre-reform period. 
Despite the reform, traditional party methods to some extent still apply for cadre selection 
nowadays, especially in the areas of political sensitivity. 
In 1949, when the CCP and PLA arrived in a region, the party and military leaders took joint 
responsibility for its administrative and general affairs and eventually constituted the initial 
personnel of the provincial government. In this way, many regional leaders and civil servants 
had a military background and transformed themselves into a civil administrative role. They 
understood their duties perfectly well as consolidating the CCP's control over the region 
through the combination of military conquest, political propaganda, economic improvement 
and social well-being. Beijing then set up a central committee and a high level Politburo to 
organise and recruit these personnel into the central power apparatus (Figure 4.1). The 
administration from the outset was a centralised-command hierarchical system. 
When the Chinese communists entered Xinjiang, they faced not simply economic poverty but 
also a politically indeterminate semi-independent Muslim state. Although the region had 
been under the control ofHan Nationalists, the Guomindang (GMD), they relied as much for 
support upon Moscow as upon Nanjing25 . Muslim ethnic groups had already shown their 
discontent with control by Han Chinese warlords and Nanjing's central government, not just 
in the anti-Han political movement of the "Di Incident" 1944-194726, but also in the 
establishment of a Republic of East Turkistan. But, unlike the GMD and the superficial 
control of the last years of Imperial China, the CCP, upon their accession to power, sent a 
large group of veteran political personnel and civil technicians from the centre to help the 
new autonomous government. This was to assure the overall control of the Chinese 
communists. 
After General Tao Zhiyue, commander of Nationalist Troops in Xinjiang, signed an 
agreement for peaceful surrender to the PLA, Wang Zhen and Wang Enmao, as the 
25 The capital of the government of the Nationalist Party. 
26 fli Incident, basically raised by Uyghur political activists in association with the independence of Xinjiang, 
took place in the fli Valley in 1944-47 and showed resistance and discontent by the local Muslim population 
toward Han control, led by the GMD, over the region. 
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commander and commissar of the First Army Group, First Field Anny (FA) of the PLA, led 
their troops into Xinjiang. The Xinjiang Military District (XMD) of the PLA, headed by 
Wang Zhen was established to maintain the military control of the region and handle general 
civil affairs of the region for the time being. 
In December 1949 the People's Government of Xinjiang Province (XPG) was established. 
The XPG Commission consisted of 33 members. It was chaired by Burhan Shahidi and had a 
vice Chair, Seypidin Aziz, both Uyghurs from the Di group27. After the region was formally 
granted autonomy in 1955, the XPG was then transformed to the "People' s Government of 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomic Region (XUAR)" (XAPG), with approximately 54,000-58,000 
cadres, including 20,000 CCP members. They were engaged both in the core institutes, 
including 16 civil bureaux and commissions located in Urumqi, and in sub-regional 
governmental institutions in autonomous townships, districts, counties, prefectures and 
village communes. The 16 bureaux were initially: civil affairs, police and security, finance, 
transport, industry and mines, agriculture and forestry, pastoral farming, education, 
commerce, trading companies, banks, health and environmental association, financial 
economy, ethnic affairs, education and culture, and the provincial people' s court. 
In October 1949 the CCP of Xinjiang also set up the CCP Xinjiang Bureau, consisting of 
nine members, including a First General Secretary (GS), Wang Zhen, a Depute Secretary, 
Wang Enmao, and various committees. Xinjiang' s CCP was led by a 6-people standing 
committee and one GS. It initially set up its headquarters in 1949 in Urumqi under the name 
of the Xinjiang' s Autonomous Regional Party Commission (XARPC), with 3,000 members 
in nine departments: organization, propaganda, unity, personnel, youth work, women's work, 
discipline and inspection, a confidential commission, and foreign affairs. Although the 
XARPC also had its own branches located in the sub-regions, the CCP in Xinjiang 
functioned largely through the apparatus of the XAPRC: their premier Party committees and 
cells penetrating territorially and institutionally into governmental institutes and social 
service units like schools and villages, etc .. Many personnel in particular territorially-based 
governmental institutes and service units concurrently were members of the Party committee 
27 Political activists in the I1i Incident 
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of the unit: for example, the leader of a unit could be the leader of the Party committee in that 
unit too. 
From January 1950 until the eve ofpre-reform era, due to Xinjiang's special character, the 
CCP Commissions were largely based on the personnel of the XMD's CCP commission. 
This had three levels of institutions in a geographical administrative hierarchy of the 
province, districts and towns. Ten political administrative districts were allocated 
geographically to the supervision of three CCP district commissions. In October 1955, on the 
establishment of the XAPG, the branches ofXinjiang's CCP commissions below the 
provincial level developed to nine, and in 1960 the construction of the regime of CCP 
commission was gradually completed, with one provincial core institute; 11 district 
commissions, including six in Sub-Regions; four in Autonomous Prefectures; one in the 
capital city; 83 township committees; and the five cells of the provincial municipality. By 
1997, there were III CCP commissions below the provincial level, 1412 premier committees 
and 58,000 cells established in villages, schools, enterprises and various institutes. In 
regulating its own operation, since 1956 the CCP has held five provincial Party Congresses, 
in 1956, 1971 , 1984, 1991 and 1996, to announce new party leaders, reconstruct the Party 
core and cell committees and discuss the missions and tasks ofXinjiang' s CCP in order to 
assure that the region and its government was acting under the Party' s directions. The same 
routine is pursued also by the sub-provincial CCP committees and cells (Figure 4.1). 
According to Chinese law, including both the 1982 Constitution and the May 1984 Law on 
Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities, specific autonomous rights in the political, 
economic and cultural spheres, enable a representative minority to exercise autonomy and 
have freedom to adapt or choose not to implement central government laws which do not suit 
their needs. But as mentioned before, Xinjiang has the same administrative system as the rest 
of China and accepts the leadership of the CCP, therefore there are sharp limitations to and 
paradoxes in the autonomy laws. One is that laws concerning membership of the government 
do not appl y to the CCP, as announced in the 12th Party Congress in 1982 for the separation 
of affairs of the Party and the State Council (SC) in order to reduce the political intervention 
of the Party. So, while the government head ofXinjiang must be from the Uyghur or other 
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minorities by law, the region's CCP GS may be a Han, and on all occasions the secretary 
determines the decisions of the government, and the same rule is applicable to all of the 
state's institutions and enterprises. 
At the time of Mao' s directive of 5th December 1949 to "turn the army into a work force", 
Wang Zhen transferred the 170,000 remnant soldiers of the Nationalist Army and some from 
the FA of the PLA, including his own Brigade 359, into civilian workers by re-organising 
them into the Xinjiang Wilderness Reclamation Army, the forerunner of the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Crops (XPCC). The demobilised troops were taught to become 
a "driving force behind modernisation in Xinjiang" (McMillen, 1981) and to learn that: 
" ... the economic heritage left behind by old (semi-feudal and semi-colonial) China is pitiably 
small. We have just begun, and we lack experience. We must study, learn from the Soviet 
Union, . . . and free ourselves from arrogance and hastiness" (Zhang Bingying, 1954, cited by 
McMillen, 1981 : p.70). Especially Brigade 359 of the 120th Division of the 8th Route Army, 
headed by Wang Zhen and Wang Enmao, had been regarded as the living heroic symbol of 
"the spirit of Nanniwan", underlying the Maoist ideology of both self-reliance and self-
sacrifice in the Nanniwan region ofYanan, southwest Shannxi in the 1940s, where they 
provided supplies to the military through the hardship of land reclamation and economic 
production in wartime (McMillen, 1981). This spirit was inherited by the Wangs and their 
followers and is said to have inspired them to devote themselves to pursuing the economic 
construction of Xinjiang. These demobilised soldiers worked on "land reclamation, water 
conservancy, agricultural and animal husbandry production, infrastructure production and 
capital construction" (McMillen, 1981: p.69) in the remote but strategically important areas 
near the major cities and transportation routes linking Xinjiang to China ' s interior and the 
areas where the basic industries, housing, communications facilities, mines and other 
enterprises, were to be established and expanded. In December 1954, these troops were 
formally established as the XPCC under the administration of China' s Agricultural Ministry 
and under the XMD for its military affairs. This effectively solved the labour and skilled 
personnel shortages for developing this huge, economically backward region. 
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By 1954, along with the soldiers, there were between 7,000 and 10,000 cadres of the FA also 
demobilised and sent to participate in rent-reduction and anti-landlord campaigns and to 
assist in socialist collectivisation at the township level. Most demobilised cadres, who used to 
be veterans in the FA, were now placed in positions of authority in the XPCC and other civil 
departments of local governments. They involved themselves, not only in economic 
production and in the socialist political transformation of the non-Han minorities, but also in 
constituting a loyal personnel network to support the leadership of the two Wangs (Table 
5.1). Given the backwardness of Xinjiang's economy, the huge areas of non-fertilised land, 
and the complex Muslim society, Wang' s campaign provided an efficient method for the 
CCP to consolidate its power and implement its policies through the sheer force of human 
resources. 
In November 1949 the central committee in Beijing required Marshal Peng Dehuai, General 
Wang Zhen, and the Party Bureau of the Northwest, to recruit party members from the local 
minorities. Mao had stated early on in the CCP' s control in Xinjiang that, without a large 
number of cadres and activists recruited from the minority nationalities, China could never 
succeed in thoroughly solving the nationalities 'problem' or in completely isolating the 
' reactionaries' among the nationalities (McMillen, 1979). Along with his pol itical concern, 
Mao obviously recognised that the effectiveness and efficiency of the CCP' s institutional 
operation must count on the native peoples, which to some extent accorded with Weber' s 
rationality of bureaucratic administration in social interaction. The criteria for qualified 
candidates was to be combined with their personal interests, such as political inclination, as a 
priority; their personal background, for example poor peasants and working families; their 
personal experiences, such as joining the democracy and communist movements before the 
establishment ofXinjiang' s CCP, etc .. Thus Burhan and Seypidin, as two local political 
activists, were recruited to join the CCP at this time and were soon appointed as the members 
ofXinjiang' s CCP Standing Committee. During the land reform and the initial phase of 
socialist transformation in 1950-1952, there were more than 1,000 minority Party members 
including Tomur and Ismail and about 16,000 local cadres trained and appointed (Table 5.2). 
After that, Xinjiang' s CCP membership expanded from 2,300 initially in 1949 to 984,689 by 
the end of 1998, representing 5.73 per cent of the provincial population. 
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Table 5.1 Party Leadership in Xinjiang, 1949, 1950, 1952,1955,1958 
Position 1949 1950 
I SI Secretary Marshal Peng Dehuai (Chinese, 151 FA) Wang Zhen (I SI) 
Secretary Wang Zhen (Chinese, Ist28) Gao linchun (I SI) 
Alternative Secretary 
Gao, linchun (Chinese, I SI) Zhang Bangying (Chinese, I SI) 
Wang Enmao (Chinese, 151) Wang Emma ( I SI) 
XU Liqing (Chinese, I SI) Seypidin (Uyghur, I1i29) 
Rao Zhongxi (Chinese, I SI) XU Liqing (I SI) 
Deng Lichun (Chinese, I SI) Rao Zhongxi (I SI) 
Deng Lichun (I SI) 
Position 1952 1955 
I 51 Secretary Wang Zhen (I SI) Wang Emma ( I SI) 
Secretary Wang Enmao ( I SI) Gao linchun (1'1) 
Gao linchun (I SI) Seypidin 
Seypidin Zhang Bangying (I SI) 
Zhang Bangying (I SI) 
Alternative Secretary Rao Zhongxi (I SI) W u Kaizhang (Chinese, I SI) 
Deng Lichun (I SI) Qi Guo (Chinese, worker) 
Zeng Di (Chinese, I SI) Zeng Di (I SI) 
Xin Lanting (Chinese, I SI) Xin Lanting (I SI) 
Lu lianren (Chinese, I SI) Lu Jianren (I SI) 
Saifulaev (Uyghur, Ili) 
Iminov (Uyghur, I1i) 
Aisihaiti (Tartar, Hi) 
Aixia (Uyghur, lIi) 
Position 1958 
I SI Secretary Wang Enmao (I SI) 
Secretary Seypidin 
W u Kaizhang (I SI) 
Lu Jianren (I SI) 
Zhang Fengqi (?) 
Li Quan (Chinese, I SI) 
Alternative Secretary Qi Guo 
Lin Bomin (I SI) 
Yang Heting (I SI) 
Tomur Dawamati (Uyghur, Turpan) 
Xin Lanting (I SI) 
.. (Note: Mmonttes m blue 
Sources: McMillen , 1979 alldfieldwork. 2003) 
In 1949, when the large personnel of the Party committee ofXMD were transferred into the 
XARPC, there were only a few members from the Uyghur and other minorities, and the 
majority of the membership, mainly Han, came from the First FA. From 1955, the key 
departments of the XARPC were virtually all headed by Han and the top personnel within the 
institutes at the provincial level located in Ururnqi were still mostly Han (Table 5.3). Among 
28 I SI refers to the 151 FA. 
29 Ili here means the former leader of the "Hi Incident". 
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the Han, in particular the Party elite, by the middle of the period 1957 to 1966, there were 
only two people who came from outside the First FA and most were veteran Party members 
with long revolutionary experience in China's West. In the period 1955-1966 a large number 
of young Han university graduates were recruited from China' s heartland to work as junior 
staff in the departments and institutes ofXinjiang' s Party commission and the government at 
all levels, of which intellectuals accounted for 11.5 per cent of the total. As Seypidin said in 
1965 (Mc Mill en, 1979), there were over 18,000 CCP primary committees and cells in 
Xinjiang, with a total membership of more than 220,000. 48 per cent of them were from the 
minorities and 60 per cent of the members of CCP committees at all levels, but only 5 per 
cent of the total minority members held leading positions at the township and village level or 
above. The majority of the secretaries of the Party committees at the district level were from 
minorities, but the first secretaries were Han. In conclusion, despite the CCP membership of 
minorities gradually increasing, the key posts of Party committees at all levels, especially 
above that of the township, remained in the hands of the Han, specifically those who were 
military veterans. 
Table 5.2 Estimated CCP and Cadres Figures in Xinjiang 1949-1965 
1949 1950-51 
CCP members 2300 5,_10,0003u 
Han members - -
Non-Han - 1000 
members 
CCP branches - -
CCP cadres - 23,000 
Han cadres - 7-10,000 
Non-Han cadres - l2,841-16, 1 00 
1958-59 1960 
CCP members 130-134,000 176,970 
Han members 68,000 -
Non-Han 62,000 60,-6149033 
members 
CCP branches 8,982 11 ,000 
CCP cadres 117-134,000 -
Han cadres 45,-62,000 -
Non-Han cadres 62,-72,000 72,000 
(Sources: McMlllen. 1979 and Wang. 1999) 
30 Not including CCP members in PLA and XPCc. 
31 Including CCP members in PLA and XPCC. 
32 Not including XPCC. 
33 Uyghur only. 
1955 1956 
20,000 (30- 62,4 78-68,000 
40,000)31 
10-11 ,000 32-41 ,000 
9-10,000 27,833-30,000 
-
25000 
54,-58,000 92-100,00&2 
18,000 40902 
35,695-40,000 51106-63935 
1962 1965 
- 220,000 
-
114,000 
85,000 106,000 
- 18,000 
200,000 190,000 
88,500 84,000 
11 ,500 106,000 
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Table 5.3 The Heads of CCP Commission in 1955-1965 
1955 1958 1965 
Dir. of Propaganda Dep. Lin Bomin W'FA) Lin Bomin Lin Bomin 
Lu Jianren 
Dir. of Unification Dep. Lu Jianren Lu Jianren 
Dir. of Organisation Dep. Anwar Hanbaba (Uzb.) ZhangFenqi )(in Lanting 
Dir. of Cultural & Educational Dep. Anwar Hanbaba Anwar Hanbaba 
Dir. of Rural Work Department Xin Lanting Sirnayyi Yashengnuofu (U) Sirnayyi Yashengnuoft 
Anwar, Jiagulin (Kaz, l1i Group) 
Dir. of Financial & Trade Dep. Xin Lanting Xin Lanting 
Dir. of Politic & Legal Dep. Anwar, Jiagulin 
.. (Note. MmontJes m blue 
Source: compiled from McMillen, 1979) 
However, in tenns of the CCP's minority membership, the proportion is considerably lower. 
In 1997, there were some 95,800 CCP members in Xinjiang, among whom about 35,800 
were from the minorities, that is 37.37 per cent, in comparison to the region having 61.58 per 
cent of its population from the various minority ethnic groups. 
This structure ofCCP committees is apparently largely unchanged even now. Here we will 
examine, as examples, two sub-regional committees from the northern and southern parts of 
Xinjiang and three party cells within the region's governmental institutions. 
First, the County of Miquan is located to the north of the capital Urumqi. In 1948 its 
population was dominated by Hui at 63 per cent, with Han only 27 per cent, but in 1989 this 
had reversed to Han 63 per cent and Hui 32 per cent. The CCP committee was set up in 1950 
and led by a Han cadre, Nui H, from central China, with a team constituted mainly of Han. 
From 1956 to 1985 the county held five CCP congresses and elected members for the CCP 
committee from time to time (Table 5.4). Each time the Han membership increased as the 
Han population was growing in the county, and the Han-dominated leadership was naturally 
reinforced. We may say that, because of the geographical location of Miquan County close to 
the capital Urumqi, it could not avoid a large proportion of Han immigrants and domination 
by Han personnel in the CCP. Now let us look at a county far from the Han-influenced 
Xinjiang's northern areas. 
Awati County is located on the northern slope of the Tian Shan Mountains to the northeast of 
Aksu City. It had a 99.4 per cent Uyghur popUlation in 1949, decreasing slightly to 85 per 
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cent in 1990. The fIrst CCP committee of the township had four members, including one 
Uyghur, and was set up in 1950, led by a Han from the 2nd FA. From 1955 to 1989 there 
were seven local party congresses held to determine the personnel changes of the county 
CCP (Table 5.5). As we can see in the Table 5.5, before the reform, Han CCP membership 
dominated, and then after the reform, Uyghur CCP membership increased. This was a result 
of the Xinjiang CCP's policy of recruiting more minority cadres and CCP members. Even so, 
the First GS and one vice secretary were Han, implying that decision-making remained in the 
hands of the Han. The Awati County's CCP Committee represents one of two common ways 
in which Xinjiang's CCP maintains its control in regions of large minority population. The 
alternative is for the First GS and one or two vice secretaries to be from the minority but for 
the majority of committee members to be Han, so again the latter dominate the decisions of 
the committee. 
Table 5.4 The Party Committee of Miquan County since 1956-1985 
1956 1964 1970 1980 1985 
1st GS Nui H (Han) NuiH WangY (Han) Hou P (Han) Wu Q (Han) 
Vice secretaries Liu W (Han) Yang CF (Han) Dong(Han) Gao L (Han) Hai R (Hui) 
Yang H (Hui) Yang H (Hui) NuiH Li D (Han) 
Yang M (Han) Tian S (Hui) Ma C (Hui) 
Party committee Nui H (Han) NiuH WangY Hou P Gao L 
Liu W(Han) YangCF WangC (Han) GaoL ZhouD 
Yang H(Hui) YangM Nui C (Han) LiD Xiu H (Han) 
Sheng Z(Hui) YangH You L (Han) MaC MaC 
Qi J (Hui) Ma P (Hui) TianS Ma Like (Kazakb) Wei F (Han) 
Liu Z(Han) Zhu H (HaD) You L WuQ 
Hao] (Han) DODgS (Han) Lu C(Han) Qu Z (Han) 
Ma D (Hui) Zhou D (Han) Ma (Hui) 
YangL (Han) Wang 
(Source: based on Miquan County Ladge. /998) 
Let us now examine the CCP leadership of three civil service bureaux: the Xinjiang 
Commercial Bureau, the Xinjiang Coal Industry Bureau, and the Xinjiang Trading Goods 
Inspection Bureau, which were governmental institutes located in Urumqi and used to play a 
key part in Xinjiang's planned economy, but are now long gone since China's administrative 
reform of 1993, when they were merged into other governmental civil departments or 
transformed into state firms. 
The CCP leaders listed in the tables were also concurrently holding leadership roles in 
bureaux operations (Tables 5.6, 5.7, 5.8). The tables display a clear structure ofleadership 
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personnel in the CCP committee in which Han obviously dominated decision-making. This 
type of structure is representative of all of the state's core and upper level institutes and 
enterprises in Xinjiang up to now. 
Table 5.5 The Party Committee of Awati County since 1956-1985 
1956 1958 1962 1971 
ISl GS Zhang C (Han) LiW Zhang Z (Han) Liu G (Han) 
Vice secretaries Abas (U) Zhang B Zhang B Liu C(Han) 
Abas (U) Abla Saber (U) 
Party committee ZhangC LiW ZhangZ LiuG 
Abas ZhangB ZhangB LiuC 
Zhang B (Han) Abas Ahmat (U) Abla Saber 
Ahrnat (U) Jin (Han) Jin Li Z.L. (Han) 
Cao (Han) Li Z.C (Han) Lu (Han) Mahamti (U) 
Li W (Han) Ahmat Cao Lu (Han) 
Cao (Han) LiZ.C. Bewuhan (U) 
1980 1985 1989 
IS' GS Mamut (U) Mamut Liu (Han) 
Vice secretaries Wei J (Han) Duan C (Han) Gan (Han) 
Abla Ashan (U) Abdulari (U) Amut (U) 
Li Z (Han) 
Chang Lu (Han) 
Mamat Y (U) 
Party committee Mamut Mamut Liu 
WeiJ DuanC Gan 
Abla Ashan Abdulati Amut 
LiZ Abla(U) Abdulari Yahpu (U) 
Chang Lu Usman (U) He (Han) 
Mama! Y Gou (Han) Matniyazi (U) 
Mahamat (U) Tan Z (Han) Tula (U) 
Qi J (Han) Abdulati Yahpu (U) Yimin (U) 
MaoLa (U) Erxidin (U) 
Bewuhan 
Mamat Sayiti (U) 
(Source: based on Awatl County Ladge. 1999) 
From the above discussion, we can safely say that minorities are under-represented in 
Xinjiang's decision-making system and in the provincial CCP's units. The pattern is found 
right across the region. Kashigar, for instance, has a 90 per cent minority population and 70 
per cent of the cadres are from minorities, but more than half of the CCP committee members 
are Han or Hui34. In Turpan, 78 per cent are from minorities, but only 50 per cent for CCP 
members. In Urumqi and any large city in Xinjiang's north, governmental institutions such as 
the key bureaux and commissions, banks, financial offices, legislative and police offices and 
enterprises are all largely composed of Han. Only the United Front Work Bureau, the Ethnic 
34 Although Huis are defined as a minority, in Xinjiang they are in fact not distinguished themselves from but 
close to Hans. 
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and Religious Affairs Department, and the Cultural and Media departments etc. are occupied 
largely by the minorities. 
Table 5.6 The CCP Cell Leaderships of Xinjiang Commercial Bureau 
Party Cell 1953-55 1956-1959 1960-1966 1972-76 351978-1980 1980-83 1983-90 
ISI GS Gao YS (H) GaoYS Cai H CH) GaoYS He C CH} Zhang CH} Tuhuti CV) 
Director Director Director Director Director Director Director 
Abduhami CV) He J CH) 
Director Director 
{I 955-56) (1966-7) 
Vice-S Abulizi K AA Abulizi K Liu Vice-d Jiang CH} Gao CH) Gao He T CH) 
Vice-d Vice-d Wang S CH} Vice-d Vice-d Vice-d Xl!..O:D 
Liu CH) Liu Vice-d (1986-90) 
Vice-d Vice-d ( 1959-62) Both 
( 1953-67) Long (H) Vice-ds 
(1959-62) 
(Source: based on Xinjiang Trade Ladge, /999) 
Table 5.7 The CCP Cell Leaderships ofXinjiang Trading Goods Inspecting Bureau 
Party Cell 1963-72 1974-81 1981-87 1988-92 1992-94 1995}6 
ISl GS Wang D.B CH) WangD.B Wei CH) WangZ Wang G (H) Kulashi (Kazakh) 
Director Director Director 
Vice-S 1iiill Du (H) Wang Z(H) Zhou CH) Yang (H) !&i!:!) 
Vice-d Zhang X (H) Director Kulashi (Kazakh) 
Du Director Vice-d 
(Source: based on Xinjiang Goods Trading Ladge, /999) 
Table 5.8 The CCP Cell Leaderships of Xinjiang Coal Industry Bureau 
Party Cell 1958-60 1960-62 1962-67 1978-83 1983-89 1989Y 
1st GS Kong(H) YangZ Bai (H) YangZ Wang(H) Tursu 
Director Director Director Director Tursu Vice-d 
both Vice-ds 
Vice-S Yang Z CH) Zhang YangZ Yasen Yasen Yu 
Zhang CH) Vice-d (1962-70) Vice-d YuCH} Director 
both Vice-ds Vice-d Both Directors 
Members Li CH) Li Yasen CV) Song CH) Wang S (H) WangS 
Fen CH) Fen (1962-70) Wang S (H) XU CH) XU 
Both Vice --<is Both Vice- Xiao CH) Jiu 
ds Ji.!!J.ID 
Zhang CH) 
Tursu AA 
(Source: based on Xinjiang Coal Ladge, /999) 
35 1966-1976 during the eR, in most institutes of China the CCP committees were usurped by Revolution 
Committees. 
36 Up to the date recorded in the ladge. 
37 Since 1988 the Bureau was separated from governmental institutions and established as a state firm under the 
name of the Xinjiang Coal Industry Company, which then was later changed in 1989 to the China Xinjiang 
United Coal Mine Company under the direct administration of the China Coal Co. 
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By way of mitigation, we might argue that the early Han domination of CCP committees is 
because of a shortage of minority CCP members but after forty years this excuse is wearing 
thin. Most leading posts are still by and large in the hands of Han, though since the 1995 
reform, numbers of minority members are increasing, and 55.6 per cent of personnel in the 
XARPC are now minorities (Table 5.9).38 According to a statistic of the year 2001 , minority 
leaders at or above provincial level are 31 persons or 55.3 per cent of the total numbers at the 
same level; under the provincial and above township level it is 447 persons, or 42.5 per cent, 
and at the township level, it is 3600, 34.4 per cent. Table 5.10 lists the numbers of Uyghur 
and other minorities and Han holding the top leading posts in XARPC and XAPG. This 
provides clear evidence of the dominance ofHan personnel in decision-making. 
Table 5.9 Minority Representation in the CCP Central Committee 
Central Committee 
8 1956 
9th 1969 
lOth 1973 
11th 1977 
12th 1982 
13th 1987 
14th 1992 
(Source: Sautmen. 1997) 
% 
5.2 
4 .6 
5.6 
5.7 
8.0 
11.2 
10.3 
The above discussion quite contradicts Mao' s statement in favour of recruiting more local 
minorities for the CCP and exploiting them to serve the Party and the region, and it 
contradicts too the state's political promises to the.region. Since 1949, CCP institutions have 
been constructed across this region and have acted in Muslim society, challenging its 
Islamism. But it failed to hire many from the local Muslim nationalities to run the region. 
This raises questions, firstly, about what is the real implication of CCP' s political institutions 
functioning in Xinjiang; secondly, as the CCP is now at last showing some determination to 
increase minority membership of the CCP in Xinjiang (Mackerras, 2003), whether these CCP 
minority members can really be expected to serve their region by implementing the CCP 
agenda; thirdly, whether CCP Han members coming to Xinjiang through propaganda 
recruitment are ever likely to commit themselves to a province with such social complexity 
and cultural differences from their own home regions. 
38Xinjiang Statistical Bureau (XSB): Xinjiang' s Glorious Fifty Years, 1999a. 
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Table 5.10 Leadership ofXinjiang's Sub-regional below Provincial Level 2001-2003 
Urumqi city 
Karamay city 
Shihezi city 
Changji (Hui AR) 
lIi (Kazakh AR) 
Bortala (Mongol AR) 
Bayingolin (Mongol AR) 
Kizilsu-Kirghiz (AR) 
Hami 
Turpan 
Aksu 
Hotan 
Kashigar 
Tacbeng 
Altay 
Statistic 
Party Commission 
GS: H 
Vice: 2 U, 3 H 
Members: 5 H, 2 U, I 0 
GS: H 
Vice: I U, 2 H 
Members: I U, 4 H 
GS: H 
Vice: H 
Members: U, 11 H 
GS: H 
Vice: I HU, 3 H 
Members: 2 U, 5 H 
GS: H 
Vice: 2 K, I U, 3 H 
Members: 2 K, 5 H 
GS: H 
Vice: I H,2 M 
Members: 2 H, 3 M 
GS: H 
Vice: I M, 3 H 
Members: I M, I U, I K, 5 H 
GS: H 
Vice: 3 U,4 H 
Members: IU, 5 H 
GS: H 
Vice: I U, 4 H 
Members: 2 U, 8 H 
GS: H 
Vice: I H, I U 
Members: 2 U, 3 H 
GS: H 
Vice: 3 H, 2 U 
Members: 4 H, 2 U 
GS: H 
Vice: 2 H, 2 U 
Members: 4 H, 2 U 
GS:H 
Vice: 2 H, I U 
Members: 3 H, I U 
GS: H 
Vice: 2 H 
Members: 3 H 
GS: H 
Vice: I K, 2 H 
Members: 2 K, 3 H 
GS: 
Minority : 0 
Han: 100% 
Vice: 
Minority: 36% 
Han: 64% 
Members: 
Minority: 27% 
Han: 73% 
Government 
Governor: U 
Vice: I HU,4 H 
Governor: H 
Vice: I U, 3 H 
Governor: H 
Vice: I K, 3 H 
Governor: Hu 
Vice: I Hu, I U, I K, 4 H 
Governor: K 
Vice: 3 K, 3 H 
Governor: M 
Vice: 2 M, I U, 3 H 
Governor: M 
Vice: I M, I U, 3 H 
Governor: U 
Vice: 2 U, 3 H 
Governor: U 
Vice: 2 U,4 H 
Governor: U 
Vice: 2 U, 3 H 
Governor: U 
Vice: 2 U, 4 H 
Governor: U 
Vice: 2 U,4 H 
Governor: U 
Vice: 213 U , 5/4 H 
Governor: U 
Vice: I U, 3 H 
Governor: U 
Vice: 2 U, 5 H 
Governor: 
Minority: 87% 
Han : I3% 
Vice: 
Minority: 36% 
Han 64% 
(Note: H for Han, U for Uyghur, Hu for Hui, K for Kazakh, M for Mongol, 0 for an unclear nationality but no-
Han. 
Source: author,fieldwork, 2003) 
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The CCP political administration and leadership, based on single party rule, has penetrated 
every corner of the country including Xinjiang and is deeply ingrained in the society. This 
gives it supreme power in manipulating the Han and non-Han populations in order to achieve 
its political goals, including ' manufacturing' the governments of this autonomous region 
(Schurmann, 1966). It is worth noting that CCP's mission in the minority regions like 
Xinjiang is not quite the same as in China' s other provinces: here "under CCP's leadership it 
seeks to approach a socialist construction" (cited in Wang 1999c: p.232). The underlying 
agenda is that, by means of Han-controlled CCP leadership and decision-making, and by 
maintaining domination in the committees and cells of the various governments and public 
institutes, a legitimate means has been found of de facto withdrawing "the permitted 
autonomy" to local people, and integrating the region with the rest of China. As a result, the 
operations of Xinjiang' s leadership, governmental administration and public services are 
heavily politically coloured and national unity-orientated. 
Always having the CCP supreme leadership in the hands of the Han not only contradicts the 
stated regional autonomy of Xinjiang, considered by Beijing to be an important tactic in the 
consolidation of the CCP in the region, but in fact it has annoyed the regional minorities and 
is turning the minorities away, especially any Uyghurs who had thought they could join 
China's mainstream if they were politically recognised as a full part of China by the Han and 
given genuine regional autonomy.39 
In order effectively and efficiently to facilitate Han hegemony in this minority region, the 
CCP has carefully recruited and employed a large number of minority people in the CCP and 
XAPG units and trained them to serve CCP' s goals. However, the Xinjiang CCP' s personnel 
policy, in promoting these minorities, especially Uyghur cadres and CCP members, reflects a 
paradox and, again, the "give and take" strategy that creates a dilemma. 
Since being recruited into the CCP, these minority cadres receive benefits in terms of the 
economy and politics far above the non-party members of their fellow people, and more than 
39 Discussion by Uyghurs at http://www.uyghuramerican.org/index.php/uaalresearch and reports! accessed in 
Qct. 2001. 
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many of their Han colleagues. They enjoy privileges granted by Chinese minority 
preferential policies, such as greater opportunities for job promotion working in high 
authority institutes in Xinjiang and even in Beijing. There is also career development, 
including training and further education in China' s prestige party schools and universities, 
and economic subsidies for themselves and family members. In return, these minority cadres 
have to work for the Han-Ied CCP and CCP-Ied local government and serve the party's goals. 
Despite the fact that the CCP has successfully recruited and trained many minority cadres, 
however, it is a different matter effectively to exploit these cadres and to 'win their hearts 
and minds ' . After all, they have totally different cultural and social roots from the Han and 
most will have been brought up to see CCP control in Xinjiang simply as Han "colonisation 
and assimilation". The economic benefits, financial incentives and other perks showed by 
various minority preferential polices to these minority cadres are not enough for most, 
especially in the reform era. 
The first major challenge for the CCP is the cultural and religious influence of Islam upon 
these minority cadres. It tries to convert Xinjiang's Muslims to Communism, but the very 
presence of Islam has been problematic. Yu (1985) and Murvar (1985) have both argued that 
Patrimonialism, formed in China from her past cultural heritage, helps the formulation of a 
phenomenon: the party leading the state and the nation believing in the party. But in Islamic 
societies, Patrimonlism has been an even stronger influence in social and political 
administration, including a belief in the ultimate goal of a common nation of Islam (Murvar, 
1985). This makes the co-existence of Communism and other ideologies difficult or 
impossible.4o Despite the CCP successfully gaining political power over Muslims in Xinjiang 
and convincing impressive numbers of the Muslim population to act on the CCP's proposals, 
its ideology and practical operation are always in conflict with and challenged by Islamic 
monotheism. 
In the past a criterion in the recruitment of minority CCP members has been an insistence on 
non-religious belief. The communique from a work conference held in Urumqi in May 1996 
40 Unfortunately "Weber's projected volume on Islam never materialised" (Murvar, 1985). 
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to discuss Xinjiang's stability, for instance, stated this specifically: "Communist party 
members and party cadres are Marxist materialists and atheists. They shall not believe in any 
religion or take part in religious activities. ,.41 However, to minority CCP members, the issue 
of religion cannot be wished away, as the great majority ofUyghurs consider themselves to 
be Muslims first. Many loyal CCP members are tormented by a decision whether to cease 
party activism or turn their back on religion, as there is no other alternative. If they choose 
the latter, they are regarded as traitors locally and cannot be accepted by their own 
community.42 In the urban areas, although a larger proportion of the minority population 
converts to Communism than in the countryside, they still have strong roots in their own 
community, and this affects their manner and attitudes toward the tasks assigned by the CCP, 
marking them out from their Han colleagues. It is in effect impossible in this region for 
minority cadres to be "good" communists, regarded by their CCP Han leader and colleagues, 
and ignore their religion and their ethnic nationality. As a result, it affects them in 
"effectively" handling assigned Party jobs within their community. The dilemma is most 
common and intense among these minority CCP members in strongly religious villages and 
counties in the south of Xinjiang. 
This can be examined through three phenomena in the recruitment and perfonnance of 
Xinjiang' s minority cadres in the remote rural areas of the southern region. Firstly, there are 
recruitment difficulties. In Mao's era, owing to the CCP's strenuous political propaganda and 
strict policy encouraging CCP minority membership, large numbers of minority members 
across the region from villages to villages were recruited by those local CCP cells. However, 
since the reform, as the grip of the CCP has relaxed, fewer locals have joined. Han personnel 
have stayed in post at the upper level of townships in the CCP apparatus but its 
administration and functioning at the grassroots has become slack and irregular. A survey by 
the Xinjiang Social Science Academy (XSSA) shows that in one Uyghur village in Awati 
County, there were a total of27 CCP members, only three of whom were under the age of30 
(Table 5.11). In January 1999, 25 minority members in a village of Ye ch en County withdrew 
their membership to return to their Muslim faith. Secondly, Party administration is irregular. 
41 BBC monitoring service: Asia-Pacific, 9 May 1996, from Xinjiang Television, cited by Mackerras, 200 I: 
p.290. 
42 Interviews, 2003 and also supportive reference found in the research of Yee, 2003. 
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South Xinjiang provides a good example, where many minority members of the CCP cells in 
remote villages now rarely come to regular party members ' meetings or receive Party 
training and instruction. One of Party members in Awati County had not attended any party 
activities since joining the Party two years before. 
Thirdly, Islam is taking a leading role. As political restrictions have relaxed, religion has 
experienced a boom in the vast areas of remote countryside without local Party committee 
control and monitoring. There has been a resurgence of Muslim fundamentalism, which in 
turn has generated more anti-Han and separatist activities since 1980. In theory, any party 
cadres and members are not allowed to attend religious activities. However there was little 
control on mosques and religious schools being utilised by Uyghur nationalists and 
separatists. In practice many minority CCP members, including cadres, not only fail to stop 
such activities but also become religiously active themselves, against the CCP rule of 
atheism, and even worse, they participate in separatist activities, against the CCP requirement 
for unity. In Pishan County in South Xinjiang there are 25 CCP cadres and all attend 
religious services. In Shache County 50 per cent of CCP members practise the religion. In 
one of the villages in Awati County, the GS and every member of the village CCP attend 
services and pray in public. In 1997, there were rumours spreading in Awati County 
encouraging local Muslim people to join a "Holy War" against the Han. However, although 
local minority CCP members didn 't involve themselves in it, they also didn't take action to 
stop it or report it to their superiors.43 
Table 5.11 The Age Structure of 27 CCP Members in Awati County in ] 998 
Ages -30 30-45 45-50 
Numbers 3 9 7 
Percentage 10% 34% 26% 
(Source: survey of Xinjiang 's Social Science Academy (XSSA), 2000). 
60 
8 
31 % 
The second challenge the CCP faces in Xinjiang is its own attitude towards minority 
members. The construction of the CCP' s institutions has shown a systematic bias against the 
minorities, leaving the majority of Muslim people to believe that the CCP has given no real 
empowerment to minority CCP leaders and cadres, and has in effect cheated them of their 
43 Fieldwork, 2003 based on the survey of XSSA, 2000. 
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legally "granted" autonomy. This has created a political environment of complexity and 
hostility among the membership of the CCP and governmental teams. Although some of 
them may have expressed their willingness to participate and to give up their religion and 
nationalism in order to join in the CCP teams, few express contentment, and this is 
exacerbated by the CCP's lack of trust in them and their marginalised position, hardly a 
compensation for the condemnation of their own community. So, unless there is a large 
opportunity available for some individuals to pursue their own personal interests, to achieve 
their career ambitions and to profit financially, most choose to act for the benefit of their own 
nationality and perform their CCP tasks slackly and uncooperatively. Some even act against 
the Party. A large minority of CCP members are seen as getting less collaborative, more 
"power hunger" and "troublesome" in Xinjiang since the reform, making the CCP leadership 
and its leading government less efficient and cohesive, in turn creating more political 
struggle. 
The issue for promoting more minority cadres and recruiting minority governmental staff is 
raised frequently in Party meetings by minority cadres. "(T)he minute one raises 'autonomy' 
in Xinjiang, people, and especially comrades from the minorities, think immediately of the 
ratios of cadres and civil servants. The two have practically become synonymous. This has 
become a 'big and intractable problem' for local government to resolve" (Ma, 2003, cited by 
Bovingdon, 2004: p.4S). In Sautman's investigation (1997: p.20), Turpan's minority cadres 
held out against the domination of a Han leadership and regarded the central government as 
"all talk and no do" in promoting minority cadres. According to the survey by XSSA, in 
Xinjiang's five macro-sub-regions, many Uyghur, including cadres themselves, consider that 
they have not been fairly and full utilised (Table 5.12). Such discontent and conflict between 
Han and non-Han, specifically Uyghur, cadres remains intense and constant, and makes 
entire cadre teams and local governments non-cohesive, fragmented and unable to achieve 
their goals and implement state policy. Public condemnation by Uyghur cadres is frequent 
and intensive of Chinese policies concerning Han immigration and economic development. 
For instance, one Uyghur leader of a county near to the Tarim oil field after drinks at a 
formal welcome dinner is said to have shouted at official guests visiting from Beijing and 
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Urumqi there to discuss oil exploration and exploitation by the Petro China, that they were 
stealing the treasure of his home town in order to make coastal regions like Shanghai rich 44. 
Table 5.12 Do You Think Minority Cadres are FuUy Utilised? (%) 
Agree Disagree Hard to Sai: Number of People 
Uyghur 41.8 50.7 7.4 349 
In which cadres: 39.9 54.6 5.5 271 
Han 73.5 16.1 10.4 298 
In which cadres: 75.0 16.8 8.2 232 
Others 51.8 27.3 20.9 110 
Total 55.8 33.6 10.6 757 
In which cadres: 54.6 37.4 8.1 570 
(Source: survey of XSSA , 2000) 
Minority CCP members in Mao's era have been strictly trained and taught in institutes like 
the party schools in Beijing and Urumqi to carry out party or governmental jobs among their 
own people with a much stronger sense of maintaining peace and political stability than the 
new cadres of the post-Mao era, who possess advanced educational qualifications and 
professional skills but have a much lower political inclination to further the interests of the 
CCP. Despite the CCP's carefulness in the selection of politically reliable minority cadres, 
the new generation has become much less effective in reconciling the worsening relations 
between Han and non-Han groups and in facilitating political harmony. Instead, in many 
institutes of the CCP and government, minority members band tightly together in groups 
based on the same religion or nationality and support each other in handling the perceived 
unfair treatment and discrimination from their Han colleagues. They know that power 
remains in Beijing and with their Han colleagues and they know they are just an instrument 
for facilitating Han's control over their people and them too. They also know that merely 
increasing the number of minority cadres does not mean that they themselves will eventually 
hold power. So, only through self-support and solidarity will it be possible to gather strength 
against Han's domination and win consideration and rights from their Han colleagues. In 
many offices a Uyghur is the ' leader' and utilises his power to create "agency" for his ethnic 
colleagues and this is seen by the Han as being "difficult and problematic". Public 
condemnation from the minority cadres of their Han colleagues' behaviour, even for any 
trivial matters, takes place frequently. The two groups of people may work in the same unit 
44 Interviews, 2003 
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but they prefer to live in separate accommodation blocks. Working relationships are 
superficially polite and friendly, but at times there is mutual hostility. Corruption among the 
minority cadres is said to be rife, although the evidence of this must be treated critically. 
Some see it as a way of "making the Han suffer".45 In 2004 and 2005, Uyghur high ranking 
cadres were listed among those indicted for serious corruption by the government. 46 Minority 
leaders of villages are often the richest in their viUage47 • 
In theoretical explanation, as Weber's efficiency depends on social interaction with 
organisational perfonnance, empowering local people in handling their own affairs means 
greater efficiency for local governmental administration in this ethnic region in which local 
cadres have the necessary knowledge, willingness and cultural background linking to the 
society. Beijing's policy in recruiting and employing minority cadres doesn't meet the 
requirement, described by Weber, for expertise and devoted administrators. It is not only 
contributing to forming a politically over-complex local government but also indeed a 
potential danger for the Han CCP leadership and for its consolidation in Xinjiang that a large 
proportion of its membership is from the Muslim minority and is active at the grassroots 
level. The CCP's political racism and disarray has served only to "increase the fractiousness 
of the region" (Bovingdon, 2004: p.3) and put the CCP in a political dilemma. 
Employing and recruiting Han personnel are also a challenge for the CCP. Many Han came 
to Xinjiang in response to CCP political propaganda or reassignments by job units, especially 
soldiers, new university or college graduates and government cadres. Due to the strict 
personnel administrative system, most have no choice but to obey these arrangements and 
they have to settle in this region remote and different from their homeland. Beyond such 
compulsion, the motivations for people coming voluntarily to Xinjiang are twofold: political 
inspiration and rewards, and financial incentives. 
Before the reform, CCP cadres, including both Han and non-Han in Xinjiang, were trained 
and promoted from the grassroots level on the basis of criteria such as possessing the desired 
45 "We are spending Han's money." Interviews, 2003. 
46 http://news.sohu.comlaccessed in 2004 and Nov. 2005. 
47 Interviews, 2003 
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communist ideological level and personal political inclination. After becoming CCP 
members and cadres, they regularly received theoretical training in order to 'purify' their 
thoughts and fulfil the desired political qualities. Cadres were therefore promoted, not 
necessarily on the basis of expertise and skill in their jobs, but also because of their political 
determination. The emphasis of the administration on non-technocrat selection in the pre-
reform period enhanced CCP's political consolidation. In Xinjiang, many demobilised PLA 
Party cadres and members were trained and transferred to the township or village level to 
provide political and technical leadership and personnel. They were advised to settle down 
and to make personal self-sacrifices and they were regarded as the most reliable CCP 
members to be in key posts at the lower level. There were material incentives, such as a 
holiday paid by the state to allow these Han cadres and workers to visit their home provinces 
every few years, and their salaries were relatively higher than those of cadres in China's 
heartland. But the political and 'spiritual' rewards were what encouraged most to settle down 
willingly in these harsh areas. They helped to consolidate CCP control and facilitated its 
effective functioning, even in the non-Han regions. Xinjiang's CCP in the early years 
regularly launched movements of self-discipline and self examination, for instance on themes 
such as "Anti Great Han Chauvinism" and "High Moral Thinking", in order to keep these 
Han cadres focused on the Party line and on improving relations with the non-Han population 
(McMillen, 1979). At that stage, local minorities seemed willing to accept the leadership of 
CCP committees and cadres, and minority cadres were part of the teams, even though they 
knew it was under Han leadership. 
But demoralisation set in during the "Cultural Revolution" has accelerated in recent years. In 
1988 the traditional selective criteria, based on cadres' political, ideological level and 
personal morality, were abandoned. Instead, along with personal expertise and intellect, 
personal ambitions and material incentives have become more important for Han to come to 
work in Xinjiang's local governmental and the CCP's affairs. 
Without an appropriate legal regime to monitor their activities, cadres have abandoned the 
traditional principles and integrity required by CCP: responsibility, self-discipline and self-
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sacrifice48• On the record, corruption among Xinjiang's Han higher elites and cadres is not so 
severe as those cadres in the coastal provinces (Liu 1983; Lu 2000). But CCP members with 
traditional commitments have long gone. Seeing that their counterparts in China's coastal 
belt receive much higher incomes, young Han cadres, including home-grown ones, have lost 
interest in serving Xinjiang. Besides, political restrictions over the affairs of the locality 
confine their freedom in decision-making and action. They have not just lost interest in 
working on this land but also no longer seem to have a sincere vocation to represent the CCP 
and to take responsibility for serving the region, understanding the minority culture and 
customs, and keeping on good terms with their non-Han colleagues. By way of example, an 
audit of the implementation of the "returning cultivated land to forests" programme, a policy 
advocated for the re-construction of the natural environment, has shown that local Han 
cadres, following orders, mechanically implemented the policy to plant trees on every type of 
land, much of which they must have known was suitable only for grass. 
Discrimination encourages these young cadres to look down on their non-Han colleagues and 
to apply harshness in handling ethnic affairs. Han cadres insultingly call their Uyghur 
colleagues "chantou" (turbans), and refer to "stubbornness", lack of "understanding" and 
collaboration. It is not uncommon to meet Han CCP cadres and leaders at or below township 
level who have no knowledge of the state's minority policies and possess no understanding 
of Muslim religious influence in society. Religious affairs are handled by them 
mechanistically and prejudicially, which ends up in conflict. For example, in December 
1999, a Han secretary of a township in south Xinjiang shut down a local mosque on an 
inspection tour, simply because a Uyghur worshipper in the mosque pointed out his mistake 
and ignorance regarding the legal age for minorities to attend a service. Even worse, in 
March 2003, six religious leaders were accused of illegal religious activities simply because 
they had prayed for a dying person.49 Both scandals resulted in resentment and riots by 
Uyghur people. Also, very few Han cadres bother to master a minority language in their job 
(Tables 5.13, 5.14). 
48 Fieldwork, 2003 
49 The investigation in Xinjiang's religious policies and activities by XSSA, 2000. 
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Table 5.13 Han/Uyghur Cadres and their Proficiency in Chinese and the Uyghur Language (%) 
Han (speaking Uyghur Language) 
Uyghur (speaking Chinese) 
(Source: compiled from Yee, 2003) 
Do not Speak Poor 
31.7 48.8 
2.1 6.4 
Fair 
17.1 
17.0 
Good 
2.4 
74.5 
Numbers of Cadres 
41 
47 
Table 5.14 Languages (%) Spoken by Cadres in North and South Xinjiang 
Uyghur Chinese Both Languages Cadres 
South Uyghur 77.8 4.0 18.1 248 
Chinese 1.9 95.4 2.8 108 
North Uyghur'O 62.1 14.1 21.1 71 
Chinese 0.8 96.9 0.8 129 
(Source: survey by XSSA . 2000) 
These cultural clashes and lack of social unification raise in the minds of many Han the idea 
of leaving Xinjiang. This has become a popular trend among both old and new generations of 
the CCP Han members nowadays51. According to statistics in a 2001 government report, 
between 1979 and 1997, due to the unstable political environment in Xinjiang and the 
economic attraction of the coast, 40,500 cadres, mainly Han, left the province and only 7,300 
cadres arrived, a ratio of 6: 1. An investigation by the XSSA revealed that many young Han 
CCP cadres resented being rotated to work in poor and remote minority towns or villages. A 
large number managed to leave the poor counties and stay in the capital or rich cities. Of 
those remaining in poor, non-Han towns, it is common for their families and relatives to 
move to cities or the capital to be with other Han and have better living conditions, while the 
cadres themselves remain in post without feeling any urge to improve the poor conditions of 
these remote towns. This all leaves CCP control and functions weakened and inefficient in 
the remote sub-regions ofXinjiang52. Local people and Uyghur cadres constantly complain 
about those "mobile" and arrogant Han cadres for their irresponsibility, harshness and 
simplicity. They think that the Han cadres come just to govern the region and look after their 
own interests, rather than serving the people. Such behaviour by Han CCP members is hardly 
likely to convince Uyghur and other ethnic colleagues to believe in the CCP any more, or 
submit to its leadership. 
50 Some speak the Kazak language. 
51 interviews, 2003 and two supportive references: Song, 2001(a and b): Wang Zben; and the Contemporary 
China 's Celebrities (ed.), 2001 (a and b): Wang Zhen. 
52 Data collected on fieldwork in 2003 and supportive reference by Yee, 2003. 
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5.1.2 The Construction of XAPG's Organisations and Institutions 
As we discussed before, China's administration varies from region to region and the 
administrative reforms undertaken have involved bargaining, negotiation and exception 
between the centre and localities to balance different interests. The results of the reforms are 
therefore never consistent with the original plans. Because of Xinjiang's special status, not 
only is its administrative system different from other regions, but all reforms on bureaucratic 
administration of the region are exceptional and do not fit with the standard requirements. 
On the establishment of the XAPG, there were only 16 bureaux and commissions within its 
administrative apparatus. After forty years, the number had expanded to 80, and this number 
does not include sub-organisations such as the Think Tank Bureau, which are affiliated to 
each bureau and commission, and it does not include the public service sector, such as 
educational institutes in the government's financial budget. Since the 1990s, China has 
undertaken a series of reforms of the institutional structure of the administrative system with 
the aim of reducing its large and bureaucratic administrative and public service sectors, 
thereby creating a lean and efficient functioning system. However, by 1997, there were 44 
administrative institutes in the XAPG 's apparatus. In 1998, under the XAPG's geographic 
area, there were five autonomous prefectures, eight districts and three provincial-
municipalities, and 87 cities and townships. 
China developed a system under the name of Bianzhi, equivalent to the Soviet Nomenclatura 
system, to "control and describe the positions and offices over which the party committee has 
authority" (Brodsgaard, 2002: p.361). Different from the Soviet Nomenclatura, the Bianzhi 
covers the personnel arrangements and the officially listed number of staff on the state' s 
payroll. The state institutions include three categories: administrative organs, service 
organisations, and economic enterprises. The administrative organs include all bureaux and 
commissions within the governmental and Party apparatuses that have authority over the 
corresponding service organisations, for example the Education Bureau has administrative 
power over decisions on key personnel arrangements and financial budgets in local 
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educational institutes. Service organisations have their own administrative departments under 
the supervision respectively of upper administrative organs and do not have power over other 
bodies. Service organisations are not-for-profit and their officially listed staffs receive pay 
from the fmancial budget of their respective governments. Economic enterprises used to have 
all of their officially listed employees, including workers, technicians, managers, on fixed 
salaries on the state payroll through the budgets of the different levels governments, but, after 
the enterprise reform, many large enterprises became private or semi-private firms, leaving 
only a few state enterprises such as China Telecom Company, and Petro China. Their key 
personnel, such as administrative staff and key technicians, experts and managers, receive a 
basic salary on the government payroll but other contracted staffs are paid from the profits of 
their companies. Companies are also responsible for any bonuses paid to staff. So, all of the 
employers and employees on the state payroll are encompassed by the Bianzhi system and 
are said to be "eating imperial grain." 
The population in the Bianzhi system, as a proportion of the entire Chinese population, 
increased from a ratio of 1 :50 in 1978 to 1 :38 in 2000. This is considered by the Chinese 
authorities as governmental agencies still being too highly bureaucratized and overstaffed, 
especially by comparison with ratios of 1 :2999 and 1 :911 in the Ming and Qing dynasties 
(Brodsgaard, 2002: p.386). According to research by Chinese scholars (Chen, Ch en and 
Zhang, 2002), in March 1996 the People 's Daily reported that there were 36,730,000 staff on 
the governmental payroll at the end of 1996, an increase of72 per cent since 1978, compared 
to an increase of 27.1 per cent in the national population in the same period. The financial 
expenditure on overheads reached 104.08 bn yuan in 1996, 15.5 times that in 1980. In the 6th 
FYP, the overhead was 6.8 per cent of financial expenditure, in the 7'h it increased to 8.8 per 
cent, in the 8th to 11.9 per cent, and since 1996 the percentage has been 13.1 per cent. The 
burden of central finance on governmental overheads is heavy and increasing. In many 
places, 80 per cent of the growing financial revenues are used for salaries. 
The Bianzhi varies at the provincial level, according to the population and politico-economic 
status of the region (Table 5.15). Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, as municipalities, have large 
bureaucratic bodies relative to the size of their populations. Regions like Sichuan, Guizhou 
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and Henan are populous provinces, thereby having comparatively lower ratios of people 
eating imperial grain, though the administrative bodies of those regions are by no means less 
staffed. The provinces with traditional heavy industries and SOEs, like Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Shannxi and Inner Mongolia, have a higher ratio of state employees, while the 
refonn-advanced provinces, like Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, have lower ratios. 
Xinjiang and Tibet have the highest ratios of state employees among all of regions after the 
three municipalities. The Bianzhi ratio to Xinjiang' s population is 1 :26, while that for the 
nation as a whole is 1 :38. 
Table 5.15 Provincial Level Bianzhi in China in 2000 
Province Population Bianzhi (thousands) Ratio Population Index 
(millions) (national= I 00) 
National 1295.33 34040 1:38 100 
Beijing 13.82 1219 1:11 370 
Tianjin 10.01 460 1:22 185 
Hebei 67.44 1851 1:36 103 
Shanx i 32.97 1093 1:30 123 
Inner Mongolia 23 .76 823 1:29 128 
Liaoning 42.38 1444 1:30 128 
Jilin 27.28 938 1:29 132 
Heilongjiang 36.89 1250 1:30 123 
Shanghai 16.74 791 1:21 206 
Jiangsu 74.38 1733 1:43 88 
Zhejiang 46.77 1129 1:41 95 
Anhui 59.86 1200 1:50 71 
Fujian 34.71 904 1:38 103 
Jiangxi 41.40 997 1:42 86 
Shandong 90.79 1316 1:39 95 
Henan 92.56 1934 1:48 74 
Hubei 80.28 1644 1:37 103 
Hunan 64.40 1606 1:40 90 
Guangdong 86.42 2159 1:40 109 
Guangxi 44.89 1142 1:39 90 
Hainan 7.87 231 1:34 109 
Chongqing 30.90 655 1:47 79 
Sichuan 83 .29 1807 1:46 79 
Guizhou 35.25 739 1:48 73 
Yunnan 42.88 1057 1:4 1 90 
Tibet 2.62 100 1:26 142 
Shannxi 36.05 1124 1:32 116 
Gansu 25.62 662 1:39 95 
Qinghai 5.18 165 1:31 119 
Ningxia 5.62 192 1:29 128 
Xinjiang 19.25 753 1:26 142 
(Source: Brodsgaard, 2002) 
The reason for Xinjiang' s highly bureaucratic structure is explained, firstly, by its large 
proportion (84 per cent) of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), in which there has been slow 
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progress of refonn because the socialist administrative system still dominates and they retain 
large numbers of workers on the state payroll. Secondly, Xinjiang' s large administrative 
bodies and public service sector contributes to the high ratio of state employees in this less 
populous region. Xinjiang is the biggest province of China in area and is located on a 
sensitive frontier with multiple minorities, which requires more personnel in security, and the 
civil service generally. Xinjiang also is the province with the sparsest population in the 
country. Despite the lowest number of geographical administrative divisions, in total 87 
divisions townships or above in comparison with 1,598 in Zhejiang province, the government 
of each sub-region operates with more or less the same scale of governmental organs and 
personnel as in other provinces. Many ofXinjiang's counties have a small population but a 
large area, which requires more or less the same sized administrative force as in other 
provinces, not to mention those minority sub-regions with autonomous administration, which 
have fixed proportions for the different nationalities involved in government organisations. 
An official report in 2001 stated that there were 652,000 cadres of all kinds in 1997, of whom 
331 ,500 were from the minorities. There were 158,600 working for the Party and 
governmental administrative organs, 404,800 working public service units, and 88,800 
working in state enterprises. 
The number of staff working in the government and Party administrative institutes and cells 
increased from 5000 in 1949, to 85000 in 1955 and then to 74500 in 1978. Before 1972, there 
was an annual increase of 1-2 per cent. From 1972 to 1975, when a large number ofHan 
immigrants were allowed to return to their home regions, the number of employees in those 
institutes was in fact sharply reduced. However, since the reform, the increase has been 
unrelenting. Firstly, in the first a few years after the CR, since large numbers of cadres were 
rehabilitated, the numbers of employees increased dramatically. In Xinjiang, in 1977-78 
alone, the number ofCCP and governmental administrative staff increased from 74,500 in 
1977 to 82,700 in 1978 and further to 110,500 in 1982 (Table 5.16), a 10 per cent rate of 
annual increase. Secondly, the administrative organs have expanded constantly since the 
reform, despite China undertaking a series of profound administrative reforms in 1982, 1988, 
1993 and 1998 in an attempt to make reductions, in which central level governmental organs 
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were cut from 100 to 60 and the provinces and autonomous organs cut their departments 
from 50-60 and 40-30 respectively in 1982. 
Table 5.16 Numbers ofCCP and Governmental Staff in Xinjiang 1978-1988 
Years Numbers 
1978 74500 
1979 82700 
1980 94500 
1981 102300 
1982 110500 
1983 114200 
1984 125400 
1985 140200 
1986 152200 
1987 156600 
1988 163900 
(Source: XSB: Xinjiang 's Glorious Fifty Years , 1999b) 
The first round of administrative reform in Xinjiang was undertaken in 1983 but the rate of 
staff increase remained at 15-18 per cent per year. In 1984-86 new governmental organs were 
required by Beijing, like the new Xinjiang Security Bureau and the separation of the Xinjiang 
Construction Bureau from the Xinjiang Planning Commission. As new organs were 
constructed, new staff were therefore recruited and the overall numbers continually 
increased. By the end of 1987, China launched a second round of its profound reform of 
governmental administration, although this only started in Xinjiang in 1990. All local parties 
and governments were instructed to rationalize overlapping organs. In particular, according 
to Zhao Ziyang's plan, the government at all levels would provide lean and efficient public 
services under the restriction of the Party's jurisdiction. In this round, the number of 
Xinjiang's administrative staff continued to increase at a rate of 4.5 per cent annually. In 
1993 the third round of administrative reform began. Again it was late in Xinjiang, starting in 
1997. This time Xinjiang cut 22.9 per cent of its Bianzhi and the numbers of departments at 
the provincial level was reduced from 60 to 48 (Table 5.17). The fourth round began in 1998 
in China as a whole, and in 2000 in Xinjiang. Now the number of departments in Xinjiang 
was reduced by nine and staffby 46.5 per cent, quite modest by comparison with other 
provinces (Tables 5.18, 5.19). 
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Table 5.17 Provincial Level Bianzbi in Cbina's Regions after 1993 
Province Bianzhi before Bianzhi after Reduction Number of 
Reform Reform (%) Departments 
Beijing 
- - - 58 
Tianjin -
- - 57 
Hebei 8.26 6760 18.0 46 
Shanxi 7849 5900 25.8 47 
Inner Mongolia 7347 5500 25.1 45 
Liaoning 8200 6160 24.9 46 
Jilin 6909 5360 22.4 46 
Heilongjiang 9461 6300 33.4 48 
Shanghai - - - 53 
Jiangsu -9722 7300 24.9 47 
Zhejiang 7435 6160 17.1 45 
Anhui 8032 6160 23.3 48 
Fujian 7597 5650 25.6 45 
Jiangxi 6983 5650 19.1 43 
Shandong 9918 7500 24.4 50 
Henan 9470 7400 21.9 47 
Hubei 7728 6400 17.2 45 
Hunan 9896 6560 33.7 47 
Guangdong 9589 7500 21.8 46 
Guangxi 7840 5900 24.7 47 
Hainan 4557 3850 15.5 32 
Sichuan 10045 8330 17.1 50 
Guizhou 6263 5300 15.4 45 
Yunnan 7336 5960 18.8 44 
Tibet - - - 38 
Shannxi - 6000 - 47 
Gansu 7402 5460 26.0 45 
Qinghai 4827 3660 24.2 34 
Ningxia 4412 3400 22.9 38 
Xinjiang 7527 5800 22.9 48 
(Source: Brodsgaard. 2002) 
Table 5.18 Numbers of State Administrative Organs before and after the Reform in Some 
Provinces and Regions in 2000 
Region Original Numbers Numbers after Reform Numbers of Reduced Organs 
Beijing 67 45 22 
Shandong 67 46 21 
Liaoning 52 41 11 
Shanghai 56 43 13 
Sichuan 35 26 9 
Heilongjiang 67 41 26 
Jiangsu 67 41 26 
Jilin 54 40 14 
Henan 57 47 10 
Xinjiang 48 39 9 
(Source: compiledfrom Chen. Chen and Zhang. 2002) 
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Table 5.19 Proportion of Staff Reduction of Some Provinces and Regions in 2000 
Regions Numbers Reduced % 
Beijing 50.0 
~~pu 4~0 
Hubei 48.0 
Jilin 48.0 
Fujian 48.0 
Xinjiang 46.5 
~~~~ ~O 
Anhui 48.5 
Ji~gxi 48.0 
Zhejiang 48.0 
Guangxi 47.5 
Guangdong 49.4 
Shandong 48.0 
Sichuan 48.0 
Liaoning 48.0 
Yunnan 47.5 
(Source: compiled from Chen, Chen and Zhang, 2002) 
So, in summary, although China's administrative reform emphasized the reduction of state 
organs and staff in order to create leaner and more efficient agencies, in reality the numbers 
of governmental staff are on the increase. The phenomenon is intense in the underdeveloped 
regions of China and in particular in Xinjiang, substantially due to its ethnicity. 
One major problem with all administrative reforms is that when one organ on the list is 
dismantled, not all of the staffs are made redundant. For fear of causing social instability, 
redundant staff on most occasions are either transferred into the remaining government 
organs or allocated into public service units. So the number of departments is reduced but the 
number of staff is not. For example, in the 1988 reform, the Price Bureau was transformed to 
a Price Department under the administration of the Xinjiang Planning Commission; its 
government staffs were transferred to the Bianzhi of the Commission and its public service 
staffs were allocated into service units of the Commission. This phenomenon is less common 
in the coastal or richer regions where redundant staff can find work in one of many 
prosperous private enterprises, but in Xinjiang there is less choice and state employment, 
with its secure income, is regarded as an "iron rice bowl", and, anyway, the salaries are 
considerably higher than in most local enterprises. From an informal survey, many 
postgraduates from Xinjiang's universities still seem eager to have a government job. 
Considering Xinjiang's ethnicity, redundancies among the minority groups are difficult. 
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From 1978 to 2001, the various reforms have reduced the number of government organs by 
50 per cent on average in the whole of China and by 46 per cent in the more cautious 
Xinjiang. Since there is a rule of maintaining at least 10 per cent of the staff from the 
minorities in each organ, many of the redundancies and transferred quotas have fallen on the 
Han staff. However, since many of the Han are key staff and possess the required experience 
and skills, it is difficult to make them redundant or transfer them. By comparison, Uyghur 
cadres are regarded as "low quality, low skilled and of poor intellect". Surveys undertaken by 
XSSA (2000) and Yee (2003) present these views held by many Han (Tables 5.20,5.21). 
Table 5.20 Do You Agree that most Uyghur Cadres are Honest, Industrious and Capable? (%) 
Strongly Agree Hard to Say Disagree Strongly Numbers of 
Agree Disagree People 
Uyghur 20.0 56.6 15.9 7.6 0.0 145 
Han 14.4 39.4 25 .0 20.7 0.5 188 
(Source: Yee, 2003) 
Table 5.21 Do You Agree that most Uyghur Cadres are Reasonably Utilised?s3 (%) 
Marginalised and Holding Many Capable but not Large Quantity but Low Quality Number of 
P b PR· d M P b D · N h· P I osts ut no ower eco :rJlse any osts ut omg ot mg eop e 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Uyghur 69.9 30.1 62.1 37.9 48.4 52.6 256 
Han 4.8 95.2 10.9 89.1 95.5 4.5 147 
(Source: survey of XSSA, 2000) 
Judged from these two tables above, more than 70 per cent ofUyghurs consider the cadres 
from their nationality to possess good work capabilities, whereas 54 per cent of the Han have 
the same opinion in Table 5.20 but 95.5 per cent of the Han cadres (Table 5.21) think the 
opposite. Here we have to take into account the preliminary condition of the two surveys. 
Yee (2003) only focused on the residents ofUrumqi, in which people's living conditions and 
educational standard are much higher than in other regions of Xinjiang; whereas the XSSA 
survey took place in five sub-macro-regions: Hotan Region, Kashigar Region, Aksu Region, 
lli Kazak Auto Prefecture and Changji Hui Auto Prefecture and was done within cadres of 
Han and Uyghur, so the XSSA survey is more practical and has better credibility in 
representing Xinjiang overall. The XSSA survey reflects Han chauvinism and discrimination 
53 The survey was done only within cadres of Han and Uyghur. 
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that leads them to underestimate the capability of minority cadres. The explanation was one 
that tends to support Han cadres' continuing domination: "The economic and cultural 
backwardness of the minority peoples results from historical reasons and the location in 
remote areas definitely influences the psychological make-up of minority nationality cadres 
in their enduring nature, public nature and complexity"(Yao, Zhongwu, 1992, cited by 
Sautman, 1997: p.19). Yee (2003) also surveyed the Uyghur's opinion ofHan cadres. More 
than 60 per cent held positive opinions about Han cadres, a higher proportion than the Han of 
their fellow Han (Table 5.22). 
Table 5.22 Do You Agree that most Han Cadres are Honest, Industrious and Capable? (%) 
Strongly Agree Hard to Say Disagree Strongly Numbers of 
Agree Disagree Peoele 
Uyghur 20.9 39.6 28.3 11.2 0.0 187 
Han 15.2 44.9 21.7 15.2 2.9 138 
(Source: Yee, 2003) 
Because of Han prejudice and because of minority cadres showing less enthusiasm for the 
hard work discipline and higher education,54 in comparison with Han, both of which affect 
their ability in tackling assigned jobs, many government and party agencies still expect to 
retain more Han than minority staff. At the end of each round of reform, less than the 
planned number of Han cadres were made redundant and all of the minority cadres were 
retained. It is the same for new recruitment: the maximum number of Han candidates is 
employed and, according to the quota, some posts are left for the minority. The 
administrative reform in Xinjiang therefore is more strongly a political phenomenon than a 
rational administration according to the principles of Weber' s bureaucratic theory. 
Apart from overstaffed governmental administrative organs, Xinjiang's public service units 
are also bloated. As we mentioned before, by 1997 there were 404,800 staff working in 
public, non-profit-making sectors like hospitals, universities and research councils, etc, 
taking up nearly two-thirds of the Bianzhi population on the state payroll. Xinjiang's radio 
station, TV channel, newspapers and book publishing houses are all established, controlled 
and financed by the local government. In order to provide a service covering this large 
province and serving people from the different minority groups, the national and provincial 
54 Bovingdon, 2004 and fieldwork, 2003 . 
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People's Radio Stations provide broadcasts in six languages and Xinjiang TV provides all of 
its programmes in three languages. Macro-sub Regions, Auto Prefectures and Municipalities 
all have their own local TV stations and radio with various channels in two or three 
languages broadcasting news and entertainment. By 1998, there were six provincial and 31 
sub-provincial radio stations covering 82.9 per cent of the area of the region; and there were 
18 TV stations and 63 channels broadcasting around the region, country and world, all in at 
least two languages and covering 84.5 per cent of the area.55 By 1999, Xinjiang had 87 
newspapers with a total distribution of 193.37 million copies in the year. Of these, 53 were 
specialised newspapers for the state and Party and 34 for others. 44 out of 87 were in 
Chinese, 27 in Uyghur, 11 in Kazak, and 1 in the Xibo language. The same variety of 
language services is used in Xinjiang's culture and art organisations, film and TV 
programme-making, publishing and ethnic language translation, needing large personnel of 
technicians, workers and experts. The expense is met from the local governmental financial 
budget and administration. Each year 20-30 per cent of the Xinjiang government budget goes 
on the operating expenses of these local cultural, education and healthcare services. The 
linguistic and ethnic complexities of the province are therefore tangible burdens on local 
government. 
As far as human resources and educational standards are concerned, the quality of Xinjiang's 
cadres and staff are considered to be declining. All of the state institutions seek to employ 
people with a university qualification. From 1955 until the CR, the personnel of 
governmental organs were largely ofnon-Xinjiang origins and graduates of universities in 
China' s heartland, with some demobilised PLA high ranking officers with equivalent 
education or work experience. During the CR, these were replaced by radical factory workers 
and revolutionaries. However, as soon as the CR finished, they were dismissed and the old 
staff returned and new employees were recruited who were university graduates. During and 
after the 1990s, as Xinjiang entered a period of relative economic decline vis-a-vis the 
coastal regions, it has been more difficult to attract university graduates from the heartland to 
the hinterland. So, the positions in government organizations have gradually been taken over 
by graduates from Xinjiang's universities. Despite Xinjiang having established 42 
55 Not including satellite channels. 
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comprehensive and subject-specialised universities and colleges since 1955, none of them are 
considered as good as those located in China ' s heartland. 
China ranks her universities into 13 groups in terms of the quality of teaching, research and 
graduates. Beijing University, Qinghua University (Beijing), Fudan University (Shanghai), 
or Tongji University (Shanghai) are all ranked in the first and best group, while Xinjiang 
University, though regarded as the best comprehensive education institute in the region, is 
only ranked in the 13th group, the lowest. Each year the universities belonging to the 1 st or 2nd 
groups take the top students who have achieved the highest scores in the university entrance 
exams. Nearly all of the top Han students, including a large number of top minority students 
from Xinjiang refuse to go back home since there is no longer a compulsory distribution 
policy, and they look for the best opportunities in prosperous regions like Beijing, Shanghai, . 
Guangdong, etc .. 
Since 1982, graduates from Xinjiang University have begun to dominate the personnel of 
provincial governmental organs, including 90 per cent of those aged 25-50. Graduates from 
Xinjiang Agricultural University dominate the personnel of governmental organs at the 
township level. In 2004, 14 new staff were recruited by Xinjiang Planning Commission and 
all of them graduated from Xinjiang University, though the required minimum educational 
level for new employees has now reached the postgraduate level. Six out of eight Bianzhi 
taken on by Xinjiang's West Development Department of the Commission were Xinjiang 
University graduates. The leaders and key personnel of government at township level are 
largely from Xinjiang Agricultural University. I interviewed three out of seven vice 
governors from one county located in Xinjiang' s north and they are all graduates of this 
university. By comparison, in China ' s coastal regions, like Zhejiang Province, personnel of 
local governmental teams at the township level are likely to be graduates of provincial 
universities or universities in Shanghai, like Fudan University, Tongji University or Zhejiang 
University, which are all ranked in the 1 st or 2nd group of universities in China. 
Since the reform, the minority government employees have also been required to have a 
university qualification. But as the minorities generally in China have much lower 
187 
educational standards than the Han, we can safely presume that the minority cadres in 
Xinjiang also have lesser qualifications. Despite lower entrance exam scores and a quota of 
minority students fixed at 60 per cent each year, still there is relatively low uptake from these 
groups and few travel to universities beyond Xinjiang. 
During interviews in Xinjiang with some key officers of governmental units, they invariably 
confirmed worries about the quality and competence of their personnel. From their point of 
view, local Han graduates have received an inadequate and low standard of education in 
factual knowledge, practical technology training and ideology. Some Han and non-Han 
students have never had a chance to travel beyond the boundary of the region and, as a result, 
they are often narrow-minded and inflexible. Uyghur and other minority students enter 
university with low scores and complete their courses, again with low requirements and low 
assessment scores. This means that a large number of minority students enjoy the preferential 
policy without making much effort. Such a programme cannot develop their full intellectual 
talents. Some minority scholars criticise the Chinese preferential policy of lower entrance 
scores for the minorities because in the long run it results in less competition and self-
development for the ethnic nationalities as a whole. These relatively inferior educational 
institutes have provided a large number of sub-standard personal for Xinjiang's government 
and this has undermined its quality and capacity. 
The poor performance of local party-state administration will never be improved without 
addressing irregular staff recruitment and bureaucratic slackness. We have seen that a good 
example is the inability, no matter how many reforms are undertaken, to curb the over-
bureaucratic nature of local government and to downsize the number of its staff. The results 
have been greater complexity, high social costs and inefficiency. 
In summary of this section, Xinjiang's ethnicity is the source of political sensitivities in the 
region, which reinforces the CCP's political control locally in order to minimise conflict. 
However, with gradual economic liberalisation since the reform, some people in China's 
central and coastal regions are debating whether one party rule should be allowed to restrict 
economic growth, a signal for political decentralisation in an attempt to break through the 
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institutional constraints on economic liberalisation. However, in a region like Xinjiang, the 
Party's supremacy is unshakable, as it is regarded by Beijing as the logical means of 
maintaining control in this 'autonomous' minority region. As a result, the Party-state 
relationship stifles local government, which, as a result, is unable to achieve either the 
economic liberalisation of North's theory or the rational, independent and professional 
bureaucracy of Weber's theory. Instead it has directed the institutional transformation of 
local government more toward political security and the consolidation of power. 
From this examination ofCCP power over the region's governmental administration in terms 
of personnel arrangements and decision-making authority, combined with an examination of 
the CCP and the construction of government, we have found that the emphasis on political 
administration is causing inefficiency and irrationality in provincial bureaucratic 
administration. As a result, the bureaucratic administration of local state is poorly regulated 
and far removed from the principles of Weber's Legal-Rational Bureaucratic Theory. In fact 
the local state, especially the provincial government, has become problematic itself and 
appears to be incapable of generating economic liberation. 
5.2 Xinjiang's Leadership in Regional Development 
As per the discussion in Chapter 2, China's economic power is decentralised to the local 
government rather than to specific economic agents. The central state can control the reform 
in the localities through exploiting provincial governments. Local leaders receive Beijing's 
instructions and make decisions to pursue both central commitments and local benefits. 
So, in Cheung's (1998b) argument, the decentralisation of decision-making power from the 
centre to the locality has challenged these local leaders not only to act normally in the 
administration of party-state-nation, but also to be local leaders in steering the region toward 
a harmonious form of social and economic development. Weber's ideal-types ofleadership 
comprised three classic models: traditional, legal-rational and charismatic. Despite his 
models corresponding to different social settings and predicting the efficient and effective 
performances of these three types of leaderships in their respective state organisation, they 
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fail to explain the phenomena of Chinese leadership in the pre-reform or reform eras. As Liu 
(2001) has argued, there is no clear line between the political leaders and administrators in 
China's administrative system. Provincial leaders, especially governors, on most occasions 
are CCP GSs too. They are constantly struggling with their "dual" role to balance their 
orientation, and acting neither solely as "central agents (administrator)" nor as "provincial 
defenders (decision-maker and entrepreneur)", but are constantly "reconciling conflicting 
pressure in order to survive" (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988: p.347). 
To assess Chinese provincial leadership, we have to understand the nature of authority, how 
it came into being, whether it fits with the current situation of the region in the whole context 
of China's development and what the impacts and results of the leadership are on regional 
development. 
To Beijing, the appointment of provincial CCP leaders is judged not simply by their 
competence of being leaders of a particular region but also whether they are in line with the 
current political context. In particular, in the reform era, despite Chinese administrative 
reform leaving the state to seek power outside the CCP, the political leaders still cast the final 
vote, especially in critical situations and in politically sensitive regions. Appointments also 
rely on individual agendas with multiple dimensions, such as a candidate 's upbringing, 
education, work experience and personal ties with Beijing central elites. 
To local leaders, formulating a leadership style in a specific region depends on them seeing 
themselves as both administrators or leaders, judging the region ' s politico-economic position 
in China's framework, detecting Beijing's policy inclination towards the region, and 
moreover, clarifying how all of this fits with their own career aspirations. According to Liu' s 
(2001) summary based on the research of Oksenberg, Lieberthal and Goldstein, there have 
been four types of leaders in China since 1949: military fundamentalist, radical conservative, 
eclectic modernizer and radical reformer. Cheung (1998b) argues that there are three types of 
provincial leadership in the reform era with regard to regional political and economic 
restructuring: the pioneer, the bandwagon er and the laggard. 
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In the framework of Chinese party-lead administrative system, it is not just natural that 
governors are submissive to the leadership of the CCP, but this has been especially 
emphasized in ethnically sensitive regions. In particular, in Xinjiang, the GSs have been 
given more jobs than their counterparts in the Han regions, including, along with political 
decision-making and central policy guiding, extensive responsibility for regional bureaucratic 
administration, central policy implementation and economic performance. In other provinces 
these jobs are shared with the governor. This has made the GSs extremely powerful but also 
forever struggling with their multiple roles. So Xinjiang's development to some extents 
depends on the profile of leadership offered by the GS, as well as the governor. 
In this section we will look closely at what impact the special circumstances of Xinjiang have 
had upon the leadership of the GSs and governors, and examine whether these leaders have 
preformed according to the situation required, what efforts they have made on behalf of the 
region, and whether they have facilitated regional development since 1949. 
5.2.1 Xinjiang's Leadership before the Reform 
On the establishment ofXinjiang's CCP in 1949, Wang Zhen as the commander of the XMD 
was naturally appointed as the GS. Burhan, a local Uyghur political activitist from Di Group, 
undertook the governorship of the XPG. 
Wang Zhen (1908-1993), of Hun an origin, joined the CCP in 1927 and fought in Mao's Red 
Army during the Long March of 1935-38. After this experience he committed himself to be a 
Maoist loyalist and veteran militant. Later on at the beginning of the refonn in 1980 he 
played a key backstage role in Beijing in bringing Deng Xiaoping back to supreme power but 
he generally supported China's conservative leaders in their fight with the new liberals in the 
reform, for instance in the crushing of the Tiananmen protests of 1989. In the years 1949-
1955, in order to stabilize Xingjian and consolidate CCP control, as the top commander of 
the XMD he conducted a series of "iron-wrist" repressions of the anti-Han and Eastern , 
Turkistan Independence movements led by Emin, Abdimit and the Kazakh rebel, Osman, and 
with other active Islamic elements in Xinjiang's west and south after 1949. Wang's action 
effectively silenced any anti-Han resistance and confirmed CCP control but it also sowed the 
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seeds of hatred among the non-Han population. The second campaign he launched was to 
demobilise large numbers of military forces and transform them into a large productive force 
to meet the labour shortage for the coming economic growth. 
Wang, as a military fundamentalist, identified his role perfectly well in showing Beijing's 
determination on the control of this region to the local people through his military action and 
human resource transformation and proved him to be a Han militant-political leader of 
Xinjiang, who met the requirement of Beijing for a strong political leader for the region at 
the in itial time to consolidate the CCP' s control over this non-Han region. Although some 
leaders of the central state considered his action on the minority population overdone, from 
the viewpoint of Chinese politics, his leadership has to be considered successful and was 
appreciated especially in the 80s-90s when Xinjiang's anti-Han separatism was on the rise. 
He was then asked to pay a few visits to show a "threatening" image to the local people in 
order to restore order. 
Burhan (1894-1989) had been born and raised in a poor Uyghur-Tartar family in a Tartar 
community in Russia. With his family, he moved to China in 1914 after receiving a school 
education in Russia. In the 1930s he went to the Soviet Union and then to Berlin for 
advanced studies, and in the former he showed an interest in communist ideology and was 
inspired by the Soviet model of economic construction. Later on he received further 
education on socialism from a few Russian specialists with whom he worked in Sheng 
Shicai 's government as director of the Xinjiang Agricultural Products Company and a 
committee in the Construction Department. He worked for Xinjiang governments under the 
Han warlords and GMD governors such as Yang Zenxi, lin Shuren, Sheng Shicai and Zhang 
Zhizhong. In his view none of them sincerely regarded Xinjiang as home, even Yang Zengri, 
who governed Xinjiang for 17 years without any military force and made certain 
developments in terms of ethnic culture, economy and political democracy. Burhan saw his 
compatriots constantly suffering under the dictatorship of these warlords and governors, so 
after the collapse of GMD coalition government in 1947-1949, he, as the deputy governor 
and Zhang Zhizhong, the last Han GMD governor of Xinjiang, decided to hand over Xinjiang 
peacefully to the PLA and to accept the leadership of the Chinese Communists (Burhan, 
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1984). After the XAPG was established in 1955, Burhan was then invited to Beijing to work 
in China's Political Consultative Commission as the Depute Chainnan (Burhan, 1984). 
As a purely local Uyghur leader who has a great interest in building up a socialist state out of 
his Muslim community for the better future of his people and home land, Burhan was 
exploited to act exactly according to Beijing's requirements for the establishment of the CCP 
administrative system in Xinjiang. He was useful for his leadership, obedience and 
submission to the CCP leaders, and for his diplomatic representation of minority interests. 
After the XUAR was established, Seypidin Aziz was appointed as the chairman of the 
XAPG. Wang Zhen resigned from First Secretaryship ofXinjiang's CCP but remained as top 
commander of the XMD and the XPCC, and Wang Enmao (1913-2001) was his successor as 
party leader. 
Wang Enmao recognised the region's special difference from other regions and realised that 
effectively integrating the region into China's Republic depended more on an efficient 
regional administration than political or military administration. His role was identified, not 
simply as a political leader in the CCP's image but more importantly as a regional leader and 
professional administrator for the region's interests, more or less in equal weight. A few 
features examined in his leadership support the argument that he acted as a local leader, 
pursuing regional administrative efficiency along Weberian lines, moving the region toward 
harmonious development. 
His leadership style was formulated from his own experience as leader of China' s northwest 
FA headed by Marshal Peng, mobilised in China's west for a long time and therefore 
knowing how to handle relations with local minorities. On examining Wang' s decisions for 
Xinjiang, we can see he didn ' t have any vital power to produce policies beyond the overall 
framework of China' s socialist construction. Both he and Wang Zhen were in relatively low 
ranking positions in China's hierarchical administrative system, compared to the Marshals 
and other provincial leaders who had already been high ranking before 1949 and were 
influential in the power pyramid to the extent that they could extract special treatment from 
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Beijing for their home or governing regions. All the two Wangs could do, besides holding 
tightly on to local CCP control, was to make justified policies according to Beijing's targets 
and implement Beijing's will in accordance with the social environment of the region. 
Firstly, with Wang Zhen's military support behind him, he confirmed that CCP leadership 
was unshakable and that Xinjiang could have regional autonomy on these terms. Actually it 
was he who in the first place turned down recommendations by 50 local minority elites on 
how the political transfonnation should proceed: whether to join the Soviet Union, become a 
province of the Chinese People's Republic or become an independent state. That was shown 
in his report to the central CCP in Beijing on 3 rd August 1951 and in his speech in a special 
meeting of the CCP Xinjiang Bureau on 13th_19th April 1951, which is discussed in Wang's 
book (1999c). He managed to build a loyal personal network in the high elite committee to 
support his leadership (Table 5.1). 
Secondly he understood that if the CCP wanted effectively to consolidate power in this land 
remote from the Chinese heartland but close to Russian and Centra} Asian influences, the 
only way was firstly to hold back the fast speed of Chinese socialist political transformation 
in this Muslim region and to retain the essential characteristics of its Islamic society largely 
intact, for the time being at least. Therefore, socialist measures such as land reform, rent 
reduction and agricultural co-operativization were undertaken much slower, more cautiously 
and flexibly than in other provinces. Land reform and rent reduction were confined to arable 
districts to start with. Religious land and pastoral districts went untouched. There were no 
hash actions against religious leaders landlords and herd-owners and all ethnic democrats 
were protected (Wang 1999c). 
Thirdly, as far as he was concerned, efficient integration of the region into China would be a 
matter of social and economic benefits granted to local minorities in terms of local culture 
and religious preservation the improvement ofliving standards and the maintenance of a 
harmonious society. He strenuously emphasized the need for good relations between Han and 
non Han populations by implementing Beijing's ethnic polices on showing respect for all 
nationalities considering the political stability of minority regions', and minority cultural and 
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language reservation and economic development, as had been decided at the First National 
Congress on 20
th 
September 1954. He required that all Han people had to show respect for 
indigenous culture, including language, religion and customs and made no attempt to change 
the religious-centred life of the Muslim people. Han cadres and workers had to be well 
disciplined and engage in self-criticism for their "Great Han Chauvinism" in order to 
maintain good relations with non-Han people and to sacrifice personal benefits to increase 
economic growth by settling in remote, hostile places (McMiIlen, 1979).56 At that time most 
leaders posted in the minority regions handled relations with local minorities with great 
caution in order to avoid the rise of Han chauvinism and discrimination against ethnic 
groups. China' s Government Deputy Chair Liu Shaoqi in his report on the "Draft 
Constitution of 1954" clearly stated that it was not because the Han had "a comparatively 
higher political, economic and cultural level" that they could be superior to the minority 
groups; on the contrary, the Han should use their skills and knowledge to help minorities 
with the development of their culture, economy and politics57. At the Xinjiang Party 
Congress of May-July 1957, Wang condemned Han chauvinism and advocated a 
''brotherhood'' relationship with all minorities as a priority. He himself had developed a 
"father and son" relation with Tomur Dawamat, the son of a poor peasant Uyghur family 
(Toops, 1992: p.78). 
Fourth, he reckoned that promoting economic prosperity and improving living conditions for 
the local people would have a more positive long-term impact on the willingness of Muslims 
to accept the CCP than indulging in harsh criticism of rich ethnic property owners for their 
exploitation of th.e poor. So, the integration of the minorities economically with China' s 
overall development became his major strategy. Thanks to China's central planning system 
plus the rapport of Sino-Soviet relations, large-scale resources were attracted to the region. 
This kick started Xinjiang' s economic growth and provided economic assistance in terms of 
technicians and technology and financial aids. The stimulus for fast economic growth was 
also, alternatively, by keeping private plots in farming and offering material incentives and 
work points for economic production in the region (McMillen, 1979). Moreover, the XPCC 
S6 Some of this narrative is from interviews conducted by the author in 2002 and 2003.-
57 http://www.people.com.cnJGB/33831 /33839130513/3051812568742.htmlaccessed to July 2005. 
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also made a great contribution to economic growth through the hard work and scarification of 
its members. 
Xinjiang's economy thus made early, impressive progress. By the end of the first FYP, 
Xinjiang had large-scale modern industrial units, including 400 big or medium plants, an 
increase of 33 fold since 1949, and the total output value of industry had reached to 44.4 
bi11ion yuan, 65 times that of 1949 and 10 times higher than that of national average in the 
same period. In agriculture, grain production had reached 3 million tons, three times that of 
1949, and cotton reached 58,000 tons, I I times that of 1949. The region's agricultural 
production had not just achieved self-reliance but was also exporting products to China' s 
heartland. The XPCC, with its large labour supply and semi-military operation, and funds 
provided by Beijing, helped to set up the first modern industrial plants for cotton textiles, 
steel and iron, flour and sugar processing, etc .. The construction work was carried out largely 
by Chinese labour. 
The new government opened schools and colleges so that a higher proportion of the 
population than ever before was able to attend, for example 366,000 in primary schools in 
1955, a 70 per cent increase on 1950 (Table 5.23). A group of advanced higher education 
colleges was established in subjects such as agriculture, medicine mining and there were no 
fees and low entry scores for minority students. 
Table 5.23 Numbers of Students in Schools and Colleges in Xinjiang in 1949,1953,1956,1965 
1949 1953 1956 1965 
Primary School 197850 356440 456657 1039027 
High School 2925 1871 2 47619 121 771 
College 336 1714 2445 7740 
306 of which 956 of which 2112 of which 3129 of which 
were minority were minority were minority were minority 
College Teachers 13 233 833 1624 
11 ofwhicb 84 of which were 271 of which 3460fwhicb 
were minority minority were minority were minority 
(Source: Wang. J999b) 
The majority of the non-Han population showed concern for the purity of their traditional 
society rather than the political significance of the XUAR. They were satisfied with the fast 
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social and economic developments triggered by the CCP and with the moderate ethnic 
policies that allowed them to continue their religious and cultural practices. Local Muslim-
Soviet relations remained strong. The Soviets bTought economic support but there was also 
political influence from the Russians, especially while Russian-supported leadeTS such as 
Burhan and Seypidin were still in power. 
At fiTSt there was no opposition to the large numbers of Han immigrants, who settled in the 
XPCe. They were in three main categories: first there was a group of specialists such as oil 
engineers, accountants, nUTSes, statisticians, metal workers construction company managers, 
univeTSity professors and physicians; second a group of demobilised soldiers; and, third, a 
group of youth regarded as "rightist" intellectuals sent for reform by physical labour from 
education institutes in China' s heartland (Schwarz, 1963). They were seen as helping with 
shortage of labour and of the skills and knowledge lacking locally. 
However Wang s 'gentle but finn" manner in administration of the region put him in a 
dilemma between his choices as a political leader and as a rational administrator in China's 
politico-determined system. Schunnann (1966) explains such conflicts between the Chinese 
Party leadership and administration in the pre-reform era: in order to achieve the goals based 
on their personal perceiVed ideologies, the leadeTS used the single Party system of political 
monopoly to attack middle level administrators and so run the government and the society 
against the grain of western notions of the legitimate administration of a state, as outlined in 
Weber s theory. Such a one Party-state administration resulted in irrationality and disaster in 
governing the region. 
On 31 st July 1955 Mao reported on the problems of China 's agricultural co-operativization 
and ordered it to be speeded up. Wang was singled out for criticism, as having "small 
women s feet" for holding up the socialist transformation of Xinjiang (Wang, 1999c: p.206). 
The Socialist Commune Movement, soon joined by the "Great Leap Forward" (GLF) in 
1958, broUght economic recession, but in Xinjiang, due largely to WaIig' s moderate policies 
of holding back the co-operativization movement and retaining private plots economic 
growth still showed an increase and the society remained stable. However, the GLF resulted 
in a "Great Famine" caused as much as anything by 800,000 hungry peasants from China's 
heartlands pouring into Xinjiang in 1959-60 alone, and these migrants were partially 
encouraged by Beijing and the XPCCs to make up the labour requirement (Schwarz, 1963). 
Because Xlnjiang's economic prosperity had been less affected by the GLF, it was especially 
attractive to the migrants. However, the local minorities saw these people as intruders, 
especially when the age-old discrimination among new Chinese immigrants towards 
minorities started re-emerging (Schwarz, 1963: p.70; Tyler, 2003: p.148). The pursuit ofa 
socialist commune system in pastoral communities led to the destruction of Kazak herding 
groups, the loss of pastoralist properties and the inefficient management of pastoral resources 
by the communes. Resentment among minority pastoralists grew, especially among the 
Kazaks, towards the Han (Banks, 1999). 
To make matters worse, deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations in 1960 caused the withdrawal of 
Russian technicians and cut off financial support to Xinjiang. Russian propaganda 
encouraged Uyghurs and Kazakhs to join the Soviet Union and assured much higher living 
standards than in China. This eventually led to 60,000 ethnic people fleeing to Russia in 
1962 the so-called' Yita Incident" (Bovingdon, 2004). After a few border military clashes 
with Russia, the borders were sealed and all contacts between Xinjiang and Russia was cut 
off. Xinjiang was completely "isolated". 
Then the following "Cultural Revolution" (CR) destroyed Wang' s carefully constructed 
administrative institutions in this sensitive region. Wang had constantly appealed to Beijing 
for cautious action toward Xinjiang in view of its frontier location, multi-minorities 
complexity and sensitive political situation and he also gave a "cold" welcome in Urumqi to 
the Red Guards (RG) on their arrival from Beijing, but he himself was accused by leftists in 
Beijing as a 'capitalist' and branded as ruling a "revisionist independent kingdom", and soon 
removed from power to exile in Nanjing (McMillen 1979: p.189-192). Despite Xinjiang 
later on being put under the protection of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai from severe 
deconstruction by the Red Guards still a lot of minority cadres and religious leaders were 
criticised along with their Han colleagues, attacked and removed from power, including 
Iminov, who was Russian-supported. He had been commander of the Uyghur national army 
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in the "ili Incident", and was vice Chair of the government in Xinjiang at the time (Tables 
5.1 , 5.24). 
Table 5.24 Xinjiang Leadership in 1965 
XUAR People 's Government 
Chairman: Seypidin Aziz (Uyghur, Jli) 
Vice Chair: XiD Lanting (Chinese, army) 
Guang, XXX (Chinese, central) 
Panthan Sugurpaev (Kazakh) 
M. lminov (Uyghur, lIi) 
Aisihar (Tatar Hj) 
Tomur Dawamat (Uyghur, Turpan) 
Tian Zong (Chinese) 
(Source: compiledJrom Toops, /992) 
XUAR Communist Party 
I st Secretary: Wang Enmao (Chinese, army) 
Secretary: Seypidin Aziz (Uyghur, Ili) 
Lu Jianren (Chinese, army) 
Li Quan (Chinese, army) 
Qi Guo (Chinese, worker) 
Lin Bomin (Chinese, army) 
Alternative Secretary: Tomur Dawamat (Uyghur, 
Turpan) 
On closer examination of the performance ofWang Enmao as Xinjiang's leader, his style 
from 1955-1968 was '~ractical, on-the-spot experience" and conservative in integrating the 
region into Chinese politico-social development and "pursuing moderate and pragmatic 
policies" ... ''without unduly provoking the sensitivities of the majority non-Han (and 
primarily Islamic) indigenous population" (McMillen, 1979: p.31 0; 1984: p.571). Despite 
being rooted in China's political-determined administrative institutions, his leadership, 
emphasizing rational regional administration, made the CCP administration in this Muslim 
region successful in consolidating CCP rule, while also creating a harmonious social and 
prosperous economic development, thus satisfying most of the local population. McMillen 
(1979: p.312) reckons that Wang had achieved five-sixths of the integration of this non-Han 
region into China s Republic by 1969. Wang had set a successful model of effective and 
efficient leadership and administrative institution in Xinjiang. This approximates to Weber's 
rational-style for an administrator whose actions are separate from political interruption, not 
subject to the interests of specific classes and which takes into consideration interaction with 
the social environment 
His success in governing the region was also interpreted as a politically strong leadership that 
was combined with two styles ''legal'' and "charismatic' authority. Weber thinks the modern 
bureaucratic administration needs a legal leadership to have authority to control and 
supervise the organisation for efficiency (Freund, 1968). In Wang's case, being CCP as and 
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the chief commander of the XMD legitimated his control overall and allowed him the scope 
for charismatic leadership. 
During the CR, Long Shujin was the leader ofa Revolutionary Committee (RC) of the 
region, an organisation replacing the XAPG and the CCP in 1968, and Seypidin and eight 
other members were vice chairs. The RC continued operating until the eve of reform in 1978. 
In 1973 Seypidin took over as chairman and he was also as First Secretary of Xinjiang' s 
CCP. The Committee was expanded to 14 members, most of them Han Chinese (Table 5.25). 
Table 5.25 Xinjiang Leadership in 1973 
XUAR Peo le's Government 
Chainnan: e pidin Aziz (Uyghur, fli ) 
ice Chair: Yang Yong (Chinese, army) 
Xiao Siming (Chinese, central) 
Song Xizhe (Chinese, party) 
Pei Zbouyu (Chinese, central) 
Hu Liangcai (Chinese worker) 
Ruzi Turdi (Uyghur, peasant) 
Zheng Jianhua (Chinese) 
Ziya (Kazakb, herdman) 
Li Cbuanjun (Cbinese, army) 
Li Zhaomjng (Chinese, army) 
Tao Kaiyun (Chinese, army) 
Wu Zunlun (Chinese, army) 
Tomur Dawamat U ur, Tu 
(Source: compiledJrom Toops. 1992) 
XUAR Communist P 
1 SI Secretary: Seypidin Aziz (Uyghur, I1 i) 
2nd Secretary: Yang Yong (Chinese army) 
3rd Secretary: Xiao Siming (Chinese, army) 
Secretary: Liu Xing (Chinese, worker) 
IsmaiJ Amat (Uyghur, Hotan) 
He Linzhao (Chinese, army) 
Song Xizhe (Chinese, party) 
Zbang Shigong (Chinese, worker) 
Alternate Secretary: Lin Bomin (Chinese, worker) 
Sawdanov (Uyghur, army) 
Long Shujin (1917-2003) was appointed by Beijing and again he was a Han military veteran 
from central China58, who had no practical experience of the northwest, let alone of a 
minority region. He worked along with the Beijing leftists and required a radical speed up of 
the integration of minorities politically and culturally into China without giving any 
consideration to Xinjiang s ethnic characteristics. Long made no attempt at an appropriately 
regional administration in terms of economic production and social unity, allowing the 
political movement to consume all of the institutions and resources that Wang Enmao had 
stored up. Ethnicity and custom were ''backward and an obstacle to progress" and were 
criticised and attacked by the Red Guards. Any religion-related practices and independent 
activities were severely punished. Many mosques were destroyed and Muslim customs were 
ss Long was a military follower of China s Northeast FA headed by Marshal Lin Biao, who was considered by 
Mao as his successor at t.he beginning of the CR and then became Mao' s rival at the end of the CR. Long's 
removal from power in Xinjiang was due to the death of Lin Biao in 1973. 
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forcibly changed in humiliating ways, including being made to raise pigs (Bovingdon, 2004). 
All private economic activities and work incentives were labelled as "capitalism" and were 
abolished. Two years of economic recession, 1965-67, proved this to be incompetence, 
although the Chinese press attributed it to bad weather. Long was removed after Beijing 
realised the consequence of his "wild" leadership and Seypidin appointed his successor. 
Seypidin Aziz (1919-2003) was born in Atushi near Kashigar and had a modem educational 
upbringing. He went to Russia in 1935 for studies and was influenced by Russian socialism. 
After his return, he was elected First Secretary of the Tachen Uyghur Literature Committee 
and became a local political activist, for which he was put in jail. Soon after he was released, 
he joined the " Ili Incident" and worked in the government of the "East Turkistan Republic" 
as the Minister of Education. In 1946 he took on the same role in Zhang Zhizhong's coalition 
government In September 1 949 he was invited to Beijing to join the first National Political 
Consultative Congress and was selected as a member of the National Law Committee, the 
National Security Committee and Central Ethnic Affairs Committee. He was appointed as the 
governor of the XAPG in 1955 after Burhan, and stayed in power until 1978. He is the only 
person so far of a minority origin to have been appointed as First GS of Xinjiang's CCP and 
he was Party leader from 1973 to 1978 (Bo, 2004)59. He stayed in power as governor for 23 
years longer than any Uyghur leader in contemporary history and worked for the Nationalist 
government for the short-li ed ni government, and for the CCP. In the CCP government he 
collaborated with Wang Zhen, Wang Enmao and Long Shujin in the most turbulent periods, 
not to mention that he alone had been the top leader of the CCP and the XPCc. 
Seypidin 's success in becoming the governor of the XUAR was firstly because his political 
hard line appealed to Beijing and he had shown his willingness to collaborate with the CCP; 
secondly because there was a acancy for him since Beijing desperately sought a young 
Uyghur representative politically reliable and capable ofleading the government after a 
number of prestigious and influential Uyghur politicians from the "lli Group" died in an air 
crash on the eve of 1949, and finally and also crucially, because he was a member of the 
Soviet Communist Party with a strong political backup by the Russians. As a Uyghur, his 
59 My interviews were a valuable source of historical fact. 
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longevity of holding top political jobs in Xinjiang is explained by his decision to become a 
political rather than regional leader serving the interests of the state rather than of his 
homeland. He was seen to be willing to accept subordination to the domination of the CCP 
(Mc Mill en, 1979) and to maintain the same political line as Beijing. 
From the very beginning, Seypidin managed well as a governor, fulfilling his role as 
collaborative, obedient and implementing CCP decisions with executive skill. He knew that 
his close ties to the Russians would help him to become an ethnic representative, an active 
public figure and a model for Beijing's ethnic policies, and, in order to reinforce his political 
career, he also used these ties to serve Beijing by strengthening contacts with the Soviet 
Union. He paid visits there to seek economic support, for example by signing agreements 
over Russian oil and transport companies in Xinjiang under the new government in 1949-
1957. Seypidin also spent more time in Beijing than Wang Enmao, to represent Xinjiang in 
various national and Party congresses and to promote ethnic policies as Beijing' s spokesman 
(McMill en, 1979). 
After Sino-Soviet relation deteriorated, Seypidin strengthened his bonds with Beijing and 
displayed a clear "political line" in anti-separatism, once again in tune with his political 
masters. His loyalty was eventually rewarded with the leadership of the CCP, the government 
and the military in Xinjiang after the peak of the CR has passed. According to Mc Mill en 
(1979), Seypidin worked closely with Beijing' s high elites and observed their internal 
struggles. As an outsider he fully understood that to prolong his political career, his political 
choices and personal networking would be crucial. This is described by Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg (1988) as the "survival principle". 
Seypidin' s leadership and administrative style was mediated by strong political agency. 
Because of this he could not or did not intend to act rationally in accordance with Weber's , 
description of an ideal administrator in a non-political performance. His style was created 
partially by Chinese politically determined institutions, and his own personal interests 
obviously did play a crucial part in his leadership. Once he had gained power as a leader for 
the CCP, government and the XPCC, he did not use it to pursue the interests of his fellow 
people through regional administrative efficiency and rational leadership, for instance 
through economic development and attempts to improve living conditions. 
Firstly, it was difficult for him to trigger economic growth since the entire country at that 
time was required to be involved in political movements rather than prioritizing economic 
production. Most economic activities, including transport construction and key industrial 
production had come to a standstill. China ' s centralised economic system and social chaos 
left no incentives for a region alone to manage its own economic growth. There was no 
foreign investment, no private plots, no trade with the outsiders, especially in Xinjiang where 
the borders were sealed, and the distance from China 's centre turned Xinjiang into an 
economic "dead corner". 
By 1973 Xinjiang ' s basic agricultural outputs of grain, cotton, cooking oil and sugar, had 
declined, to the point where even local consumption could not be met, and reliance was 
therefore increasing on imports from other regions, such as Shanghai. There were shortages 
in the state markets and urban residents were living on a strict ration system to obtain their 
basic needs from public stores. Xinjiang relied entirely on Beijing' s subsidies to survive. 
Secondly Seypidin made no attempt to change the situation, though he could possibly have 
managed at least to encourage economic self-reliance by exploiting all of the well-established 
local economic units. All he did was to maintain the political line of the region in tune with 
that of the centre ignore economic production, and constantly ask for large state subsidies to 
sustain Xinjiang by reminding Beijing of its strategic position. Beijing had to bail Xinjiang 
out by continually enhancing investment in capital construction. In 1974 this was more than 
five times that of 1955. 
At the end of the eR Seypidin was removed from power in Xinjiang and given a high but 
powerless post in Beijing. In the press he was accused of a close alliance with the "Gang of 
Four" thus holding back the economic and social progress of Xinjiang (McMilIen, 1979, 
1984; Toops, 1992). Although he had indeed developed close contacts with and supported 
the "Gang of Four' , his outspokenness for his nationality contributed to his fall from the 
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power (McMillen, 1979). Early in the First FYP, he complained that Xinjiang had retained 
less revenue from state enterprises (20 per cent) than it should have done, and, together with 
Wang, he asked for more autonomy for the region (Lo, 1961). Seypidin had also attempted to 
ask in 1956 for an increase in the number of ethnic cadres, but was warned that 
"nativization" of the government would be regarded as "anti-revolutionary" (Lo, 1961 ; 
Bovingdon, 2004). He publicly suggested that Xinjiang had taken too many Han migrants 
and, as a result, he made enemies. From the start of the CR to 1973, China organised a third 
wave of popUlation migration to the remote frontier regions, such as the west and northeast. 
These were mostly the urban unemployed and high school graduates, who were forced to 
leave home for rustication in poor areas to receive the "new-social education" ordered by 
Beijing. Xinjiang received about 1 million rusticated youths, including the radical RGs in 
1967. After 1973, the majority of immigrants to Xinjiang were poor peasants, as the urban 
registration system of Xinjiang was comparatively easy for those people settling in the towns 
and cities. During the destruction of China' s Production and Construction Crop in 1975, he 
demobili sed most units of the XPCC, and this also contributed to his downfall. 
5.2.2 Xinjiang's Leadership after the Reform 
After Seypidin, Beijing appointed a Han leader, Wang Feng, previously the First Secretary of 
Gansu province, to head the CCP and government in 1978. But he didn ' t stay long in the post 
because firstly, he had no "on the ground experience in Xinjiang" and had not yet set up a 
network of personal ties to the province' s high authorities who might support him for his 
future career (McMillen 1984: p.572). 
Secondly in 1980 there was a movement to correct the wrong-doings of the CR in the 
minority regions by improving their living conditions and allowing a revival of religious-led 
social activities to non-Han populations. Mosques were reopened and religious practice was 
allowed. The return of Arabic script enabled the minorities to read their traditional literature 
and re-establish their old ties. Transport connections between Xinjiang's north and south 
were being restored in order to facilitate the economic improvement in the poorest areas 
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(McMillen, 1984). This all echoed the proposals ofHu Yaobang6o ft h' ··ts t Xi .. ,a er IS VISI 0 nJIang 
and Tibet in the summer of 1980, when he saw poverty and underdevelopment, for the 
removal of the many restrictions on ethnic societies and realising more autonomy for the 
• 61 
regtons. 
Early in 1980, a Uyghur drunk died in custody in the police station in Aksu, and this sparked 
violence between locals and rusticated Han youths in Kashigar, quickly escalating into a 
series of bloody anti-Han riots across the major cities of South Xinjiang. This conflict 
exposed the long-tenn discontent of local minorities with the massive Han immigration and 
stagnant economy, and also the discontent of the Shanghai youths with conditions in the 
region and with the prospect of unemployment if they returned home. It was reported that 
hundreds of civilians and soldiers were killed or wounded. After returning from the visit in 
Xinjiang, Wang Zhen and a few of the remaining "old veterans" argued with Hu over his 
proposals. Their argument was that if "you give (the Uyghur) autonomy, they will turn 
around and create an East Turkistan" (Yuan Ming, cited by Ferdinand, 1994b: p.276; 
Bovindorn, 2004: p.21). Facing such chaos and lacking powerful control by a prestige 
leadership in Xinjiang, Beijing and the CCP under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping 
recognised that Wang Enmao' s "understanding but firm" leadership was effective in dealing 
with all kinds of minority affairs in Xinjiang (McMillen, 1984: p.571 ). 
In October 1981 Wang Enmao returned to the CCP leadership in Xinjiang. Soon, in 
December, he gave special reports, both in the 5th People 's Congress and in the 4th Political 
Consultative of the region, in which he stressed that national unity was the priority for the 
province' s future. Using his old methods, he restored the CCP' s institutions in Xinjiang by 
reorganising and reunifying the party, go emmental and military units. He brought back his 
old allies, reduced and downsized the slack, oversized government institutes; strengthened 
the military forces and consolidated the border defences. He also confirmed the strategic role 
60 Hu at the time was the youngest leader of the central CCP and eventually ~me GS o~ the CCP of China, 
1984- 1987. He was regarded as one of radical and contradictive reformers and hIS death tnggered the 
"Tiananmen Incident " in 1989. . . nd 
61 Hu 's speech of 1980 is available on the Tibet information Network, httj?://www.t:Jbetmfo.net. accessed on 2 
March 2004. 
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of the XPCC by turning it into not only the biggest economic production unit locally but also 
a semi-military force for suppressing any potential anti-Han separatist activities (McMillen, 
1984; Wang, 1999c). 
Secondly, Wang granted more power to non-Han cadres and promoted non-Han cadres, 
including Tomur, to the Party committees. He also gave considerable freedom to locals to 
practise religion and develop their Islamic culture. Classic and modem literature and art 
relating to minority culture and social developments reappeared. On an inspection tour of 26 
cities, counties and XPCC units, factories and enterprises in southern Xinjiang, he criticised 
the increase of Han chauvinism during the CR but also required minority peoples to work 
hard by their own efforts. His attitude was echoed in a famous slogan: "Xinjiang' s minorities 
and Han cannot be separated" (Wang, 1999c: p.312). In early 1983 ethnic-Han relations were 
said by Governor Ismail to have "improved" (Toops, 1992). 
Thirdly, he was determined to bring back economic prosperity and to improve the living 
conditions of all minorities. He advocated the economic reform that was being promoted by 
Deng's party and he started changing the operating systems of factories and agriculture. He 
asked Beijing for its continuing financial support whilst at the same time advocating that the 
region should develop its own strengths by the exploitation of its rich resources (McMillen, 
1984). Wang successfuUy adopted the responsibility system of family units, taking control of 
agricultural fields, grasslands, herds and production resources, and he promoted 
technological innovation in agricultural production, which stimulated growth. By 1984 
Xinjiang had terminated its commune system and, the year before, it had ended the import of 
basic agriCUltural goods, achieving self reliance in grain, cotton, cooking oil and sugar. The 
output value of agriculture was increased by an average 9.7 per cent annually (Wang, 1999a). 
Along with the agricultural improvement, manufacturing industries were also able to increase 
their total output value, at a rate post 1978 of 14 per cent annually for light industry. 
Transport improvements ended the isolation of southern Xinjiang and linked its economy to 
the rest of the region. Private activities and trades were encouraged and abundant food and 
daily goods were available in the markets (Huang, Liu, Wu and Zhu, 1990; Wang, 1999a). 
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In October 1985 the government staged a large demonstration in Urumqi to celebrate the 30th 
anniversary of the foundation of the XUAR. Wang Enmao and Ismail both declared that the 
social and economic situation of Xinjiang had achieved stability and had developed since 
1978 (Toops, 1992). This helped in Wang's decision, at the age of72, to announce his 
resignation from the Party leadership and to join the Xinjiang Consultants Think Tank. He 
didn' t withdraw totally from power until 1991, however, and, in fact, he continued to act 
behind the scenes. 
In December 1985, the XUAR People ' s Congress announced that Ismail, appointed as the 
governor in 1979 and renewed in 1983 (Table 5.26), had finished his position as governor 
early and was to be re-assigned to a new job in Beijing and to be replaced by Tomur. At the 
same time it was announced that Song Hanliang was to be Wang' s successor (Table 5.27). 
The former announcement irritated Uyghur university students in Xinjiang, who boycotted 
classes and marched in Urumqi, with support from 200 Uyghur students from Beijing 
Universities, who marched to Zhongnanhai62 . The students' demands included no nuclear 
tests in Xinjiang, the strengthening of minority education, no one-child policy for minorities, 
and the retention ofIsmail. In their view, Ismail was more educated than Tomur, and had 
served the interests of the Uyghurs better than Tomur, without total submission to CCP 
orders. They felt that Ismail, coming from Xinjiang's south, could fully understand and 
represent the Uyghur, more than Tomur, who came from the Han-influenced north (Toops, 
1992). 
Ismail Amat was born in 1935 in Hotan to a poor peasant family and his rise during the land 
reform of 1954 served him later on as a selected, politically reliable youth among others sent 
to the Central School of the CCP in Beijing to study advanced Marxism-Leninism. Upon his 
return in the early 1960s, he took a series of jobs from Depute OS of his county to the Deputy 
Director of the Department of Political Work in Culture and Education in the XAPO in 
Urumqi. He was recommended by Seypidin, but had less interest than Seypidin in personal 
ties with top authorities. He had had more education, better than other Uyghur leaders 
(Toops, 1992). As a follower of Seypidin, he became the number two Uyghur in power 
62 Also from my personal ex:perience. 
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during the CR (Table 6.25). After Seypidin's removal, Ismail was appointed governor, which 
accounts for his inactivity in the CR and his lack of close relations to Seypidin (Toops, 
1992). 
Table 5.26 Xinjiang Leadership in 1984 
XUAR Peo le's Government 
Chainnan: Ismail Amat (Uyghur, Hotan) 
Vice Chair: Tohiti Sabir (Uyghur) 
Song HanUang (Chinese, academy) 
Tomur Dawamat (Uyghur, Turpan) 
(Source: compiled from Toops, 1992) 
XUAR Communist P 
I st Secretary: Wang Enmao (Chinese, anny) 
Secretary: lsmall Amat (Uyghur, Hotan) 
Tomur Dawamat (Uyghur, Turpan) 
Qi Guo (Chinese, worker) 
Li Jiayu (Chinese) 
Janabil (Kazakh) 
Standing Committee: Tan Shanhe (Chinese) 
Zhang Sixue (Chinese) 
Amudun Niyazi (Uyghur, LunTai, middle school) 
Yang Huasheng (Chinese, anny) 
Badai (Mongol) 
Wang Zhenwen (Chinese) 
Fu Wen (Chinese) 
Li Shoushan (Chinese) 
Son HaiJian (Chinese, academy) 
As the governor, Ismail was required to be subordinate and collaborative. Under Wang's 
leadership, his job was to manage Han-minority relations, to develop the region's economy 
and to be a spokesman echoing the policies of the CCP. Unlike Seypidin, he didn't have pre-
Communist lli experience or Russian support, but he gradually created his own agency to 
become a local leader (Toops, 1992). Coming from Hotan, he fully understood the 
underdevelopment of southern Xinjiang and in 1984 recommended that this region should 
develop its economy as a solution to Xinjiang's social instability and the sensitive relations 
between the 'Han and non-Han.63 This was a response to Hu Yaobang's and Zhao Ziyang' s 
comments on developing Xinjiang' s economic potential on their visits in 1983. He also, like 
Seypidin, publicly expressed concern about the rights of the Uyghur and on the "colonization 
of Han". He pointed to the increasing population ofHan in Xinjiang, and insisted that all 
Uyghurs should be offered jobs before Han migrants. That resulted in his downfall (Toops, 
1992). 
63 Ismail's speech in the National Unification Meeting of 5th May 1984. 
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Tomur Dawamat was born in 1928 to a poor peasant family in Toksun, in north Xinjiang. He 
was involved with the land reform and joined the CCP in 1952. He was sent to Beijing in 
1956 for studies at the Central Nationalities College and, on his return, he was appointed as 
the first Party Secretary of Toksun County, the first ethnic man to be a Party Secretary in that 
region. He became the vice Chair of the XAPG in 1964 (Table 5.24). According to Toops 
(1992), Tomur's rise was strongly related to his hard, pro-Han line and his relationship with 
Wang Enmao. It is said that he was given his Communist education by a Han work team in 
Toksun and then selected by the party to be part of the new Uyghur elite, which was 
supported by Wang. He developed close bonds with Han cadres. During the CR, he stood up 
for Wang and lost power in the Party committee in 1976, although he stayed on in the 
agricultural office in Urumqi.64 After 1980, on Wang's return, Tomur was restored to the 
Party committee and became the second highest ranking Uyghur leader in the region. 
Table 5.27 Xinjiang Leadership in 1985 
XUAR Peo le's Government 
Chairman: Tomur Dawamat (Uyghur, Turpan) 
Vice Chair: Tohiti Sabir (Uyghur) 
Jin Yunhui (Chinese, army) 
Mao Dehua (Chinese, academy) 
Zhong Lianhui (Chinese) 
(Source: compiledfrom Toops, 1992) 
XUAR Communist Party 
I SI Secretary: Song Hailiang (Chinese, academy) 
Deputy Secretary: Tomur Dawamat (Uyghur, Turpan) 
Janabil (Kazakh) 
Li Shoushan (Chinese) 
Amudun Niyazi (Uyghur, Luntai, middle school) 
Zhang Sixue (Chinese, army) 
Standing Committee: Badai (Mongol) 
Keyum Bawudun (Uyghur, academy) 
Tang Guangcai (Chinese) 
Xue Gang (Chinese) 
Huang Baozhang (Chinese, economy) 
Ren Guoyin (Chinese) 
Chan Dazhen (Chinese) 
In the view of many Uyghurs, Tomur was the very model of a Han-trained political leader, a 
collaborator who implemented CCP policies without criticism. In the troubles of the 1980s he 
stressed National Unity as the prioritl5, which was viewed by the Uyghurs as putting him on 
the side of the CCP and the Han, and against them (Toops, 1992). After the 1990 rebellion in 
Baren Township, Tomur visited the site and blamed those Uyghurs who had provoked the 
violence, in contrast to Ismail who expressed understanding of the problems of the people in 
64 Fieldwork, 2003 and McMiUen, 1984, p.230. 
65 Tomur, the report on the situation and tasks, 27th Dec. 1982. 
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this region of economic backwardness. Tomur developed personal ties to powerful men like 
Wang Enmao to assure his promotion. He stuck to Wang and the CCP and is viewed by 
Toops as the political reality of the pragmatic Uyghur leadership. 
Tomur and Ismail fit two different models of native leaders of the region. Ismail tried to act 
rationally through activities orientated to the interests of the region, rather than engaging in 
politics on the lines of the "survival principle", whereas Tomur' s strategy was very different. 
He survived, but at the expense of his fellow Uyghurs. 
Song Hanliang (1934-2000) was born in Zhejiang province and graduated in geology from 
one of the universities in Shannxi. No sooner had he graduated in 1954 than he came to 
Xinjiang, following Beijing' s encouragement. He worked with Soviet specialists on the 
discovery and development of a new oil field in Karamay in 1957 and led research on 
Xinjiang' s oil reserves, oil exploitation and oil industrial development in Xinjiang' s Oil and 
Geology Bureau. He was made vice director of the Bureau and was rewarded by the country 
several times for his outstanding scientific research, before becoming the vice Chair of 
XAPG in 1983 and then the GS ofXinjiang' s CCP in 1985 (Table 5.27). 
Judged from Song' s personal background, he obviously fits in the category of those 
technocrats who receive a science training and are experienced in the technical field but 
eventually work in bureaucratic administration to make policy for the region. His rise was 
due largely to his outstanding academic background tuning into the national campaigns that 
"science raises a country" and China' s bureaucratic administration reform after the 13th Party 
Congress in 1987. The reform called for the division of the civil service into three broad 
dimensions: a relatively small "administrative executive" with a leadership function; a much 
larger "specialist/technical" service; and a "supportive" or "service" function. There was a 
decentralisation of central Party control, the promotion of local CCP leadership and 
government functions, and the recruitment of technocrats into cadre teams (Burns, 1989; Liu 
2001). 
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At first sight Song was equipped with qualities for becoming a regional leader and qualified 
administrator. He was highly regarded by both the Uyghur and the long settled Han. His 
leadership was imbued with social interaction, a sign of his experience as a Han who for a 
long time had lived and worked in Xinjiang and understood the region and non-Han Muslim 
people thoroughly. His academic achievements facilitated his talent, rationality and 
capability in making justified policies and administering the region. Under Song's leadership 
the restrictions on Xinjiang's ethnic groups were further removed and Islamic social 
influence and religious freedoms increased. Many new mosques were built; for example 
Yiecheng County had 775 in 1965,352 in 1980, and 903 in 1990.66 Religious leaders gained 
respect and influence. 
Song took regional development seriously by promoting openness and concentrating on 
economic reconstruction. In December 1988, during a period of improving relations with the 
Soviet Union, it was Song who suggested to Beijing that it was time for the promotion of 
development in China's west. "Link Xinjiang with the Great Islamic Circle (GIC)" was a 
slogan suggested in this period. It was Song, no doubt due to the nature of his academic 
background, who advocated "Science and High Technology promoting Xinjiang" as a tenet 
in conducting the regional policy in Xinjiang's 7th and 8th FYPs. In the light of Xinjiang' s 
natural conditions, Song suggested the application of high-technology for local resource 
industries, to increase the value of their products and for agriculture in order to reduce 
poverty, and economic restructuring to stimulate local productivity, openness and 
marketisation. Because of Song' s efforts, Xinjiang established several science institutions 
and special teams to undertake resource surveys, make economic plans and recruit more 
postgraduates from the universities of central China to service Xinjiang's economic 
development and to counter the large numbers of highly skilled Han who had left the region 
since 1978. Song also recognised the importance of the private enterprises led by Wenzhou 
businessmen and others from the provinces of Guangdong and Zbejiang investing in remote 
66 Fieldwork, 2003 
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minority cities and towns. He formally expressed his thanks to the people from his home 
province for bringing economic productivity to poor areas67. 
Many Han saw Song as an incorruptible and down-to-earth Party Secretary, but he was 
viewed more as an economist and policy-maker than as a political leader and decision-maker. 
For instance, according to Beijing's ethnic religious reform, he gave freedom to ethnics for 
their practice of religion without clarifying and monitoring the practices, for instance of 
advocating Jihad against the Han Chinese and the CCP.68 He understood the region and 
recommended effective solutions, but he was seen a weak political leader and lacked the 
power to help determine, monitor and finalise his plans, which obviously failed to meet the 
requirement of a "professional politician" in particular in a region like Xinjiang, in which 
political strength and administrative capacity share the equal weight in successful 
governance. 
As we have seen, China's reform is partial and regionalised. Although many political 
institutional constraints over the economy have been removed or relaxed in most provinces, 
political restrictions over Xinjiang's government's performance, regional political 
administration, and even economic management, have been reinforced due to the 
increasingly violent anti-Han sentiment among the indigenous people, especially the 
Uyghurs. In addition, from 1978-1999, Beijing launched the "three-ladder-step" campaign 
and ignored western regions like Xinjiang in its preferential policies. Song's inactivity and 
lack of background ties meant a lack of powerful allies and Beijing paid little attention to his 
plea for policy preference. Without state backup in terms of financial support and 
institutional incentives for generating economic growth, Song's campaign was considered as 
theoretically correct but unrealistic and difficult to finalise. 
The 1989 Tiananmen Incident created chaos in China and provided an opportunity for 
UYghur independence movements. In May 1989 Han students demonstrated in Urumqi in 
sympathy with Tiananmen Square, and, at the same time, a march was held by Uyghurs 
67 Comments by a director of development and reform institute of Zhejiang, 
http://www.cmgsl.com.cnlimagesllI6111932.htm. accessed in Dec. 2004. 
68 Fieldwork, 2003 
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mirroring a protest by Hui Muslims in Ningxia province to express anger at the publication 
of a book, Sex Customs, which was said to "contain insulting misrepresentation of Islam". 
The Muslim demonstrators eventually attacked, burned and bombed the CCP headquarters in 
Urumqi. Soon after, in April 1990, there was an organised, armed rebellion in Xinjiang' s 
Baren Township, Aktao County of Kizi1 su-Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture (10 kilometres 
south ofK.ashigar). Seven members of the armed forces were killed, including one Uyghur 
army soldier and one Han officer, and 100 civilians were injured, forcing the XMD to send in 
troops to suppress the riot. 
The GS of China' s CCP, Jiang Zhemin, and President Yang Shangkun, accompanied by 
Wang Enmao, Song and Tomur, visited Xinjiang and Kashigar in 1990, and in 1991 they 
gave "urgent directives to restore order, rally the minorities under party rule, strengthen 
control and pluck by the roots the shoots of ethnic disunity and rebellion" (Harris, 1993: 
p.118). In such an unsettled situation, the 7th Xinjiang People' s Congress reasserted its 
principal aim of "national stability and unity" as the guide for its approach to regional 
development. In February 1992 during the Chinese New Year this was shattered when bombs 
went off in two buses in Urumqi, causing 14 casualties, followed in September 1993 by a 
series of bombs in Kashigar and Yining. 
Song's campaign was interrupted by this political instability. He proved to be incapable of 
controlling Xinjiang' s social unrest. He himself showed weakness and subordination in 
decision-making and a lack of charismatic leadership and determination in governing the 
region. He repeated the importance of the leadership ofWang frequently and seemed to 
imply his subordination to Wang s domination. His speech in the 4th Party Committee 
Meeting69 stated that Xinjiang s CCP should make efforts to study the experiences of old 
comrades, especiallyWang Enmao, who had mastered a high standard of Marxist-Leninist 
theory and who had experience in governing. Song also said that Xinjiang had to retain the 
socialist system in pursuit of its economic growth and stick to the CCP's core leadership. In 
the shadow ofWang s virtual power Song' s government recommended profound reforms to 
69 www.xjjjb.com accessed on I SI June 2005. 
213 
enterprise, the market economy, etc .. , but they inherited Wang's manner in the 
implementation of state policies, and therefore acted slowly, cautiously and conservatively. 
In 1985-1995, Xinjiang's economy, in comparison to the coastal regions, experienced a slow 
rate ofGDP increase, less than the national average (for a full discussion, see chapter 7). 
Song's leadership was "weak, indeterminate and lacked backbone" (Cheung, 1998b). 
Because of his political weakness, Song was unable to conduct the region' s economic 
development toward the path he had identified of stretching the "parameters of central policy 
to the maximum latitude". In this regard, his leadership in managing regional economic 
reform was in a style somewhere between laggard and bandwaggoning (Cheung, 1998b). 
Bandwaggon leaders are "unwilling to adopt new policies or alternatively tend to operate 
within the confines of central policies" and "seldom deviate from central policy in the 
initiation and implementation of economic reform" (Cheung, 1998b). A laggard "does not 
favour change at all and is unwilling to depart from existing institutions or policies." ... and 
is "sceptical of market-orientated refonn and clings to some of the Maoist policies such as 
collectivized agriculture or the planning system" ... and "acted conservatively because of 
their inability to adapt to the new political and economic environment" (Cheung, 1998b: 
p.26). His leadership style can be likened to the "eclectic modernizer", which is regarded as 
more suitable in the most successful coastal regions without political restrictions in the 
reform era (Liu, 2001). However, in a region like Xinjiang, such a style only produced 
failure. 
In 1991 , Wang Enmao eventually quit power and Song also had to resign in 1993 due to 
serious ill-health. The First Secretaryship of the CCP was taken by Wang Lequan70, a native 
ofShandong, who had been appointed vice governor of Xinjiang in 1991. 
Reflecting on Wang Enmao's leadership during the reform era, we can see that, after his 
return in 1982, he tried hard to re-apply his moderate leadership in order to restore social 
calm and to re-establish harmonious relations between the Han and non-Han. But, as China 
entered in a new phase of development, with political decentralisation and openness, his old-
10 Recommended by Hu Iintao, www.chinesenewsweek.com accessed in Feb. 2004. 
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fashioned approach turned out to be inadequate and inappropriate. Openness led the door to 
be opened for isolated minorities to seek greater political recognitio~ and the policy of 
removing restrictions on religious activities and promoting ethnic culture and cadres, and 
improving living conditions, did not solve any of the fundamental problems. Wang's efforts 
did not go beyond the limitations of his own political ideology. This time his cautious and 
conservative manner in dealing with radical economic reform, for instance the need to 
transform socialist economic control over local productive sectors in the regio~ though 
having a political rationale, in practice served only to hold the region back from participating 
in all kinds of marketisation and achieving financial independence, and it had a negative 
impact on the local state, which lacked incentives to take up a dynamic economic role in 
China's reform. In addition, without Beijing's preferential policies and strenuous financial 
support, and without removing further institutional constraints in Xinjiang, Wang' s strategy 
became invalid and his leadership, laggard according to Cheung' s classification (1998b), 
became inefficient in governing the region. In additio~ his dominance and influence over 
government undermined Song's rational administration and shaded Song' s leadership. 
In December 1995 it was fonnally announced that Wang Lequan had taken over the 
leadership of the CCP, as recommended by Hu71 , and that Abulahat Abdurixit was to be 
made the new governor (Table 5.28). Tomur, like his predecessors, moved to Beijing after 
completing his full premiership. 
Wang Lequan (1944- ) rose from participation in "Rural Socialism Education" in his home 
region ofShandong in 1966-67 and spent more than ten years as the leader of an agricultural 
commune, a village revolutionary committee, and of the CCP of a village commune in the 
south of Shandong. From 1982 to 1988 he became Vice Secretary of the Shandong Youth 
League (YL) and at the same time he was trained at the Central School of the CCP in 
Beijing. During this period, he gained notoriety when he recommended to Beijing that a 
young disabled woman from Shandong should become a nationwide model of "outstanding 
self-supporting youth" in a campaign of Socialist Civilisation Education, advocated by the 
Central YL headed by Hu Jintao. He thus gained a ')x>litical bonus" for himself, and for Hu 
7 1 Hu now (2006) is China' s president. 
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too, and the personal connexion laid the foundation for his future career. After that, he soon 
became the CCP secretary ofShandong's sub-region in 1987 and then vice governor of the 
province from 1989 to 1991. 
Table 5.28 XinjiangLeadersbip in 1995 
XUAR Peo le's Government 
Chairman: Abulabat Abdurixit (Uyghur, Yining) 
Vice Chair: Wang Youshan (Chinese) 
Zhang Yuechuan (Chinese, Jiangxi) 
Wuber Abdula (Uyghur) 
Li Donghui (Chinese, settled in Xinjiang) 
Aishati Klimube (Kazakh) 
Jahemijit Naser (Uygbur) 
Yusub Asa (Uyghur) 
(Source: Xinjiang Year Book. /996) 
XUAR Communist Pa 
1st Secretary: Wang Lequan (Chinese, Shandong) 
Deputy Secretary: Tomur Dawamat (Uyghur, Turpan) 
Abulahat Abdurixit (Uyghur, Yining) 
Janabil (Kazakh) 
Jing Yuhui (Chinese, settled in Xinjiang) 
Keyoumu Bawudun (Uyghur, academy) 
Zhang Wenxue (Chinese, Sichuan) 
Standing Commit: Pan Zhaoming (Chinese) 
Wang Chuangyou (Chinese) 
Hailijiemu Slamu (Uyghur, female) 
Li Fengzi (Chinese) 
Abdreyimu Amit (Uyghur) 
Zhang Yuechuan (Chinese, Jiangxi) 
Chen Deming (Chinese) 
Wu Dunfu (Chinese) 
Wang was transferred from his home region to the west in the rotational nomenclatura 
system of China's cadre training, which aids Beijing' s top-down control and prevents any 
localism of leadership (Edin, 2003). In addition, such geographical transfer at the same 
administrative level ensures the training of reliable provincial cadres, who might be destined 
to move up to Beijing in future on the hierarchical ladder of the CCP (Edin, 2003). 
Wang took the leadership at the time when violent separatist riots, mainly led by Uyghur, 
were on the rise in Xinjiang. In 1996 and 1997 a series of bus bombings took place in Beijing 
and Urumqi during the traditional New Year, at the time of the death of Deng Xiaoping. 
Hundreds were killed and wounded Shortly after, there was a series of assassinations 
targeting local Han and Uyghur cadres and those minority religious leaders close to the Han. 
Wang, in response to a central instruction, determined to extinguish all violent movements 
and stressed that the major danger to Xinjiang' s instability was separatism and so it was 
necessary to 'strike hard' against any such nationalism. Wang's "strike hard" campaign was 
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approved by Beijing as a strategy to be associated with international anti-terrorist policy in 
central Asian countries. This had been initiated in 1996 when the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation was established, initially with five members - China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan - later joined by Uzbekistan, to sign a treaty for a mutual tension-
reduction and security. After the 11 th September 2001 attacks in America, China negotiated 
with the US to add numbers of East Turkistan terrorist organisations to the list of recognised 
international terrorist grOupS.72 Since then, the campaign of "anti-terrorism and anti-
separatism" has been promoted on a large-scale and there is no doubt that it has furthered 
China's geopolitical objectives. 
Restrictions on religious activity have been reinforced since Strike Hard. There was a slow 
down in mosque construction and, according to unofficial reports, some informally permitted 
mosques have been demolished. The government now closely monitors and 'guides' the 
activities of Islamic religious leaders (imams). From March to December 2001 , the 
government implemented an imam "patriotic re-education" campaign in Xinjiang. They were 
required to attend 20-day sessions to study patriotism, Communist Party ideology, and how 
to combat separatism. 
Wang became a member of Beijing' s CCP Central Committee in the 15th Central People' s 
Congress (CPC) and was then promoted to be one of the 25 members ofCCP' s Politburo in 
the 16th CPC in 2002. This makes him the highest ever ranking Xinjiang politician in the 
CCP hierarchy. It implies that Beijing has put stabilising the west, including Tibet, at the top 
of its priority list. Wang Zhen, Wang Enmao and Song had all appealed to Beijing to deal 
with Xinjiang's instability in the 1980s. However, they had no means of getting Beijing's 
attention lmtil the violent riots escalated. Wang' s "Strike Hard" campaign came just in time 
and won him another "Political Bonus". 
His political campaign has obviously irritated the Uyghurs, though their anger is concealed. 
Even some Han think. that overstressing separatism and terrorism will turn the minority 
12 http://WW\v.whitehouse.go /newslreleasesl2001 11 0/20011019-4.html. accessed on 16th June, 2004. 
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further away73. Rather, improving relations between minorities and Han would be better 
achieved by social integration and regional economic development. But, "Strike Hard" has 
come to play an increasingly dominant role, as seen in one of his speeches in the spring of 
2005, in a meeting of Xinjiang's Political Consultative Committee: "Xinjiang's top task is 
not economic development but anti-separatism. It is wrong to presume that only economic 
improvement will persuade the separatists not to act. We must clear up any separatism, from 
root to shoot.,,74 In guiding Xinjiang's regional economy, in 1996 the province's 9th FYP 
revealed that the region's economic development would be centralised by building up two 
bases, oil and cotton, Wang's new economic policy of "one Black and one White (one Red)" 
(BW(R)). He presumed that the region would benefit from a concentration on massive 
production of these two core products, although "one Red", the tomato, had to be added in 
the lOth FYP of2001 after a slump in cotton sales in 1998. 
Wang has switched away from his predecessors' policies, and, by following Beijing's orders 
so closely, he has displayed the simplicity of his governance and politico-orientated 
leadership, which has over shadowed his administrator role, another crucial part of efficient 
leadership for Xinjiang. Wang's leadership is subject to political priority as against Weber's 
rational, ideal-style for administrative efficiency. It is not surprising to see the disapproval of 
his economic policies by economists and moreover complaints about his political policies, 
not only by the non-Han population. 
The "BW(R)" policy and its implementation was criticised by many researchers as 
unrealistic, unjustified and superficial, ignoring the region' s economic and environmental 
conditions and the context of national market economic transition (see the detailed discussion 
in Chapters 6 and 7). Xinjiang's heavy SOE-dornination, especially in the most productive 
oil sector, implies no protection for local property rights and the extraction and export of 
local wealth. This in turn provides no incentives for the locality to pursue economic growth 
through the completion of self-reliance. Lu (2003: p.634) clearly states that such policies 
make the sector (state) rich but the region poor. Furthermore, the policy also creates yet more 
73 interviews, 2003 
74 www.chinanew.com. 16:00 on 14/01 /2003, accessed on 18th April, 2005. 
social unrest as the local minorities see "resource-exploitation as a drain on their regional 
wealth for the sake of the east's prosperity." In addition, many Han have complained that 
since Wang gained power, he has given many benefits including tax exemptions, special 
preferential policies on bank loans and land rents specifically to the enterprises from his 
native region, which were seen by Xinjiang's people as very non-Xinjiang-oriented 
regionalism. 
Wang's prominence nationally, supported by Beijing, has meant that criticism of his policies 
has been muted. The context of the Western Development Programme (WOP) (1999) 
provides an institution continually to allocate large investments to sustain Xinjiang's 
economy, to help him with "Strike Hard", and to bail him out of his incompetence in steering 
the local economy. His priorities for the Strike Hard political campaign have been 
institutionalised and his political leadership is even more secure. 
In summary, judged from Wang's background and promotion experience, he is a highly 
skilled Chinese CCP politician, whose ability to enhance his own political career was 
developed from his skilfully established personal ties with China' s high authority elites and 
from his clear, central political line, which by no means makes him a skilled regional 
administrator, or an effective policy-maker. His attempts at unifying this multi-national 
society have been non-tactical, though certainly radical in his harsh "Strike Hard" campaign, 
without realising that his tough stance will only control violence and separatism temporarily 
and that in the long-term it might be counterproductive. 
Abulahat, the new governor from 1994 to 2003 after Tomur, was born in Yining to a Uyghur 
family in 1942, so most of his upbringing was in socialist Xinjiang. He graduated in 1965 
from Xinjiang's Industrial College in electronic gas studies and soon after he was offered a 
job at the Institute of Xinjiang's Construction and Survey Designation. He worked there as 
an engineering technician. By 1980 he had risen to be the vice Director of the institute and 
then the vice Director ofXUAR's Planning Commission in 1983. In 1991 he became vice 
governor ofXAPG and then governor. 
Abulahat's should be seen as a ''pragmatic Uyghur Leader", who is regarded by many Han as 
gentle and cautious with a "low ethnic nationalist mood", a recognised mark by Beijing for 
obedience to the political line in tune with Chinese political requirement for an ethnic leader. 
This can be explained by his experiences of living in a Chinese-dominated community since 
he was 19 years old and working for a long time in an academic institute dominated by non-
political Han, thereby lIDderstanding the philosophy and principles of dealing with Han and 
working out a survival strategy. His selection and promotion to be leader of the region was 
due largely to his being collaborative and tolerant, which is specifically required for 
lIDdertaking the job of governor. 
Abulahat managed his post well, in particular under the domination ofWang Lequan's 
leadership. He had not only had little power but also few opportunities to express his own 
opinions. All he could do was just to switch Wang's emphasis slightly by emphasising 
Xinjiang as a stable place for investment, which was somewhat at variance with Wang's 
report of 1,000 people being arrested for participation in terrorist activities.75 Many Uyghurs 
called him a Han puppet, as they had done with Tomur, Ismail, and others, jeopardising 
Uyghur interests to benefit his own career. 76 Abulahat is again recognised by his people as a 
political leader rather than a regional leader standing firmly for his region. 
On the 1st Sep 2001 at the ceremony ofUrumqi Trading Fair, after Wang Lequan's speech 
addressing the region's security, where he claimed that "(A)lthough national separatists and 
religious extremists have never stopped their efforts for launching destructive activities, their 
efforts never affect Xinjiang's stability ... ", Abulahat responded rather differently. According 
to him, "the struggle between splittism and counter-splittism has never stopped in the history 
of Xinjiang. At present, society is stable and the economy is developing at a high speed. The 
situation of Xinjiang is better than ever in history.,,77 Nine days before 9/1 1, he told a Hong 
Kong newspaper report that "by no means is Xinjiang a place where violent and terrorist 
accidents take place very often." He invited more investment from Hong Kong. But on other 
75 http://www.wsws.org/artic1es12002 accessed in July, 2005. 
76 Fieldwork, 2003 
n http://216.239.59.1 04/search?g=cache:Ggn I wf49D8MJ:www.mail-archive.comlmutti-
lo/04Otaklamakan.org/msg00861 .html+Abulahat+Abdurixit&hl=en accessed in May 2005. 
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occasions he has had to stress Xinjiang's separatist tendencies and in April 2001 he told the 
Xinjiang Legal Daily that the Strike Hard campaign in Xinjiang would specifically target 
"national splittists," ''violent terrorists," and "religious extremists." In January 2002, 
Abulahat announced that artists, writers, perfonners, historians, and others who advocate 
separatism through art would also become targets of Strike Hard.78 In 2003 he safely 
completed his full term of office and his reward for his "yes-man" approach was a new post 
in Beijing. 
In summary of section 5.2, in examining the performance of Xinjiang's CCP or 
governmental leaders in governing the region, we have seen that their leadership has shifted 
towards a more politically-orientated and central-state-directed approach and away from 
rational and rule-based practices. This is due to the priority of the single party state on 
political administration and especially its worries about Xinjiang' s ethnicity and violent 
separatist actions over recent years. As a result, the CCP has further entrenched, not only its 
Han-Ied super authority over the institutions and leadership of the region, but also the 
performance of the leaders themselves in focusing on political administration. This can be 
seen especially in the leadership of the latest CCP leader, Wang. The power oflocal Uyghur 
leader as a governor of the autonomous region is institutionally weakening. On this basis 
there seems to be no immediate hope for the kind of rational administration based on non-
political attachment, emotionless and impersonality but rule-based legalisation, as described 
by Weber. 
In considering Xinjiang' s special features and the nature of Chinese political institutions, 
efficient government of the region requires a GS such as Wang Enmao, who understands the 
region and creates an image of himself as a local leader defending the region, with the 
capability to balance his multiple roles and make policies that exploit the opportunities in the 
Chinese reform, and with the political and economic capital to bargain with Beijing. So far, 
no such leader, except Wang Enmao himself in the pre-CR era, has yet come forward. 
78 http://www.cecc.gov/pageslvirtuaIAcadluighur/ inannrept02.php accessed in May 2005. 
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Our conclusion from this chapter must be that Xinjiang' s government itself has become part 
of the problem rather than part of the solution for the province' s economic transition. Such a 
government cannot act in the required dynamic, authoritative role to steer the region out of its 
traumas and toward a respectable prosperity and hannony. The solution is connected to 
China's partial reform. Economic reform without the parallel political reform is not a strategy 
that will work in Xinjiang, and the present unbalanced mix of policies is holding back 
economic reform, as predicted by Komai and North. This chapter has addressed many of the 
problems of Xinjiang' s local government and the causes of its incompetence and inefficiency 
and of its poor leadership in managing the economic growth and facilitating reform from the 
politico-orientated organisational construction. This supports the core argument of the thesis 
that partial reform is not ideal and that it may ultimately create further fundamental 
problems, which Chinese reformers will have to solve sooner or later. 
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Chapter 6 Local Government, Financial Management and 
Regional Enterprises 
As we discussed in chapter 2, China's reform decentralized responsibility for the regional 
economy to the local state. Scholars, including Yang (1994), Oksenberg and Wong (1991), 
and Tong (1989), have emphasized the importance of fiscal decentralisation and its dynamic 
means of granting real power to the local state. In the words ofYang (1994: p.63), the 
implication of fiscal decentralisation is to reduce central intervention, in order to "stimulate 
the initiatives of localities". Given that this thesis places particular emphasis upon the local 
state, we are interested in the amount of power delivered by the series of fiscal reforms, in 
any new capacity in producing policies, and in the extent to which performance has changed 
in managing the local economy. 
In this chapter we will, first, examine China' s fiscal reforms and their impacts on the 
financial behaviour of local government. Second, by examining the financial budget and 
revenue productive sectors, we will address any defects in the financial management of the 
region and the response of local government to the defects, and seek causes in relation to 
property rights and incentives for flexibility in local government financial and bureaucratic 
behaviours. Therefore we will return to the theoretical debate about the characteristics of 
China' s institutional decentralization and the consequences for the regional economy. 
In their theory of federalism Chinese-style, Qian and Roland (1998) use a three-layer 
hierarchy to reveal the relationship between the government's incentives for hardening 
budget constraints (HBCs) and the local desire for decentralisation of fiscal authority through 
reconstructing and privatizing locality-based state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in response to 
central HSCs (Figure 6.1). In general, since the decentralisation, local and central 
governments have acted against each other in securing their own budgetary grants that drive 
the two actions taking place: the introduction of HBCs from the centre to the localities, 
including locally and centrally state-controlled enterprises; and bargaining for more fiscal 
decentralisation from local government and enterprises to the centre, as shown in paths 1 and 
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3 of Figure 6.1. The same two actions take place too between local governments and locally 
based enterprises, as shown in paths 2 and 4. 
Figure 6.1 The Path of Decentralisation and HBC in China 
~===~-. 
3 
/ 
Decentralisation ---------.. HBC 
(Note: CG: central government) 
Source: author, 2005) 
As we know, China's coastal economy is dominated by township and village enterprises 
(TVEs) and other semi-private firms, in which property rights were declared during the 
decentralisation to be under the local government domain. So the local state in that part of the 
country has gained power by winning financial independence through revenues from well 
developed non-state sectors; and it also now has incentives to discipline its own financial 
management and act against control from Beijing, although the centre has also gained 
incentives through its HBCs over such localities. The decentralisation and the HBCs take 
place simultaneously between the central and local states and then between the local state and 
enterprises, displayed in paths 1, 2 and 4 in Figure 6.1. 
However, in the inland regions, any large local economic enterprises are predominantly 
SOEs, in which the property rights, especially of industries that are strategically significant, 
are still held by the centre. Here the actions of HBCs and fiscal decentralisation have taken 
place directly between the central state and the SOEs, bypassing the provincial government 
(path 3 in Figure 6.1). As a result, not only are there difficulties in generating enough income 
for the regions where local revenues are entirely dependent on those enterprises, but also 
their local governments gain no actual power from the development of the enterprises seen as 
a financial independence and autonomy and ,therefore are not empowered to act like their 
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coastal counterparts. Consequently their competence in making decisions about steering local 
economic development is limited. Without efforts made by local actors, a local economy 
cannot achieve its best, according to Hayek (1945). Instead there are perverse incentives for 
the central government to use soft budget constraints (SBCs) to bailout poor regional 
economies and to ignore or excuse the poor performance of local governments. 
These SBCs, as described by Komai, mark out a major problem in socialist economies 
because they are seen as causing shortages for the entire society. SBCs take place when the 
central government, for political reasons, protects enterprises or low levels of public 
administration from their financial failures, based on the principle of a trade-off between 
political consequences and economic costs. As a result, these enterprises indulge in state 
financial protection and thus continually perform badly and don 't develop proper financial 
discipline. China's partial and gradual economic transition, without a parallel political 
institutional reform, has been criticized by Komai (1990, 2000) as continually laying the 
ground for the occurrence of SBCs, which in his view will therefore hold back the economic 
transition. In general terms, the problem is also identified by North (1990) as a failure of the 
state's credible commitment to markets. 
The SBC syndrome is very relevant when considering China's financially deficient western 
provinces, which are dominated by large SOEs but also have complicated societies with 
multiple ethnicities present. The capability of these regions ' governments to manage their 
local economic growth is restricted, not entirely because of a low competence of the 
institutions of government, but because of lack of institutional incentives to release the talent 
of the local state as a result of the partial nature of reform. 
Qian and Weingast (1997) have suggested that a solution for the tension between the 
commitments of the government to produce public goods and also to preserve market 
incentives is to apply a decentralisation from the centre to the locality. They argued that 
government, in order to preserve these market incentives, needs, on the one side, not to 
extract too much wealth from the locality and, on the other side, to punish economic failure. 
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The former, according to North (1990), is the problem of "state predation" and the latter is 
the problem of Komai's SBCs. 
This chapter borrows Qian's and Roland's (1998) three-layer framework in order to argue 
that China's partial reform leaves the central government continuing to hold the ownership of 
the profitable enterprises of Xinjiang, thus strangling market forces but also encouraging the 
draining of wealth and resources to from the region. It leads to SBCs and "state predation" 
operating both at the same time. As a result, the locality has lost initiatives and the local 
government has "no incentive to take risks and make efforts", leading to a vicious circle of 
inefficient local government and poor future prospects. 
6.1 Xinjiang's Financial Performance in China's Fiscal Reform 
6.1.1 Xinjiang's Financial Performance before the Reform 
Before 1980, China's fiscal system could be characterised as having been centralised, in line 
with the centralised banking and investment systems of the centralised planning politico-
economic system. There was centralised revenue collection or centralised fiscal transfer. That 
is, all taxes or profits were remitted to the central government and then transferred back to 
the provinces according to expenditure needs approved by the centre, sometimes called 
"eating in one kitchen" (yi zhao chi/an). 
The establishment of such a system, understood as the state's fiscal management and 
budgeting process and therefore a key, integral part of China's command economic 
institution, enabled the centre to achieve a balanced development and to distribute and 
channel national resources to targeted regions. 
In this period, despite adjustments made following a few economic crises, the major features 
of the fiscal system were as follows (Oksenberg and Tong, 1991; Ma, 1997; Dai, 1999; Li, 
2000; Wei, 2000b; Li and Vie, 2001): 
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1) All local revenues were remitted to the centre. 
2) All local expenditures were distributed by the centre. 
3) There was no correspondence between revenues and expenditures. 
The relations between central and local governments may be seen in the implementation of 
the system: the centre could either restrict or increase provincial power by tying provincial 
spending to arranged expenditures or by providing incentives to provinces from the extra-
budgetary funds or from setting revenue-sharing rates specialised to particular regions, 
according to its own interests. 
The problems that resulted from this system may be summarised as follows: 
1) The national stability and regionally equalised development were administratively 
"manipulated" through the centre using the centralised fiscal system. All resources and 
investments were transferred horizontally from region to region and vertically from 
sector to sector without concern being given to locality and market rules and without 
well-coordinated adjustment systems, and, as a result, the regional economies were 
subordinated to national events. Consequently, the !ocal government's power to direct 
regional productive factors and economic growth was seriously undermined. 
2) Much of the revenue transferred was wasted in inefficient projects or in ineffectively 
generating economic growth in budget-deficit provinces at the expense of budget-surplus 
provinces in which the necessary funds for regional economic growth were lacking. 
From 1950 to the eve of the reform, Xinjiang' s financial administration was the same as 
other provinces under the centralised control of financial institutions, though, in considering 
its historic underdevelopment, multi-minority population and political autonomy, Beijing had 
granted not only considerable financial autonomy to the region, so that Xinjiang' s 
autonomous government could retain all financial revenues except for the custom tax, salt tax 
and incomes from all SOEs, but also an institution of financial subsidization specifically 
designed for economically-lagging minority regions like Xinjiang and Tibet, etc., with the 
aim of generating fast economic growth in those regions. It was seen that, although the centre 
227 
detennined Xinjiang's budgetary expenditures and retained the budgetary surplus, the centre 
also covered its fmancial deficits. Moreover, with regard to minority regions' inheritance of 
historical economic underdevelopment, in 1955 the centre set up a special fund, a form of 
institutionalized subsidy, for these regions. It was indicated in "the instruction of the State 
Council (SC) on the draft of state budget of 1956" that there would be an extra fund set at 2-3 
per cent of provincial expenditures in a budget for each region and province, and 4 per cent 
for Xinjiang and Tibet. In 1963 the SC again granted a new preferential policy in "the draft 
of improving minority regions' financial administration", in which Xinjiang and other 
minority regions could retain all revenues and budgetary surpluses, receive extra funds 2 per 
cent higher than other provinces, and extra mobile funds as 5 per cent of budgetary 
administration fees. They also received extra subsidies from the state and tax exemptions or 
reductions in tax payments for local minority enterprises. Despite the destruction caused by 
the Cultural Revolution (eR) in the period 1965-1977 and its resultant chaos in China's 
financial administration, Xinjiang and Tibet remained on this state financial lifeline and 
enjoyed large fund transfers by the state to subsidize fully their financial management 
without worrying about budgetary constraints. 
Under this institutionalized subsidy, Xinjiang' s finances have operated with increasing 
deficits but with no proper system to discipline her financial behaviour. Although the 
province achieved large revenue increases in the first decade of communism, rising from 
22.18 million yuan in 1950 to 633.12 million yuan in 1960, an annual rate of increase of 42 
per cent; however, as a result of massive infrastructures and industries constructed to 
improve the local economy, expenditure also rose, from 66.96 million yuan in 1950 (leaving 
a deficit of over 40 million yuan) to 958.37 million yuan in 1960 (a deficit of over 300 
million yuan), an annual rate of increase of 38.4 per cent. From 1962 to 1978 there was a 
continuous economic recession in the CR, during which financial revenues increased only 
modestly at a growth rate of 16 per cent annually. In detail, in 1961 and 1962 revenues 
declined by 46 per cent and 18 per cent, followed by 36 per cent annually during the first 
three years of the CR. From 1972 to 1975, the rate of decline was 39 per cent annually, 
affected by the Third Front Programme (TFP), although in the same period expenditure 
continued to grow at 11.7 per cent annually (Figure 6.2). So, even in the 1950s, Xinjiang' s 
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of the minority regions, supports our idea that it was a combination of the financial institution 
and preferential policies that gave rise to the incapability and slackness of these governments 
in managing local economic growth. 
On top of this, the central state also extracted any surplus revenue and left the local state with 
no incentives and no real financial power. Even the growth of the 1950s was manipulated by 
Beijing and "transactions were not entirely one-way" (Lo, 1961: p.95). According to Lo's 
research (1961), in 1959 Seypidin complained in his report on )(jnjiang's achievements, that 
Beijing had only returned 20 per cent of the taxes paid by Xinjiang's SOEs. This is viewed 
by the Uyghurs not only as a drain of their wealth achieved from their own sources but also a 
means of faking the autonomy promised to them in terms of financial self administration. 
This wealth extraction, labelled by North as a problem of "central predation", along with 
Beijing's subsidies created a "self-contradictory" double effect in the local politics of inertia 
and dependence. 
6.1.2 Xinjiang's Financial Behaviour after the Reform 
After 1978, a series of changes in fiscal and financial administration took place, especially 
during 1980-1984, echoing the national economic reform of 1978. Based on preliminary 
experiments of adjusting total remittances to the centre, by revenue sharing between 
particular provinces and the centre, a nationwide reform of fiscal policies and systems 
resulted in the decentralisation of revenue and expenditure responsibilities in a revenue 
sharing system. That is, the centre and provinces could share increased revenues, and the 
provinces could decide their own expenditures, which were to some extent linked to 
revenues. "Eating in separate kitchens" ifeng zhao zhi) 79 was the term used to describe the 
character of this new system. 
The essential elements of the new fiscal system were as follows: 
1) The revenue sources were divided into three sorts: state-fixed revenue from the state-
owned enterprises that were levied by the centre; local-fixed revenue levied locally; 
79 The tenn was, after it first appeared in China's newspapers, broadly used in all research books or articles to 
mark this specific refonn. 
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and shared revenue that would be shared between the centre and localities according 
to agreed rules. The shared revenue referred to the income of local enterprises that 
were directly administered by the Se. 80 The provinces could retain increased profits 
mainly from the third revenue source at a four-or five-year fixed rate. 
2) The expenditures were classified into central and provincial. The localities could 
decide their expenditures according to budgets. 
In addition, official government budgets appeared in two forms: budget and extra-budget 
(Wei, 2000b; Wang and Hu, 2001). The difference between budgetary and extra-budgetary 
revenues is that the former is collected by the Ministry of Finance but the latter is collected 
by government departments as fees. The establishment of China's special "extra-budget" has 
an aim of providing a small flexible fund outside budgets for localities and enterprises, and 
their origins can be tracked down to the early days of communist China. Over the decades 
extra-budgetary funds have expended gradually, generated by several types of fiscal power 
decentralization (Wang and Hu, 2001). Logically, extra-budgetary expenditures should be 
accounted for in the centre's total expenditure (Zhang and Zhou, 1997). The extra-budgetary 
revenue consists of three components: income managed by local government; fees collected 
by the largely non-economic units of government; and retained earnings shared between 
firms and their supervisory agencies. These extra-budgetary revenues are used to finance 
road and building maintenance, education and scientific research, etc .. Apart from the official 
budget, there is an off-budgetary revenue and expenditure that is decided by government 
units, particularly at township and village levels of government, without the authorization of 
the central or provincial level governments (Ma 1997). 
The new fiscal system was implemented accordingly: 
1) Guangdong and Fujian were permitted a fixed sum remitted to or retained from the 
centre for five or four years, retained large savings from expenditures that thereby 
increasing revenues and enjoyed great fiscal autonomy. 
80 Before 1980 China 's se directly controlled enterprises took up a small portion (3%) of the total 83,000 
public industrial enterprises, compared with other socialist countries (Wong, I 986b). 
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2) All minority autonomous regions received large transfers from the centre, apart from 
retaining most sums collected locally as well as increased revenues. 
3) An other provinces shared revenue with the centre at varied rates specific to each 
province. However, shared and fixed rates were determined by the centre. 
4) As a result, approximately 80 per cent of the shared revenues were remitted to the 
centre and 20 per cent retained in the localities. 
The new fiscal reform decentralised financial power and generated local enthusiasm to some 
~xtent. Thus Guangdong gained great financial incentives for generating economic growth 
undet: the new system including a new fiscal policy especially preferable to her. However, 
central revenue was declining and some rich regions, such as Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin 
still remitted a large portion of local revenues, and they were major sources of central 
revenue (Table 6.1) (Li, 2000). As a result, the centre suffered a deficit in collecting revenues 
and provided incentives that weren't shared fairly across the country. 
So in 1988, along with the deepening of China's transition to a "socialist market economy", 
the third new reform of the fiscal system was launched and the new fiscal systems were 
classified as six types (Ma, 1997; Wei, 2000b; Li, Yie and Wang, 2001): 
1) Increasing revenue sharing at a certain growth rate (10 localities including Zhejiang 
province) (shou ru di zeng baG gan). 
2) Fixed quota remittance without an annual adjustment (three provinces including 
Shanghai, Shandong) (ding e shangjie). 
3) Fixed quota remittance with growth adjustment (three provinces including 
Guangdong) (shangjie e di zeng baG gait). 
4) Fixed rate of revenue remittance but rates vary from region to region (three 
provinces) (ding efeng chen). 
5) Fixed rates of revenue remittance with growth adjustment (three localities including 
Beijing) (ding efeng chenjia zeng zhangfeng chen). 
6) Fixed central subsidies (ten mainly minority provinces including Xinjiang) (ding e bu 
zhu). 
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Table 6.1 Revenue-Sharing Rates of China's Provincial Units 1980-1983 (%, biUion yuan) 
Province Arrangement 1980 198 1 1982 1983 
Bei jing SOR +28.1 +26.95 +35.49 n.a. 
Tianiin SOR +30.6 +31.07 +34.92 n.a. 
Shanghai SOR +8.6 +8.46 + 10.5 1 n.a. 
Hebei OR +27.2 +27.2 
SOR +67.5 +63.5 
Shanxi OR +57.9 +57.9 +75.4 
SOR +82.6 
Liaoning SOR +30.1 +30.0 +30.0 +34.2 
Jiangsu SOR +39.0 +37.0 +38.0 +35.7 
Zhejiang OR + 13.0 + 13.0 
SOR +56.0 +5 1.8 
Anhui DR +58.1 +58.1 
SOR +77.0 +76.15 
Sbandong OR + 10.0 
SOR +48.9 +48.9 +51.5 
Henan OR +75.4 +75.4 
SOR +82.0 +77.8 
Hubei OR +44.7 +44.7 
SOR +69.0 +63.8 
Hunan OR +42.0 +42.0 
SOR +75 .0 +70.3 
Sichuan OR +72.0 +72.0 
SOR +85 .0 +83.7 
Shannxi DR +88.1 +88 .1 
SOR + 100.0 + 100.0 
Gansu OR +53.2 +53.2 
SOR +80.0 
MS -1 69 
Guangdong Lump-sum + 10.0 + 10.0 + 10.0 +9.76 
payment* 
Fujian Lump-sum subsidy* -1.5 -1.5 - 1.5 -0.63 
Jilin ORS -3 .0 -3.0 -3 .0 -2.34 
Hei longjiang ORS -8.87 -8.87 -8.87 -9.00 
Jiangxi DRS -1.38 - 1.38 -1.38 -1.50 
inner Mongolia ORS -11.68 -12.86 -14.14 - 13.83 
Guangxi MS -2 .97 -3.27 -3.59 -3.08 
Guizbou MS -5.26 -5.78 -6.36 -5.97 
Yunnan MS -3.30 -4.77 -5.25 -4.48 
Tibet MS -4.96 -5.46 -6.01 -5.81 
Qingbai MS -4.02 -4.42 -4.86 -4.52 
ingxia MS -3.0 -3.3 -3 .63 -3.55 
Xinjiang MS -8.95 -9.84 -10.83 -11.2 1 
(Notes: SOR: sharing overall revenue 
DR: dividing revenue refers to local sharing income 
*: Guangdong and Fujian remitted or received a flXed sum to or from the centre 
DRS: receiving subsidies in the dividing revenue arrangement 
MS: receiving subsidies with various rates of funds from the centre 
Gansu: changed from a remitting to receiving fund province in 1983 
Source: Oksenberg and Tong. 1991) 
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Since economic power was decentralised to the locality, the varying capability oflocal 
government in conducting regional economic growth accounts for their balancing or 
otherwise of their financial budgets and the generation oflocal funds. Some, especially those 
on the coast, have managed to generate significantly greater revenues from their locality-
based enterprises, such as TVEs, while others went to great lengths to negotiate with the 
centre over the rate of revenue remittance for their locality, which made, like before, the 
implementation of the new fiscal system inconsistent with the plan and distorted from the 
original expectations. These rates or sums of remittance or retention varied from region to 
region according to the effectiveness of the locality in lobbying the centre (Ma, 1997; Dai, 
1999). As long as the negotiated remittance quota was met, localities could retain as much 
revenue as possible, by creating different unofficial local rules to exempt the tax from the 
centre. The same phenomenon also applied to all types of enterprise that were taxed at 
different rates based on the fonn of ownership. The enterprises eagerly negotiated with their 
line ministries for the lowest remittance instead of making efforts in productivity 
improvement (Ma, 1997). Wang and Hu (2001) have pointed out that it was also the centre 
that held the major responsibility for allowing tax exemptions by means of a series of 
preferential policies for particular regions. China has long been suffering budgetary deficits 
since Mao' s era, but now the centre has greater difficulty in collecting budgetary revenues 
from localities to meet its own deficits, not to mention the difficulties in the extra-budgetary 
control. 
In the past whatever budgetary or extra-budgetary revenues went through the centre would 
then be transferred to the key regions, but now the drastic increase and retention of extra-
budgetary revenues in the hands of local government, especially in coastal regions, has 
stimulated extra-budgetary expenditure that is not authorized by the centre, not to mention 
that off-budgetary revenue and expenditure has increased too and is completely out of reach 
of the centre. As mentioned by Wang and Hu (2001) and Wei (2000b), the more the centre 
tries to control extra-budgets, the more the localities levy fees from somewhere for local 
development. A fight for fiscal power sharing between localities and the centre is always 
accompanied by the expansion of extra-budgetary funds. 
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By 1991 the amounts of extra-budgetary revenue and expenditure almost matched those of 
the official budget. The coastal regions were capable of generating more extra-budgetary 
funds and benefited greatly (Wei, 2000b). As a result of this fiscal chaos, the centre-province 
relationship was viewed as a weakening of the central control of the budgeting process and 
revenue sharing, while the rich provinces were increasing their own budgetary authority and 
fiscal autonomy. The latter has provided great incentives for local actors to eliminate any 
bureaucratic slackness and pursue maximum economic growth. 
The struggle for extra-or budgetary funds was only partly between the centre and these rich 
regions. One consequence was that poor regions suffered a decline of fund recruiting 
capacity. The large SOEs located in their territories were still in the ownership of the central 
state, so these could not be cash cows for the localities. Moreover transfers of funds from 
Beijing were reduced in real terms as a consequence of the decline in central revenue 
collection, again making matters even worse - in effect a hidden resource flow eastwards. 
Poor regions were receiving transferred resources from the centre through "quota subsidies, 
grants, income subsidies and other welfare" (Wei, 2000b: p.67), while the price distortions81 
were channelling a net flow of resources and raw materials to the east (Zhou, 2000; Wei, 
2000b). The poor provinces not only had no resources seen as extra-budgetary and even 
budgetary funds to participate in the fight for fmancial autonomy but also remained 
dependent on the central revenue transfers more than ever before, thereby reinforcing their 
lack of fiscal autonomy and their poor management of economic growth. Overall, the 
incentives provided to the localities by the centre generated an unfair economic boom in 
some regions, and this was followed by overheating nationwide of investments and sharply 
soaring inflation and budget deficits. Declining central fiscal controls and declining 
government revenues (30 per cent in 1978 down to 14.5 per cent in 1993)82 troubled the 
centre in consideration of rising political and economic instability (Ma, 1997). 
81 By using state fixed price in the period of socialist planning economy, the Chinese centre efficiently 
distributed energy resource and industrial raw materials including staple agricultural goods to the coastal area 
where major manufacturing industries located (Table 6.2). The fixed price "tended to underprice energy and 
raw materials and overprice manufactured goods" (Yang" 1997: p.62-63). This is socalled "price distortion" or 
~rrice scissors". .,. . . 
Reports on China' s economic transition and economIc poltcles by Chma EconomIC Research Centre of 
Beijing University, Ed. (200 I). 
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Table 6.2 Agricultural Product Prices ControUed by the State Council 
Product Prices Number ofltems Items 
Official price set 17 Rice, wheat, corn, soybeans, peanuts (& oil), rapeseed (& 
by the State oil), cottonseed (& oil), sesame (& oil), sunflower (& oil), 
cotton, tobacco, sugarcane, sugar beet, cocoons, brick tea 
Price guideline set I1 Hogs, timbers, wool , jute, bluish dogbane, tea leaves, rosin, 
by the State musk, liquorice, encomia, kalahoa (herbal medicine) 
Sale prices 
Official prices 14 Wheat flour, rice, corn, soybeans, soybean oil, peanut oil, 
established by the rapeseed oil, sesame oil, tea tree seed oil, sunflower oil , 
State cotton, lumber, soybean waste 
Price guideline 4 Pork, tea leaves, lumber, musk 
established by the 
State 
Ex-factory 6 Logs, fire logs, lumber, plywood, rosin 
prices83 
established by the 
state 
(Notes: I . In March 1979, purchase pnces were raIsed for eIghteen agncultural products by 20% including grain 
and cotton. 
2. In November 1979 retail prices for eight supplementary food products including pork, beef, eggs, vegetables 
and milk. were increased by and average of 20%. At the same time, workers were given allowances to offset 
these price increases. 
3. In 1979 ex-factory prices were raised for some heavy industrial products. For example, coal rose 30.5%, pig 
iron 33.0%, and rolled steel 20%. 
4. In 1981 synthetic fabric prices were lowered and liquor and tobacco prices were raised. In 1981 price for 
textile products were completely adjusted; synthetic prices were lowered, and cotton fabric price were raised. 
5. In 1984 freight rates for railway and water transport were raised. 
Sources: author, compiled from National Statistical Bureau (NSB): China Price Yearbook 1990; Yabuki, /995) 
During the first round of fiscal refonns in 1980-1987, state subsidies, in particular to China' s 
minority regions, were changed to allocate the fixed quota subsidy by establishing an initial 
fund based on the deficit made by each province in the base year, and then subsides were 
increased by 10 per cent each year afterwards until 1987. This replaced the traditional 
practice of paying for any size of deficit made in a year (Table 6.3). By 1987, over 38 years 
the state had invested in or subsidized Xinjiang to a grand total of 38.08 billion yuan, a sum 
equal to 268.8 per cent of its total revenues. Then from 1988 to 1994, the annual increase of 
10 per cent was abolished and each year the state only subsidized Xinjiang and other 
minority regions by fixed sums based on the financial deficit in 1988. To regions that needed 
more financial subsidies the state allocated extra but only via specific funds, such as the 
Frontier Construction Fund. Beijing, via these fiscal refonns, attempted to reduce its 
83 "Ex-factory" price refers to the price of products that have left the factory but not yet enter the distribution 
system, so the prices do not include a wholesale makeup (Yabuki , 1995). 
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subsidies to the minority regions, hoping to enhance local financial self-reliance and 
discipline their financial behaviour. 
Table 6.3 Five Autonomous Regions Receiving Gradually Increasing Subsidies from Beijing 
Region 1985 Annually 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Inner Mongolia 17.83 19.61 21 .57 23.72 26.10 
Xinjiang 14.50 15.95 17.54 19.30 21 .23 
Tibet 7.50 10% increasing 8.25 9.07 9.98 10.98 
Guangxi 7.16 7.87 8.66 9.53 10.48 
Ningxia 4.94 • 5.43 5.98 6.57 7.23 
Yunnan 6.37 6.97 7.67 8.44 9.28 
Guizhou 7.34 8.17 8.99 9.89 10.88 
Qinghai 6.11 6.72 7.39 8.13 8.94 
(Source: compiledfrom Yabuki, /995) 
The consequences of the two refonns came out as quite the opposite of the expectations of 
the state with regard to the poor regions. First, the refonn meant further difficulties for 
Xinjiang, which had been troubled by financial deficits since 1950 and was not yet ready to 
eliminate them by its own efforts. Xinjiang's fiscal revenues from 1979 to 1994 continually 
increased at a rate of 19 per cent annually but, at the same time, expenditures were increasing 
too at a rate of 9 per cent annually (Figure 6.4). Simply judged from the two lines in figure 
6.4, we can see increasing trends in both, but the rate of increase for expenditure is far greater 
than that of revenue. As we mentioned before, at the beginning of the refonn Xinjiang' s 
financial deficit was already 987.53 million yuan and the amount of expenditure had reached 
more than three times that of revenue. Now the deficits were getting larger and larger. The 
increasing financial revenues simply could not cover them (Figure 6.5). 
Because of the two reforms of state subsidies to the lagging regions before 1994, changing 
from total deficit subsidies to fixed quota subsides and then to fixed sum subsidies, Xinjiang 
received much less subsidy than before. For example in the three years after the abolition of 
the lO per cent increasing fund, Xinjiang lost 2 billion yuan of subsidy. Before 1978, these 
subsidies were sufficient to clear the annual deficit and leave an average of 22.21 million 
yuan per year for the region, but from 1978 to 1993 there was only 12.11 million yuan 
annually to retain and in some years there was none left or even a shortfall (Figures 6.6, 6.7, 
6.8). 
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but on how much subsidy the region would get from the state. In this thesis I suggest that 
China's partial reform is the cause of this rigidity of the fiscal reform and its invalidity for 
the poor regions. 
Table 6.4 The Perceotages of Xiojiang's Financial Expenditures on 000- and Production 
Total Financial (%) 
Expenditures Ofwbicb: 
(million yuan) Basic Enterprise Liquid Capital Non-productive, 
Construction Reproduction Fund for Administrative Overheads 
Production 
1949-53 17.661 4.1 I 
- - 94.16 
1st FYP 94.936 33.57 - 4.87 56.30 
2nd FYP 271.063 50.34 
- 6.62 38.49 
1963-65 116.068 36.36 - 4.85 51.84 
3rd FYP 217.813 47.45 
- 6.44 44.87 
4th FYP 397.709 39.37 1.77 9.50 41.05 
5th FYP 710.196 31.41 4.85 4.26 49.24 
6th FYP 994.194 16.08 4.87 1.14 71.38 
1986 351.154 14.79 3.5 - 71.17 
1987 336.877 15.14 3.13 - 72.30 
(Source: Jm and L,U, (eds.) J 990) 
Second, partial reform meant that the state SOEs in these poor regions went unreformed and 
remained in the ownership of their respective Ministries. Large revenues from the revenue-
productive SOEs go directly to the state instead of the localities. Along with this, most SOEs 
were still operating in a socialist system incapable of fitting into a market-led economic 
transition, thereby producing no efficiency gains but losing profits. The economy of the poor 
frontier regions has continued to be dominated by these state-owned, resource-based 
industries and yet local governments were deprived of the opportunity to use them to raise 
revenue. Therefore the frustration has continued, due to the unfinished institutional reforms, 
with state subsidises the inevitable counterpoint through various funds targeting lagging 
regions and through reduced or no interest bank loans (Figures 6.9, 6.10). The SBe and 
"predation" syndromes therefore were continually having their double effect. Such fiscal 
reform within China's partial reform, without defining property rights for the region, have 
only produced further failure in the poor regions, supporting the argument of the chapter and 
the thesis. 
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Figure 6.9 State Subsidies 1979-1993 
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(Source: author, based on the data of XSB: Xinjiang 's Glorious Fifty Years, /999b) 
Figure 6.10 Tbe Composition of Xinjiang's Financial Revenues from tbe Locality and tbe State's 
Subsidies 1990-2001 
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In 1994, the last major fiscal reform took shape after experiments in nine regions, including 
Xinjiang. This new fiscal system was characterised as rule-based instead of negotiation-
based, and stands as a remarkably different initiative from the previous ones, in trying to 
legalise the fiscal responsibilities of both the centre and the provinces. This was done by 
defining taxes as central local or shared, and by establishing tax-collecting agencies at all 
levels of government to monitor the implementation of the system. It also introduced uniform 
taxes with fixed rates applied to all enterprises and persons regardless of their ownership and 
nationality. The reform intends to detach the fiscal and budgetary authorities of enterprises 
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and national production sections from the interventions of all levels of government, and aims 
both at strengthening the power of the centre to resist the tactical manoeuvres of the 
localities, such as discretion bargaining on shared revenues, and in motivating the localities 
to rely increasingly upon their own resources. The major features of the fiscal system are as 
follows. 
1) Taxes are divided into three types: state, local and shared. In general, enterprises will 
remit 33 per cent of revenue as Income Tax to their administrative governments, for 
example a state or local company will submit income tax directly to its respective 
supervisory government, and then remit 17 per cent as V AT to both the state and 
locality with a fixed division of75 per cent to the state, 25 per cent to the locality; 
and finally 3 per cent in other taxes, such as Infrastructure Tax, Birth Planning Tax, 
etc. to its local government. Taxes collected by centre and localities are displayed in 
Table 6.5. 
2) Expenditures are divided into two types: state and local. The state will pay for 
military forces and national security, diplomatic affairs, key construction projects 
such as the Three Gorges Dam, and the foreign or domestic debts and maintenance 
costs of the central government. The provinces will pay for their local governmental 
spending, investments and debt sponsored locally and local production, infrastructure 
construction and social affairs, etc .. 
3) All tax rates are still determined by the centre, as before. 
Although the last major reform in 1994 clearly defined the balance of fiscal responsibilities 
between localities and centre, there are still a few issues to be considered (Ma, 1997; Dai, 
1999)84: 
1) China needs to legalise the fiscal responsibility and tax duty further through national 
legislation instead of governmental intervention, which will enhance the 
implementation of the fiscal system across the country. 
84 A new roood of fiscal refonn is proposed that aims to improve unbalanced regional development, especially 
by re-structuring the traditional heavy industrial regions: NE China. 
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Table 6_5 Taxes Collected by the Centre and Localities 
Taxes 
State~wned en.terprises (SOEs) Income Tax 
Railway, banks and insurance 
companies and those fmancial 
institutes 
A 11 enterprises and persons 
A 11 enterprises and persons 
All enterprises and persons 
Locality-based SOEs 
VAT 
Others including Infrastructure 
Tax 
TumoverTax 
VAT 
Others including Infrastructure 
Tax 
Customs Duties 
Consumption Tax 
Consumption Tax on items as: 
Cigarettes, Liquor, and gasoline 
Income Tax 
VAT 
Others including Infrastructure 
Tax 
Business Tax 
State Collection 
33% 
17%-75% 17% -25% 
3% 
33% 
17%-75% 17% - 25% 
3% 
17% 
17% or 13% 
33% 
17% - 75% 17% - 25% 
3% 
3-5% 
Local Collection 
Local or state~wned 
enterprises (excluding railway, 
bank, etc.) 
and 5-20% applied to highly profited 
entertainments 
Person 
Local or state~wned 
enterprises 
Local or state~wned 
enterprises applied only to 
Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Personal Income Tax 
Natural Resource Tax 
Others as : 
Cultivated Land Occupation Tax 
Urban Land Using Tax 
Land Value Increasing Tax 
Fix Capital Investment 
Adjustment Tax 
Vehicle Tax 
Property Tax 
Agricultural Tax 
AgricuhUnlI Special Products 
Tax 
Husbandry Slaughter Tax 
Securities trading tax in the form 
of.stamp duty 
(Tax on Ocean Oil remitted 
to state) 
3-5% - 88% 
5-45% according to salary 
15-1 8% varied regionally 
3-5% 
3-5% 
3-5% 
3-5% 
3-5% 
5% 
3% 
3-5% 
3-5% 
3-5% - 12% 
(Note: Red coloured text refers the taxes collected by localities. . . . 
Sources: author. based Off interviews. 2003 and books by Ma. 1997; Doi. 1999; Fang and Li. 2001; Xie. 2001. NS8: Chma StatistICS 
Yearbooks. 1994-2(01) 
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2) A consolidated public sector accounting system should be set up to include 
budgetary, extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues and expenditures in order to 
conduct macroeconomic control effectively (Ma, 1997). 
3) The division of the two expenditure streams needs to be further defined, as there is an 
overlap of the local and the central state's responsibilities, generating new rounds of 
resource bargaining between them.85 
4) Local protection agencies and local tax rate- or policy-making agencies within local 
government should be established and legalised, in order to protect local interests and 
adjust local tax rates to reality. 
The 1994 fiscal refonn tried to clarify legally the responsibilities of revenue collection and 
tax remittance between the state and localities, with the aim of reining back the increasing 
gap between the coast and interior and institutionalising the fiscal decentralisation. The 
refonn is regarded as significant, but perversely it has trapped poor regions like Xinjiang 
continually into a financial downward spiral, as the fundamental problem, seen initially as 
property rights in these regions, are still not defined and therefore the state's ownership of 
key enterprises in China's poor regions remains. In the regions reliant on large SOEs, under 
the new fiscal system, income tax plus 75 per cent of VAT paid by the SOEs will be 
legalised to go directly to the state, while only 25 per cent of V AT is left for the localities. By 
contrast, after meeting their tax responsibilities, rich regions now are allowed to gain more 
financial autonomy by legally retaining their surplus revenues and taxes from the locality-
based productive economic units. 
In 2001 , Xinjiang's total financial revenue was 29.17 billion yuan, of which 32.6 per cent 
was local budgetary revenue, 63.0 per cent from state subsidies, and 4.4 per cent from last 
year's liabilities. On examining Xinjiang's economic institutes, there are too few profitable 
TVEs and agricultural enterprises to produce a substantial and sustainable revenue for the 
local finances and, even if the local SOEs such as the Xinjiang China Petroleum Corporation 
(XCPC) are productive, they will benefit the central state more than the locality (the point 
85 Starting in 2000, a new experiment of budget control in some g?vem~ental sectio~s aims a~ further cle~ng 
the fiscal responsibility of an levels of governmental and economIC secttonaI expenditure (Chma Econo1lllc 
Research Centre of Beijing University, (Ed.) 200 I). 
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will be discussed later on) through their legally-required submission of most income to 
Beijing - North's predation. As a result, the region's budgetary deficits remain and get worse 
as a result of "legal" creaming off by the state, and negotiating power afforded to the local 
actor by the new fiscal system is reduced. 
Xinjiang' s rate of financial self-reliance has reached only 45 per cent on average since the 
reform (Table 6.6), by comparison with 75-100 per cent for other provinces (Table 6.7). 
However, Xinjiang and a few other minority regions, such as Tibet, can never expect do as 
well as their counterparts. In 1994 alone, the 85 sub-regions above the township level in 
Xinjiang only achieved on average a 45 .55 per cent (61.9 per cent after tax reimbursements) 
financial self reliance. Only 23 out of the 85 reached 50 per cent, 18 were between 30 per 
cent and 50 per cent, while 44, over half, did not achieve even 30 per cent of financial self-
support. 75 out of 85 cities and towns have had financial deficits totalling 0.91 billion yuan. 
25 towns in the 'poverty' category by national standards achieved 19.75 per cent of financial 
self-reliance. 32 out of 33 frontier towns had financial deficits totalling 0.36 billion yuan. 
Table 6.6 Xinjiang's Financial Revenues and Expenditures Index 1990-2001 
Year Revenues Expenditures Balance Rate of Increase (%) Financial Self-Support Rate 
(million yuan) (million yuan) (million yuan) Income Expenditure (%) 
1990 2178 4781 -2604 12.69 14.19 45.55 
1991 2647 5253 -2607 21.54 9.87 50.38 
1992 2607 5609 -3001 -1.49 6.77 46.48 
1993 3513 6471 -2958 34.75 15.36 54.29 
1994 2870 7110 -4240 -18.32 9.87 40.37 
1995 3828 9640 -5812 33.39 35.59 39.71 
1996 4831 11489 -6658 26.19 19.18 42.05 
1997 5761 12682 -692 1 19.27 10.39 45.43 
1998 6657 14738 -8081 15.53 16.21 45.17 
1999 7444 16911 -9467 11 .83 14.75 44.02 
2000 9550 20545 -10995 28.29 21.49 46.48 
2001 11575 28181 -16606 21.2 1 37.1 7 41 .07 
(Source: author, fieldwork. 2003) 
Although, in order to generate more local financial incentives, the state compensates the 
locality by allocating "tax reimbursements" after completing the collection of all taxes, this 
policy again benefits the rich regions most and doesn' t solve the basic problems of the poor 
regions. The amount of the "tax reimbursements" allocated to the regions is based on the 
initial sum they received in 1993, with added annual adjustments. The rate of increase is 0.3 
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out of the 1 per cent extra conswnption tax and VAT submitted by the locality, which means, 
when the total amount of the two taxes remitted by a region to the centre increases by 1 per 
cent, then the increasing amount of ''tax reimbursements" received in return by the region 
will be 0.3 per cent of that sum. This greatly benefits the rich regions, whose turnover of tax 
is greater and the reimbursements are therefore also large in absolute terms, and it does 
nothing to narrow the gap between the rich and poor regions either. 
Table 6.7 Provincial Variations in Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures (billion yuan) 1990 
Revenue Expenditure Ratio=ElR Self-Support Rate 
(%) 
Eastern Region 119.60 111.28 93.0 1.07 
Shanghai 15.77 7.57 48.0 2.08 
Beijing 7.62 6.87 90.3 1.11 
Tianjin 12.93 12.22 94.6 1.06 
Liaoning 16.15 15.15 93.8 1.06 
Hebei 8.12 8.73 107.6 93.0 
Shandong 10.91 12.39 113.5 88.1 
Jiangsu 13.63 10.10 74.1 1.35 
Zbejiang 10.16 8.02 79.0 1.27 
Fujian 5.71 6.85 120.0 83.4 
Guangdong 13.10 15.07 115.0 86.9 
Hainan 0.74 1.74 235.7 42.5 
Guangxi 4.76 6.58 138.1 72.3 
Central Region 56.25 66.83 118.8 84.2 
Sharuci 5.38 5.69 105.9 94.6 
Inner Mongolia 3.30 6.09 184.7 54.2 
Jilin 5.07 7.17 141.4 70.7 
Heilongjiang 7.66 9.27 121.1 82.6 
Anhui 5.45 6.16 113.0 88.5 
Jiangxi 4.06 5.08 125.0 79.9 
Hen an 8.60 9.19 106.9 93.6 
Hubei 9.51 9.95 104.7 95.6 
Hunan 7.24 8.24 113.8 87.9 
Western Region 34.79 47.79 137.4 72.8 
Sicbuan 11.98 14.27 119.1 84.0 
Guizbou 3.61 4.86 134.6 74.3 
Yunnan 7.74 9.08 117.2 85.2 
Tibet 0.02 1.29 7177.8 1.55 
Shannxi 4.44 5.71 128.6 77.8 
Gansu 3.42 4.59 134.3 74.5 
Qinghai 0.72 1.71 236.6 42.1 
ingxia 0.67 1.50 222.3 45.5 
Xi nji ang 2.] 8 4.78 219.6 45.6 
(Source: compiled from We" 2000b) 
The state again frequently sets up various sorts of special extra fund to assist lagging regions 
with their poor infrastructure conditions, but this time the funds involved often go directly to 
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the projects and do not pass through the coffers of the provincial governments. For example, 
in Xinjiang, two major infrastructure projects were financially handled directly by Beijing. 
They are the Taklamakan Highway, completed in 1995 and providing a transport link from 
the central of the region to south across the desert; and a railway linking Korla and Kashigar, 
completed in 1999 and extending the railway network of the region to the south. The rolling 
out of such projects and the bypassing oflocal institutions not only increases central control 
over the economic growth of a region like Xinjiang but also neglects the potentially dynamic 
role oflocal government, who know better than the centre about handling local affairs. 
Becquelin (2000) cites a local researcher, Hou Hanmin: "If we compare the situation before 
and after the reform, in 1994, the centre got its hands on more than an extra billion yuan, 
putting the province's [Xinjiang's] finances in an increasingly difficult position" (Becquelin, 
2000: p.74). 
By way of conclusion to this section, Xinjiang' s financial deficits, after experiencing a series 
of the state's fiscal reform, are worsening. This is not only because of the poor perfonnance 
of the local finances, but also because of the problems of China's institutions. No matter how 
many rational new fiscal reforms are made, they will only produce further problems in this 
SOE-dominated region, as long as the fundamental problems of undefined property rights are 
left untackled, and because the ability to complete and implement them is blocked. Without 
the generation of corporatism capability and competitive machinery, local actors will remain 
dependent and slack and it is difficult to imagine the development of lagging regions like 
Xinjiang ever being finalised. 
6.2 Provincial Financial Management 
In this section, we will examine the region s financial behaviour as shaped by the financial 
and economic institutions responsible for it. Under such institutions, whether or not they 
could develop their own strengths by triggering improvements in the productivity of local 
enterprises in order to gain more local funds and could they work out a rational financial 
budget to discipline financial behaviour and create efficient management in order to meet the 
financial targets from their own efforts? 
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6.2.1 Provincial Expenditures 
This section will examine the causes ofXinjiang's rapidly increasing expenditure and 
financial management of the provincial government in budgeting expenditures. Table 6.8 and 
Figure 6.11 show its composition since 1949. Judged from the structure, the major feature is 
that, since 1950, non-productive sectors such as governmental administration and the 
overheads of all sectors have taken up large shares of local expenditure funds and these 
shares are continually increasing. The cost of administration, for instance, took up a huge 
share - more than 70 per cent of the total (Table 6.9). 
Table 6.8 Structure of Xinjiang's Fiscal Expenditures (%) 
Periods Basic lnnovation Agricultural Transport City Education, Government Price 
Constructions Funds of Expenditures and Maintenance Health, Administrations Subsidies 
Enterprises Commercial etc., Civil 
Expenditures Services 
50-52 4.22 - 2.91 0.91 - 9.4 76.08 
1st 32.6 - 5.7 1.4 - 19.42 31 .92 
2nd 43.71 - 8.94 3.84 - 13.80 13.65 
63-65 36.39 - 11 .92 2.32 0.83 18.94 18.52 
3rt! 46..52 - 8.18 \.89 0.91 16.05 14.31 
4th 40.0 \.81 8.7 \.23 \.36 15.47 11.21 
5th 31.96 4.44 17.83 1.85 1.08 16.07 10.46 
6th 16.19 4.91 16.9 2.31 1.75 16.67 14.74 
7th 13.05 3.61 11.70 222 2.26 24.41 14.51 
8th 9.31 2.45 10.79 1.91 3.17 29.04 21.06 
9th 9.10 2.46 7.55 0.97 3.89 26.65 16.62 
(Source: author, compiledfrom the XSB: Xinjiang's Glorious Fifty Years, 1999b; Xinjiang Statistical Year 
Books, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003) 
The explanation is that, first, despite being a less populated region, Xinjiang's large area, 
multi-ethnic composition and multi-autonomous political administration, requires more 
bureaucratic administrative and social service sector support than the sparse population 
would otherwise require. Although the same discussion has been given in Chapter 5, we give 
a further example to add the point: Xinjiang' s Shabushaer Xibo Autonomous County, in the 
Di Kazak Autonomous Region, is the only political Auto-administrative division specific for 
the Xibo minority in the whole of China. According to Chinese Minority Autonomous Law, 
all media and the press must be issued in both languages, Xibo and Mandarin, in this region. 
In order to preserve the ethnic culture and customs, the county government has to spend large 
sums on newspapers and other public materials published in the Xibo language, on practices 
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7.82 
15.31 
8.74 
5.85 
Others 
6.78 
8.97 
16.06 
1\.23 
12.4 
2022 
15.72 
15.07 
12.92 
13.48 
29..57 
Since the reform, Xinjiang's expenditures on administration and social welfare have 
increased dramatically and took up as much as 50 per cent of total budgetary expenditure in 
the 8th FYP. The share of these two sectors still remains at 40 per cent right up to the present, 
in comparison with 30 per cent in rich provinces such as Guangdong (Table 6.11). The 
overall burden of administrative expenditures obviously contributes to the increasing 
budgetary deficit for this poor region, whose entire provincial financial revenue is equivalent 
to one of the richest counties in Guangdong province. As the provincial government has no 
"effective" means to increase revenues, only management of expenditure gives it any kind of 
control. 
In the province's budgetary expenditure, local productive sectors nowadays take up a lesser 
percentage but also the total is shrinking. This is due to increased spending on non-
productive sectors, causing a distortion in the provincial budget (Jin and Liu, 1990; Dai, 
1999). There used to be liquid capital fund for the use of local enterprises in budgets before 
the i h FYP (Tables 6.4, 6.9) but, since 1986, these funds have been eliminated due largely to 
the enterprise reforms, which required enterprises to seek their own capital and so reduce 
government intervention. However, traditionally the operation of the majority of Xinjiang's 
local SOEs was largely sustained by capital investment from local government. Without the 
mobile capital and other financial sponsorship of the government, these SOEs face 
bankruptcy. In Xinjiang' s provincial budget, there is now only enterprise innovation and 
basic construction left of the productive sectors receiving direct budgetary expenditure. 
Again, the expenditure on enterprise innovation has shrunk gradually since the 6th FYP. 
The share of expenditures on local basic construction has declined too, for instance, from a 
peak of 46.52 per cent in the 3rd FYP down to 9.10 per cent in the 9th FYP. Since the 1990s 
large funds from the centre have gone directly to key infrastructure projects, including the 
building of standard highways, railways and water irrigation systems, which has reduced 
local government's outlays. But the amount of basic construction funds set in the budget is 
less than sufficient for infrastructural programmes projected by local government. The long 
distances between settled areas and the harsh natural environment require large investments 
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even for a small-scale infrastructure projects. By comparison, Guangdong only deploys 13-
14 per cent of its expenditure on infrastructure and has a territory one-tenth the size of 
Xinjiang's, but the sums involved are 5,500-10,000 million yuan, 5 times the total amount of 
Xinjiang's infrastructure fund. However, as the local government have other priorities for 
their limited budgetary funds, expenditure on all productive sectors has had to be reduced. 
There has been a reduction of financial inputs to local capital-intensive economic production, 
affecting its output and the revenues and taxes of local enterprise. This trend further 
undermines the region's ability to cover its overall deficits from its own resources. 
These problems with Xinjiang's expenditure structure mark out an irrational strand in its 
local government financial administration. This is, firstly, because of the misbehaviour of the 
government in Urumqi in terms of not controlling overspending on personnel administration 
and bureaucratic overheads, although it has not yet gone as far on wasteful spending as the 
interior province of Shaanxi, which was reported to have spent 100 million yuan in 1983 on a 
single governmental office building, the most expensive in China.86 However, corruption 
plays a part, along with inefficient financial management by a highly bureaucratic and 
incompetent political organisation. According to the statistics in 1994, there were 46,819 cars 
purchased to provide specific services for various social and civil, non-production units, 
absorbing 1.87 billion yuan oflocal budgets, including the cars' maintenance. Table 6.12 
displays the basic investment in productive and non-productive sectors in different periods 
and shows the changing balance between the two. Obviously investments on governmental 
administration have a relatively large share. This poor local government is not controlling its 
unnecessary expenditures due to the lack of a monitoring system to punish the failure and 
due to the central state's protection. This is what Kornai calls paternalism. However, 
considering Xinjiang's weak economic base and its disadvantages in exploiting the 
opportunities of reform, the inefficiencies of local government plus the increased financial 
burdens are only leading to more social instability. 
Secondly, there have been many errors in the Chinese financial system, all rooted in the 
partial reform. For instance, the establishment of a multi-level autonomous administration for 
86 Fieldwork, 2003 and supportive references: Lane, 1998. 
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the region increased the levels of compulsorily budgetary expenditure without clarifying the 
financial sharing of responsibility between the centre and locality; and there were also 
requests for bureaucratic administration refonn without any funds attached. The local 
government mismanaged its budget by withdrawing production funds and transferring them 
into expenditure in non-production sectors. 
Such financial bungling was pointed out, at the end ofih FYP, by the director ofXinjiang's 
Planning Commission and the vice governor of the region in their edited book entitled 
"Studies of Xinjiang' s Economic Development Strategy Toward 2000". However, there has 
to date been no concerted effort from either Urumqi or Beijing to make the necessary 
changes. My interviews in Xinjiang with officers of various economic departments suggested 
that civil servants are obsessed with requesting more central government investment in 
Xinjiang, and that this is in their eyes is "the key" to regional economic growth. The major 
job of many directors of Xinjiang' s economic departments is to lobby their respective 
ministries for more money and to spend most of the year in Beijing. The "Western 
Development Programme (WOP)", for instance, has been seen as an opportunity to bargain 
for more funds from the centre, and the central government's view is similar, rather than 
bargaining for institutional changes by the provincial government or disciplining its financial 
behaviour. 
254 
Table 6.9 The Composition of Local Financial Expenditures 
Period Total 
Financial in which: Percentage in each Sector 
Expenditure 
10,000 yoan Expenditure on Production Expenditures on non-Production Administrative Fees Othersl7 
Total 
Basic Enterprises Supplementary Liquid Capital Fund for Agricultural Commercial & Cities Educational Govemm Price 
Infrastructure Funds Production Overheads Industrial Maintenances and Welfare ental and Subsidy 
Overheads Service Legal 
Services 
1st FYP 94939 33.57 - 4.87 56.30 -
2nd FYP 271 663 50.34 - 6.62 38.49 -
3'd FYP 217813 47.45 - 6.44 44.87 -
4th FYP 397709 39.37 1.77 9.5 41.05 -
5th FYP 719 196 31.41 4.85 4.26 49.24 -
6th FYP 994 195 16.08 4.87 1.14 71.38 -
7th FYP I 970367 12.81 3.52 - 11.7 2.22 2.26 24.42 14.51 15.31 12.92 
811• FYP 3386426 8.9 2.49 - 10.79 1.96 3.17 24.24 21 .06 8.73 13.48 
9th FYP 
1996 I 148890 7.2 2.69 - 9.65 1.42 3.61 29.70 21.39 6.65 17.57 
1997 1268218 7.2 2.15 - 8.55 1.43 3.68 26.55 20.21 5.12 25.07 
1998 I 473783 8.9 1.76 - 7.53 0.72 3.74 26.80 18.95 5.79 25 .75 
1999 I 662788 10 3.3 - 4.5 0.6 4.4 25 .0 11 - 39.79 
2000 I 909529 12 2.4 - 4.44 0.69 4.06 25.22 11 .56 - 39.71 
(Source: author, compiledfromfieldwork materials, 2003 and/rom Jin and £ill, (eds.) 1990) 
87 Including the Expenditure on Increasing Liquid Capital. 
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Table 6.10 Index of Some of Xinjiang's non-Productive Expenditures (million yuan, %) 
Year Social Welfare Government Price SOE Subsidies Total 
Administration Subsidies Expenditures 
1986 749.11 399.28 326.29 289.12 3252.01 (23.94) (12.28) (10.03) (8.89) 
1988 928.24 558.34 570.48 334.37 4225.35 (23 .25) (13.21) (13.50) (7.91 ) 
1991 1360.17 904.17 681.35 367.22 5620.71 (24.20) (12.09) (12.12) (6.53) 
1994 2396.03 1722.05 400.62 236.65 7346.27 (32.62) (23.44) (5.45) (3.22) 
(Source: Lee, J 998) 
Table 6.11 Structure of Guangdong's Fiscal Expenditures (%) 
Periods Basic lnnovation Agricu ltural Transport Cities Education, Governmental Policy 
Constructions Funds of Expenditures and Maintenances Health, etc., Administrations Subsidies 
Enterprises including Commercial Civil 
lnnovation Expenditures Services 
Funds 
1994 13.25 8.42 6.2 4.4 6.1 27.8 8.7 2.8 
1995 13.74 8.01 5.5 3.4 6.0 27.0 8.2 2.3 
1998 15 .1 7.0 4.3 2.9 5.1 22.5 7.4 2.1 
1999 14.9 6.9 5.7 2.9 4.6 21.4 7.6 I.7 
(Source: author, compiled from Guangdong Statistics Bureau: Guangdong Statistical Yearbooks, 1999, 2000) 
Table 6.12 Capital Construction Investment by Sector in Different Periods (%) 
Periods Productive Social Health and Education Science and Governments, Others 
Sectors Service Welfare and Cultural Technological Parties and Social 
Sectors lnnovation Organisations 
61li FYP 77.6 3.5 2.3 8.3 1.I 7.2 
7th FYP 83.1 1.9 2.0 5.7 1.0 4.7 0.2 
8th FYP 87.5 2.5 1.0 2.7 0.5 5.3 0.1 
1991 87.3 1.8 1.1 3.1 0.4 4.2 0.1 
1992 87.9 1.8 1.0 2.3 0.4 3.7 0.2 
1993 86.5 3.1 1.0 2.2 0.7 6.0 0.2 
1994 85.6 1.9 0.8 2.7 0.3 5.0 0.1 
1995 85.0 3.4 1.0 3.4 0.6 6.5 0.04 
9th FYP 82.8 4.5 1.2 3.4 0.3 6.3 0.4 
1996 81.8 4.5 1.2 3.3 0.2 7.3 1.3 
1997 83.1 4.2 1.0 3.4 0.2 6.5 0.2 
1998 82.9 4.5 1.3 3.1 0.3 6.5 0.1 
1999 83.2 3.8 1.5 3.2 0.4 6.6 0.1 
2000 82.3 5.5 1.2 3.9 0.3 5.2 0.5 
(Note: Productive Sectors include agriculture, mining and quarrying, manufacturing, power industries, 
construction, water irrigation and geological exploration, transportation and telecommunication, retail and 
catering services, banking and insurance, and real estate. 
Source: author, compiled from XSB: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbooks, 2001,2002) 
6.2.2 Provincial Investments 
China's investment system was centralised from 1950 to 1978, with Beijing controlling all 
investment sources and activities including budgeting, verification, approval and distribution. 
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allocated by the centre to the region. So, from 1949-1979 most central investment went to 
state funded projects, including 156 projects granted by the first FYP, the TFP constructions, 
and, in 1978, the oil industry promotion. Post investment monitoring and checks on the 
efficiency of spend remained loose. In reviewing China's investment process in Mao's era, 
we have seen that it experienced a circle of "investment-inflation-adjustment-reduction and 
re-investment-inflation" in which there was a lack of an efficient system of control, a classic 
phenomenon of Komai's SBe. Because of this, many projects ran out of funds halfway 
through their life-span. In order to complete them, local government negotiated with the 
centre for continued investment. Therefore many projects ended up with, in effect, an 
unlimited investment. As a result, resource shortages developed, in the classic mode of 
"investment hunger" common in socialist economies (Komai, 1980; 1992). Fights over 
investment allocation between the centre and localities took place all the time, which tested 
the competence of local government in bargaining for investment leverage. 
State investment has experienced three reforms. Starting in August 1978, the SC proposed a 
reform of investment in infrastructure that was processed via China's Construction Bank with 
a bank loan and interest pay-back system. On 16, August 1988, the SC then started a new 
"reform planning on investment administration system" which established six investment 
companies sponsored by the state to handle investment in state funded projects. This initiated 
the withdrawal of the state budget investment (SBI) gradually from the financial investment 
market and since then the SBI now only focuses on a few large-scale projects from projected 
key infrastructures. The action thus required the state, locality and enterprises to share 
responsibility for their respective projects, and empowered local actors such as local 
governments and enterprises to be the major legal body for production investment. In 1988, 
the SC, through establishing a "Construction Fund", separated expenditure on infrastructure 
from budgetary funds and througb these six companies sought to administer and monitor 
investments. From 1992 to 1999, there was a series of actions for further reform of the 
investment system, including the 1993-1996 reforms in the banking system, to separate the 
responsibilities of the central bank, investment bank and policy bank, and clarify investors' 
responsibilities and risks. In 1999 a law of national competitive bidding was passed to 
legalize the investment processes and diversify investment responsibilities away from a 
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Private investment was forbidden. Local governments could assist the centre in budgeting but 
had no authority in decision-making for investment redistribution. The channel of central 
investment in a region for its economic growth was through the funds attached to projects 
allocated by the centre to the region. So, from 1949-1979 most central investment went to 
state funded projects, including 156 projects granted by the first FYP, the TFP constructions, 
and, in 1978, the oil industry promotion. Post investment monitoring and checks on the 
efficiency of spend remained loose. In reviewing China's investment process in Mao's era, 
we have seen that it experienced a circle of "investment-inflation-adjustment-reduction and 
re-investment-inflation" in which there was a lack of an efficient system of control, a classic 
phenomenon of Komai's SBC. Because of this, many projects ran out of funds halfway 
through their life-span. In order to complete them, local government negotiated with the 
centre for continued investment. Therefore many projects ended up with, in effect, an 
unlimited investment. As a result, resource shortages developed, in the classic mode of 
"investment hunger" common in socialist economies (Komai, 1980; 1992). Fights over 
investment allocation between the centre and localities took place all the time, which tested 
the competence of local government in bargaining for investment leverage. 
State investment has experienced three reforms. Starting in August 1978, the SC proposed a 
reform of investment in infrastructure that was processed via China's Construction Bank: with 
a bank loan and interest pay-back system. On 16, August 1988, the SC then started a new 
"reform planning on investment administration system" which established six investment 
companies sponsored by the state to handle investment in state funded projects. This initiated 
the withdrawal of the state budget investment (SBI) gradually from the financial investment 
market and since then the SBI now only focuses on a few large-scale projects from projected 
key infrastructures. The action thus required the state, locality and enterprises to share 
responsibility for their respective projects, and empowered local actors such as local 
governments and enterprises to be the major legal body for production investment. In 1988, 
the SC, through establishing a "Construction Fund", separated expenditure on infrastructure 
from budgetary funds and through these six companies sought to administer and monitor 
investments. From 1992 to 1999, there was a series of actions for further reform of the 
investment system, including the 1993-1996 reforms in the banking system, to separate the 
responsibilities of the central b~ investment bank and policy bank, and clarify investors' 
responsibilities and risks. In 1999 a law of national competitive bidding was passed to 
legalize the investment processes and diversify investment responsibilities away from a 
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monopoly of the central state. So, by the end of those refonns, one project could be 
sponsored by multi-investment sources and channels, and shared investment responsibilities 
by different legal bodies. The investment of central government will only respond to key 
infrastructure projected by the centre and industries crucial to the state but not to locally-
based economic production and its enterprises. The local government and individual 
enterprises have become the legal bodies for recruiting funds to their respective areas and 
sectors. 
In the 1980s, China's investment had substantial interests in five sectors: agriCUlture, energy, 
transport, and education and scientific research. In the eighth FYP, the state reinforced its 
investment in basic social and industrial infrastructure, and besides those five sectors, 
promoted investments in electronic machinery industries, oil and oil chemicals, and motor 
vehicles. In the ninth FYP still more emphasis was put on infrastructure construction. Since 
1978, as mentioned before, state investment has focused on coastal development, starting 
with 50 per cent of total investment in the coast region in the sixth FYP, rising to 63.8 per 
cent in the eighth FYP, which very effectively encouraged its rapid economic growth. After 
the tenth FYP, there was a change in investment policy, focusing more on the west in order 
to reduce the development gap between the two macro regions. 
Decentralisation of the investment system changed the structure of investment gained by a 
region and allowed the participation of non-state sources, for example foreign direct 
investment (FDI), which is seen as one of major factors generating the economic rapid 
growth of the coastal regions. The greater financial autonomy of the local governments on 
the coast has allowed them to seek out investment outside state sources. But the western 
region is economically and geographically far away from these non-state sources and, as 
financial interaction among regions has yet to take place, there is little alternative to central 
government investment. 
In Xinjiang, the major capital investments come basically in the form of state and local 
government investments. Table 6.13 shows the percentages of state funds in Xinjiang's fixed 
assets investment. However, since 1949, Xinjiang's economy has been completely tied up 
with SBI and this came to the region basically in the form of funds attached to specific state 
projects. Furthermore, due to Xinjiang's disadvantages in infrastructure and advantages in 
crucial natu~l resources, state projects in infrastructure and. resource industrial constructions 
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in the region have never been stopped. And the projects are all large-scale and capital-
intensive. For example, in 2002 in Xinjiang there were a total 47 large and medium size 
projects of capital construction undertaken with investments of 422,862.8 million yuan. 11 
out of the 47 were directly funded from the centre with 340,925.4 million yuan, taking up 
80.6 per cent of the total investment in the 47 projects. Therefore the amount of the 
investments have never reduced dramatically even during the initial time of the reform, long 
before the WDP. From the table 6.l3, we can see the proportion of investment subordinated 
to the state has been over 50 per cent of the total investment of Xinjiang most of the time, 
though it has been gradually reduced since the 9th FYP. This is because ofthe withdrawal of 
the SBI. As the SBI had once been the major investment source for Xinjiang, its reduction 
has obviously affected the total amount of all investment subordinated to state sources, 
although the impact is not so significant (Table 6.14). Table 6.14 and Figure 6.12 display all 
sources of investment funds in Xinjiang's fixed assets. Apart from the SBI funds, 40 per cent 
of the total investment funds from the state come to the region in the form of domestic loans, 
state sponsored FDls, bonds and extra-budgetary funds, responding to the different 
investment sectors. 
A major impact on Xinjiang of the change of central investment policy is that central 
investment that will no longer have an interest in the local economic sectors and enterprises. 
Province-based SOEs, collective enterprises and private firms will have to manage to raise 
funds by themselves through applying for all sorts of bank loans and non-state investment 
sources. To a poor region like Xinjiang and to its resource-based and capital intensive 
enterprises, finding such investment sources will be a difficult challenge, as they are short of 
local market attractions and of efficient management to compete in the domestic or 
international investment market. 
In general, the region lacks the capacity to recruit investments from non-state sources. The 
unfriendly natural environment is a factor, as is Xinjiang's location far from central markets 
and the consequent high transport costs. There is also an underdeveloped market economy 
and the existence of unreformed and inefficient SOEs. The incompetent operation of many 
existing SOEs and non-openness of productivity-strong economic sectors such as the oil 
industry, is holding back non-state investors. More critically, there is a lack of involvement 
by local government in raising funds. 
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Table 6.13 Total Investment in Xinjiang's Fixed Assets by lnvest~rs (10,000 yuan, %) 
Period Total Classified by Investment from 
5ib FYP Centre Locality 629834 339624 290210 
6th FYP 1491299 
(53.9) (46.1) 
822167 669132 
7th FYP 3319729 
(55.1) (44.9) 
1793864 1525865 
8th FYP 11622193 
(54.0) (46.0) 
7064761 4557452 
9th FYP 
(60) (40) 
24994604 12737703 12256901 
1996 
(51 ) (49) 
2027722 1805750 
1997 
(52.3) (47.7) 
2398515 2069633 
1998 
(53.7) (46.3) 
2705328 2492345 
(52.0) (48.0) 
1999 2638879 2707589 
(49.4) (50.6) 
2000 2922259 3181584 
lOth FYP 
(47.9) (52.1 ) 
2001 7059970 3264641 3795329 
(46.2) (53.8) 
2002 8130223 3157268 4972955 
(38.8) (61.2) 
(Source: XSB: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2003) 
Table 6.14 Total Investment in Xinjiang's Fixed Assets by Sources (10,000 yuan, %) 
Period Total State' s Domestic Bonds FDIsand Self-Raised Funds 
Budgetary Funds Loans Loans and Others 
5th FYP 629834 295378 5822 51240 277394 
(46.8) (0.9) (8.1 ) (44.0) 
6th FYP 1491299 494838 166756 36165 793540 
(33.2) (11 ) (2.4) (53) 
7th FYP 3319729 534200 779602 193372 1812555 
(16.1 ) (23.5) (5.8) (54.6) 
8th FYP 11622193 489327 2434324 1645856 7052686 
(4.2) (20) (14.2) (60.7) 
9lh FYP 24994604 1801257 5066378 31805 761934 17333230 
10th FYP 
(7.2) (20) (0.1) (3.0) (69.3) 
2001 7059970 545176 1321317 8340 64834 5120303 
(7.7) (18.7) (0.1) (0.9) (72) 
2002 8130223 1323660 1607535 30504 62992 5105532 
{1.5} ~19.8} (0.4) (0.7) (62.8) 
(Note: Self-raised funds basically involve local government recruited funds including major extra-budgetary 
funds and few private funds from the coastal region. But the latter make a tiny portion of the total investments. 
Source: XSB: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook. 2003) 
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that they do not have the option of closing them down. Thus, Xinjiang's provincial 
government has become very cautious in sponsoring or recruiting funds for SOEs, unless 
required to do so by Beijing. And state banks, wary of bad debts, also try to limit investment 
to SOEs unless forced to do so for political reasons. Kornai' s theory of paternalism is very 
relevant here in its prediction of the bailing out of bankrupted projects for fear of socially and 
politically costly layoffs. However, after granting investment in the region by state banks 
following Beijing's investment policies, the sequential debts will always fall due to local 
government. Again, some of these domestic loans also go to state-sponsored projects 
according to the fixed quota required by Beijing for local financial contributions. For 
example, the state's "poverty minimisation" policy requires local government to pay 30 per 
cent of total costs. So, despite many state funded projects being allocated to the region, the 
local government officials complain that they come with major costs attached.88 Facing all of 
these increasing debts, the enthusiasm of the local government in the sponsorship for regional 
investment has been seriously undermined. 
Secondly, foreign capital investment in the Xinjiang has never been impressive and, after the 
8th FYP, it has been reduced dramatically (Table 6.14), especially the FDls who account for 
only 21 per cent of foreign total investment. Xinjiang's FDI only makes up 0.1 per cent of 
the national total, though it started as early as the beginning of the 1980s and at the time there 
were 10 joint-venture enterprises established. In the 8th FYP, local FDls reached a peak $0.18 
billion, while in the 9th FYP, due to a change in state FDI investment policy and the "Asian 
Financial Crisis", the FDIs in the region were reduced in value to $0.15 billion. These FDI 
projects involve small-scale, low technology, labour-intensive and raw material processing 
industries. 
Foreign bank loans, as one of two kinds of foreign investments in the region (another is FDI), 
have come from the World Barik and Japan and started in 1983, benefiting the region greatly 
at first with their low or no interest. By the end of the year 2000, they had funded 62 projects 
totalling $2.3 billion in agriculture, irrigation, transportation, resource exploitation, urban 
facilities and education. However, since 1999 the investment policy was changed by the 
World Bank, and the region now finds it difficult to pay back its loans at full standard interest 
88 Rep ·rts fr Xin" F ' 'a1 B 2002 and Li director of Xinjiang's West Development Programme, 
o om ~lang manCl ureau, , . " . China D I ent and 
2002: "Analysis and Rethink ofXinjiang' s Economic Development Envrronment ill eve opm 
Planning Commission (Bd.): Strategic Studies on the lOth FYP, and interview, 2003. 
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rates that are high and non-negotiable, and the region has had to replace foreign loans with 
domestic ones. 
Some of the large foreign joint-venture enterprises are highly inefficient and run at a loss. For 
example, in the 1980s, Xinjiang's Tian Shan Woollen Textile Limited Company (XTS or 
GTS), was established as the first foreign joint venture. It had some of its products labelled 
by varied foreign brands to sell worldwide and earned $2 million dollars of foreign exchange 
each year for the region. These products were recognised in 1991 with an international award 
for quality. But after ten years, the XTS has not developed into what the region had once 
expected. Now it faces losses of204 million yuan and is struggling to survive89. By the end 
of 2000, only 76 out of a total 222 foreign invested enterprises were making profits totalling 
0.27 billion yuan, while 132 made losses of 0.26 billion yuan. Such poor performance by 
local foreign joint venture companies has not been interrupted by the government, which 
makes foreign investors hesitate to consider the region. 
Thirdly, according to Wiemer (2004) and my fieldwork in 2002-2003, the major attractions 
of the region, oil and gas, are not fully open to either foreign or domestic private investments. 
Once, a rich local tycoon proposed to purchase some assembly lines of primary products of 
natural gas and crude oil from the XCpc. However, this was refused on the grounds of the 
costs necessary for health and safety measures, but underlying this was the XCPC's and the 
Se's unwillingness to see private capital take part in this strategic industry. Again, since 
2000, a large group of private businessmen from China's richest county, Wenzhou, have 
made a 5 billion yuan bid to purchase 150 oil wells in the Karamay oil field. However, 
according to the media, the prospect of these businessmen breaking the state monopoly is not 
good. In 2004 most investors from Wenzhou left for Shannxi, where a small oil field had 
been found and the SC has granted the non-state enterprises permission to join in exploitation 
and production 90. 
Fourthly, Xinjiang's local government still regards itself as politically superior to others and 
is unwilling to undergo a transformation of its attitude to SOEs, thereby showing itself to be 
politically attached, bureaucratically arrogant and institutionally uncooperative91 • Unlike 
89 http://www.tsw.com.cn/accessed in November 2003 and also se~ discussion in chapter 7. 
90 http://www.sohu.com/new/ 16:00 on 12105/2005, accessed on 12 May, 2005 and fieldwork, 2003. 
9 \ Fieldwork, 2003 
their counterparts in Shandong, who are intimately involved in local business affairs, 
Xinjiang's provincial government not only on principle leaves the enterprises to struggle with 
their financial, managerial and operating problems, but also makes no attempt to lift the 
institutional bans on exploiting local wealth or help with the development of non-state 
sectors. Published policies in terms of investment recruitment for the enterprises issued by 
the local government have not granted real institutional functions, "empty cheques" named 
by local enterprises. There is no special agency set up to handle the financial problem of 
medium or small-scale enterprises. In reality the politics of domination restricts the 
effectiveness oflocal government administrative functions, and one solution might be seen as 
Weber's politically unattached, rational administration and Gulick's (1937)92 separation of 
politics and administration. 
The absences of local governmental commitment and intervention are particularly damaging, 
as elsewhere in China this has been the most dynamic element in economic development. 
Given the political will, local government could break through the central institutional 
restrictions and provide better services to the region if it utilised its full powers. 
6.2.3 Provincial Financial Revenues 
Since the 1994 fiscal reform, local financial revenues have been received from four sources 
(Taples 6.5,6.15): first, local fixed incomes including turnover tax, income tax, land rental 
tax, enterprises revenues, etc.; second, locality-state shared incomes: V AT, resource tax, 
securities exchange tax, etc.; third, the central state tax reimbursements; and, finally, some 
regions receive subsidies for specific policies, such as "Poverty Reduction Funds" (Table 
6.15). 
The growth rate of Xinjiang's regional revenues since the reform has been increasing very 
fast compared to the pre-reform period (Table 6.16). Despite a slight decrease after the 7th 
FYP, the annual rate of increase was still maintained at 14.65 per cent and 14.69 per cent in 
the 8th FYP and the 9th FYP respectively, the highest in the nation. 
92 Gulick, Luther W (1937). Notes OD the Theory of.Organizatio.n,Papers OD. the Sci.e~ce o~ A~S:c~~~ in 
Gulick, L. and Urwick, L. New York, Columbia Urnverslty InstItute of Public AdministratIon, p. 
Liu, 2001: p.83. 
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I Fixed revenues 
2 Revenues shared 
between locality and 
centre 
3 
4 
Table 6.15 Local Financial Incomes 
Turnover tax (not incl~~~ ~ose from railw~y, b~ and insurance co~anies); 
alll~cal-based enterpnses mcome tax (not mcludmg those from domestIc bank, 
foreign bank, and other fiscal institutes); all local based enterprises submitted 
revenues, personal income tax, land rent tax, urban construction and maintenance 
tax, property tax, vehicle hire tax, stamp tax, butcher tax, agriculture tax, 
agricultural specialised product tax, cultivable land usage tax, land V AT, etc. 
VAT, resource tax (not including those from ocean oil), securities exchange tax 
Tax reimbursements 
Fund incomes'J4 and policy subsidies 
(Source: author, compiled from Fan and Li, 2001) 
However, if we decompose the major revenue sources contributing to these increases, we can 
see Xinjiang's revenues come from two main sources: one is the regional financial revenue 
and other is state subsidies. Secondly, the subsidy revenues take up the lion's share, 
representing 63.01 per cent of total revenues. Table 6.l7 shows total revenues for 1990-2001 
and two major contributing sectoral revenues. Thirdly, the average rate of increase of 
financial revenues was 17.47 per cent annually over these 11 years while in the same period 
that of state subsidies was 21.94 per cent. Simply judged from the two ratios of financial 
revenue and subsidy to total revenue (note: (2)/(1) and (3)/( 1) in Table 6.17), it easy to work 
out that the rate of increase of state subsidies was stronger that of local financial revenues. 
The results of the examination above prove that the fast increase ofXinjiang's regional 
revenues, described in the table 6.17, is generated by state subsidies. 
93 Local based enterprises include collective enterprises, and TVEs, some SO~ but not those strategically 
important in relating to Bank, Insurance, Oil exploitation and refinery Industnes. . 
94. . d fund, If ·sing fund and state' s constructIon fund. Fund mcomes refer to the mcome from extra-bu getary se -ral 
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Table 6.16 Xinjiang's Growth Rat f F" . 
e 0 mance m Comparison with those of Other Provinces 
1 Shanghai 
2Qinghai 
3 Liaoning 
4 Beijing 
5 Gansu 
6 Heilongjiang 
7 Ningxia 
8 Shanxi 
9 Shannxi 
10 Hebei 
11 Xinjiang 
12 Jiangsu 
13 Shandong 
14 Anhui 
15 Henan 
16 Zbejiang 
17 Fujian 
18 HUDan 
19 Tianjin 
20 Guangxi 
21 Yunnan 
22 Guangdong 
23 Jiangxi 
24 Inner Mongolia 
25 Guizbou 
26 Jilin 
27 Sichuan 
28 Hubei 
29 Hainan 
30 Tibet 
Annual 
Percentage 
Growth during 
1953-1978 
17.5 
13.8 
13.7 
13.0 
11.8 
10.9 
9.8 
9.6 
9.6 
9.3 
9.1 
8.8 
8.5 
8.5 
8.2 
7.8 
7.7 
7.7 
7.6 
7.5 
7.3 
6.8 
6.7 
6.6 
6.5 
6.0 
6.0 
Average 7.2 
(Source: Yabuki, 1995) 
after the Reform (%) 
Ranking Annual 
Percentage 
Growth during 
1981-1989 
1 Inner Mongolia 24.0 
2 Yunnan 20.7 
3 Hainan 20.3 
4 Xinjiang 19.1 
5 Guizhou 19.0 
6 Heilongjiang 17.4 
7 Qinghai 16.8 
8 Guangdong 16.0 
9 Fujian 14.8 
10 Jilin 14.7 
11 Guangxi 14.4 
12 Sichuan 14.3 
13 Zhejiang 13.6 
14 Ningxia 13.4 
IS Jiangxi 13.0 
16 Henan 10.9 
17 Anhui 10.8 
18 Shanxi 10.5 
19 Shannxi 9.7 
20 Hunan 9.7 
21 Hubei 9.5 
22 Hebei 9.0 
23 Gansu 8.7 
24 Shandong 8.6 
25 Jiangsu 7.9 
26 Liaoning 4.9 
27 Beijing 3.7 
28 Tianjin 1.4 
29 Shanghai 5.4 
30 Tibet 
Average 11.6 
Table 6.17 Structure of Xinjiang's Total Revenues 1990-2001 (10,000 yuan) 
Year Total Increase Financial Increase State Increase (2)/( I) (3)/(1 ) 
Revenue Compared Revenue Compared Subsidy Compared 
(I) to Last (2) to Last (3) to Last 
Year{%) Year {%) Year {%) 
1990 529648 ;2 17784 243644 41.11 46.00 
1991 560220 5.77 264691 21.54 244948 0.54 47.25 43.72 
1992 581504 3.80 260737 -1.49 286434 16.94 44.84 49.26 
1993 672941 15.72 351346 34.75 291302 1.70 52.21 43.29 
1994 760053 12.94 286989 -18.32 436402 49.81 37.76 57.42 
1995 1026007 34.99 382818 33.39 522571 19.75 37.31 50.93 
1996 1130884 10.22 483069 26.19 590688 13.03 42.72 52.23 
1997 1335460 18.09 576170 19.27 683783 15.76 42.57 50.52 
1998 1485241 11.22 665674 15.53 801176 17.17 44.82 53.94 
1999 1763420 18.73 744404 11 .83 939967 17.32 42.21 53.30 
2000 2031417 15.20 954986 28.29 1190159 26.62 47.01 58.59 
2001 2917322 43.61 1157540 21 .21 1838294 54.46 39.68 63 .01 
Average: 17.47 21.19 
(Source: author, fieldwork, 2003) 
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Xinjiang's financial budget is then decomposed further into two sectors: a general budget and 
the fund budget established after the 1997 reform. The fund budget separates all specific 
funds allocated for construction from the province's general budgetary funds, helping to 
clarify all sorts of financial sources for systemic budgetary control. These funds come from 
the centre for specific key infrastructure projects, such as road construction, etc .. The fund 
revenues have increased from 0.39 billion yuan, 5.4 per cent of the financial revenue in 1997, 
to 2.1 billion yuan, 17.8 per cent, in 2001. On this point, the share of the general budgetary 
revenue, the real income from Xinjiang's own sources is shrinking relative to total financial 
revenues. Table 6.17 shows that the weight of local budgetary revenue actually remains very 
low in proportion to total regional revenues. This means that the capacity and share of local 
budgetary revenue in the entire local financial economy is very low, though its rate of 
increase has remained steady over the years. In the 8th FYP the rate of increasing of 
budgetary revenue reached 20.8 per cent; in the 9th it was slightly lower at 11.9 per cent; but 
in the 9th FYP it is back to 20.1 per cent. 
We can analyse the low capacity of the general budgetary revenue from two angles. First, 
since the reform, as we know, the Xinjiang's financial revenues have grown steadily. From 
1978 to 2001, regional financial income increased from 0.71 billion YUan to 1l.5 billion 
yuan, an annual rate of increase of 12.87 per cent, 0.57 per cent higher than the national 
average. However, if we look closely at the region's budgetary revenue, although 9.5 billion 
yuan was achieved in 2001, this accounted for only 1.22 per cent of the total sums of China's 
provincial budgetary revenues (Table 6.18), compared to 14.87 per cent for Guangdong. The 
GDP of the province was 148.6 billion yuan in 2001, 1.47 per cent of national GDP, ranking 
24th out of the 30 provinces. This low regional GDP is symptomatic of the low capacity and 
low productivity of the region's economy. A region with a low economic capacity achieving 
a highly significant increase of budgetary revenue is not realistic. The ratio of the budgetary 
revenue to the GDP of Xinjiang remained at 6-7 per cent in general until 1999 and then 
reached 16 per cent during the WDP, in comparison to the national ratio of 12-15 per cent 
annually. Xinjiang's low ratios before 1999 are evidence of the low productivity oflocal 
economic enterprises. 
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Table 6.18 Ratios of Regional Revenue to the Total Sum of Provincial Revenues 2001 (%) 
Locality Xinjiang Ningxia Tt·bet Guangxt· I 1 nnerMongoia 
Ratio 1.22 0.35 0.08 2.29 1.27 
Locality Guangdong Shanghai Shandong Jiangsu Zhejiang 
Ratio 14.87 7.81 7.35 7.33 6.42 
(Sources: author, fieldwork, 2003 and XSB: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2003) 
Second, through decomposing the revenue sources, we can try to find out which budgetary 
sectors contribute to the poor local budgetary revenue. The data displayed in the Tables 6.19, 
6.20,6.21 and Figure 6.13 show the basic structure of the regional budgetary revenues. From 
Tables 6.19, 6.20, 6.21 we can see that the income of Xinjiang's enterprises plays a less 
important role among four sectors and its rate of increase remains very low too. Despite 
others like the economically advanced Guangdong province having a similar revenue 
structure, however, its enterprise revenues are the second big budgetary revenue sector and 
take a 12 per cent share in the period 1993-2000, higher than the 7 per cent share of Xinjiang, 
not to mention that the enterprise revenue of Guangdong accounts for an amount that was 
much higher than that of Xinjiang. In addition, the enterprise revenue in a provincial budget 
only counts the revenue submitted by province-directly-controlled SOEs and does not 
include revenues from private firms and state-directly controlled SOEs. And province-
directly-controlled SOEs in Guangdong are not large in numbers and not significant or key 
economic units in economic growth, so their enterprise incomes don't account for a 
significant contribution to the local budgetary revenue. What makes up major contribution to 
Guangdong's or Zhejiang's or Shandong's local budgetary revenue is tax income constituted 
by various taxes submitted by their productivity-strong, large-scale and-number, non-state 
enterprises such as TVEs and others, like foreign enterprises. 
Xinjiang's economy is largely dominated by its SOEs (Table 6.22), 84 per cent of the 73,941 
enterprises in Xinjiang in 2002 and largely those involved in industrial sectors. Within these 
SOEs, the central-state-directly-controlled-SOEs represent only 25.7 per cent of the total 
local SOEs in 2002 and these SOEs' enterprise incomes are not included in the provincial 
budget. However, there are as many as 74.3 per cent of SOEs, with the ownership under the 
domain of the province, which means that the provincial government will directly collect 
enterprise income and income tax from these locality-based enterprises for the budgetary 
revenue. Large numbers of province-based SOEs imply that the enterprise incomes of these 
SOEs could possibly make up a big portion of substantial budgetary revenues to the local 
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Table 6.21 Indexes of Increases of Xinjiang's Financial Revenues, GDP, Enterprises Income and 
Taxes Income in the 7tb, 8tb and 9th FYPs (%) 
GDP 
Financial revenue 
Enterprises income 
All taxes income 
(Source: author, fieldwork, 2003) 
9.7 11.5 
20.8 11.9 
1.9 -2.24 
11.5 9.4 
8.0 
20.1 
12.7 
15.0 
Table 6.22 Regional Gross Value ofIndustrial Output by OwnerShip in 1997 
Volume (billion yuan) 
Total SOEs COEs POEs Others SOEs 
China 9189.4 3122.0 3362.3 1182.1 1523.1 34.0 
East 6065.4 1658.0 2397 .6 712.3 1297.5 27.3 
Beijing 190.9 102.6 39.5 1.8 46.9 53.8 
Tianjin 209.4 69.2 67.3 5.9 67.0 33. 1 
Hebei 399.6 144.7 150.0 67.3 37.6 36.2 
Liaoning 497.5 218.9 150.2 76.3 52. 1 44.0 
Shanghai 512.9 202.8 95.0 5.7 209.4 39.5 
Jiangsu 1181.3 249.8 709.1 52.2 170.2 21.1 
Zhejiang 808.8 113.7 373.2 225.6 96.2 14.1 
Fujian 280.1 50.3 89.3 43.4 97.0 18.0 
Shandong 845.6 260.1 386.6 106.8 92.2 30.8 
Guangdong 953.5 171.0 293.6 85.5 403 .5 17.9 
Guangxi 166.6 67.0 41.9 39.0 18.7 40.2 
Hainan 19.3 7.9 1.9 2.9 6.7 40.8 
Centre 2188.4 952.2 726.7 355.5 153.9 43 .5 
Shanxi 175.4 80.5 58.1 32.6 4.2 45.9 
Inner 78.2 49.6 14.7 8.5 5.4 63.4 
Mongolia 
Jilin 142.9 89.1 25.8 12.4 15.6 62 .5 
Heilongj ian! 220.4 146.4 42.0 15.5 16.4 66.4 
Anhui 3 15.6 99.9 136.1 56.2 23.4 31.7 
Jiangxi 129.1 68. 1 38. 1 14.5 8.5 52.8 
Henan 471.5 160.1 184.3 94.2 33.0 34.0 
Hubei 4 10.3 156.3 151.8 68.5 33.6 38.1 
Hunan 245 .1 102.2 75.8 53.3 13.8 41.7 
West 935.4 511.8 237.9 114.2 71.5 54.7 
Sichuan 442.6 178.3 139.1 77.5 47.7 40.3 
Guizhou 55.7 37.3 8.4 7.2 2.8 67.0 
Yunnan 120.7 83 .8 · 25.2 6.8 4.8 69.4 
Tibet 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 73 .0 
Shannxi 118.3 7 1.9 28.2 10.6 7.6 60.8 
Gansu 82.5 54.7 15.8 8.3 3.6 66.4 
Qinghai 14.9 12.5 1.8 0.4 0.2 83.8 
Ningxia 19.8 13.6 2.6 1.1 2.5 68.7 
XiI&iang 80.2 59.0 16.7 2.3 2.3 73.5 
(Note: COE: collectlve ownership enterpnse; POE: pn vate ownership enterpnse 
Source: Wei, 2000) 
Share % 
COEs POEs 
36.6 12.9 
39.5 11.7 
20.7 1.0 
32.2 2.8 
37.5 16.9 
30.2 15.3 
18.5 1.1 
60.0 4.4 
46.1 27.9 
31.9 15.5 
45.7 12.6 
30.8 9.0 
25.2 23.4 
9.6 14.8 
33.2 16.7 
33. 1 18.6 
18.8 10.9 
18. 1 8.7 
19. 1 7.0 
43.1 17.8 
29.5 11.2 
39. 1 20.2 
37.0 16.7 
30.9 21.8 
25.4 12.2 
31.4 17.5 
15.1 12.9 
20.9 5.7 
17.8 5.7 
23.8 8.9 
19.2 10.0 
12.0 2.6 
12.9 5.7 
20.9 2.8 
Others 
16.6 
21.4 
24.6 
32.0 
9.4 
10.5 
40.8 
14.4 
11.9 
34.6 
10.9 
42.3 
11.2 
34.7 
7.0 
2.4 
6.9 
10.9 
7.4 
7.4 
6.6 
7.0 
8.2 
5.6 
7.6 
10.8 
5.0 
4.0 
0.0 
6.4 
4.4 
1.3 
12.6 
2.9 
Table 6.23 shows the total profits and taxes made by Xinj iang's industrial SOEs under the 
different regional-level state ownerships. From this we can see that the perfonnance of 
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locality-based SOEs from all levels, provincial, prefecture and township, is not impressive, 
taking up only 13.07 per cent and 32.85 per cent of shares of profits and taxes by all SOEs in 
2000 and 2002 respectively and making losses in 1999 and 2001. 
Table 6.23 Total Sums of Profit and Taxes Made by Industrial SOEs 1999-2002 (10,000 yuan) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Regional Total 608068.8 1622729.5 1674766.8 1519822.0 
Domestic Enterprises 592195.1 1610453.4 1661796.5 1505858.9 
SOEs 439545.2 49345.3 21989.9 44968.4 
State SOEs 4466149 42898.2 27953 .9 30198.5 
Local SOEs -7069.7 6447.1 
-5964.0 14770.0 
Provincial SOEs 7594.8 27239.1 
-3271.4 19989.5 
Prefecture SOEs -2 1329.6 
-23054.7 
-1210.5 -7520.8 
Township SOEs 6276.6 1728.0 
-1769.0 678.5 
(Sources : XSB: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbooks , 2000, 200J, 2002, 2003) 
In the provincial budget, all enterprises of Xinjiang were presented as making financial losses 
until 1994, and, since 1999, industry and commerce have started making losses (Table 6.20). 
The loss-making of the industrial and commercial enterprises will no doubt contribute to low 
enterprise revenues. The industrial and commercial enterprises, who submit various taxes 
that constitute 92-95 per cent of local tax incomes in the local budget, are therefore the most 
import budgetary source for Xinjiang. Since 1991 , tax revenues submitted by various 
production enterprises in Xinjiang have been as much as 94.27 per cent of the total budgetary 
income (Tables 6.19, 6.21 and Figure 6.13), though after 1994 this source has decreased in 
weight. 
On examining all sorts of taxes received by China' s provinces, there is support for the 
argument that a region's low budgetary revenues are due to its non-productive enterprises. 
Table 6.24 shows the proportions of the five major sorts of taxes received by ten selected 
provinces. Economically advanced provinces such as Guangdong and Zhejiang have a 
relatively higher proportion of income taxes than poor provinces like Xinjiang and Inner 
Mongolia. According to Chinese analysts, in a region with a low standard of economic 
development, income taxes are relatively less significant in total tax revenues, while in a 
region with a high standard economic development they increase their role95 . Xinjiang falls 
into the category of a region having relatively less developed enterprises, a low income tax 
take and a higher proportion of liquid taxes. 
95 lrr . tervlews, 2003 
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Xinjiang's enterprises represent two features: firstly large-scale enterprises dominate and are 
heavy-industry based. By 2000 Xinjiang had 6268 industrial enterprises and only 177 were 
large and medium scale but they accounted for 70 per cent of gross industrial output value 
(GIOV). Half of the enterprises engaged in heavy industries account for 77 per cent of 
GIOV. Such resource-based and large-scale enterprises mean large investment but less profit 
added in products, which is less amenable to gain in the highly competitive market. Again, 
geographical distance away from the main market in terms of investment and consumption 
blocks the flow of capital from private sources entering resource-based enterprises. Without 
much market advantage, it is not surprising to see that many enterprises are struggling to 
survive. Although restructuring with hi-tech is an important strategy for the region, as 
frequently mentioned since the 8th FYP, Xinjiang's government has no funds to materialise 
the strategy. 
Table 6.24 Five Major Sorts of Taxes Re(:eived by Ten Sele(:ted Provinces 
Locali!}: Xinjiang Ningxia Tibet Guangxi Inner Mongolia 
Total taxes 100 100 100 100 100 
In which: 
All liquid taxes 59.54 53 .98 62.56 45 .34 48.47 
All income taxes 23 .23 33.29 32.90 38.75 26.92 
Resource taxes 9.89 6.16 3.81 9.94 15.32 
Asset behaviour taxes 1.73 0.99 0.74 1.49 2.74 
ProEerty tax 5.62 5.58 4.49 6.54 
Localit~ Guangdong Shanghai Shandong Jiangsu Zhejiang 
Total taxes 100 100 100 100 100 
In which: 
All liquid taxes 51.84 53.56 45.47 51.91 48.05 
All income taxes 38.01 37.09 38.11 35.38 42.64 
Resource taxes 2.35 0.86 9.69 6.13 2.87 
Asset behaviour taxes 2.26 2.8 2.29 1.24 0.89 
ProEerty tax 5.62 5.48 4.44 5.33 5.53 
(Sources: author, fieldwork, 2003 and XSB: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2003) 
Secondly, a lack of market-orientation dominates Xinjiang's SOEs. She has 1,006 centrally 
controlled companies, including some engaged in the profitable oil industry, and they 
account for more than one-third ofGIOV. 42 per cent of enterprises are controlled directly by 
state-owned holding companies at national or regional levels and they contribute 86.1 per 
cent ofGIOV. Although more than a quarter are ' collectives' in terms of ownership, they are 
still categorized as being in state ownership. So, in total, 84 per cent of registered enterprises 
are recognized as SOEs. Despite these SOEs appearing in the form of state-owned, 
. . . th · ti s in production sales and services collectIve, cooperatIve, or share-holdmg, elr opera on , 
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Very few ofXinjiang's enterprises promote their products in the national press, even though 
the products have a strong capacity to compete in international or domestic markets. The 
GTS Woollen Company mentioned above, for instance, in the early 1990s had a niche market 
only focusing on the region rather than further afield and it has never formally promoted its 
products beyond the regional border. At the same time, Inner Mongolia' s Erdos Woollen 
Textile Limited Company has not only sold in the international market, but has also 
established itself as a leading brand of woollen goods in the domestic market by promoting 
its products on national TV and in the newspapers nearly every day. Erdos is now seen by the 
nation as the best and first in brand, quality and market share and has reached sales of 3.9 
billion yuan, earning 0.19 billion dollars of foreign exchange in 2003. Meanwhile, GTS has 
only been able to reach sales of379 million yuan and is struggling with 204 million yuan of 
losses96. Such lack of market-orientated operation among Xinjiang's SOEs is very common 
and results in large-scale non-profitability (Table 6.25). 
In addition, the non-involvement of local government in the operation and promotion of their 
leading locality-based SOEs accounts for some of the failure. In Shandong province, there 
are two leading, successful locality-based companies, Zhangyu Winery and Haier, a 
manufacturer of major appliances and electronics with a roster of products including wine 
cellars, refrigerators, freezers, air conditioners, dishwashers, laundry products, small 
appliances, electronics, and televisions, including plasma and flat screen models, that both 
owe a great debt to their local government, which has granted funds to establish the company 
brands and to advertise their products nationwide. Eventually, Zhangyu became a trading 
company whose brandy, wine, champagne and tonic wine are top products in terms of 
national brand recognition and quality. Haier has also now become a large international 
group able to issue shares and invest in the American market97 • In Xinjiang, such action from 
the local government is totally absent. The explanation for this is that the local government 
has neither money in hand nor the will to consider its transitive role as a supervisor to its 
enterprises. In the WDP it was frequently mentioned that there is a need to promote the 
efficiency of local SOEs, however, without local governmental efforts on ownership reform, 
96http://www.chinaerdos.coml accessed in Nov. 2003; http://www.tsw.com.cn! accessed in Nov. 2003. 
97 In . tervtews, 2003 
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investment recruitment and operation efficiency, in the end the enterprises are left to struggle 
with their own problems alone and local budget receives no contribution from those profit-
lose SOEs. Neither Haier nor Zhangyu are state SOEs or private firms but rather locally 
collective SOEs. In this regard, the local government treats them as their own property and 
has made the two -companies successful and pillar sectors to contribute the increase of local 
revenues. 
Table 6.25 The Economic Effectiveness Index of Industrial Enterprises in Central and West 
China in 1996 (million yuan) 
Independent-accounting State owned Capita Tax Rate 
Enterprises Independent-accounting 
Enterprises 
Profits Increasing Profits Increasing Independent- State owned 
or Reducing or Reducing account Independent-
(comparing (comparing Enterprises account 
to last year) to last year) Enterprises 
Shanxi 35.09 l.ll 27.14 -1.05 6.31 5.69 
Inner Mongolia 8.92 -0.37 0.87 -5 .99 9.37 4.58 
Anhui 24.08 -21.96 -7.21 -15.43 9.37 6.93 
Jiangxi 0.89 -4.26 -9.44 -12.93 4.27 3.57 
Henan 72.40 -33.49 37.25 -11 8.51 7.7 
Hubei 46.13 -6.13 8.67 -15.73 6.59 5.01 
Hunan -7.44 -12.21 5.24 6.34 8.07 8.36 
Sichuan 12.69 1.45 2.8 -1.81 4.84 4.83 
Guizhou -4.85 -8.62 -5 -8.44 6.62 6.46 
Yunnan 101.15 -13.56 91.67 -19.85 25.95 31.58 
Tibet 0.42 0.38 6.02 5.18 
Shannxi -9.8 -6.44 -20.46 -11.83 3.37 2.27 
Gansu -0.09 -5.82 -4.94 -5.19 4.7 4.26 
Qinghai -9.87 -4.22 -9.28 -3.95 -l.l -1.2 
Ningxia 2.11 -1.26 -0.92 -2.26 4.65 3.43 
Xinjiang -19.10 -17.92 -10.6 -8.16 3.17 3.33 
(Note: Independent-accounting enterprises refer to enterprises are financially independent and compile their 
own balance sheets. 
Source: compiled/rom Chen, 2001 . based on NSB: China Statistical Yearbooks. 1996. 1997) 
From the analysis above, a few conclusions can be drawn. First, the low standard of 
Xinjiang's entire economic development confines the budgetary revenue in amount, scale 
and forcefulness. Second, the low productivity of local economic enterprises directly affects 
the budgetary gains from enterprise revenues and income taxes. It results in a problem of 
weak local resources, shortages in the regional financial budget and leads to financial 
deficits, and continued reliance on state subsidies. 
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6.3. The Province's Enterprises and their Submission of Revenues and 
Taxes 
In the last section we argued that the insufficiency of provincial budgetary revenues in the 
regional economy is regarded as a problem caused by the inefficiency and low productivity 
oflocal enterprises, which are then unable to submit sufficient revenues and income taxes for 
local government purposes. In this section we try to discover the problems in collecting 
revenues and taxes by local government from all enterprises, and try to find out whether the 
benefits in local financial revenues that local government and economy have received from 
the key economic sectors match their development. 
6.3.1 Xinjiang's Enterprises and their Submission of Revenues and Taxes 
In China's budgetary system, regional collection ofrevenues and taxes from the various 
enterprises depends on the defined ownership of enterprises. In this regard, we can divide 
Xinjiang's enterprises into four categories of ownership: TYEs, SOEs, private enterprises 
and foreign joint venture companies. As described in Table 6.5, the provincial budgets are 
only entitled to count taxes mainly income tax from state SOEs, TVEs and foreign firms, and 
enterprise revenues and all taxes from the locally based SOEs. 
Table 6.26 shows the taxes generated from the agricultural and husbandry sectors, which 
only take up 5.4 per cent of budgetary revenues in 2001 and Figure 6.14 shows the 
agricultural enterprises since the 3rd FYP have produced no contributions to the enterprise 
revenues but losses. Budgetary expenditure on agriculture, including investment in 
innovation and administration, is considerably higher by as much as 10 per cent on average 
each year (Tables 6.8, 6.9). By 2002 rural industry makes up only 2.3% of GIOY because the 
rural industrial and commercial enterprises represented by TVEs in eastern China generally 
have never been well developed in Xinjiang. From the reform until 2002, there were only 27 
rural industrial enterprises, 18% of the total, producing 512.69 million yuan GIOY, or 1.06 
per cent of the regional total. Xinjiang has only 121 foreign and overseas Chinese investment 
companies and 432 private companies, which together account for 3.4 per cent ofGIOY, 
while in Guangdong foreign and overseas Chinese investment companies alone account for 
59 per cent ofGNO. Income taxes from Xinjiang's TVEs, private and foreign firms are not 
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significant. In 2000, taxes paid by the TVEs made up onI ° 7 f h Y . per cent 0 t e total taxes 
received by the region (XSB, 2001; 2002; 2003). 
Table 6.26 The Percentages of Xinjiang's Budgetary Revenue by Sectors (%) 
1949-53 47.42 1534 
1st FYP . 1.86 28.26 54.73 19.34 16.98 
2nd FYP 39.67 11.89 8.96 42.26 3.18 
1963-65 45.22 11.02 36.70 0 
3rd FYP 66.08 17.35 5.62 1
7
0.9
6
5 
45: FFYPyp 126.20 25.43 -70.71 19.07 
89.94 11.62 -17.43 17.86 
6th FYP 136.73 11 19 th . -54.99 0.62 6.92 
7 FYP 92.82 4 65 -4 th • .70 5.55 2.61 
8 tb FYP 81.90 7.19 0.83 5.23 4.84 
9 FYP 71.68 8.29 5.23 4.99 8.74 
Industrial and Agricultural and Enterprises 
Commercial Taxes Husbandry Taxes Incomes 
Fund Others 
Revenues 
2001 71.51 4.92 8.36 4.33 10.87 
2002 68.83 5.40 7.80 4.88 13.08 
(Source: author, based on the data of XSB: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbooks, 2001, 2002, 2003.etc.) 
Figure 6.14 The Xinjiang's Enterprise Revenue by Sectors 
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Xinjiang's vast, remote land, inconvenient transportation and sparse population make it 
difficult to promote small-scale, non-state TVEs and other private enterprises in the region. 
Anyway local government has made little effort. In the early 90s, large groups of private 
businessmen from the coastal regions, mainly Wenzhou, came to Xinjiang and tried to 
develop the local retail and commodity market. They faced not only opposition to their 
importation of the "culture of China's south", but also institutional non-cooperation. There 
was no encouragement of their investment, no social welfare for the children's education or 
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family settlement of these businessmen in a very different environment. On the contrary, 
there were many trade barriers for their businesses to overcome, for instance the absence of 
loans from local banks. This attitude discouraged many wealthy businessmen from the south 
of China. Even many Xinjiang home-grown private finns, after having success in 
establishing a business in Xinjiang, all intend eventually to leave. A good example is Delong, 
one of China's top ten private companies, which left Xinjiang for Shanghai, considering 
Xinjiang to be institutionally and geographically unsuitable for running a private business98 . 
So Xinjiang's SOEs, 84 per cent of the total enterprises, are mostly resource industries, and 
they are the main sources of Xinjiang's budgetary revenues. 
Table 6.27 demonstrates the productivity of all SOEs by production sectors, represented by 
economic indicators including the added value of industry CA VD, and profits and taxes. We 
can see that oil industrial enterprises, including oil drilling and processing and oil refining 
and cracking remain at the top, with the best achievements in A VI and profits and taxes. 
There are only 28-30 enterprises directly involved in the oil industry, 2 per cent ofthe total 
numbers of the total enterprises, but they represent 33 per cent of total GIOV. There are no 
loss-making enterprises in oil drilling and processing, and only 6-8 out of the 23 make a loss 
in the oil refining and manufacturing industries. The profit made by oil drilling and 
processing alone accounts annually for 83 per cent of total profits made by all oil enterprises 
and, even after allowing for the losses in oil refining and further oil product processing, the 
entire range oil industrial enterprises still produces 78 per cent of total profits annually. The 
profits and taxes in total of the oil industries represent 74 per cent of the total of all 
enterprises in Xinjiang. The varied taxies submitted by Xinjiang's oil enterprises take up 60 
per cent of total taxes income of provincial budgetary revenues and are not only the biggest 
but also the only key revenue source for local budget. Therefore oil industries are regarded as 
the pillar sector for local financial revenue and economic growth. 
Such profitability in Xinjiang's oil industry and oil enterprises may be viewed firstly as the 
result of state strategic investment in oil production expansion in the region, and, secondly, 
as due to large domestic demand in China's current phase of economic progress. Xinjiang 
has large reserves of oil and gas in its two deserts. According to a national oil survey after the 
98 . 
Intemews, 2003 
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reform, there are approximately a total 20.08 billion tonnes of oil and 10 thousand billion 
cubic metres of gas in reserve, making up 30 per cent and 34 per cent of national total oil and 
gas reserves on land. These reserves place Xinjiang in a strategic position in national 
economic development. Since 1993 the country has started to rely on imported oil to sustain 
its fast economic growth even though home production was 16.9 million tonnes of crude oil 
in 2003. Consumption is increasing 5 per cent annually but production only by 1.8 per cent. 
Oil consumption in 2003 was 0.23 billion tonnes; in 2005 it will be 0.26 billion tonnes and in 
2010 more than 0.3 billion tonnes. In 2003 30 per cent of consumption was imported, 
amounting to 91 million tonnes, in 2005 100 million tonnes and in 2010 150 million. Starting 
from 2002, the rate of self-reliance in China has been just 70 per cent, and Chinese oil 
researchers estimate that this will be reduced to 55 per cent in 2010 and 40 per cent in 2020. 
So, a future oil shortfall looms and the Chinese central government must find increased oil 
supplies for its fast growth. There are two possibilities. One is looking for international 
partners who have large oil reserves and are ready to sell their oil on a large scale to China, 
such as Russia, Middle East or Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan. The other is 
exploring for more oil at home. Both directions bond Xinjiang tightly to China's oil resource 
99 
supply strategy . 
99 hnp:/Iwww.sohu.com/news/ aecessed on 19/0312004 and 09/0412004. 
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Table 6.27 Index of Major Economic Indicators of Enterprises by Production Sectors with Independent-accounting System 2000, 2001 , 2002 (million yuan) 
2000 2001 
Sectors Numbers Numbers GIOV AV I Tota l Tota l VAT Numbers Numbers GIOV AV I Tota l Total VAT 
of of Loss At Profi t Profit and Of of At Profit Profit 
Enterprises Making 1990 Taxes Enterprises Loss 1990 and 
Enterprises Prices Making Prices Taxes 
Enterprises 
Non-oil mining 130 46 1401.2 1083 .1 20.47 2 14.7 163 .2 11 5 34 165 .2 1228 .35 88.2 320.5 194.8 
and processing 
Oil and gas 5 0 7017 .3 20702 .2 9408 .7 12978.4 2715 .6 7 0 5871.7 19326.0 8597.1 11192 .6 1984.7 
dri lling and 
processing 
Food and 310 153 4797.2 1709.64 15.6 545.0 287.4 289 11 4 5775.4 2549.3 36 1.7 829.5 330.5 
related products 
Textile, leather 124 48 4768 .8 19 15.2 9.5 340.0 306.6 11 1 65 4313 .7 1470.16 -429.2 -227.6 186.6 
and garment 
industries 
Timber and its 133 62 1063.7 452. 1 28. 1 111 .7 75 .9 104 43 10 13.3 4 19.6 54 .8 12 1.2 59.8 
process ing, and 
related product 
manufacturing 
Oil refining 23 6 6657.8 3082.9 - 1270.0 - 165.9 3 14.9 21 8 902 1.4 4026.4 -121.5 1666 .. 9 658.7 
and coking 
Chemistry, 149 55 3810.2 11 3 1.6 221.8 486.2 202 .9 156 46 452 1.2 144 1.1 5.39 349.4 287.6 
medica l .,etc, 
manufacturing 
Non-and - 232 76 5732.7 2527.6 674.0 1073 .3 359.7 193 47 7089.4 3478.5 1303.3 1935.9 592.5 
metals products 
manufacturing 
Machinery and 149 75 2725 .3 765 .6 -29.94 108.7 125.3 132 56 3125.5 847.3 69.02 199.75 114.5 
electronic 
industries 
Power 284 I 11 3026. 1 4392. 1 -40.1 1 1050.6 518.1 292 134 3499.6 4484.4 -369.7 1 722 .14 523 .7 
industries 
Tablc 6.27 contd 
2002 
Sectors Numbers Numbers GlOV AVI Total Total VAT 
Of Enterprises of Loss At Profit Profit and 
Making 1990 Taxes 
Enterprises Prices 
Non-oil 114 26 1841 1411.3 134.3 404 .5 229 
mining and 
processing 
Oil and gas 6 0 6167.6 17513.2 6536.4 9022 .86 1813 .5 
mining and 
. process ing . 
Foods and its 247 95 6600.4 2628.8 295 .7 1011.0 390.3 
related 
products 
Textile, leather 101 54 436.7 1410.4 -286.9 -99.1 171.6 
and garment 
industries 
Timber and its 102 42 1122.5 502.3 68 .6 126.8 53.4 
processing, 
and its relation 
products 
manufacturing 
Oil refining 24 6 9377.5 4562.7 -171.1 1927 .7 910.2 
and coking 
Chemistry, 149 46 4937 .4 1596.6 \30 .7 413 .0 239.1 
medical .,etc, 
manufacturing 
Non-and - 189 59 8132 .6 3850.9 1256.6 1764.5 465.8 
metals 
products 
manufacturing 
Machinery and \37 52 3591 .3 1014.0 18.6 184.9 146.9 
electronic 
industries 
Power 206 124 2083 .0 2882 .9 -270.0 442.4 652.9 
industries 
(Notes: Non-oil mining and processing includes coal, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, and non-metal minerals. 
Food and its related products include grain, sugar, beverage, tobacco, etc. 
Timber and its related products manufacturing include furniture, paper-making, printing etc 
Source: author, based on the data of XSB: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbooks. 2000. 2001. 2002. 2003) 
Xinjiang not only has large quantities of this key resource but also shares borders with 
Kazakhstan, regarded by some observers as the future "Kuwait of Central Asia" (Liu and 
Felmingham, 1998: p.6). This is important, especially after the failure of negotiations with 
Russia over the construction of an oil pipeline from Russian Taishet across China's Northeast 
to her harbour city of Dalian. Because of Japanese and North Korean objections, Russia had 
to adjust the route of the pipeline, ending at Nokhodka instead of Dalian. This change made 
China determined to reinforce her partnership with Kazakhstan over oil tradelOO• 30 billion 
yuan has been invested to build up the oil pipeline from Kazakhstan's Alashankou to 
Xinjiang's Arks~ starting on 28th September 2004, with an expected completion at the end of 
2005. This confirms the ''bridge'' position of Xinjiang in economic connections between 
central China and the central Asian countries. The central government is expecting Xinjiang 
to become China's newly major crude oil supply site, replacing the traditional one in the 
northeast. 
Increasing investments from the state have focused more on the resource industries, reaching 
31.5 per cent of total regional investment in the fifth FPY by comparison with 16.7 per cent 
in the fourth FYP and a peak of 48.03 per cent in the eighth FYP. State investment alone in 
the oil industries in Xinjiang has reached 81 .71 billion yuan. A number of projects linked to 
surveys of oil reserves, exploration, exploitation and refinery were successively launched. 
Since the discovery of three large-scale oil fields in the Tarim, Zungharian and Turpan-Harni 
basins, the numbers of oilfields have increased from 8 in 1979 to 56 in 1998, and led to a 
production of 23 million tonnes of oil annually, 20 per cent of national oil output. Over the 
coming 5 years since 2000 the region is expected to verify oil reserves of up to 3.3 billion 
tonnes and gas reserves of 1.16 trillion cubic metres, with a plan of increasing its crude oil 
output to 24 million tonnes annually, and gas to 18 billion cubic metres. 101 Oil pipelines have 
been extended and doubled in number to 12 from the fields to the refinery sites, with a 
capacity of delivering 2.0 million tonnes annually in 1998, along with the construction of a 
giant east-west gas pipeline reaching China' s major industrial cities, the Lanzhou and 
I~ttp:llwww.sohu.comlnewl accessed on 5lh and 25 th Feb., 19th Match, and 9th April, 2004. . .. . . 
101 Landrethg, Jonathans. (2000 24111 April). "China' s Wild West: the Promise and the Dan~er of XinJlang 011 ~ 
the Desert Cotton in the Lowland, Wind Energy on the Steppes." http://www.uyghuramencan.org.J accessed m 
2001. 
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Shanghai sections of which were completed in 2004102 . Oil refinery and crude oil 
manufacturing industrial complexes have been established in the region's major economic 
zone, the economic "golden triangle" ofUrumqi-Kuytun-Karamay, in which 7 million tonnes 
of crude oil was consumed for the output of products like chemical fertilizers totalling 0.35 
million tonnes in 1996. 
Such an emphasis on resource industries, especially oil, has restructured Xinjiang's industrial 
economy (Table 6.28). Table 6.28 demonstrates the increasing domination of oil and gas 
industries in the regional GDP over the four decades of local industrial development. 
Table 6.28 The Changes in Xinjiang's Major Industrial Sectors (%) 
Year 1952 1957 1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994 
Black metals 0.99 2.62 2.68 2.53 2.15 1.77 2.22 2.81 3.25 4.56 
Nonferrous metals 7.51 9.69 2.05 1.07 0.76 0.67 1.42 1.05 2.41 2.06 
Electric 0.12 0.64 1.61 1.70 2.91 3.02 3.20 3.31 3.25 2.76 
Coal 1.66 2.88 4.74 4.44 4.14 6.02 6.08 4.75 3.00 3.16 
Coke 0.10 0.12 0.33 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.08 
Oil and gas 6.34 7.01 23.56 20.09 21.37 27.11 2 1.94 22.43 21.20 30.55 
Chemistry 0.85 0.77 2.52 2.42 2.82 3.52 3.47 4.51 6.4 3.96 
Machinery 4.90 5.94 11.6 9.09 9.24 11.6 13.15 11.94 9.33 6.14 
Construction materials 2.00 2.17 1.97 4.59 4.60 4.83 6.49 7.65 5.28 6.08 
Forest 4.86 6.49 2.39 3.34 1.94 1.60 1.87 1.85 1.01 0.72 
Food 21.36 18.32 19.24 18.44 20.34 18.58 19.07 17.00 16.02 13.05 
Textile 22.45 6.22 17.43 23.22 23 .26 14.12 12.38 15.99 22.65 22.34 
Tailoring 14.96 7.09 3.87 3.01 1.54 1.92 2.22 1.55 1.10 0.57 
Leather 9.80 5.25 3.41 2.15 2.11 2.09 1.70 1.68 1.68 0.85 
Paper making 0.08 0.08 0.57 1.07 0.76 0.55 0.88 0.64 0.90 0.63 
Stationery 1.22 2.02 1.21 1.37 0.86 1.51 1.77 1.29 1.18 0.64 
Others 1.07 2.69 0.82 1.43 1.20 0.96 1.12 1.52 2.03 \.87 
Total gross output 22.0 48.5 121.9 137.7 181.0 214.2 407.1 867.8 2199.2 5905.2 
(million yuan) 
(Source: Wang, J999a) 
6.3.2 Leading Economic Sector and its Submission of Revenues and Taxes to the Region 
From discussion above, we have shown that oil is the local economy's pillar sector, and that 
the state effort in oil industrial development in Xinjiang is enormous. But does the expanding 
development of the oil industry match its contribution to provincial economy especially local 
budgetary income? 
102 htto:llwww.sohu.comlnewsJ accessed on 03/0812004 and on 18/1012004. 
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China's oil industry and enterprises used to be controlled and headed by the Energy Ministry 
of the SC, from 1949 to1984. Since 1984, the start of the refonn and the transfonnation of 
SOEs, three large-scale companies have been established, under state ownership, in the 
names of the China Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum and Chemical 
Corporation (petroChina or CNPCC), and the China Offshore Petroleum Corporation. They 
have taken control of the oil sectors in their respective areas. The three companies have been 
directly headed by the SC since the closing down of the Energy Ministry. The CNPCC has a 
40 per cent share of on-land oil enterprise and the CNPC the remaining 60 per cent. 
Xinjiang's oil industries, all in the hands of the CNPC and the CNPCC, have set up seven 
large-scale companies: the Karamay Oil Bureau, engaged in local oil extraction, refining and 
processing; Dushanzi Oil Chemical Manufacturing; Zhepu Oil Chemical Manufacturing; 
Urumqi Oil Chemical Manufacturing; Xinjiang Tarim Petroleum and Exploration and 
Development Command Post; Xinjiang Tuha Oil Field Petroleum and Exploration and 
Development Command Post; and, finally, the Xinjiang Oil Selling Company. Xinjiang' s gas 
is controlled by PetroChina, which in turn is owned by the CNPCC. So, through these seven 
enterprises, Xinjiang's oil and gas resources, including their extraction and refining and all 
related manufacturing, are tightly controlled by the CNPC and the CNPCC and directly 
supervised by the Se. There is no intervention of the local government over any exploration, 
production and sales of the seven oil companies. Although attempts have been made by 
private companies to break through the state monopoly of the oil industry in Xinjiang, their 
involvement is held back by the huge risks in investment, by a complex process of bribing 
officials through their bureaucratic agents for permission to drill and, most of all, by the 
state's determination on tight control over this strategically important sector. 103 Even though 
foreign companies, for instance, Shell, have been involved in the sector, the deals are made 
directly between PetroChina and the companies. 
Although Xinjiang's oil industries have developed into a key economic sector, their products 
focus on crude oil and secondary raw materials and outputs is low and variety limited. The 
ratio of industrial value added among crude oil , processed oil products, and advanced oil 
103 I . 
ntervtews, 2003 
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chemicals is 1 :2:4 in China's domestic market. 104 The oil refinery and manufacturing 
industries established in Xinjiang are small-scale in comparison to those located in Shanghai 
and Lanzhou, and are only able to consume 9-10 million tonnes of crude oil annually, less 
than half (45 per cent) of the total amount of oil produced in the region. When these primary 
processed products reach their major markets in the east, the total cost, including the long 
distance delivery, is much higher than simply selling the crude oil, and, due to the high fixed 
prices, the products are not really competitive in the coastal market. State control of 
marketing means that Xinjiang's output is sold to the east, but the profits made by Xinjiang's 
oil enterprises are far below those of Shanghai ' s and Lanzhou' s large advanced oil 
enterprises. In addition, half of the natural gas is wasted in the oil extraction gas 
manufacturing processes, due to the low standard of extraction technology. A long-term 
project would be to build a series of large complexes for efficient oil and gas extraction, 
refining and manufacturing and to increase the market competence of Xinjiang's oil and gas 
products. These would require substantial investment in high technology and a reduction in 
labour costs. By way of a start, the CNPC announced in June 2004 that in the coming11 tb 
FYP the investment in Xinjiang by the company will increase with a focus on the Urumqi, 
Dushanzi, Karamay and Tarim oil refining enterprises 105. 
The former director of Xinjiang's Development and Planning Commission pointed out in the 
second meeting of the 10th National Politico-Corporation Congress that the monopoly of the 
state via the CNPC and the CNPCC has blocked the development of non-state and locality-
based enterprises in the province' s oil sector. So, consequently, not only does Xinjiang's 
local economy receive less benefit than it might from its oil resources, but also the lack of 
competition reduces incentives for technological innovation and the provision of high quality 
products to the oil industries ?f the region. By the time that the pipeline between Xinjiang 
and Kazakbstan is completed, there will be a tax revenue windfall of the order of billions of 
th . 106 S h yuan, but even then the bulk will be received by the state and not by e regIOn . uc 
issues have been raised by the local academic institutes and western scholars, such as 
Christoffersen (1993) and Wiemer (2004). 
104 http://www.sohu.comlnewsl accessed on 12110/2004. 
105 http://www.sohu.comlnewsl accessed on 12/1012004. 
106 http://www.sohu.comlnewsl accessed on 9/03/2004. 
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According to the media,107 in 2004 Xinjiang produced 60.2 thousand tonnes of crude oil daily 
and 21,400 thousand tonnes for the year in tota1. The oil refineries, however, were only able 
to process 45-50 per cent of that tota1. So, 50-55 per cent of crude oil is channelled to 
Lanzhou, in which a massive refinery and processing centre is located. On the international 
market today (October 2005), one tonne of crude oil sells at $447 approximately. lfthere was 
not the control of the state over Xinjiang's oil industry, each year Xinjiang could possibly 
receive an income of 4.5 billion dollars or 36 billion yuan just simply by selling about 10 
million tonnes of crude oil at the full world price, not to mention other profits received from 
selling processed oil products. 
However, due to the state monopoly, enterprise income, income tax and 75 per cent of the 
V AT submitted by Xinjiang's oil and gas enterprises are directly passed on to the state via 
the CNPC and CNPCc. The benefits received by Xinjiang from this profitable resource are 
only taxes, including 25 per cent of V AT and others like the Resource Extraction Tax, which 
is 15 per cent of profits. 108 Despite these tax revenues submitted by the oil enterprises to 
locality being limited, they still make up 60 per cent of local taxes revenues in the budget and 
represent the biggest share of all revenues and taxes to the locality from all enterprises (Table 
6.26). 
The central government investment in the development of Xinjiang's oil aims at serving its 
own oil strategy in which Xinjiang's oil has been developed impressively and dominates the 
entire regional economy. It bonds Xinjiang's economy with regard to oil development 
entirely with the central strategy. The decomposition of the province's revenue received from 
its oil sector reveals that the qil sectoral development has greatly benefited China as a whole 
but not the region itself. Many of Xinjiang's local economics scholars in my interviews said 
that if such a phenomenon as the state monopoly over profitable local enterprises was found 
in any of the coastal or central regions, the local government would go to great lengths to 
undertake negotiations with the centre for a better deal or to develop a strategy against state 
107 004 http://www.sohu.comlnewsl accessed on 9/03/2 . . . . 
108 The rate of Resource Extraction Tax varies from 150/0-18% according to ~e~ot:tat:tons ~etween the locahty 
and the centre. For Daqing, China's largest oilfield and energy supply base, It IS set at 18 YD. 
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control, such as raising the rate of all taxes on oil products sold outside the province, for 
instance, the rate of Resource Extraction Tax set for Xinjiang could be raised from 15 to 18 
percent as the same as that of Daqingl09, and pave the way for non-state enterprises to be 
involved in the oil industry. In the case of Xinjiang, the local government itself makes no 
effort to argue the case and at the same time Xinjiang's complexity and Beijing's oil strategy 
reinforce the phenomenon. So it is not surprising to see that the minorities of the region feel 
that they have been cheated by the state, which is seen not only to have deliberately taken 
Xinjiang' s wealth away, but also to provide a "fake" financial and political autonomy. These 
minorities point to their own populations living in poverty and they argue that the state 
siphons off the region's most precious resource. 
In the light of our discussion ofXinjiang' s low budgetary revenues resulting from low 
submitted revenues and taxes from local SOEs, we may now safely say that the province's 
most profitable enterprises have not been counted in. Xinjiang's oil enterprises have been 
detached completely from the region ' s economic units and have served the purposes of 
Beijing. Given the prosperity of all oil enterprises in Xinjiang, if, say, half of their revenues 
went to the locality, the local financial situation would be transformed. In Table 6.26 the total 
profits of the oil drilling and processing enterprises alone reached 9408.7 million yuan in 
2000, and in the same year Xinjiang' s budgetary revenues were 7980.2 million yuan and the 
state subsidy was 11901.6 million yuan. So the central government took away the region's 
wealth and gave back nearly the same amount in subsidies. This supports the argument raised 
in section 6.1.1 that China' s financial institutions in Xinjiang are "self-contradictory" and 
that they have reinforced the impacts of Kornai's SBCs and North's "State predation" on the 
, 
toothless nature of local government. In effect, local government as the major economic actor 
has now lost inter~ in pursuing economic growth for the region. Thus we say the 
competence and integrity ofXinjiang's local government is undermined not only by the 
orientation of its political administration but also by the uncooperative economic institutions, 
which provide no incentive for the development of initiatives of local government. 
109 Daqing, in NE China, has China ' s largest oilfield at present and once was the major oil supply base of China. 
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In conclusion for this chapter, although China' s central state has withdrawn its monopoly 
over the ownership of most property in order to revive market incentives, still large, 
prosperous sectors like the national railway and air networks, and key resource industries are 
under the central state' s tight control. The coastal regions are able to generate the prosperity 
from non-state sectors, but for inland regions, like Xinjiang, the public monopoly over their 
dominant economic sectors blocks resources and incentives at the local level. Xinjiang' s case 
is just as described by the paths 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 6.1 , suggesting, as argued at the 
beginning of the chapter, that local government has gained no power from decentralisation, 
and is unable to promote or defend the region's interests. Through examining the impacts of 
fiscal and investment refonn in Xinjiang, we have seen that the invalidation and failure of 
these reforms in Xinjiang has resulted in increasing dependence on state subsidies and in 
mismanagement by local government of its financial affairs. The incomplete nature and 
innate biases of China' s partial refonn are ultimatel y at fault. 
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Chapter 7 Local Government, Local Economic Policy and 
Regional Development 
In their theory of Decentralisation Chinese Style, Qian, Weingast, lin Roland and Maskin 
examine the mechanisms of vertical decentralization in China's partial reform and they 
remark upon the dynamic role of local government in two ways. First it acts as a local 
defender against politico-economic institutional restrictions by protecting regional economic 
success from central "predation"; and, second, it plays an active part in planning for the local 
economy to take off. Making regional policy by the local government is not just a matter of 
tuning the province's development with China ' s development as a whole but also, as in the 
good example set by Wang Enrnao in his pursuit of socialisation in Xinjiang, building a 
rational and effective government administration for the sake of the region. In China's 
decentralisation, fiscal reform and the development of non-state sectors empowers the local 
governments to transform their administrative role into the one with more economic 
responsibility and to act as a real economic agency for local development. In this chapter, by 
examining Xinjiang's regional development since the reform in terms of economic growth 
and policies created by the local government in deaiing with the problems between resource 
industrial promotion and infrastructure deficiency, economic zone designation and uneven 
spatial development, resource exploitation and environmental degradation, we will judge 
whether it have been conducive to the region' s own interests and economic-social harmony, 
and the degree to which they reflect local governmental power gain, competence and 
administrative orientation. 
7.1 Xinjiang's RegiQnal Policies 
7.1.1 Making Xinjiang's Regional Development Policies in the Framework of China's 
National Development 
7.1.1.1 The SEZs and Three-Ladder-Step Development 
China's regional development can be viewed as the state ' s determination, through policy 
instruments, to manipulate economic growth and influence geopolitics. China adopted the 
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Soviet model of 5-year plans (FYPs) to set up a periodic goal for the country's development 
and to determine regional development by allocating resources through key projects 
distributed to the targeted regions. 
In Mao's China under the centralised politico-economic system, the absence of market 
integration left central planning as the major means to determine all economic activities and 
, 
the practice of central planning was extended to every aspect of society (Oi, 1995; Liu, 
2001). Regional development was thus subject to the state planning monopoly and local 
government acted as a central policy implementer in pursuit of national strategies. Regional 
development planning was heavy, inclusive and mechanical, with detailed instructions and 
broad arrangements as to the amount of output of local factories and farms, such as how 
many lorries, cars or tractors could be produced by the SOEs (no private industrial 
enterprises existed), or what cotton production quotas should be allowed on local farms (Oi, 
1995: p.1134). Such mechanical planning without taking account of local conditions and 
interests strangled local initiatives and resulted in inefficiency in terms of investment and 
production. 
At the time, China's regional strategy was influenced by the notion of even development 
with emphases on (a) China ' s inland regions, and (b) the targeting of heavy industrialization 
on the principle of production being close to resource supply sites. The policies and 
principles of regional development reflected the ideology of industrial distribution and 
resource allocation that had originated in China's first FYP. These fundamental ideas 
subsequently determined China's policy-making for decades (Wei, 2002; Lu, 2003). The 
factors behind forming such a strategy are fourfold. Firstly, an extremely lopsided economy 
before 1949 militated against the requirement for equality, the ideology of Socialist country' s 
economic development, which provided a theoretical base for China' s policy-making. Since 
most industrial bases had been developed on the coast and the major resources were found in 
the interior, the shortage of raw materials for Chinese industrialization required the opening 
up of these the inland areas. Secondly, the Soviet style of heavy industrialization shaped the 
Chinese pattern. Thirdly, the threat of international attacks on the newly developing country 
was expected to come from the sea. Finally a fourth guiding principle for China's regional 
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economy, added by Mao, was the promotion of self-reliance. This principle drove China's 
regions to build up relatively independent industrial clusters within each macro-region, in 
order to develop similar production patterns from region to region and to encourage a self-
reliant but fragmented development (Wu, 1967). Therefore, in accordance with the theories 
of Soviet-industrial-location and balanced regional growth, and with national security and 
self-reliance in mind, the interior of the country was considered to be desirable and suitable 
for early and rapid development (Lin, 1999). 
Under such a regional development strategy, Xinjiang' s development, especially in the first 
and second FYPs, was seen as (a) selfreliance oflocal agricultural economy, and (b) 
resource-oriented industry. A series of new coal mines were sunk around the capital Urumqi 
and related coking industries set up nearby. Oil and its refinery and petroleum industries 
were also soon under way after a new oilfield was discovered in Karamay. There were early 
signs of an industrial conglomeration with emphases on resource industries, including 
electric power stations, steel and iron plants, plus some light industries such as textile, sugar, 
wool and cotton yam manufacturing factories, established along the northern slope of the 
Tian Shan Mountain. In 1957 industry had brought 26 per cent of the regional total income, 
and in 1959 the income of heavy industry took up 58.66 per cent of total regional industrial 
income. Although the Soviet Union gave substantial financial and technological aid to 
Xinjiang's development, nevertheless the Chinese central state still was responsible for 
solving capital and labour shortages. In the period 1950-1958, Beijing invested 13,980 
million yuan, including the Russian aid, to spur Xinjiang's growth. In 1960 the first railway 
construction started to link the region to the nearest province and this reached the capital, 
Urumqi, in December 1962 with plans eventually to reach the Soviet border. However, all 
development soon stopped du~ to political upheavals since the 3rd FYP. 
Mao's death in 1976 ended ten years of the Cultural Revolution and China soon adopted 
economic reform under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Although Mao' s egalitarianism was 
still a major principle, in order to give a fillip to efficiency and growth, a strategy was 
adopted of "encouraging some regions and individuals to get rich first" . Comparative 
advantages, openness and decentralisation were promoted. Individual regions with initiatives 
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for fast growth were emphasized and, in order to generate the initiatives, preferential policies 
from the centre were thus granted. 
The new Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were "institutional special" zones set up to "act as 
'windows' through which China could more readily interact with the outside world, with a 
view to learning managerial and technical know-how and attracting international capital" (Li, 
2000: p.158; Marton and Wu, 2004). Four SEZs were established at the general meeting of 
the Fifth People's Congress in 1980: Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong province, 
and Xiamen in Fujian province (Hainan Island was added as the fifth in April 1988). After 
the SEZs, 14 coastal cities were granted open status by 1984, followed by three open delta 
areas: the Pearl River, Minnan (South Fujian) and Yangzi in 1985 and 1986 (Map 7.1). The 
state provided the preferential policies to the SEZs and open cities in order to materialise its 
promise. As a result, the centre of gravity of state investment and of productivity distribution 
started moving eastwards from the interior to the coast. The preferential policies are as 
follows (Fan, 1995: p.426): 
1. Investment Policy: the central government allocated more investment to the coast via the 
state appropriations, loans, and subsides, and distributed projects (Table 7.1). 
2. Foreign Exchange Retention Policy: In 1979 the central state decentralized the control of 
foreign exchange; allowing enterprises in SEZs to retain 5-50 per cent of foreign 
currency. 
3. Revenue-remittance Policy: regions like Guangdong province and Fujian received or 
retained the funds and revenues from the centre (see chapter 6), unlike other developed 
provinces that had to submit most revenues and savings. 
4. Price Policy: the price of raw material and capital goods was set at lower levels than the 
finished and consumption goods by state price policy, and that benefited the enterprises 
in the SEZs in purchasing resources from inland. 
5. Financial Policy: the SEZs received significant economic autonomy and financial 
incentives in managing their local economy, such as reduced income tax to 15 per cent, 
exemption from income tax for FDI companies (the details Table 7.2). 
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6. Land Rent Policy: reduced land rental fees for the enterprises in SEZs and allowances for 
land to be freely rented out and contracts renewed among the state and local enterprises. 
Table 7.1 The Share of Fixed Capital Investment 1953-2003 among the Coast and the Interior 
(Three Broad Regions) (%) 
Region 
Coast Interior 
Eastern Central 
1953-57 44.08 55.90 34.38 
1958-62 40.65 59.37 36.00 
1963-65 37.49 62.49 35.04 
1966-70 29.39 70.59 32.51 
1971-75 39.47 60.56 33 .28 
1976-80 45.77 54.25 32.70 
1981-85 50.66 49.35 31.06 
1986-90 56.44 43.52 26.31 
1991-95 64.39 35.61 22.53 
(Sources: National Statistics Bureau (NSB): China Statistical Yearbooks, 1992-/997) 
Map 7.1 Divisions of tbe Tbree-Ladder-Step and the Third Front 
XINJIANG 
Western 
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REGION 
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~O ----Third Front regions 
----Three economic belts 
The golden coastline 
• Fourteen open coastal cities 
• Ave special economic zones 
Open cities and counties 
(Source: compiled from Fan, 1995) 
Table 7.2 The Incentives of Regional Preferential Policy for the Granted Zones and Districts 
Tax Incentives Other Incentives Numbers, Locations and Established 
Years 
SEZs For FDI finns of I O-year contract 100% foreign 5: 1980: Shantou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
or longer: exempt income tax on exchange Xiamen. 1988: Hainan Island 
the first 2 profitable years and earnings retained 
half of the tax for the following 3 locally; 
years. Others are the same as in land renting 
ETDO; some tax exemptions autonomy 
applicable to the domestic firms 
too. 
Economic and 15-30% income tax on Tax exemption 21 : Shandong(4); Fujian, 
Technologlc productive or non-productive on the gross Guangdong, 1iangsu, Liaoning (3); 
Development business respectively; exempt profit Shanghai, Zhejiang (2); Tianjin (I) 
Districts (ETOO) from local added value tax; for reinvestment; ( 1984-1995) 
FDl business only: exempt tax on land renting 
profit transaction abroad. autonomy etc. 
High/New Tech- 10-15% income tax only for high 51: Guangdong (6); Shandong (5); 
Industrial Parks or new tech projects. 1iangsu, Liaoning (4); Beijing, 
Fujian, Guangxi , Heilongjiang, 
Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, 1ilin, 
Shannxi, Sichuan (2); Anhui , 
Guizhou, Hainan, Inner Mongolia, 
Shanghai, Shanxi, Tianjin, Xinjiang, 
Y unnan, Zhejiang (I) 
Free Trade Same as SEZ Same as SEZ 13: Waigaoqiao (Shanghai)( 1990); 
Districts Tianjin , Futian, Shatoujian 
(Shenzhen) (1991); Qingdao, 
Haikuo, Zhangjiagang, Ningbo, 
Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Oalian, Xianyu 
(Xiamen) (1992); Shantou (1993) 
Pudong For FDI finns investing in Retain all new I: Shanghai (1990) 
Development infrastructure: exempt income tax increasing 
District on the first 5 profitable years and revenues during 
half of the tax for the following 5 the period of the 
years 8th FYP 
For finns importing equipments Allowing foreign 
and vehjcles for production: banks, 
exempt from industrial- commercial 
commercial tax and tax on profit retails, and 
transaction abroad financial 
Others are the same as in SEZ. institutes set-up 
Coastal Open 24% income tax for all FDI Land renting fee 14: Oalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, 
Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyuangang, Cities (COCs) invested in old urban area reduction, etc. 
Nantong, Shanghai, Ninbo, 
Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, 
Zhanjiang, Beihai 
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Table 7 2 cootd . 
Coastal 24% income tax for all FDI Land renting fee 40 cities and 215 counties in three 
Economic Open invested in old urban area reduction, etc. open delta areas (1985), and 
Regions Liaodong Peninsula, Jiaodong 
Peninsula, and Bohai Rim (1988) 
Inland Open Same as COCs Same as COCs 5: Wuhu (Anhui), Joujiang (Jiangxi), 
Cities along Wuhan,(Hubei) Chenlingji (Hunan) 
rivers Chongqing (Sichuan) (along 
Y angz1)( 1992) 
Inland Open 24% income tax for all FDI Allow 13: Heihe, Cuifeng (Heilongjiang), 
Frontier Cities invested in old urban area establishing Manchuli, Erlianhoute (Inner 
and Counties For FDI firms in manufacturing economic Mongolia), Huichun (Jilin), Yining, 
and producing agricultural corporal district Bole, Tacheng (Xinjiang), Fengxian, 
materials: exempt from local along borders, Dongxin county (Guangxi), 
added value tax and tax on profit Accordingly Wangding, Ruili, Heko county 
transaction abroad decentralize (Yunnan) (1992) 
For FID from bordering local government 
countries exempt from administrative to 
industrial-commercial tax and the cities 
tax on profit transaction abroad 
(Sources. author. compzledJrom Wang and L,U. 2000; Marton . 200/; Marton and Wu, 2004 and data from 
fieldwork. 2002. 2003) 
7. Institutional Reform: state governments' intervention was minimized in the operation and 
production of SOEs in SEZs and the state's administrative responsibility only at the 
macro levels; the directors or top managers of SOEs received more powers in running 
businesses, buying and selling products, employing and sacking workers, and so on. Non-
state enterprises were encouraged to develop in SEZs and operate based on market 
regulations. 
On the examining these preferential policies, Fan (1997: p.626) criticizes China's regional 
policies for not really being comparative-advantage-orientated but being based instead on 
resource allocation. Although after two decades of reform, regional policies have now 
changed to emphasize region~l economic initiative and efficiency, by confining state 
intervention to a certain extent, the transfer of state resources is still the major component of 
regional preferential policy and therefore a determining factor of regional growth. However, 
Demurger, Sachs, Woo, Bao, Chang and Mellinger (2002) have argued for a different 
definition to China's preferential policies in the context of her transition. They think that the 
so-called "preferential policy" granted to the coastal regions is indeed a policy to transform 
these coastal regional economic environments into ones with less intervention by centralized 
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planning, in which production and trade can be operated under semi-market regulations. 
These preferential policies should rightly be called "deregulation policies". In the coastal 
regions, especially the SEZs, firms were allowed to "import intermediate inputs duty-free to 
produce exports; collaborate with foreign companies in investment, manufacturing and 
distribution; hire and fire workers in accordance with their performance and demand 
conditions, and escape the confiscatory taxation that is needed in a centrally planned 
economy to finance its vast, complicated system of social subsidies" (Demurger, Sachs, 
Woo, Bao, Chang and Mellinger, 2002: p.6). There was the existence of resource 
redistribution in the form of some state fund transfers through bank loans, i.e. with agreed 
lower interest rates, granted to local enterprises for establishing business links with trans-
national companies, but there were no significant steady transfers as subsidies to sustain 
failing enterprises in order to maintain the living standard in the region, as for the north 
eastern provinces. So, there was no such phenomenon, as described by Demurger and his 
fellow researchers (2002), that "the prosperity of these coastal economies has been sustained 
by a steady flow of state subsidies either from the state budget or from the state bank 
system" ... "Only such state subsidies could truly be called preferential policies" ... " In short, 
because a certainly planned economy is an over-regulated economy, what the preferential 
policies really did was to remove some of these regulations, namely, the regulations against 
the marketization and internationalization of economic activities" (Demurger, Sachs, Woo, 
Bao, Chang and Mellinger, 2002: p.6). 
In this sense institutional transition in fact accounted for the economic miracle of these , 
regions. For instance, although the state investment redistribution still is the major 
component of state regional policy, as the investment structure in terms of the distribution of 
state financial resources has been changed, fast regional economic growth was generated 
from own financial sources. In the reform, the decentralisation of financial management 
reduced the revenues received by the state while it increased the revenue retained by the 
locality and, consequently, the state has to reduce its overall investment in the regions and 
adjusts the investment strictly to those key, large-scale infrastructures and industries (Table 
7.3). The local productive sectors won't receive state investment unless the production is part 
of state-promoted projects or under the direct control of the Se. Budgetary financing of SOE 
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investment declined from 73.2 per cent in 1978 to 29 per t· 1988 d . cen In an 5 per cent In 1995. 
The locality has to find its own way to recruit the financI·al re ta k1 . fi · I sources, celts own nancla 
problem and finance its own projects or productive sectors in pursuit of growth. This 
obviously requires more responsibility and dynamism than the original duties of local 
government and consequently it empowers local government to make local economic 
decisions in steering its territorial economy. 
- 0 Table 7.3 The Structure of the Government's Fiscal Expenditure in China 1978 1991 (0/.) 
Year Economic Culture, Welfare Defence Administration Price Subsidies 
Construction Education, and Social Outlay 
Science, Relief 
and Health 
1978 63 .71 10.05 1.69 15.21 4.67 0.99 
1979 59.78 10.37 1.74 17.48 4.95 6.22 
1980 55.31 12.06 1.67 15.98 6.23 9.71 
1981 48.83 15.37 1.95 15.06 7.41 14.30 
1982 47.10 17.08 1.86 15.30 7.88 14.93 
1983 49.15 17.30 1.86 13.70 7.98 15.27 
1984 50.74 17.02 1.63 11.69 9.04 14.12 
1985 48.51 17.71 1.69 10.38 9.27 14.19 
1986 52.97. 16.30 1.53 8.61 9.44 11 .05 
1987 51.46 16.45 1.53 8.56 9.23 12.03 
1988 51.61 17.96 1.54 8.09 10.03 11.71 
1989 38.85 18.20 1.63 8.27 9.37 12.18 
1990 34.62 17.88 1.59 8.41 9.66 11 .03 
1991 33.25 18.57 1.77 8.66 9.85 9.80 
(Source: compiledfrom Hu. 2001) 
The discussion above and in chapter 2 shows that the dramatic changes in state regional 
policy over the initial period of reform ushered in participation by the local state, in particular 
the provincial government, in generating the regional economic growth in terms of recruiting 
capital investment and determining local development strategy. Therefore Beijing's regional 
policy, embodying the issue of preferential policies, is more seen as an empowerment or 
power decentralisation to local political and economic institutions, who lead the regions or 
units conducive to a growth based on their own sources and own efforts, and this accounts 
for a significant part of coastal development. Here it is TVEs that facilitate the 
implementation of the state's preferential policies and enhance the effect of decentralisation. 
The beneficial policies in resource purchase, capital investment and trading tax, from the 
centre towards the coast compensated for the shortages of capital and raw materials in the 
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initial time of refOIm. Therefore state investment preferences, local economic institutions and 
state permissions are all necessary conditions for local economic growth in China. 
Through these preferential policies the impressive economic growth in the southern and 
coastal China was generated. In the Sixth FYP the three-ladder-region division was proposed 
and in the Seventh FYP China was divided into three developing regions responding to 
geographical location, economic growth levels and natural environment (Map 7.1). The state 
regional development policy adopted the "coastal fast development" strategy influenced by 
the Chinese version of growth pole theory, the three-ladder-step theory, emphasizing the 
development of the economically advanced coastal regions first, and hoping that the coastal 
wealth will eventually spill over successively through the middle land to the poorer interior. 
The three-ladder-step theory became the important guide for the policy makers and uneven 
development resulted in the escalation of regional disparities between the inland and coastal 
regions in tenns of economic growth. The then Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang was ruthless in 
his application of the theory: "The centre is unable to invest in large areas such as Xinjiang 
(in the western region) in the short term; these areas have to wait until at least the 1990s"llO. 
Since the reform, Xinjiang did not experience a rapid growth as its coastal counterparts. At 
the beginning of the reform, the provincial government, under the leadership ofWang Enmao 
and Song Hanliang, deliberately held back the pace of economic institutional reforms such as 
rapid marketization in this politically sensitive region, and the violent separatism increasing 
in the region in the 80s diverted attention away from economic liberalisation in favour of 
political consolidation. But also the central strategy for economic reform had little scope for 
Xinjiang to gear up for the sort of reform seen in the coastal regions, as its geographical 
location and economic backwardness did not mesh with China 's new strategy based on the 
principle of efficiency. 
As a result, in the first decade ofXinjiang's regional development since the reform, the local 
development plans, echoing to the centre's periodic strategy, narrowly focused on the reform 
110 • • •. th t rth est is an important strategic tentative plan Zhao Ztyang, (1986) "Developing Xinjlang and e grea no -w 
of the centre". Tian and Lin (eds.), 1986, as cited by Yang, 1997: p.27. 
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of agriculture's productive system and the region's infrastructure improvement with the aim 
of improving local living conditions. From 1978-1985, basically during the 6th FYP period, 
the refonn of agriculture was based on two reports ofXinjiang's CCP in May and August of 
1978 on "the local agricultural development problems". These introduced the family 
responsibility system to agricultural production including pastoral and field farming, and 
gave decision-making autonomy to the peasants and herds over their production in order to 
generate enthusiasm and productive efficiency. Following the instruction of the central 
policy, in 1984 Xinjiang terminated the commune system and introduced a land rental 
system. Second, a diversification of agricultural products was encouraged from rice and 
wheat to crops such as cotton, fruits, woods, fishes , wool and poultry. In 1984, the Xinjiang 
CCP recommended a target for the local agricultural economy in an aim of establishing 
Xinjiang as a resource base of the nation to supply major agricultural products to other parts 
of China. 
In the same period, the region ' s development strategy paid great attention to local 
infrastructure reconstruction. The region relies for access heavily on a one-track railway 
westwards terminating at the capital, Urumqi, one national air route, and a poor standard 
intra-provincial road. These, combined with a few interregional roads, constituted the 
transport network for the region before 1978. The local and central governments realized that 
the transport network deficiency of Xinjiang is a bottleneck for the regional economic growth 
and future openness. For instance, the region takes up 17.5 per cent of the national total land 
area but has only 3.3 per cent of total national railway miles, in the least dense railway 
network in the world. Therefore a few state projects were undertaken to improve local 
transportation conditions. The railway extension to the Russian border was restarted in 1985 
(Map 7.2) and completed in 1990, thus ending what had turned out to be a thirty-year project. 
The region ' s length of railway track was doubled and both road and rail links increased 
between north and south. The mileage of roads increased by 34.6 per cent from 1978 to 1997 
and eight national standard highways were completed. 51 new air routes, including 33 
national, 5 international and 12 interregional, and 11 airports were built across the region. 
From 1952 to 1995 a total of 13 .35 billion yuan of state investment was put into transport 
construction in Xinjiang, of which 49 per cent went on the railway, 34.5 per cent on roads, 7 
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per cent on airways, and 9 per cent on pipelines. However, in spite of all of this, given the 
huge distances, the current transportation network is still insufficient to meet regional 
demand. Due to the shortfall of funds of the local government, all projects were granted, 
planned and funded by the centre. Even those internal road constructions between towns and 
villages had to rely on the state's funds. As a result, in particular in many far-off areas of 
Xinjiang's south, the transportation was not just poorly provided but also ignored for years 
till the 9th FYP in 1996. 
Map 7.2 China' s Railway Network in 1985 
• • • Beebified ~ 
-- ........ undIr oonIIIrUCtiOn ' 
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(Source: Goodman, 1989) 
. . fCCP' 12th congress in Beijing in October 
According to the guidance of the thlrd meetmg 0 s . 
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1984 in which a policy of reVlvmg the product1VIty 0 
d . I by SOEs undertook the 
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reform of introducing a responsibility system and a rental system to the operation and 
production of the large numbers of SOEs. In 1992, Xinjiang had a further reform of 
enhancing its rental system and political separation on the operation and administration of 
her SOEs with a new guidance granted in the third meeting of 14th congress of the CCP. 
From then until 1997,50 per cent of Xinjiang's SOEs have been transformed into the 
company system of limited responsibility under the ownership of the state. 
Since 1978, compared to the fast growth of the coast, the development in China's western 
regions, including Xinjiang, has remained in effect at an economic standstill, without state 
preferential policies or heavy investment in the local effective economic sectors. More 
importantly, the local state of the western regions has taken no action to step forward itself, 
due partly to a lack of institutional incentives from the centre and partly to the unwillingness 
of the local state to take risks. Local politicians have meekly followed Beijing's line on the 
inland regions and waited for "spillover" effects from the east. A few reasons may be cited 
here: first, from the outset, local government was hidebound with a Maoist ideology 
regarding the reforms as being too liberal. Therefore, before the reforms were confirmed by 
the centre and successfully experimented with by the coast, Xinjiang dared not advocate 
private ownership and capitalism in particular for this politically sensitive region (McMillen, 
1984: p.573). They deferred their reform until 1984. After seeing success stories in the other 
provinces, Xinjiang's local authority eventually realized the significance of rural change to 
regional growth and adopted a series of policies generating agricultural reform. Second, 
many reforms in economic production aimed at increasing output and increasing the range of 
products, hut 'ignored adjustments to a market economy and neglect the upgrade and 
innovation of production toward efficiency in order to increase market competitiveness and 
overcome the geographical bamers. A good example is seen in the reform of the local 
agricultural economy that, although the natural conditions are good for producing many best 
quality products and many manufacturing industries of agricultural products have been well 
established since Mao's era, the agricultural economy yielded very poor returns, due largely 
to the low-level of production in the absence of hi-technology and commercialisation. Thus, 
regional revenues did not increase significantly and the economy has not approached self-
reliance, demonstrating a rigidity of thought rooted in traditional socialist planning. Third, 
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this is also the part of the local government's commitment to the orientation of its 
bureaucratic administration, seen as following China's political instruction and economic 
central plan. Therefore, in the viewpoint of the provincial government, Xinjiang's economy 
should be developed to produce abundant raw materials for the coastal regions. In Xinjiang's 
i h FYP, the major target for the region was again presented as, firstly, improving living 
conditions and infrastructures and, secondly, establishing the region as a base to supply 
industrial raw materials including coal , oil and brass, cotton and food crops like fruits and 
grains for consumption in the coastal regions. During the 80-90s, Xinjiang's GDP per capita 
on average increased by about 10 per cent annually, slightly more than the national average 
(Tables 7.4). 
Despite the economic growth of Xinjiang in the first decade after 1978 maintaining first 
position among the western provinces, this was due to state investment (see chapter 4). The 
fast growth of expenditure in the regional accounts was consistently higher than that of GDP 
and always covered by state subsides, which reinforced the locality in its unwillingness to 
make its own efforts. During 1981-1995, Xinjiang received transfers beyond its GDP by 20 
per cent. It was number one among the provinces that received the largest net transfers from 
the state at the time. 
The Eighth FYP recognized the increasing gap of economic growth between the east and 
west after the refonn. Following the model of coastal development, a few inland cities were 
allowed to open up in 1992 (Table 7.2). First, eight cities along the Yangtze River opened 
their harbours and became free trade zones in 1991 , followed by six others in 1992. Second, 
as relations improved with China's inland neighbours, such as Vietnam and the former Soviet 
republics, cross-border-trade revived and inland major cities in Helongjiang, Xinjiang, 
Guangxi, Yunnan and Inner Mongolia were consequently opened, with multi-level 
preferential policies granted, to establish border trading zones. This increasing openness 
came to dominate regional policies in the 90s. The relative success story of inland cross-
border trade was noticeable in the province of Yunnan, Southwest China, where economic 
growth has been largely determined by increases in trade and the tourist industry since 1993. 
Table 7.5 shows the success ofYunnan in receiving significantly high foreign currency 
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income from her tourist development in comparison with other western regions. And in 2003 
the total income from tourism reached 28.4 billion yuan, representing more than 10 per cent 
ofGDP in Yunnan. 
Table 7.4 Changing GDP per capita 1978-1995 
GDP per Percent Annual Growth 
capita (national 
(yuanJperson 2 avera~e = 100) 
1978 1995 1978 1995 (%) 
North ! 
Beijing 1,248 13,073 331.48 270.77 8.76 
Tianjin 1,150 10,308 305.45 213.50 7.44 
Hebei 364 4,444 96.68 92.05 8.66 
Shanxi 365 3,569 96.95 73.92 7.25 
lnner Mongolia 307 3,013 81.54 62.41 8.28 
Shandong 327 5,758 86.85 119.26 10.63 
Northeast H 
Liaoning 677 6,880 179.82 142.50 7.61 
Jilin 391 4,414 103.85 91.43 8.40 
Heilongjiang 563 5,465 149.54 113.19 6.58 
East tl 
Jiangsu 430 7,299 114.21 151.18 11.45 
Anhui 242 3,357 64.28 69.53 9.08 
Zhejiang 470 8,074 124.84 167.23 12.80 
Shanghai 2,498 18,943 663.50 392.36 7.94 
Northwest H 
Shannxi 294 2,843 78.09 58.89 7.96 
Gansu 348 2,288 92.43 47.39 6.99 
Qinghai 431 3,430 114.48 71.04 5.06 
Ningxia 354 3,328 94.03 68.93 6.55 
Xinjiang 313 4,819 83.14 99.81 8.98 
Central ! 
Henan 232 3,313 61.62 68.62 9.21 
Hubei 332 4,162 88.18 86.21 7.70 
Hunan 285 3,470 75.70 71.87 7.35 
Jiangxi 276 3,080 73 .31 63.79 8.95 
South tl 
Fujian 273 6,965 72.51 144.26 12.12 
Guangdong 367 7,973 97.48 165.14 12.27 
Hainan 310 5,225 82.34 108.22 11.88 
Guangxi 225 3,543 59.76 73.38 7.97 
Southwest H 
Tibet 375 2,392 99.60 49.54 6.34 
Sichuan 253 3,201 67.20 66.30 8.51 
Guizhou 175 1,853 46.48 38.38 7.63 
Yunnan 223 3044 59.23 63.05 8.22 
National Average 376 4,828 100.00 100.00 9.86 
(Sources: Lin, /997; NSB: State Statistical Yearbook, /996) 
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In Xinjiang in 1986 the first joint venture with the Gulf States on oil production emerged. 
The idea of a "Great Islamic Circle (GIC)" was proposed by the local government under the 
leadership of Song (Harris, 1993), through which Xinjiang tried to turn her face westwards in 
order to find trade partners in central Asia and the Middle East. Shortly after China re-opened 
its western borders, cross-border trade became popular. Despite the fact that the former 
Soviet republics remained politically unstable and economically poor during the post-
communist period of the 90s, the intention of cooperative development from both sides of 
border was genuine. Xinjiang' s local government presumed that, at the very least, the 
province would benefit from being a corridor between east and west. A country like 
Kazakhstan, for instance, might want to import household commodities from China's coast 
and, in return, export oil exploration equipment, tractors and fertilizers to China. The railway 
which links central Asia and Europe also makes it possible to travel and to transport goods 
overland to the Persian Gulf, and further to West Europe. Markets in Almaty and Tashkent 
became well stocked with Chinese commodities. As an inland "bridge", Xinjiang seemed 
ready to cash in on this relative advantage and expected to act just like her counterpart 
Yunnan province. 
Table 7.5 Tbe Foreign Currency Income from Tourist Industry among tbe Western Regions, 
1999 and 2000 (1 ,000,000 dollars) 
Region 1999 
Inner Mongolia 1.2 
Guangxi 2.02 
Chongqing (municipality) 0.97 
Sicbuan 0.97 
Guizhou 0.55 
Yunnan 3.5 
Tibet 0.36 
Shannxi 2.72 
Gansu 0.37 
Qingbai 0.04 
Ningx.ia 0.02 
Xinjiang 0.86 
(Source: Lu, Fan. Liu. Jin. Sheng and Liu. (eds.) 2003) 
2000 
1.37 
3.01 
1.63 
1.66 
0.69 
3.67 
0.46 
3.09 
0.45 
0.09 
0.03 
0.99 
Urumqi became an inland open city in 1990 and a border-open-zone centred by Urumqi with 
h fr '" Y " BIT heng was also granted in 1992 (Table 7.2) in t e open ontIer CItIes: mmg, 0 e, ac 
" , . ' . h ' n The state permitted Xinjiang to 
antICIpatIon of attractIng foreIgn mvestment to t e regto , 
d · dd'ti the SC agreed on a mobilized loan adopt the same open policies as the coast an , m a Ion, 
303 
of 0.1 billion yuan through the Bank of China specifically to Xinjiang for its foreign trade. 
The construction of standard highways linking central China to her western border through 
Xinjiang was soon underway. The number of companies conducting border trade increased 
from 5 in 1991 to 346 in 1996. 
However, unlike Yunnan, Xinjiang's opening westward achieved little. The first reason was 
that the lack of an adequate legal system and properly established market regulations to 
monitor business affairs meant that there was no respect for fair trading from both sides of 
the border in terms of currency exchange, goods quality control, and tariff barriers. This was 
exacerbated by a lack of intervention from Xinjiang's government in stopping the sale of 
inferior goods, with the result that there was harm to the reputation of Chinese business and 
to the normal trading on the border and further afield. Anyway, the new central Asian 
countries showed greater interest in European than Chinese goods. Xinjiang's ratio of foreign 
trade reached only 15.7 per cent ofGDP in 2000, compared to 43.9 per cent for China as a 
whole. Second, since opening the borders, local minorities gained opportunities to re-
establish their Islamic connections and this has inspired them to seek their own national 
identities. The result may be seen as a danger to China's unity and there was certainly an 
escalation of violent action for independence. The idea of the "GIC" was soon turned down, 
though the interest of trading westward has been retained. 
During the 90s, state regional policy continued to focus on the traditional resource 
economies, in order to provide raw materials for coastal development. Even after the Western 
Development Programme (WPD), policies designed for the interior still emphasize its natural 
resource sectors. However, such approach has to be justified as appropriate to the local 
natural and economic conditi~ns. After 1990, a series of development policies and plans were 
adopted by local government in response to the need for profound reform in which Beijing's 
expectation of the inland regions that they use their own strengths to develop their 
economies. Xinjiang's 8th FYP, produced by the provincial government and the CCP, 
commented that strenuously exploiting local natural resources is a way of recruiting initial 
capital and obtaining incentives to tackle shortages of investment and stimulate growth 
driving forces. Although upgrading local industry from heavy reliance on resource extraction 
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to hi-tech manufacture had been mentioned on many occasions, the FYP prioritised the 
exploitation of reserved fossil resources and the development of five sectors: agriculture, the 
oil resource industry, transportation, textile and food manufactures, and the chemical raw 
material industries. This strategy in fact, in gearing with the central plan, tried to establish 
Xinjiang as a raw materials supply "power house" to facilitate the fast growth of the coastal 
region. But it was unrealistic and inconsiderate for the local development, first, because the 
vast distances from the capital and consuming markets raised costs and marginalised profits 
of the export of these raw material products. Second, state-imposed fixed prices on raw 
materials, the result of "scissors pricing", benefited the central and coastal regions at the 
expense ofXinjiang. Besides, since the resource industries were all SOEs, any profits were 
extracted by the centre rather than the province. Raising the necessary investment locally was 
unrealistic and therefore central support was vital. This not only invalidated the strategy of 
promoting self-reliance but also bonded the region ' s development to the centre, which, in 
return, had to serve the centre. The FYP ofXinjiang's local government tied itself to act with 
"empty hands" and "empty promises". 
7 .1.1.2 The West Development Programme 
China' s regional development during the first twenty years since the reform was largely 
dominated by the theory of the "ladder step". Fan (1997: p.625) has argued that "the ladder 
step theory is more elaborate on the regional order of development than on the process of 
regional diffusion of growth". Without compatibility between Western theories and Chinese 
reality, the three-economic-belt idea has set the development pace and assigned different 
tasks to the three macro-regions but it didn ' t explain how the diffusion would take place from 
the growth pole westward. Yang (1997: p.84), citing the comments of many scholars, 
suggests that "the prevailing regionalization scheme was too broad to capture the wide 
dispersion of industrial production in China and very significant variations within each of 
these regions ... the ladder-step theory was simply too crude as the foundation for China's 
regional development strategy." In practice, ironically, the "Three-Ladder-Step" increased 
China' s unbalanced development gap between regions and the diffusion didn' t happen as 
expected and in contrary, the gap expanded since 1978 (see the change of GDP per person 
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among the three macro':'region in Table 7.6). Because the uneven development has brought 
political instability, the central government has had to reverse the policy by focusing on the 
interior and thereby redirecting state investment to these newly targeted areas. ''The Chinese 
theory of regional development relies heavily on spatial forms and organization, such as 
regional delineations, zones and belts. Very often, researchers and policy-makers focus on 
'where' rather than 'what' and 'how'" (Fan, 1997: p.633). 
Table 7.6 The Differences of GDP per person among the Three Macro-Regions 
Differences (yuan) Relative Difference Ratio 
(%)111 
Years Based on Price of the Same year Based on the Price of 1978 
East-Centre East-West East-Centre East-West East-Centre East-West 
1978 153.6 212.9 153.6 212.9 33.1 45.9 
1979 160.9 224.0 157.7 219.6 31.1 43.3 
1980 183.1 255.4 169.3 236.2 32.2 44.9 
1981 195.6 285.2 176.7 257.6 31.7 46.2 
1982 214.9 301.7 190.5 267.4 32.0 44.9 
1983 218.4 325.2 190.7 284.0 29.8 44.4 
1984 269.9 390.7 229.3 331.9 31.1 45.0 
1985 341.0 474.1 266.2 370.2 32.6 45.4 
1986 374.4 528.8 275.8 389.5 32.7 46.2 
1987 431 .3 645.7 296.1 443.3 31.7 47.5 
1988 608.4 802.0 352.4 464.6 36.1 47.7 
1989 685 .7 897.1 337.2 441.2 36.8 48.1 
1990 700.1 885.8 337.2 426.7 35.6 45.1 
1991 900.9 1056.2 421.7 494.4 39.9 46.8 
1992 1320.5 1514.2 586.4 672.5 43.5 49.9 
1993 1874.8 2194.7 735.5 861.0 45.9 53.8 
1994 2529.4 3029.2 815.4 976.5 46.7 55.9 
1995 3086.7 3832.1 866.8 1076.1 45.5 56.5 
1996 3525.7 4495.2 933.1 1189.7 44.3 56.5 
1997 3897.4 5057.6 1023.3 1327.9 44.0 57.2 
1998 4270.0 5490.9 1151.1 1480.2 44.8 57.7 
1999 4643.1 5930.6 1290.3 1648.1 46.0 58.7 
2000 4790.2 6162.0 1351.5 1738.5 44.5 
57.2 
(Sources: compiled/rom: Lu, 2003 and NSB: China Statistical Yearbooks. 1978-2000) 
The Ninth FYP (1996-2000) identified polarization as a serious threat to China's prosperity, 
stability and unity, and the reduction of regional inequalities as a top policy priority. From 
1978 to 2000 the reality was rapid economic growth on the coast and economic stagnation in 
the interior, especially in the west. Without heavy investment and preferential central policies 
and without any effort by the regions themselves to break through the institutional 
11 1 Relative difference ratio = (region I-region 2)/region I x 100%. 
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constraints, the lagging economy of the western regions soon reached a crisis point. In the 
1980s, the percentage ofGDP increase in coastal regions like Hainan was 20.7 per cent, in 
Fujian and Guangdong 19.7 per cent, and in Zhejiang and Jiangsu 19.0 per cent and 18.1 per 
cent respectively, while in the western regions like Qinghai it was 7.3 per cent; Ningxia 7.6 
per cent; Guizbou 8.5 per cent; and Gansu and Shannxi 9.2 per cent. Recently, seeing that the 
transition has generated escalating problems in the northeast, causing some social instability, 
in the tenth of National People's Congress held in Beijing in March 2004, the Chinese Prime 
Minister, Wen Jiabao, announced that a new strategy will target both rebuilding the heavy 
industry-based North East and also prolong the WDP which had started in 1999.112 
The continually lagging regional economy obviously caused trouble for Beijing in many 
respects. In political terms, the west has large populations of minority groups, who share the 
same social values and historic roots with China' s western, north western and northern 
neighbours. The demonstration effect through the media of the coastal regions' wealth made 
the west regions, especially minority peoples, unhappy with their relative poverty. Xinjiang' s 
minorities were particularly dissatisfied, in view of their double losses - the "wealth drain" 
and "cultural assimilation" - reinforced their resentment towards the Han, and the result was 
occasional violent separatist protests. Rather late, "China is also clear about the inherent 
value of economic development in bringing about political stability. A sound, growing 
economy is certainly not the only way to create this stability, but it is an important factor. " I 13 
In addition, the regional economy, being traditionally heavily weighted by resource 
industries and SOEs in the Maoist era, has been experiencing severe depression and, as a 
result, workers shed from the bankrupt SOEs have burdened the central as well as local 
governments with huge redundancy payoffs, welfare and pensions and there has been a surge 
in problems such as crime, and social instability, especially in China's northeast. Improving 
these regions ' economies has therefore become very urgent. From an economic perspective, 
demand in the coastal regions, especially the output of local industries, has gradually reached 
saturation point, so the coastal enterprises need to find new markets for their products. In 
additio~ the fast development of the coastal regions now desperately needs energy resources 
11 2 
113 h~p.:llwww.news.sohu.com. accessed on 03/~212004 . " 
SlSCl, Francesco. (2001 Jun.). "China Eyes SIlk Road All the Way to the US. 
http://www.uyghuramerican.org.l Accessed on 4th Nov. 2001. 
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70r its sustenance, and these are concentrated in the west The fight' c. d I I 
. . 109 lor resources an oca 
~conomic protection is generating regionalism that has militated against the holistic intent of 
.1ational planning. So the development of western China, opening it up to the outside world, 
md encouraging domestic and foreign enterprises to participate in the development of 
infrastructure facilities and natural resources in the region, has great significance in the 
:;ountry's middle term development. 
The Chinese government is working out an overall plan for the development of the western 
regions, namely the WDP, which targets nine provinces, autonomous regions and one 
municipality: Chongqingll4 (Map 7.3). The central government has fonnulated a series of 
preferential policies and measures to encourage domestic and international investors to set up 
economic connections with the west. The preferential policies and measures are seen as, first, 
transferring major state investments, including FDI, to the west through the allocation often 
key projects on local economic and social infrastructure, including the establishment of 
particular funds for local education, technological innovation, minority region development, 
reduced interest rates on bank loans or certain tax exemptions; second, the gradual 
redirection of key infrastructure projects to the west in the coming ten years, such as oil and 
gas pipelines from the west basin to the east coast, electrical power transmission from the 
west and southwest to the east, railway construction on the Tibetan plateau, highways, a 
water conservancy hub, and flood control measures. In Xinjiang a project for transmitting 
natural gas from the Tarim basin to Shanghai, involving more than 140 billion yuan of 
investment, is one of the ten key projects. Infrastructure projects generally put US$6 billion 
on the budget of Xinjiang in the fiscal year 200 I, within which a particular effort is being 
made to build up the transportation infrastructure in order to make the region more attractive 
to various investors (Loughlin and Pannell, 2001: p.478). Third, sustainable development is 
being promoted, with an emphasis on natural environmental protection, including returning 
land to forest and prairie especially where located near to water sources. In addition, poverty 
elimination, infrastructure improvement and technological upgrading and institutional change 
are all emphasized by the WDP. 
114 Cho " d . 1.·t M h 14 1997 at the same administrative level with other three: 
ngqmg s upgra e to a mumpa I y on arc '. . 
Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, implies the centre' s expectation to Chongqmg to act largely as an economIc 
leading role in the WDP. 
308 
Map 7.3 China's Western Regions in the WDP 
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(Source: www.libetinfo.net accessed on 2710212004) 
However, the WDP has been criticized by those, even including many Chinese scholars, for 
its "empty promises", because there will be none of the removal of institutional constraints or 
"deregulation" that was seen on the coast. 115 The effectiveness of these policies is 
questionable. First, the central 'government insists that regional growth inland must be 
achieved through "self-reliance"- efforts by local institutions coordinated with market 
regulation and with state preferential policies; but in reality remains of unreformed economic 
institutions and strong political control. Large unreformed and property-right-undefined 
SOEs continue to dominate the regional economy. At this stage of China 's partial reform, the 
local administration has, not only received no power to punish the failure of the SOEs, but it 
115 
Interviews, 2003 
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~las also been tasked to retain and sustain them There aren't suffi· t fr h 
. Clen revenues om t ese 
~OEs that the local budget can count on which downgrades the at · d 
' u onomous power game 
jY local government to make efforts. Second, investment from Beijing focuses only on the 
argeted projects and bypasses local government, again undermining its capacity. Third, the 
-,olitical sensitivity of some inland regions in particular explains Beijing's reluctance to 
jecentralise power politically or economically and its conservative attitude to experimental 
~eforms. All in all, the success of the centre's regional development policies with regard to 
:he inland regions during the WDP is debatable. 
J nder the direction of the WDP, before the end of 9th FYP, Xinjiang's current CCP GS, 
Wang Lequan, and the provincial government initially suggested promoting two types of 
~)roduction by the region: "one black, one white (and one red, added afterward)" referring to 
)il, cotton (and tomatoes) and related production. Xinjiang' s own 10th FYP highlighted high 
~echnology improvements, environmental protection, poverty reduction, and education and 
30cial welfare enhancement. In terms of economic development, the exploitation of natural 
resources and infrastructure construction are still the major priorities and oil, cotton and 
tomatoes have become key revenue earners (see discussion and table 6.28 in chapter 6). This 
is the evidence Wang used to produce his recommendation. Lu (2003) has criticised Wang' s 
strategy for its simplicity, unprofessional and non-regional-orientation because Xinjiang' s 
economic growth relies too heavily on central governmental investment in oil resource 
exploitation and land reclamation that manipulates the region to be one of leading regions in 
economic growth among the western provinces but achieves little for the region ' s own 
benefit. Second, Lu claims that it is not wise to rush into establishing Xinjiang as a cluster of 
oil and its manufacturing industries. The region is regarded as a major crude oil and gas 
supply base for China but the hi-tech processing facilities are largely located on the coast. 
Although the oil industries make the bulk of revenues for Xinjiang and involve a large labour 
force, their production is levelled at primary products. Their retention in state ownership and 
stifles the necessary long-term investment and holds back economic growth, not to mention 
the fact that all resource industrial developments are restricted by deficits in local 
transportation capacity and the need for ecological maintenance. Xinjiang's cotton 
production is also restricted by the international marketing price, which in the past has 
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caused huge losses to many plantations. To promote this sectoral development is only based 
on an assumption that its large output could generate the huge revenues by ignoring its 
market efficiency, which is an unjustified strategy (Lu, 2003: p.634). 
On the examining Xinjiang's own regional policy, we can see that local government cannot 
think beyond being entirely tied in its development to the central interest. This reflects the 
weakness oflocal entrepreneurial activities, the SOEs' highly centralised economic structure, 
and the inadequate capability and economic management of local institutions, which are 
restricted by the financial dependence. This raises the question about whether Xinjiang' s 
economy could survive a really profound reform. 
7.1.2 Strategies for Sectoral Development 
Before 1952 the provincial economy was dominated by its primitive agriculture. The shares 
of the three sectors (agriculture, industry and service) in GDP were 64.7 per cent, 22 per cent, 
and 13 per cent respectively. Since the first FYP, when China sought Stalin-style 
industrialization, Xinjiang could not escape from this approach and its large and varied 
resources in reserve and its geographical closeness to the Soviet Union seemed appealing to 
the central plan for heavy industrialisation. This made strides in its heavy industrialisation 
after receiving huge investments of up to 0.26 billion yuan in fixed assets during the first 
FYP. The implication of the 1 st and 2nd FYPs was to move China' s industry towards to the 
Soviet border, a matter of global strategy between two super-communist countries (Wu, 
1967: p.63). In 1978, on the eve of reform, the sectoral shares of primary, secondary and 
tertiary in GDP were 35.76 per cent, 46.97 per cent, and 17.27 per cent. By 2000, after a 
series of restructuring and readjustment, with the service sector increasing its share (Table 
7.7), the shares were 21.1 per cent, 43.0 per cent, and 35.9 per cent. 
7.1.2.1 Industry 
All regional policies so far have emphasized the development ofXinjiang's resource 
industries and, within heavy industry, resource extraction has taken a lead, contributing as 
much as 61 per cent of the total industrial GDP (Table 7.7) and 82.4 per cent of the industrial 
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~dded value (lA V) (Table 7.8), and oil and gas in particular represents almost 33 per cent of 
industrial output of Xinjiang in 2000. However other sectors h d , . suc as cotton an woollen 
textile industries, and the iron and steel industries also make 'd bl . , up a cons} era e portIon that 
contributes half of gross industrial output value (GIOV) Xl'n,i}'a ha b I 
. "ng s ecome a cotton-woo -
sugar supply base, comprising 8 key sectors: 6 production sites and a group of modem 
enterprises, contributing one-third oflocal GIOV. Xinjiang's other resource sectors, like 
Construction Materials, Chemistry, Black Metals, and Nonferrous metals are also important, 
with one-sixth of GIOV. 
Table 7.7 Xinjiang's Sectoral Shares of GDP in 2000 (%) 
Primary 
Secondary 
Industry, of which· 
Light: Agriculture inputs 
Non-agriculture inputs 
Heavy: Extractive 
Raw materials processing 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Tertiary 
Transport/Post/Telecom 
Trade! Catering 
Total 
Xinjiang 
21.1 
43.0 
30.9 
( 11.6) 
(1.6) 
(61.0) 
(21.2) 
(4.6) 
12.1 
35.9 
8.9 
8.7 
100 
China 
15.9 
50.9 
44.3 
(24.3) 
(13 .2) 
(12.4) 
(24.5) 
(25 .7) 
6.6 
33.2 
5.5 
8.2 
100 
(Note: ·For the sub-sectors of industry, shares are calculated based on a subset of enterprises for which 
sectoral data are available; this subset accounts for 85.4% of all industrial added value for Xinjiang and 
64.2% for all China. 
Source: Wiemer, 2000: p .174) 
However, despite Xinjiang possessing a large capacity in resource and manufacturing 
industries other than oil-gas, the lack of proper strategic focus has meant that none of non-
oil-gas sectoral developments lives up to expectation. 
In Table 6.28 of chapter 6, we saw that the textile industry is the second economic sector 
after the oil industry. Xinjiang's sandy soils and dry, hot summer make it suitable for 
growing high quality cotton. Official figures show that the province has accounted for more 
than a quarter of China's cotton output since 1995, making it the second best of the leading 
sectors in terms of revenue submission. In 1995-1997, due to centrally directed cotton prices 
and centrally planned marketing channels, her plantations benefited from maximum output, 
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without needing to worry about demand. But, after the removal of the controls in 1998, the 
amounts of cotton in store and in production far exceeded demand. Despite rescue efforts by 
the state, through the China Cotton Corporation, to purchase large amounts of cotton and to 
reserve them in a national store, there were still huge amounts of cotton left over and the 
producers have not made any profits since then. In spite of the good quality ofXinjiang's 
cotton, the long distance delivery costs mean there is restricted demand and limited revenues 
locally in taxes and enterprise incomes. 
Table 7.8 Tbe Industrial Sectoral Structure of Cbina's Regions in 2000 
IAV Machine Chemical Resource Light and E-communication High 
and Materials Industries Textile Industries Technological 
Electronic and Industries Industries 
Industries Products 
Industries 
billion 
yuan % % % % % % 
China 2539.4 23.69 11.93 36.5 26.09 7.18 8.07 
Beijing 72.27 39.92 10.48 27.68 22.83 23.96 22.07 
Tianjin 63.01 36.73 14.25 30.80 16.96 22.45 9.60 
Hebei 113 .27 12.02 12.65 49.78 24.53 1.17 3.77 
Shanxi 42.87 6.99 10.09 72.08 8.93 0.21 2.68 
Inner Mongolia 27.95 4.05 7.56 63.50 22.79 1.24 2.15 
Liaoning 119.40 20.55 9.99 55. 10 12.66 4.51 6.11 
Jilin 49.60 31.25 18.64 33.65 15.78 1.93 3.95 
Heiloogjiang 121.30 5.08 3.59 82.51 8.30 0.55 3.11 
Shanghai 168.71 36.74 14.88 24.87 21.85 10.24 11.56 
Jiangsu 260.43 30.96 17. 12 19.88 30.69 8.14 9.23 
Zhejiang 156.01 27.34 14.64 19.15 36.57 4.10 5.50 
Anhui 50.74 20.33 11.99 36.92 29.44 1.72 2.86 
Fujian 79.71 26.73 9.94 24.36 33.73 14.16 14.25 
Jiangxi 26.97 19.90 12.88 39.86 25.40 2.09 7.86 
Shaodoog 254.94 19.57 10.99 38.38 29.49 2.54 2.77 
Heoan 111.64 13.99 10.40 51.10 26.23 1.88 3.34 
Hubei 101.18 24.09 11.66 31.20 29.62 2.57 4.70 
Hunan 52.81 14.17 10.70 38.58 34.20 2.12 3.07 
16.96 17.03 Guangdong 342.39 32.80 11 .00 26.78 27.11 
28.66 1.40 2.53 Guangxi 32.39 15.76 12.50 40.61 
32.73 32.44 0.32 8.22 Hainan 6.33 8.87 20.46 
0.57 2.54 Chongqing 28.37 34.46 15.82 27.86 16.57 
10.79 13.19 Sichuan 66.25 24.07 12.81 29.95 31.75 6.64 30.46 1.57 Guizhou 21.70 11.63 16.30 40.79 1.15 0.17 Yunnan 53.15 3.68 7.38 24.95 63.49 0.00 0.00 3.46 16.00 59.24 20.22 17.12 
Tibet 0.93 
8.44 24.71 9.65 45.75 17.80 4.66 
Shannxi 41.11 
15.53 2.58 Gansu 24.47 8.29 11 .35 62.84 0.05 0.46 1.73 8.59 83.67 5.75 1.63 
Qinghai 6.53 0.00 18.15 56.49 15.76 ingxia 7.37 9.05 
82 .40 12.28 0.04 0.28 Xinjiang 35.67 2.14 3.17 
8 (Source: compiledfrom Lu, Fan, Liu, lin, Sheng and Lw, (eds.) 2003. pA ) 
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Xinjiang's cotton textile industry was being established in the early years of the first FYP, 
but its production capacity has never reached a level where it used substantial amounts of 
local raw material and produced sufficient cotton-related textile goods to compete in the 
domestic market. A few features can be summarised here regarding the textile industrial 
development in Xinjiang. First, industrial production is largely (87.8 per cent) in the hands of 
SOEs. Production and sale are still under the centrally guided planning system, which gives it 
a double disadvantage, in the removal of price controls mentioned above. Second, most of 
the products are raw material-orientated, thereby adding less value than is possible. 80-84 per 
cent of the local cotton textile industries produce either raw cloth or yarn. The ratio among 
producers of yarn, raw cloth and processed cloth in the region is 1 :0.2:0.02 in comparison to 
the national 1 :0.8:0.8. Third, within the 75 cotton textile enterprises in the region in 1999, 
there were only 29 that possessed large-scale production lines of more than 30,000 spindles, 
a standard scale for large textile enterprises in China. Fourth, the industry is burdened by 
debt. 75 per cent of the productivity of Xinjiang's textile industries is gained from 
investments made using fully-scaled bank loans. The innovation funds rely on loans too. Few 
enterprises have enterprise capital and liquid funds . But each year aB of the enterprises 
together have to pay back 0.58 billion yuan of interest on these loans. Fifth, most equipment 
and machinery are outdated and needs to be upgraded. 32.4 per cent was produced in the 
1990s, 48 per cent in the 1980s and 18.8 per cent in the 1970s. The technical efficiency of the 
large and medium enterprises reaches only 0.2 per cent of the world's most advanced 
companies and about 24.8 per cent of China 's best practice (Wang, 1999a: p.306-307). 
Despite the cotton and its related textile industries being regarded as one of two key 
economic units in Wang Lequan ' s policy, in reality neither cotton production nor the textile 
industries seem very promising for the regional economy. The total share ofXinjiang' s 
cotton textiles is only 5 per cent of the region 's GIOV. The local government has neither 
funds to finance this key sector for its production upgrading and innovation, nor institutional 
willingness and incentives to interfere or assist the qualitative development of the sector. 
Wang (1999a) has enthused about regional growth based on cotton' s production, but how to 
develop the resource and how to make its best benefit are not clearly presented in the local 
policy. Especially given the long establishment cotton textile industries and the technological 
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and financial assistances offered from the coastal regions, Xinjiang's cotton sector could do 
much better than at present. 
Xinjiang's fossil resources, apart from oil and gas, also include coal with the largest amount 
in reserve in the country; iron with six well developed mines; nonferrous metals, such as: 
copper with largeness in reserve and 17 mines sunk or expected to be developed; nickel with 
the biggest reserve in the country and one large scale mine under the construction; and others 
like gold and silver. Three large coal fields are well established and have developed into 
coal-supply-bases with the output annually of 10 million tonnes. Xinjiang also possesses top-
class natural energy potential in her wind, solar and fossil fuel. There are seven areas in the 
region well known for wind power, which have been exploited to generate electricity with 
foreign technology and equipment, such as Philip turbines. Longer and strongest sunshine all 
year round produce clean and recyclable solar energy for the region. In 2003, China's biggest 
solar power controlling system was built in Xinjiang by Beijing and the region has put 
enormous hope into the development of this resource, though being well aware of high 
necessary investment. 
All in all, despite Xinjiang's potentially strong natural resources and the related industries all 
being well established, according to the information provided in the Tables 6.27 and 6.28 
(chapter 6), apart from oil and gas, none of them seem to have contributed significantly to the 
local economy. The related enterprises are even making losses, for example the power 
industries. All of these sectors together only contributed 12.62 percent of total gross 
provincial industrial output in 1997. Although local researchers have mentioned that water 
and capital shortages, transportation inconvenience and underdevelopment of high 
technology and manufacturing industries undermine the market attraction of these resources 
industries, however, the neglect and incapability of the major economic actors and planners 
to raise these sections is another key. The development of these industries needs large 
investment. The provincial government has not been able to raise sufficient funds alone. For 
instance, with two recent discoveries, a big copper mine and a big potassium-salt mine in 
Xinjiang in 2001, all of the 1.2 billion yuan investment came from the centre. The shortage 
of independent investment capital neuters the provincial government in terms of its own 
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plans to promote these industries. Xinjiang's Bavi Iron and Steel C fChi' b' 
J' 0., one 0 na s 19gest 
mills, was founded by Wang Zhen in the early 50s. Due to the shortfall of steel supply in the 
domestic market, Beijing decided to promote cooperation between China's largest mills, the 
Baoton Steel Group of Inner Mongolia and the Bayi Iron and Steel Co of Xinjiang, in order 
to increase the output of steel. But before Beijing's decision, Bayi faced many difficulties 
and remained in a fight for survival despite the strong domestic steel market. 1 16 On 
examining Xinjiang's FYPs, all of the resource industries considered by the plans for 
promotion have been largely the result of state funded projects. However, given the large 
amount of various natural resource industries in Xinjiang and the limited state's funds, only a 
few resource industries are in the favour and the rest of them are left to struggle. Local 
government involvement is completely absent. 
7.1.2.2 Agriculture 
Xinjiang's agriculture is based on arable farming and animal husbandry, which together 
contribute 97.5 per cent of agricultural gross output value (AGOY) in 1997. Arable farming 
agriculture along take up 78.46 percent of AGOY in 1997 and 73.99 percent in 2000 (Table 
7.9). Although since the reform the weight of agriculture 's GDP share has been reduced from 
35.76 per cent to 21.1 per cent, it still employs 11.6 million people, 64.48 per cent of the 
total. 86.50 per cent of agricultural labour force is devoted to two major products: grain and 
cotton. These crops and their related manufactured products represent 70-90 per cent of the 
province's export volume. Xinjiang produces one-fourth of China's cotton and is the major 
sugar base in the west. Grain output makes the region self-reliant. However, agricultural 
production remains at a low standard of land regeneration and productivity: for instance from 
1978 to1995 the rate of high-technology application is only 33 per cent in total ll7. Within the 
light industrial sector agricultural raw material input manufactories make much as 88 per 
cent of the total light industrial share of GDP. But all primary agricultural productions are 
still vulnerable to natural environmental disasters. Every year the local government has to 
payout nearly one billion yuan to cover losses due to natural destruction. 
116 l . 
ntervtews 2003 . 
:11 0.28 out 0[0.86 billion yuan ofXinjiang's agricultural output is contributed by hIgh technology 
ImprOVement (Liu, 2000: p.43). 
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China 
Beijing 
Tianjin 
Hebei 
Shanxi 
Lnner Mongolia 
Liaoning 
Jilin 
Heilongjiang 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
Shandong 
Hen an 
Hubei 
Hunan 
Guangdong 
Guangxi 
Hainan 
Cbongqing 
Sicbuan 
Guizhou 
Yunnan 
Tibet 
Sbannxi 
Gansu 
Qinghai 
ingxia 
Xilliiang 
Table 7.9 The Change of Arable Farming Agriculture in Chjna's Regions' Agricultural 
Structure 1997-2000 
Percentage of Arable Ratio of Ratio of Regional 
Fanning in AGOV (%) Change Ratio of Percentage to National Change 
1997 2000 
Average 
56.40 
1997 2000 
55.68 0.72 1.00 
50.91 46.67 
1.00 1.00 
4.24 0.90 
60.32 
0.84 .5.88 
53.36 6.96 1.07 
58.80 54.81 
0.96 9.66 
3.99 1.04 0.98 
66.59 67.71 
5.54 
-1.J2 1.18 1.22 
-1.55 
61 .50 56.77 4.72 1.09 
47. 11 
1.02 6.56 
47.91 
-0.80 0.84 0.86 
-1.12 
53.94 52.56 1.38 0.96 0.94 1.92 
67.62 66.29 1.32 1.20 1.19 1.84 
41.68 41.48 0.20 0.74 0.74 0.28 
59.75 58.62 1.J3 1.06 1.05 1.57 
51.37 48.96 2.41 0.91 0.88 3.35 
57.16 55.35 1.81 1.01 0.99 2.51 
42.28 40.59 1.69 0.75 0.73 2.35 
50.24 50.94 -0.70 0.89 0.91 -0.98 
50.05 56.68 -6.63 0.89 1.02 -9.21 
64.66 63 .81 0.85 1.15 1.15 1.18 
57.24 54.70 2.54 1.01 0.98 3.53 
49.92 51 .88 -1.96 0.89 0.93 -2.72 
51.40 49.24 2.15 0.91 0.88 2.99 
50.69 50.52 0.17 0.90 0.91 0.24 
45.95 46.49 -0.54 0.81 0.83 -0.75 
60.21 59.31 0.90 1.07 1.07 1.25 
57.20 55.57 1.63 1.01 1.00 2.26 
69.26 67.70 1.56 1.23 1.22 2.17 
64.88 61.15 3.73 1.15 1.10 5.18 
52.64 51 .56 1.08 0.93 0.93 1.50 
69.33 70.51 -1.18 1.23 1.27 -1.64 
68.63 73.99 -5.37 1.22 1.33 -7.45 
51 .89 43 .68 8.21 0.92 0.78 11.40 
67.95 60.41 7.54 1.20 1.08 10.47 
78.46 73.99 4.47 1.39 1.33 6.21 
(Source: compile from Lu. Fan. Liu. Jin. Sheng and Liu. (eds.) 2003) 
As we have discussed in the c~apter 2, China's reform is distinguished by her success in 
agriculture since 1978, which has stimulated large numbers of the TVEs in the coastal 
provinces, improved peasant income and made a great contribution to local agricultural 
economic upgrading. In 1978 Xinjiang's agricultural economic structure displayed the 
follOwing percentages of three sectors: primary agriculture, urban industry, and agricultural 
tertiary I 18 in the ratios 84.3: 10.7: 3; but in 1985 this remained stagnant at 83.7: 11.4: 4.9. It 
was not until 1986 that Xinjiang's local government decided to take measures to readjust 
118 Agricultural tertiary refers to those commercial sectors run by the agricultural labor force. 
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local agricultural structure by advocating a policy to promote TVES119• As we have discussed 
before, this has not been significant, make no effective contribution to the upgrading of the 
agricultural economy. So by 1997 the ratio ofthe three sectors had only adjusted to 71.8: 
18.0: 10.2, while in China the ratio in general was by now 25.1: 63.5:11.4. 
Primary agriculture is still dominant in Xinjiang. According to the statistics in 1997, only 9.1 
per cent of the agricultural labour force is involved in agricultural processing and commercial 
sectors. The composition of the peasants' income shows that 1,160.73 yuan out of the 
average income of 1,378.52 yuan per person, or 84.2 per cent, comes from primary activities. 
This explains why Xinjiang's agriculture has made little progress since the reform. Its 
average annual rate of growth has been 7.5 per cent since 1978, only 2 points above the 
national average, and large numbers of farmers still have low incomes (Table 7.10). 
Table 7.10 Groups of the Average Net Income of China's Peasants from the Different Regions in 
1999 
Above 3000 an er ear 
3000-2000 yuan per year 
2000-1500 
During the WDP, along with cotton, other major products like tomato, red chilly, grape, pear, 
wool and milk have become alternative attractions, and are expected to be developed , , 
further, with related manufacturing industries. However all of these products lack of 
appropriate management in product promotion and marketing, and are not living up to 
expectations. 
The Xinjiang Maiquer (Group) Co., Ltd produces dairy products including milk, yoghurt, ice 
cream and cake. These are regarded as the quality products by local people and they have 
dominated the region's dairy market since the company founded in 1988. The company has 
reinvested its revenues to purchase advanced equipment and it now possesses high-tech 
assembly lines and production systems. However, the management of sales and promotion of 
119 Xi ·· ' p 1 G ed a policy· "the decision on the problems of promoting the town DJ1ang s eop e ovemment announc . 
and village enterprises" on 26th February 1986 (Wang, 1999a). 
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products are again mainly locality-orientated. In Beijing and other major cities, the markets 
are dominated by products from Inner Mongolia's ni Co., Ltd, 120 whose advertisements 
appear frequently in the national media. The same is true of local enterprises processing 
tomato puree, chilli sauce, and wine. Their assembly lines and production quality meet 
international standards and in theory they could compete in the international markets or 
domestic markets on the coast. Manas County, for instance, has many such plants in its area 
and the local authorities here have shown some enthusiasm for their further development. 
However, their strategy only narrowly focuses on the recruitment of capital for investment 
and the expansion of production, and no effort has gone into the promotion of the products 
and the development of markets. 121 The sectoral development of tomatoes and the related 
industries is the one of components of Wang's strategy, but his government gave only a 
broad direction and no plan, financial support or intervention on marketing and production of 
these agricultural products. This is yet another example of the incompetence of government 
institutions in releasing local talent and performing an economic role. 
7.1.2.3 Transportation 
Since 1960, and especially since 1978, despite many efforts in railway improvement, by 1998 
there is still only one route, the LanXin line, linking Xinjiang to the outside world (Table 
7.11). It lies along the northern terrain of the Tian Shan Mountain in the middle of the 
territory centred at the capital Urumqi and eastbound it links to the capital city of Gansu, 
Lanzhou, and westbound it reaches the Kazakhstan border via the Alar Pass. Trains from 
Urumqi to Beijing and Shanghai run once daily and takes 48-72 hours to complete the 
journey. There have been trains too between Urumqi and Almaty twice a week since 1993. 
The intraregional rail network' fans out from Urumqi linking up 18 out of 87 local cities and 
towns and the major southbound line to Kashigar via Korla around the northern sphere of 
Tarirn Basin was completed in 1998, and the construction of extension lines north linking up 
to Alytai via Kuytun and south to Hotan via Kashigar is under way. The length of railway in 
Xinjiang has now reached 3,008 km in 2003 (2000 km in 1997) but this amounts to only 3.3 
120 F' Id le work, 2003 
121 F' Id le work. 2003 
319 
;;er cent of the national total (3.7 in 1997) and the density of network is lower as 0.11 (0.12 in 
.997) km per sq km, 17 (21.6 in 1997) per cent of the national average (Table 7.12). 
Apart from railway as the major form of transport to access the outside, roads are 
1mdamental for the travelling within the region and by the end of 2004, 99 per cent of 
;;ounties, towns and villages had been linked up by the road network, which is now a total of 
35,600 km. The density of road network by 1997 was 1.92 km per hundred sq km, which is 
15.14 per cent of national average and ranked at very bottom of the list compared to other 
) rovinces (Table 7.12). The network of standard highways is based mainly on two internal 
lines, Tur-U-Dai (Turpan-Urumqi-Dahuangshan) and U-Kai (Urumqi-Kuytun); and three 
extemallines, LanXin (Lanzhou-Xinjiang), QinXin (Qinghai-Xinjiang) and XinTibet 
(Xinjiang-Tibet). In addition, the aviation service is gradually taking on an important role, 
with increasing numbers of passengers, though it is expensive. There are 59 air routes, 
including 52 domestic and 7 intemationallines with a total distance of 170,000 kilometres 
linking 11 airports 122. 
The long distances, mostly across deserts, results in iong travelling times, high costs, and 
various logistical problems of operation. In 1995 the average of distance per delivery for 
export was 1944.5 km and for import 2854.8 km, 3.5 times the national average. Internal 
deliveries are also costly as they are mainly by road across the huge territory. For example, 
the road from Urumqi to the southern city of Kashigar is longer than the rail route from 
Beijing and Shanghai. According to 1995 statistics, transport expenditure per unit of GDP is 
2 to 3 times higher than the national average. The national average of cargo prime cost on 
railway was 0.0397 yuan per ton km, but the prime cost on freight train of northern Xinjiang 
was 0.0598 yuan per ton km of the south was 0.1354 yuan per ton km (Han, 1998). 
Transport development and economic growth are strongly related in China' s regional 
development (Demurger, 2001). "Considering China's huge size, important regional 
differences arise naturally in geography and in natural endowments. These may have a 
substantial impact on the economic returns of any kind of reform"(Demurger, 2001: p.96). 
Il2 Xinjiang's 10th FYP, 2002. 
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Localities with advanced infrastructure are generally more open to marketisation. Local 
efforts to provide sufficient transport can change the comparative advantage of a region and 
facilitate the implementation of a variety of development policies. In the case of Xinjiang, 
needless to say, its past, even during the early phase of reform, has been a story of neglect. 
Neither Beijing nor Urumqi made a strong commitment to the improvement oflocal 
infrastructure facilities. According to Demurger (2001), Xinjiang's peripheral location, its 
inadequate transport network, and the expense of travel to the main markets elsewhere in 
China obviously contributes to her slack economic growth. Xinjiang has lowest growth per 
capita in transport contributing to the region's negative growth relative to the national mean 
(Table 7.13). Figure 7.1 shows the investment changes in basic construction of transportation 
and communication (T &C). From the figures we can see that the period having the lowest 
point of investment in the T &C was during the eighth FYP, which was the exactly the period 
of the "three-ladder-step" and, ironically, matched the period that Xinjiang started to drop 
down the growth ranks of provinces, from 1991 onward, after having been in the top group of 
growth regions for years. 
Xinjiang has taken 50 years to complete its basic transport network and most of the 
investment came from the central state. Before 1979 Beijing had responsibly for planning, 
funding and constructing transport assets in Xinjiang. Since the reform, the division between 
the state and locality in sharing financial investments has varied. The central government, 
represented by the Transport Ministry (TM), is in charge of building-up the major inter-or 
intra-regional trunk lines of railway, highway and pipe, military roads and also of hub 
airports. The local transport department is responsible for funding all local branch lines and 
minor airports. For example, the investment in the construction of railway from Urumqi to 
the Alar Pass in 1986 was shared 50:50 between the TM and the local government. The 
money came largely in the fonn of bank loans and commercial goods loan, and also state 
distributed and locally collected funds. The main sources for generating funds to construct 
the regional infrastructure are state budgetary funds through the TM allocated to the region 
for state-planned-infrastructure-projects, plus locally self-collected funds mainly from local 
extra-budgets. Local government has either to rely on raising local production revenues or on 
negotiating with the central government for more extra-budgetary fund allocations. In the 
. .. . . Id,· frastructure proiect requires huge 
case of XlDJlang, gIven the SIze of the an any III . J 
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investment, which is unlikely to be raised easily by either the local government or private 
sources, not to mention that the local governments below the provincial level have always 
struggled to solve their deficits of local revenue. Therefore the sectoral development of 
Xinjiang's transportation has not only been tied to investment from the centre but has always 
been planned according to central interests. Large network extensions of highways and 
railways are always focused on regional resource development rather than local agendas. 
Table 7.11 Infrastructure Availability and Structural Characteristics by Province 1985-1998 Average 
Provinces Transport Network Density Tele- Population Coal Electricity 
(kmllOOOkm2) communication Density Production Production 
Railway Highway Waterway (Telephones/ (sq km) (Tonnes! (kWh/person) 
I 000 persons) 1000 
Eersons) 
Zhejiang 9 310 104 50 418 31 672 
Fujian 9 350 32 38 250 289 594 
Guangdong 4 372 61 59 360 137 796 
Jiangsu 7 245 231 45 660 357 727 
Shandong 14 301 12 23 547 803 646 
Hainan 6 401 10 26 199 2 291 
Henan 13 273 7 14 521 1048 461 
Anhui 12 226 43 16 409 636 406 
Hubei 9 259 46 23 294 197 667 
Hebei 17 252 0 25 327 1085 748 
552 357 199 29 15 229 Jiangxi 10 
558 0 17 9 1443 Xinjiang I 17 
1008 864 6 36 132 Jilin 19 151 
19 2410 957 19 Lnner Mongolia 4 38 
192 687 383 15 12 Sichuan 5 173 
96 628 49 3 14 Yunnan 4 154 
183 237 356 Guangxi 7 163 19 13 
4 20 161 2018 560 Shanxi 9 188 
2193 0 2620 Shanghai 42 547 370 139 1114 149 665 859 Beijing 58 617 0 1275 90 798 0 Tianjin 42 370 15 393 11 291 653 Hunan 11 276 48 
27 1 1315 1192 3 44 Liaoning 24 276 
189 9777 1268 I 14 Shannxi 15 214 187 1298 456 178 10 9 Guizhou 8 50 750 845 Gansu 5 76 0 11 2931 1416 27 72 Ningxia 8 125 6 2131 896 31 76 Heilongjiang 11 102 0 620 1194 21 6 Qinghai 2 23 0 338 1134 798 35 National Average 13 237 37 
(Source: Demurger, 2001) 
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(Source: Xinjiang Statistic Bureau (XSB): Xinjiang's Glorious Fifty Years, 1999b) 
Table 7.12 The Comparison of Transportation Development of Xinjiang and China in 1997 
Units China Xinjiang Xinjian~China % 
Railway mileage thousand km 54.6 2.0 3.73 
Density of railway kmlsq km 0.569 0.12 21.59 
network 
Railway mileage kmlperson 0.45 1.59 352.37 
per person 
Road mileage thousand km 1157 30.3 2.62 
Density of road kmlsq km 0.12 0.02 15.14 
network 
Road mileage per kmlperson 9.55 23 .61 247.21 
person 
Goods mileage I 0 thousand tons 12,348,100 400,490 3.24 
Goods turnover billion ton km 3573 40.763 1.14 
Passenger turnover billion ~eo~le km 900.2 23.98 2.66 
(Source: compiledfrom Wang, 1999a) 
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Table 7.t3 Contributions to Provincial Growth Gaps Relative to the National Mean 1985-1998 (%) 
Contribution of Each Variable to the Difference in Eer caEita Growth Relative to the National Mean 
Region Growth Fixed Initial Investment Education Agriculture Coil. FDI Urbanisation Transport Telecom. 
Difference Effects GDP Sector 
Predicted 
East: Non-Agriculturcll , Transport-rich, Successful Provinces 
Guangdong 2.97 2.64 -8.50 0.22 -0.54 2.49 0.29 2.00 1.27 1.79 1.31 
Fujian 2.87 2.65 -2 .29 -0.56 -4.16 1.19 0 .73 2. 11 0.37 2.38 0.45 
Zhejiang 2.40 2.24 -8 .73 -0.14 -0.35 2.98 2.82 -0. 12 0 .55 2.28 0.86 
Jiangsu 2.25 1.60 -10.63 0.52 1.80 3. 16 3.05 0.37 0 .06 1.67 0.65 
Shandong 1.40 -0.29 -2 .76 0.20 0 .37 -0.19 1.38 0.29 0.47 2.00 -0.06 
Hebei 0 .98 - 1.98 -0.97 -0.07 0 .58 1.35 1.12 -0.21 -0.31 1.45 0.00 
North: Non-Agricultural , Education-rich, Unsuccessful Provinces 
Jilin -0.15 -2.92 -3.37 -0.16 6 .23 0.31 -0.81 0 .17 0.90 -0.64 0.48 
Liaoning -0 .87 -4 .84 -12 .21 -0.18 8.05 4 .98 -0.35 0.19 0.77 1.99 0.72 
Shanxi - 1.45 -10.08 0.02 0.56 3.65 3.95 0.43 -0.40 0 .17 0.64 -0.39 
Heilongjiang -1.71 -0.38 -5.51 -0.48 5.96 1.60 -1.13 -0.24 0 .54 -2.34 0.26 
Centre: Agricultural , Transport-rich, Unsuccessful Provinces 
Jiangxi 0.26 4.59 3.47 -0.92 -3.06 -2.87 -0.81 -0.27 -0.53 0.99 -0.34 
Henan 0.23 -4.68 5.00 -0.19 -0.10 -0.92 0.75 -0.29 -0.74 I. 79 -0.38 
Hubei -0 .3 1 -0.66 -1.51 -0.90 0.74 -0.99 0.44 -0.21 0 .66 2. 14 -0.04 
Anhui -0.36 0.29 4.73 -0.66 -3.68 -2.34 0.52 -0.28 -0.29 1.65 -0.30 
Hunan -0.73 -2.89 5.18 -1.74 -0.46 -2 .24 0.11 -0.25 -0.30 2.31 -0.47 
Southwest: Agricultural , Education-Eoor, Unsuccessful Backward Provinces 
Guangxi 0.34 -1.25 10.71 -1 .07 -2.96 -3 .78 -0.74 0.27 0.17 -0.28 -0.04 
Yunnan -0.48 5.30 7.39 -0.01 -7 .63 -2. 15 -0.81 -0.36 -0.68 -1.13 -0.04 
Sichuan -0.72 0.68 4.79 -0.67 -3 .12 -1.23 -0.04 -0.30 -0.3 1 -0.10 -0.43 
Guizhou -2 .07 -1.98 12.58 -0.16 -6.71 -2.96 -1 .55 -0.40 -0.33 0.00 -0.55 
Northwest: TransEort-Eoor, Unsuccessful Provinces 
Xinjiang -0.49 8.20 -1 .77 2.70 3.87 -4.00 -1.36 -0.40 -0.40 -7.09 -0.25 
Gansu -0.51 5.78 2.31 -0.32 -2 .89 1.32 -1.04 -0.42 -0.60 -3 .98 -0.48 
Shannxi -0.84 -5.22 2.04 0.79 2.23 0.35 -0.56 -0.12 -0.36 0.14 -0.14 
Inner Mongolia -0.86 6.31 -0.46 -0.01 2.41 -1.33 -1.06 -0.43 -0.25 -5.84 -0.20 
Ningxia -2.14 -3 .12 0.65 3.24 -0.23 1.30 -1.39 -0.38 -0.49 -1.82 0 .10 
(Note: Positive (negative) figure means one higher (lower) than the national mean . Source: Demurger, 200/) 
7.1.2.4 Spatial Development 
The spatial distribution of economic development is also problematic. The Tian Shan mountain 
range divides Xinjiang not only geographically but also economically into north and south. In 
contemporary history, it is due to its geographical convenience and a friendly natural 
environment that a major travel route passed through it and the capital city was established in 
Urumqi of northern slope of the Tian Shan under the old governmental regime of pre-1949, but 
cultural and social activities were mostly hosted by the south across the Taklimakan desert in 
the areas of Kashigar in particular, and Hotan. So Kashigar is always regarded as home by the 
Ugyhurs. After 1949, the space economy was reconstructed by shifting most activities into 
areas near to the railway route, oil fields and the political administrative centres, and therefore 
social activities were also shifted to the northern slope of the Tian Shan where many Han 
migrants, the plantations of the XPCC, and modem resource industries were settled. This area, 
stretching from the Hami-Turpan Basin to the lli Valley is now being promoted by the 9th and 
10th FYPs as an economic special zone, namely, the Tian Shan Northern Slope Economic Zone 
(TNSEZ) (Map 7.4), and this has become a centre of gravity of most resources, regional 
wealth, and various communication networks and L'ldustrial sectors, banking, trade and 
commerce, infonnation, high technology and educational institutes, and agricultural 
commercial plantations. The urbanization and industrialization of the TNSEZ is the greatest in 
the province, with 69 per cent oflarge-and medium-scaled enterprises and 90 per cent of public 
listed companies here and 9 of Xinjiang's total 17 standard cities. In 2000, the TNSEZ 
produced a GDP of 60 billion yuan, 44 per cent of Xinjiang's total. The TNSEZ also includes 
Karamay, a key city on the edge of the south Zungharian Desert and the centre of the oil 
extraction industries. Within the TNSEZ, Kuytun-Urumqi-Karamay including Shihezi is 
further being promoted as a golden triangle for regional growth. The second biggest city of the 
region, Shihezi, is home to all members of the XPCC and was reclaimed from the desert. This 
city is under the direct political administration and financial sponsorship of the SC via the 
XPCC. Karamay and Dushanzi (a city next to Kuytun) are united for Xinjiang' s oil exploration 
and refinery industries. Those zones and cities were designated specially to attract investment 
in 1997, with the best economic conditions, and with various preferential policies in 
expectation that it would become an economic pole to generate rapid growth for the region. 
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According to year 2000 statistics, the per capita income of Kashigar Region is RMB 2241 
yuan, Hotan Region RMB 1653 yuan, and Kizilsu-Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture RMB1832 
yuan, far below the Xinjiang average of 7470 RMB. The population of these three areas make 
up 30 per cent of the region's total and 45 per cent of the ethnic population. 95 per cent or 
more of local people are ethnic, led by the Uyghur at 58.6 per cent. Eighteen out of the total of 
21 towns in these three areas are among the 30 towns in the province that have been classified 
as state standard poverty towns. The 2.98 million people of these poor counties account for 41 
percent of the entire Uyghur population of China. These areas attract much less investment in 
fixed assets - only 4.62 per cent of Xinjiang's total from 1990 to1997, and the numbers are still 
in decline. The land area comprises 27.5 per cent of Xinjiang's total but produce only 11.82 per 
cent of its GDP. There aren't many natural mineral reserves here and the local economy largely 
depends on agriculture, particularly 672.7 thousand hectares of irrigated lands, taking up 20.84 
per cent of province's cultivated land. Handcrafts and agricultural input manufactories 
constitute the local industry, representing 1.57 per cent ofXinjiang's industrial enterprises. As 
a result of its dry desert climate, the ecological system here is extremely fragile. Although 
Kashigar is on the railway network, accessing the rest of the area is only possible by road or air 
and even these are not well established. The area shares a long border with Tibet but cross-
border trade is prevented by the Tibetan Plateau and the Kunlun Mountains. There is only one 
border crossing for trade with Uzbekistan but this is underutilized. 
The Ili Valley, Turpan-Hami basins, the foothills of the Altay Mountains and southern slope of 
the Tian Shan, located respectively in the west, east, far north and middle-south, have 
relatively advanced economies compared to K-H-K. A newly developing oil industry, 
traditional cotton plantations-and tourism are important for Turpan-Hami. lli once was popular 
for cross-border trade in the early 90s, but now the local economy is declining. Table 7.15 
provides an overall development of Xinjiang's sub-regions between 1949- 1997. Apart from 
those cities and towns on the northern slope of the Tian Shan, their inter-relations in terms of 
transportation, information exchange and economic cooperation among the other cities and 
towns remain to some extent sparse and distanced. 
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Table 7.14 GDP by Xior 'D· . laog S Istncts, Prefectures aod Key Cities io 2000 
Place Area Population GDP GDP per Output Value of (10,000 sq Grain Cotton (10,000 Person Agriculture (tonnes) (tonnes) km~ yuan) (~an) (10,000 yuan) 
Urumqi 1.2 2081988 2790547 15426 
~ ci!l:l 47557 63668 871521 
Karamay 0.95 269611 1385871 42498 8919 2517 4046 (city) 
Shihezi 0.76 590106 253584 9066 60100 34069 27313 (city) 
Bayingolin 48.27 1056424 1348986 12874 306342 262686 83601 
Changji 9.39 1503547 1198195 7580 554492 863806 90888 
Turpan 6.97 551030 598400 10912 130960 94173 16895 
Hami 15.3 492093 338199 6894 69959 853449 6903 
IIi 5.6 2387066 849881 3834 414845 923739 2716 
Tacheng 9.56 892420 837572 6703 387755 479548 88566 
Bortala 2.7 423660 224333 5446 115260 158754 45159 
Altay 11.7 561670 315030 5345 148843 211610 0 
Aksu 13.2 2141084 935339 4548 524726 1106767 230767 
Kashigar 16.2 3406342 754366 2241 623668 1537181 257054 
Kizilsu- 7.09 439650 79632 1832 62271 176003 4906 
Kirghiz 
Hotan 24.55 1681526 271280 1653 316862 807091 40020 
--
Total 160 18,462,572 13,643,600 7470 4,872,005 8,086,000 1,500,OC 
(Source: author, fieldwork, 2002) 
The regions of Xinjiang show an extremely uneven spatial development. The highest GDP is 
produced by the TNSEZ and is 4.6 times that ofK-H-K. It attracted 51.6 per cent of fixed asset 
investment from 1990 to 1997, remained highly increasing of industrialisation and took 80.93 
per cent of the total volume of foreign trade, while the K-H-K area received only 4.6 per cent 
of investment in 1997 (Table 7.15). Since granting a developing priority to the TNSEZ, 
inspired by the growth-pole theory, the gap between the poor and rich areas is widening. 
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Table 7.15 Economic Development of Xinjiang's Five Economic Regions 
TheTNSEZ 
The I1i Valley 
and the Altay 
Mountains Area 
Turpan-Hami 
Basins 
The North 
Tarim Basin 
The South 
Tarim Basin K-
K-H 
TheTNSEZ 
The Ili Valley 
and the Altay 
Mountains Area 
Turpan-Hami 
Basins 
The North 
Tarim Basin 
The South 
Tarim Basin K-
K-H 
Rank of 
Land 
Coverage 
5 
3 
4 
2 
Cities 
1997 
8 
4 
2 
2 
3 
Rank of GDP Increasing GDP per 
Population Rate Person 
billion yuan yuan 
1990 1997 1997 
2 13 .2 24.44 84.83% 10984 
3 4.56 7.57 66 .32% 3685 
4 1.93 3.95 104.61 % 7254 
5 4.2 1 9.67 129.95% 6453 
4.56 '6.13 34.37% 2040 
University Graduates per Illiterate or Half Illiterate 
thousand People per thousand People 
44 74 
12 98 
15 11 0 
10 142 
5 182 
(Note: A:I:S: agriculture : industry : service; SOllrce: ail/liar. fie ldwork. 2003) 
The Ratio of Economic Economic Spatial Centre and Major Economic 
Sectors 
A: I: S 
1997 1949 
13.62 : 45 . 1 : 41.38 Changji 
Urumqi ( 1955) 
(industry, 
commerce, etc.) 
51.79 : 17.93 : 30.28 lIi 
(agriculture, 
trade) 
19.96: 52 .72: 27.32 Turpan 
(agriculture) 
35 .24: 40.67 : 24.09 Aksu 
(agriculture) 
63 .67 : 10.22 : 26.1 I Kashigar 
(agriculture, 
trade) 
Fixed Asset Investment 
1990-1997 % 
51.6% 
7.96% 
11 .68% 
20.69% 
4.62% 
Activities 
1997 
Urumqi (combined with 
Industries, commerce, etc.) 
Ili 
(agriculture, trades, touri st) 
Turpan-Hami 
(oil industry, tourist) 
Aksu-Bayingo lin 
(oil industry, agriculture) 
Kashigar 
(tourist, agriculture) 
The Ratio of 
Agricultural 
Output Value 
to the Total 
1997 
24.78% 
21 .24% 
6.04% 
23 .5% 
24.43% 
The Ratio of 
Industrial 
Output Value 
to the Total 
1997 
66.71% 
7.62% 
6.49% 
13 . 1% 
3.26% 
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Simply concentrating all energies on the TNSEZ to generate a fast growth in a limited area 
and then expecting that wealth to spread to the vast, poor areas is not realistic or practical. 
First, the poor areas of Xinjiang are not only short of natural resources and transport facilities 
and have a low standard of industrialisation, but they also have less skilled labour and low 
levels of modem development seen as education. The human and natural development 
indicators of those areas show no market attraction for investment from either inside or 
outside Xinjiang. Given the hugeness, distance and primitive economic development of these 
poor areas, planning and investment to help them out of poverty is obviously not easy but 
rather large and long-tenn. The capability of the TNSEZ to generate autonomous growth is 
doubtful. In 1997 the GDP per person in Shanghai is 25,253 yuan, the average for 
Guangdong is 11 ,184 yuan, that ofTNSEZ is 10,984 yuan, and the Xinjiang average is only 
6,629 yuan. 
Second, the plausibility of a real spread effect is questionable in a market economy. It is 
unlikely that, without governmental intervention, capital and other resources will flow freely 
into a poor area with such low market capacity. China eventually gave up on the strategy of 
the ' 'Three ladder Step" in 1999 because it hadn' t performed as expected. It is not wise for 
Xinjiang still to apply this outdated approach. Most importantly, as it is impossible for the 
gap to be narrowed down by the poor sub-regions themselves and, as the local government is 
handicapped by a shortage of funds, all hope once again is pinned on the central government. 
However, central government is only interested in oil development and this reinforces the 
growth pole effect ofTNSEZ, which in turn exacerbates Xinjiang' s unbalanced development 
and creates social tensions. Xinjiang has proved to be a slave to the central plan and, in the 
lOth FYP, developing TNSEZ is a major strategy for the region. 
7.2 The Impact of Development Policies on the Regional Development 
7.2.1 Natural Environment Causes Problems 
With Xinjiang's strenuous development of its fossil resources industries, there is a potential 
price to pay given the fragility of the local environment. Located at the very centre of 
Eurasian continental block, the province is barricaded on all sides by ranges of mountains 
. t Both Xiniiano' s north and south and deserts, which impose a contmental, dry ecosys em. ,,0 
. B . . the north with the second have a desert dominating the landscape: the Zunghanan asm m , 
330 
largest shifting sand sea in the world after the Sahara, the Gurbantangut Desert; and the 
Tarim Basin, in the south, with Taklimakan Desert The AIta Mt ' . h . rth 
. y oun ams are on t e no em 
boundary and the Kunlun, with average heights of 5000-6000 metres, is on the southern 
border each beyond the two deserts. 
Human settlement is only possible in 8000 oases, taking up merely 3.7 per cent of the 
territory while the deserts and sandy land cover 45.5 per cent. Before 1949, there were 2650 
thousand sq km of oases developed over thousands of years of human history, however, by 
the end of the 1980s the total area of water irrigation oasis had sharply increased to 7070 
thousand sq km. 4420 thousand sq km of land has been developed in the space of only 40 
years. In the same period Xinjiang lost 25 per cent of mountain forest and ushered in 
degeneration of 80 per cent of its natural grassland. The economy traditionally relies on 
livestock fed on the grassland taking up 34.44 per cent of territory, of which one third has 
now reached a warning point of serious degradation. The rate of grassland withdrawal is 0.5 
per cent per year and its productivity is now reduced by 30-60 per cent. Xinjiang has 19 
million hectares of forest lands only covering 1.68 per cent of the region, the lowest rate of 
forest coverage anywhere in China. Due to the massive deforestation during the last 20 years 
of economic development, desertification has occurred on 60 per cent of the total land since 
1949 and speeded up to 84.2 sq km per year, 2.44 times faster than the average of over the 
past 2500 years. 20,000 sq km of oasis has been lost, 110,000 sq km of land salinized. 85 per 
cent of the severe desertification is attributed to human over-exploitation of the land. 
Water is a key to social and economic development in this parched landscape. The region 
annually receives an average of merely 120 to 150 millimetres of rainfall, distributed 
unequally. 60-70 per cent of'rainfall in Xinjiang is concentrated in the summer, causing 
floods in piedmont areas, but the rest of the land remains dry most of the year. The water 
sources for the region come largely from 18,000 glaciers totalling 24,000 square kilometres 
and feeding rivers in spring time. Although there are 570 rivers, most of them have short 
route with annual flow rate: 88.4 billion cubic metres, which is 3 per cent of China's average. 
The underground water reserve is 25.2 billion cubic metres. According to a survey by the 
Xinjiang Academy of Science, there is a need of approximately 23.8 billion cubic metres of 
. . ' H th total amount of water resources is 
water for basIC ecolOgical mamtenances. owever, e 
87.8 billion cubic metres and, after reductions from agricultural irrigation and industrial 
production water usages, and from the water flowing away across the borders, only 19.1 
billion cubic metres are left. This means a shortage of 4.69 billion cubic metres water for the 
region's ecological. Local people are keen on extracting more water from underground and, 
according to The People IS Daily, 2003 "geologists have also found fresh water that can be 
drunk directly in a 140-square metre groundwater distribution area in east Lop Nur123, a 
renowned wilderness named as the 'forbidden zone of life' in Xinjiang".124 However, there is 
no clear research on whether the extracted water from underground is fossil water or an 
aquifer resource that can be replenished (Hoppe, 1987).125 
Due to massive water extraction upstream for domestic and industrial use, the Tarim River 
has been shortened by more than 400 km, one-fourth of its length; its flow rate has been 
reduced to 10 per cent of the amount in the 70s, and the water table has dropped from 4-5 to 
10-12 metres below ground. Vegetation has been degraded on a large scale: for instance, 
529.2 thousand hectares of Populus tree land in the 50s was reduced to 281.0 thousand 
hectares by the end of the 80s. As a result, the 70s'scene of the Tarim River running freely 
within banks up to 50 to 100 kms wide, with the luxurious forests ofPopulus trees on them, 
has disappeared. The lakes downstream of the Tarim and the Manas rivers in the north of the 
Tian Shan, and the lake of Lop Nur have disappeared too since the 70s. Turpan's Idi Lake 
and ni's Ibi Lake have also shrunk considerably. As a result Xinjiang's lakes have thus been 
reduced by 51 per cent from 9700 sq km in the 50s to 4748 sq km in the 70s. 
The first major problem has been inappropriate reclamation for agriculture. Huge population 
growth and a tendency for overheated economic growth have encouraged large projects for 
reclaiming deserts to increase irrigated land. This began in the first FYP and, by 1959, 
irrigated land had increased from 0.97 million in 1949 to 2.27 million hectares. 126 From the 
50s to 60s, a few cities were 'also built on desert land, such as Shihezi and Karamay, settled 
by immigrants. Since the reform, the land reclamation surged and by 1992, 3 million hectares 
had been developed and up to 2001 the area was continually increasing at a rate of 67 
thousand hectares per year.l27 After the WDP, although the land reclamation is required to be 
cautious, still two more large reclamation projects have been proposed: developing the lli 
River Valley and diverting water from the Irtys River of Altay Mountain to Karamay. By 
123 In the east of the Tarim Basin. 
124 Geoscience News in the Australian Institute of Geoscientists, 
ttgP:I!www.aig.asn.auINews2003/groundwaterdiscovery.htm. accessed on 18/01 /2005. 
126 CIted by Toops, 2004b: p.270. 
127 S~e Lo, 1961: p.96. 
Fleldnotes, 2003 
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billion cubic metres are left. This means a shortage of 4.69 billion cubic metres water for the 
region's ecological. Local people are keen on extracting more water from underground and, 
according to The People's Daily, 2003 "geologists have also found fresh water that can be 
drunk directly in a 140-square metre groundwater distribution area in east Lop Nur 123 , a 
renowned wilderness named as the 'forbidden zone oflife' in Xinjiang".124 However, there is 
no clear research on whether the extracted water from underground is fossil water or an 
aquifer resource that can be replenished (Hoppe, 1987).125 
Due to massive water extraction upstream for domestic and industrial use, the Tarim River 
has been shortened by more than 400 km, one-fourth of its length; its flow rate has been 
reduced to 10 per cent of the amount in the 70s, and the water table has dropped from 4-5 to 
10-12 metres below ground. Vegetation has been degraded on a large scale: for instance, 
529.2 thousand hectares of Populus tree land in the 50s was reduced to 281.0 thousand 
hectares by the end of the 80s. As a result, the 70s' scene of the Tarim River running freely 
within banks up to 50 to 100 kms wide, with the luxurious forests of Populus trees on them, 
has disappeared. The lakes downstream of the Tarim and the Manas rivers in the north of the 
Tian Shan, and the lake of Lop Nur have disappeared too since the 70s. Turpan' s ldi Lake 
and Di's Ibi Lake have also shrunk considerably. As a result Xinjiang's lakes have thus been 
reduced by 51 per cent from 9700 sq km in the 50s to 4748 sq km in the 70s. 
The first major problem has been inappropriate reclamation for agriculture. Huge popUlation 
growth and a tendency for overheated economic growth have encouraged large projects for 
reclaiming deserts to increase irrigated land. This began in the first FYP and, by 1959, 
irrigated land had increased from 0.97 million in 1949 to 2.27 million hectares. 126 From the 
50s to 60s, a few cities were also built on desert land, such as Shihezi and Karamay, settled 
by immigrants. Since the reform, the land reclamation surged and by 1992, 3 million hectares 
had been developed and up to 2001 the area was continually increasing at a rate of 67 
thousand hectares per year. 127 After the WDP, although the land reclamation is required to be 
cautious, still two more large reclamation projects have been proposed: developing the Hi 
River Valley and diverting water from the Irtys River of Altay Mountain to Karamay. By 
123 In the east of the Tarim Basin. 
124 Geoscience News in the Australian Institute of Geoscientists, 
http://www.aig.asn.aufNews2003/groundwaterdiscovery.htm. accessed on 18/0 112005. 
125 Cited by Toops, 2004b: p.270. 
126 S 6 ee Lo, 1961: p.9 . 
127 Fieldnotes, 2003 
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very scarce. Therefore the density of population per sq km of oasis land is considerably high 
at 277 people: 13 times more than China's total average, especially in considering that 
Xinjiang's oasis land is much less productive and low capacity. Obviously the area of 
cultivated land per person is relatively low and, with the population increasing, it is 
continually going down (Table 7.16). This obviously adds pressure on land usage and forces 
people continually to reclaim cultivable land from forest, grassland and deserts. 
Pollution is another serious threat to the region due to rapid resource-intensive 
industrialisation. In Chau's (2004: p.268) article, 7 out of 10 cities in the world labelled as 
seriously atmospherically polluted are in China and Urumqi is one of them. Large coal mines 
developed near to the cities and towns and coal burning for heating and energy supply to 
cities and industries bring serious air pollution, which is difficult to disperse because of the 
high mountains surrounding all the major cities in the region. The smoke is thick with S02 
and C02 from burning coal and oil, and sand and dust contribute to major sulphur pollution 
with average 348 mcg per standard cubic metre in the air (446 mcg in Ururnqi). The rate of 
recycling industrial solid wastes reaches only 40 per cent and the rest is discarded into the 
environment. Acid rain and pollution is getting worse, with 19 rivers and 7 lakes seriously 
polluted. 
Table 7.16 Xinjiang's Population and Cultivated Lands 1949-1997 
Year Total Population Average Increasing Possessing Cultivated Land Cultivated Land 
Rate by the End of Year per person 
million % thousand hectares hectares / Eerson 
1949 4.3334 1209.76 0.28 
1950 4.4390 2.44 1332.35 0.30 
1952 4.6517 2.37 1543.14 0.33 
1957 5.5801 3.71 1953.03 0.35 
1962 6.9897 4.6 3053.82 0.44 
1965 7.8910 4.13 3164.72 0.40 
1967 8.7184 5.11 3376.83 0.39 
1970 9.7658 3.85 3131.86 0.32 
1975 11.5453 3.40 3146.97 0.27 
1980 12.8324 2.14 3181.70 0.25 
1985 13.6114 1.19 3082.52 0.23 
1990 15.2916 2.36 3086.89 0.20 
1994 16.3270 1.65 3124.15 0.19 
1997 17.1808 1.71 3228.76 0.19 
(Source: compiledfrom Wang, 1999) 
Since the WDP in 1999, sustainable development has been backed by the central government 
in western China due to the high pressure of environmental degradation. A specific project in 
the tenth FYP was "Reclaiming the Land for Forestry from the Cultivation", with state 
investment ofRMB 340 billion yuan over ten years. The project, including a series of 
actions, tries to reconstruct natural land by preventing people from land reclamation from the 
water source areas, river banks and lake districts; replanting trees and grass on the land being 
seriously affected by desertification due to over-cultivation and over-grazing; and 
compensating peasants with crops and other subsidies for giving up their fann land. 
However, despite the detennination of the central state and the collaboration of various local 
institutes, the effectiveness of the project is questionable for its unrealistic planning, its lack 
of cohesive implementation by all involved non-and state's institutes, and dissatisfaction and 
non-cooperation from local peasants in pursuit of their own economic benefits. 
7.2.2 Regional Economic Development in China's Overall Development 
Despite the heavy investment from the state and regional development under the direction of 
policies made by the regional government in accordance with state planning over the past 
few years, Xinjiang's economic growth is steady but is not living up to expectations in 
matching the large funds of transfer, and its rank in GDP annual growth rate has sharply 
declined in the latter years of reform: from rank 7 in 1978-1990 to 20 in 1990-1999 (Table 
7.17). Over the twenty years since 1980, the local GDP growth rate remained at 10 per cent 
annually, slightly lower than the national average. Compared to one of China' s most 
economically advanced provinces, Guangdong, Xinjiang's GDP per capita in 1991 was only 
57 per cent of Guangdong's after 12 years of reform. The relative decline of individual 
income has directly affected local residents, both ofHan and non-Han ethnicity. Table 7.18 
shows that urban incomes have dropped from 10th position in 1978 to 1 i h in 1999 in the rank 
orders of 30 provinces and municipalities, and the income of peasants is down even further 
from 18th to 25th . Even among all western regions, Xinjiang's incomes of urban and rural 
household are not impressive at all (Table 7.19). And the rate of unemployment in the region 
is also considerably higher. Table 7.20 shows that Xinjiang is the second highest among 
western regions in the ratio of registered unemployment128 to employment and the highest in 
the ratio of registered unemployment to total unemployment. The latter means in Xinjiang 
the capacity of financial self-support or self-management ofunemployee is low. In another 
words, the local government's financial burden of supporting those employees is high. 
In the i h FYP 258 out of 331 identified poverty towns were located in the central and 
western provinces and 458 out of 567 towns in the 8th FYP. The criteria used were that the 
128 Registered unemployment means people claim the state 's unemployment benefit, such as: dole. 
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annual average income per local person should be less than RMB 180 yuan in 7th and RMB 
300 yuan in 8th FYP. 51.9% of poor towns in 1994 were found in the west where there is a 
large minority population living. In 1993, 25 out of China's 592 identified poverty towns 
were located in Xinjiang and involved 1,760,000 people (Table 7.21), 90% of whom were in 
south Xinjiang. By 2000, the numbers of poverty towns in Xinjiang had increased to 30, 
again concentrated in the south, especially the K-H-K area which is dominated by minorities, 
led by the U yghurs (see discussion in section 7.2.1.4). During the eighth FYP, China adopted 
a new poverty alleviation policy, with a focus on western China The measures taken under 
the "State's Eight-Sever Poverty-Improving Policy" in 1994 included: improving local 
infrastructure, establishing intra-or-inter-provincial economic collaborations, especially 
between rich and poor regions; raising funds specially for local education and technological 
improvement; reducing taxes; and providing loans for local enterprises. According to the 
Chinese news media, 129 the poverty alleviation plan seems to have achieved a great deal in 
Xinjiang. During the 10th Five-Year Plan, 1.41 million poor households are said to have 
shaken off poverty. However, there are still as many as 1.5 million people remaining in 
poverty. Moreover, although poverty is not as widespread in comparing to other provinces, in 
south Xinjiang the income of households that are said to have escaped from poverty is still 
only one thousand yuan per year, about 40 per cent of the average income of a Chinese 
peasant. 
Although scholars like Mackerras (2004) have claimed that the wealth brought by the WDP 
and the reform has not reached only the Han, in fact many non-Han, especially the Uyghurs, 
have also had a share. Thus one of the richest local private business tycoons was once a 
Uyghur woman, Rebiya Kadee~. But the unequal division of rich-poor between TNSEZ and 
cities occupied largely by Han and K-H-K and remote villages by non-Han remains a basis 
for ethnic discontent. Moreover, the large numbers ofHan immigrants have increased 
competition in local labour markets and put increased pressure on Muslim defensiveness over 
social and cultural purity. The violence ofUyghur separatism and anti-Han movements have 
become a major social problem in the region. 
129 http://english.gov.cnl2006-0Il05/content accessed on 08/0212006. 
337 
Table 7.17 Economic Growth Rate by Provinces in Different Periods in China (%) 
Index NI Relative GDP Relative GDP Relative GDP Relative 
Annual Rate Annual Rate Annual Rate Annual Rate 
Growth Growth Growth Growth 
Rate Rate Rate Rate 
Period 1952-78 Region 1978-90 Region 1990-99 1999 
t1ncrease 
I Beijing 12.54 1.99 IZhejiang 11 .94 1.42 I Fujian 16.1 1.32 10.0 1.14 
2Shanghai 8.66 1.37 2Tibet 11 .84 1.41 2Zhejiang 15.4 1.26 10.0 1.14 
3Qinghai 7.74 1.23 3Guangdong 11 .29 1.35 3Guangdong 15.1 1.24 9.4 1.07 
4Tianjin 7.36 1.17 4Jiangsu 11 .06 1.32 4Jiangsu 14.4 1.18 10.1 1.15 
5Liaoning 7.29 1.15 5Fujian 10.49 1.25 5Shandong 14.2 1.16 10.1 1.15 
6Shanxi 6.98 1.11 6Shandong 9.91 1.18 6Hebei 13.2 1.08 9.1 1.03 
7Xinjiang 9.88 1.18 7Hainan 12.9 1.06 8.6 0.98 
8Yunnan 9.33 1.11 
9Henan 8.99 1.07 
10Anhui 8.9 1.06 
IIHubei 8.89 1.06 
- Steady 
7Heilongjiang 6.33 1.00 12Guizhou 8.31 0.99 8Anhui 12.6 1.03 8.1 0.92 
8Ningxia 6.20 0.98 13Ningxia 8.21 0.98 9Shanghai 12.3 1.01 10.2 1.16 
9Yunnan 5.96 0.94 14Beijing 8.16 0.97 10Jiangxi 12.2 1.00 7.8 0.89 
10Xinjiang 5.78 0.91 15Jilin 8.14 0.97 I I Hubei 12.1 0.99 8.3 0.94 
I I Gansu 5.77 0.91 161nner 8.11 0.97 12Guangx i 12.1 0.99 8.3 0.94 
Mongolia 
12Shandong 5.73 0.91 17Shanxi 8.09 0.97 13Henan 11.7 0.96 8.1 0.92 
13Zhejiang 5.72 0.91 18Jiangxi 7.96 0.95 14Tianjin 11.6 0.95 10.0 1.14 
141nner 5.69 0.90 19Sichuan 7.87 0.94 15Beijing 10.6 0.89 10.0 1. 14 
Mongolia 
20Hebei 7.87 0.94 
21Shannxi 7.76 0.93 
lDecline 
15Jiangsu 5.56 0.88 22Gansu 7.45 0.89 16Hunan 10.7 0.88 8.3 0.94 
16Jilin 5.52 0.87 23Hunan 7.23 0.86 17Ji lin 10.5 0.86 8.1 0.92 
17Fujian 5.42 0.86 24Shanghai 7.16 0.85 18Sichuan 10.2 0.84 5.6 0.64 
18Henan 5.36 0.85 25Guanxi 7.16 0.85 *Chongqing 7.6 0.86 
19Hebei 5.33 0.84 26Liaoning 6.89 0.82 19Tibet 10.1 0.83 8.5 0.96 
200uangdong 5.32 0.84 27Tianjin 6.86 0.82 20Xinjiang 9.9 0.81 7.1 0.81 
21 Hunan 5.19 0.82 28Heilongjiang 6.23 0.74 21 Shanxi 9.7 0.80 6.1 0.69 
22Shannxi 5. 17 0.82 29Qinghai 5.90 0.70 221nner 9.8 0.80 7.7 0.88 
Mongolia 
Table 7.17 contd 
23Hubei 
24Sichuan 
25Guangxi 
26Guizhou 
27Jiangxi 
28Anhui 
5.12 
5.01 
4.99 
4.61 
4.60 
3.56 
0.81 
0.79 
0.79 
0.73 
0.73 
0.56 
23Yunnan 9.5 0.79 7.1 0.81 
24Gansu 9.5 0.79 8.3 0.94 
25Liaoning 9.5 0.79 8.1 0.92 
26Shannxi 9.0 0.74 8.0 0.91 
27Guizhou 8.7 0.71 8.3 0.94 
28Heilongjiang 8.4 0.69 7.5 0.85 
29Ningxia 8.4 0.77 8.7 0.99 
30Qinghai 8.1 0.66 8.2 0.93 
Nation Total 6.32 Nation Total 8.38 Nation Total 12.2 8.8 
(Notes: Chongqing was separated administratively from Sichuan and established as municipality in 1997; NI refers to national income. 
Source: Lu, Liu, Fan, Xue and lin,' (eds.) 2000) 
Table 7.18 Rank Orders ofGDP per person and Personal Income of Ch iD a's Western Provinces from 1978-1999 
Indicators 
Year 
Xinjiang 
Yunnan 
Shannxi 
Sichuan 
Guizhou 
Gansu 
(Source: Lu, 2003) 
GDP per person Urban People Income 
1978 1999 1978 1999 
20 13 10 17 
28 25 12 9 
21 20 17 25 
25 26 22 14 
30 31 24 20 
14 30 13 29 
Peasant Income 
1978 1999 
18 25 
15 28 
13 27 
16 21 
25 29 
28 30 
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Table 7.19 The Comparison of Income and Consumption Level between Urban and Rural Areas 
in China's West 
Income Level Consumption Level 
Urban Rural Pure Ratio Urban Rural Ratio 
Disposable Income Urban/Rural Consumption Consumption Urban!Rural 
Income 
yuan yuan yuan/ Eerson yuanI Eerson 
Chongqing 5896 1737 3.4 5711 1363 4.19 
Sichuan 5478 1843 2.97 4702 1578 2.98 
Guizbou 4934 1363 3.62 4197 1072 3.92 
Yunnan 6179 1438 4.30 5032 1555 3.24 
Tibet 6909 1309 5.28 4169 981 4.25 
Shannxi 4654 1456 3.2 4428 1175 3.77 
Gansu 4475 1357 3.07 4263 962 9.19 
Qinghai 4703 1467 3.21 4087 1185 3.45 
Ningxia 4493 1754 2.55 3633 1290 2.82 
Xinjiang 5320 1473 3.61 3614 1872 l.93 
Western 5302 1519 3.49 4384 1303 3.37 
regions 
China ' s 5854 2210 2.65 6182 1895 3.26 
average 
(Source: Lu, Lu, Fan, Liu, Jin, Sheng and Liu, (eds.) 2001) 
Table 7.20 Unemployment in Cities and Towns in China's West (10,000, %) 
Registered Layoffs Total Ratio of Ratio of Total Ratio of (1 )/(2) 
Unemployment Registered Unemployment 
Unemployment 
10,000 10,000 10,000 % {I) % (2) 
Ningxia 3.9 3.8 7.7 4.7 9.4 0.5 
Xinjiang 12.8 7.7 20.5 3.9 5.9 0.7 
Guizbou 19.7 12.6 23.3 3.8 8.5 0.4 
Sichuan 30.2 43.6 73.8 3.7 10.0 0.4 
Chongqing 10.1 12.4 22.5 3.5 6.6 0.5 
Gansu 8.3 17.7 25.4 3.3 9.1 0.4 
Shannxi 12.2 4l.6 53.8 3.1 1l.7 0.3 
Qinghai l.8 4.0 5.8 2.5 8.4 0.3 
Yunnan 6.0 6.3 12.5 2.2 3.3 0.7 
Tibet 
Western 96.0 149.1 245.3 3.4 8.1 0.4 
regIons 
China 's 486 873.3 1359.3 2.4 6.4 0.4 
average 
(Source: Lu, Fan, Liu, Jin, Sheng and Liu, (eds.) 2001) 
It is too early to assess the WDP's success in bringing economic prosperity and social 
hannony to the region. However, judged from the economic development of the region, and 
based on the examination of all economic sectoral development in the past, the local policies 
made by the central and local governments are obviously not leading the region toward an 
impressive level of development: transportation still remains poorly developed, especially in 
terms of links with the rest of the country; and the income of local people is becoming lower 
and lower in comparison to huge wealth achieved by the coastal provinces. Local ethnic 
groups are scared by the large-scale immigration of Han Chinese into the region. The local 
government of Xinjiang has been dependent upon the central government for huge subsidies 
to manage economic growth but the resulting slow rate of economic growth doesn't match 
the high rate of investment. 
"In more recent years up to 50 per cent of its operating budget had to come from Beijing. 
Over the whole period 1950-84 the centre provided 60 per cent of the region's government 
expenditure." Thus it is not surprising to learn that ''Beijing seemed to be both subsidizing 
and exploiting Xinjiang" (Fedinand, 1994a: p.l 02). Western observers have viewed central 
policies as a form of exploitation of local resources: "Within the province there was a sense 
that Xinjiang was being allowed or forced to fall further behind in the race to develop a 
modem, industrialized economy" (Fedinand, 1994b: p.279). 
Table 7.21 Numbers of Poverty Counties and Population in China's West in 1993 
Counties Poverty Ratio Population 
Counties % 10000 
Sichuan 158 43 27.2 1000 
Guizhou 80 48 60.0 1000 
Yunnan 123 73 59.3 700 
Tibet 77 5 6.5 48 
Shannxi 88 50 56.8 500 
Gansu 76 41 53.9 400 
Qinghai 39 14 35.9 119 
Ningxia 19 8 42.1 140 
Xinjiang 85 25 29.4 176 
Westem regions 745 307 41.2 4083 
China 's average 2142 592 27.6 8066 
(Source: Lu. Fan. Liu. lin, Sheng and Liu, (eds.) 2001) 
In setting China's regional development policies, central leaders have to balance the interests 
between local economic efficiency and central control for political domination and stability 
to maximise growth. When the centre perceives no political threats from decentralisation and 
is convinced that political stability will be enhanced by the maximization of economic 
growth, then regional development is likely to be approached by institutional relaxation to 
provide incentives and by reinforcing local interest to maintain the growth along the path 
seen in the coastal regions. But when there is a perception of political instability resulting 
from decentralisation, then the central leadership will probably call for institutional 
constraints on regional development and ignore local interests. Beijing's regional 
development policy is very politicized and centre-orientated. Thus a key role of China's 
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be developed and the wealth can be protected and continued and at the same time the centre's 
interests are furthered as well. 
So, it is local government who during decentralisation need to produce effective policies to 
help local development out of the restrictions in terms of institutions and to minimi ze unfair 
treatment by central government policy. But Xinjiang's local policies have not only failed to 
counter unfair treatment from the centre, they have willingly facilitated such "central 
predation" and remained paralyzed and powerless to handle the local economy. As a result, 
they have failed to look after the interests of their locality. 
It is just like what Li, Yeung and Qiao (2004: p.44) have said "institutional innovation is 
fundamental to western development. ... Although these endogenous factors are more or less 
a local heritage, the government's participation is still important. The government can 
establish quasi-government organisations for financial and technological promotion and 
thereby directly foster local institutional networks. Through training and educational 
programmes, the government can also introduce and spread modern industrial culture and 
value to the western region. The aim is not to act in defiance of local cultural value but to 
fertilize the local soil to encourage the growth of economic tree." 
In sum, as we discussed in the chapter 2, Xinjiang's provincial government, based on their 
understanding of the region in terms of the geo-politicallocation in the central strategic 
framework, identifies and orientates the dynamic role of bureaucratic administration toward 
political administration. Therefore, in partiCUlar, the government has failed to integrate local 
economic strengths with market regulations and it has failed to protect property rights as a 
means of releasing local talent. No economic self-reliance means no real power and no 
mechanism for providing rational administrative services. This is predicted by Weber 
(Hamilton, 1991) as ·a problem of bureaucratic inefficiency, which has continually put the 
region at the discretion ofBeijing, with wealth predation and bailout, the problems discussed 
by North (1990) and Komai (1980). The economic inefficiency of the region encourages 
political instability and challenges China's unity. 
In this chapter I have tried to bring out all of the problems of Xinjiang's regional 
development in terms of economic sectoral development, transportation deficiency, uneven 
spatial development and environmental degradation. We have to acknowledge that its 
economic development is constrained by its transportation deficiencies and environmental 
fragility caused by its geographical location, by the rigidness of socialist economic system, 
and by a series of ill-fitting policies. Challenges to the local government are not only a matter 
of how to transform the regime into an efficient agent with dual roles - political 
administration and economic institutions - but also how to work out a strategy fitting local 
conditions which could lead it to the best path toward sustainable growth. Orientating 
Xinjiang's economy by balancing the interests of the locality and the state, skilfully 
readjusting central policies, enforcing financial independence to gain sufficient investment in 
economic production and environmental and human infrastructure, are all tasks that should 
be designed within the governmental blueprint. Whether this can be achieved or not is a 
commentary on the leaders' integrity, capability and dynamism to facilitate Xinjiang's 
economic transition. In this regard, Xinjiang's local government has failed to meet its new 
role as determined by China's reform. 
343 
Chapter 8 Conclusions 
Xinjiang, due to her ethnicity and geopolitical position, provides a good case study for 
debating the sustainability of China's partial reform and also a basis for challenging the 
country's present centralized polity, which is undennining economic decentralisation and 
restricting growth in some provinces. 
8.1 Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 2 provides a conceptual framework for unfolding the argument of the thesis. There 
are many existing criticisms of China' s partial reform for its incompatibility of the current 
polity with the decentralised economy, and Qian and Weingast (1996, 1997); Qian and Roland 
(1998) have developed these in theoretical and empirical terms into an argument about the 
long-term sustainability of the reforms. According to them, local government is the key 
middle agent responding to central institutional constraints and to the potential of the locality 
in facilitating economic reform and growth. During the process of decentralisation, local 
government is empowered to be involved in local economy to the extent that it can minimize 
two of the greatest ills of socialist planning: Komai ' s soft budget constraints (SBC) and 
North's political predation. The chapter introduces these ideas of Komai, North, Qian and 
Weingast, Roland, and also Weber's theory of rational-ideal bureaucracy. They are used as a 
basis to argue that the decentralisation has not been equally undertaken and that there is a 
regional bias in which some regions with political sensitivities have been disadvantaged in 
institutional terms. It is examined as the non-change of administrative role of local 
government, which leads to economic stagnation. Continuing poverty, coupled with political 
restrictions, has directly led to escalating social unrest in these regions, in particular in the 
province ofXinjiang. In this regard, the thesis raises concerns about the sustainability of 
China's partial reform and challenges Qian, Weingast and Roland's argument through a case 
study of Xinjiang. 
Chapter 4 examines the nature of the autonomous system granted to Xinjiang. In considering 
the characteristics of the minorities, in terms of religion, culture and racial identity, we found 
these to be significantly different from the national majority, the Han Chinese. The 
autonomous system is in theory designed to provide institutions that enable Xinjiang' s 
minorities to undertake self-determination through political autonomy, cultural preservation 
and socio-economic development, and at the same time preserve the integrity of the People' s 
Republic. Any ideas of secessionism are vigorously discouraged. Although autonomy 
acknowledges the ethnicity of a region through territorial definition, political apparatuses of 
autonomous government and various preferential policies in favour of local people 
developing their self-determination, nevertheless the vital mechanism that could promote 
secessionism has been "skilfully" withdrawn. Close examination reveals that in reality 
autonomy has been institutionalised as a mechanism that effectively and efficiently serves the 
central goals of Beijing. Firstly, the local autonomous government has to act under the 
leadership of the CCP, the main leaders of which in Xinjiang, from the top committees to the 
grass roots level, are largely held by Han personnel. In this way the Han have "colonised" the 
region through CCP penetration (Bovingdon, 2004). Secondly, by granting multi-level and 
extended autonomy to marginalized minorities such as the Kazakh and Hui, and by 
establishing the Han-dominated XPCC, Beijing has weakened the power of the leading 
minority, the Uyghur. So the autonomous system is regarded more as a game of "take" and 
"give" . These institutions and the nature of day to day political administration have led on the 
one hand to low-level lack of cooperation by local people and, on the other hand, they have 
"exacerbated regional conflict", "provoked" the local Uyghurs and encouraged more "violent 
separatism" (Bovingdon, 2004: p.7; Millward, 2004). 
Chapter 5 discusses the bureaucratic administration and organisational construction, the 
leaderships of the autonomous government and the CCP in Xinjiang. We learn that, due to a 
strong emphasis on political-orientation by local government, and its weak bureaucratic 
performance, the operation of the local state has been seriously irregular and conducive to 
bureaucratic inefficiency and irrationality. This is manifest, first, in the CCP' s increase of its 
super-domination in Xinjiang at the same time as a nationwide call for detaching the party 
from local government administrative affairs. Second, staff recruitment has given priority to 
ethnic staff intake but has ignored the technocratic quality of recruits and emphasised instead 
their political inclination. This is particularly true of the Uyghur governors. 
As a result, the bureaucratic infrastructure of local government has been problematic due, 
firstly, to too many organs and staff, and consequent slackness and inefficiency, and, 
secondly to the dilemma facing administrators between rationality and political orientation. 
The latter affects local leaders, who face a choice between, on the one hand, being a regional 
defender and rational administrator or, on the other hand, being an advocate of national 
policy and delegates ofBeijing. 
In the recent period of escalating anti-Han violence, local leaders have tended to focus more 
on political administration instead of bureaucratic rationality and economic administration, 
and this has fostered the incompetence, lack of commitment of local government to its 
economic role and rational policy-making. It has also facilitated the incoherence of the 
regime, seen in frequent personnel confrontation and poor collaboration between Han and 
non-Han staff. Xinjiang's local government has shown itself to be unable to meet the 
requirements of a market economy or to exercise its key function of target-focused steerage 
of regional development. 
Chapter 6 analysed Xinjiang's financial management throughout China's fiscal reform and 
revealed the province's large and increasing financial deficit. The chapter analysed the 
causes of these deficits and their impacts on the economic management of local government. 
There was a discussion of incomplete nature and built-in bias of China's fiscal system, rooted 
in the partial nature of the reform. An example of this is the neglect of potential incentives in 
the clarification of property rights. So a series of fiscal reforms produced only partial success 
in regions with a large portion of non-state sector, while in the regions with state-dominated 
economies, the reforms were a failure. Xinjiang is a case in point. The large reserves of 
natural resources, in particular oil and gas, should be a major economic strength for the 
province and for the government in Urumqi as a source of revenue; but, in reality, the lion' s 
share of the profit produced by the oil industries is extracted by Beijing via the state 
ownership of the assets. This leaves Xinjiang to struggle with chronic financial deficits. In 
order to sustain its economy and maintain the satisfaction of the local minority population, 
Xinjiang's government has had to count on central financial handouts. In order to pursue a 
political stability, on the principle of a trade-off, Beijing is willing to subsidise instead of 
punish the failure of the provincial economy. As a result, the local state is locked into 
continuing dependence on bailouts, which in turn distort its own financial behaviour and 
management and reduce its commitment to financial discipline and the pursuit of self-
reliance. More importantly, the local government has gained no vital power from the 
financial decentralisation to enable it to perform as a real economic agency, and to act in its 
own terms and on the par with its counterparts against unfair treatment from the centre. So, 
"central predation" remains. 
Chapter 7 examines the policy made by the region in response to the central call for 
economic reform. We see that Xinjiang's economic underdevelopment is partly the result of 
the centre's regional policies unfairly treating the region as a strategic raw material supply 
site without considering the local natural conditions and local benefits. Moreover, central 
regional policies gave preference to the coastal regions at the outset of the reform in terms of 
institutional relaxation of economic decision-making and politics, which gave incentives and 
permission to local actors for entrepreneurship. In Xinjiang, although the WDP provides 
support for local infrastructure improvement and key sectoral development, there is an 
absence of the institutional deregulation of state property rights to kick start local economic 
development. 
The local government's poor performance and irresponsibility are another facet of Xinjiang' s 
economic standstill. The chapter examines policies and development strategies in terms of 
sectoral promotion and spatial designation made by the local government in response to the 
central overall development planning. Local policies are by and large centre-orientated, 
without paying attention to local interests: key economic sector such as oil industry has been 
exploited without changing its ownership or bargaining for privatisation; resource industries 
has been developed without considering region ' s insufficient infrastructures; economic 
preferential zone has been designed without concerning the equality of regional development 
as a whole; economic growth has been sought only from land reclamation and resource 
exploitation without caring environmental degradation. These all lead to the second 
explanation: the local government has neither the political self-confidence nor economic 
capacity seen as financial sufficiency to take risks, and therefore is not able to produce 
efficient and justified policies to exploit local talents. This is also explained by the local 
government having lost desires for producing a harmonious regional development for 
Xinjiang and having less interest in local people due to its administrative orientation: not 
acting as a local defender but a state defender or central policy guarder. The political 
instability of the region is threatened by the consequent economic decline, which is the 
combined result of incompetence, injustice and misleading local policies, with added 
pressures caused by Han expansionism, Muslim minority sensitivities and environmental 
degradation. 
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8.2 Achievements of the Research 
Based on the arguments of the four main discussion chapters, the findings and achievement 
of the research may be summarized as follows. 
Firstly the centrepiece of the thesis is the argument is that China's reform is incomplete and 
complex, as a result of which the sustainability of the reform is questionable. This is on the 
same lines as arguments by scholars such as Walder (1996a), who considers that its partial 
nature creates new conflicts that have challenged and sometimes even blocked the intended 
path of the reform. These new conflicts are acknowledged as the incompatibility of economic 
decentralisation with political dictatorship. But in the thesis, I argue, along with the purely 
institutional problem, there is a geo-political issue which not only holds back the institutional 
decentralisation in some regions but also deepens the conflicts and complexity of removal of 
institutional constraints in the reform. 
The vastness of China and her many geo-economic and geo-political differences, tend to 
differentiate the degree of decentralisation from region to region. Many researchers attribute 
the country's uneven regional development purely to its transitional market economy, which 
determines the central preferential policies, including resource allocation and institutional 
decentralisation toward the region, but I argue that it is in fact the local geo-politico position 
and the relationship that this creates with Beijing through the single-party political system, 
that determines central attitudes to the granting of permission for change and the 
commitment to decentralisation of each province. When a province has political sensitivities, 
which might jeopardise central political control or national unity, the centre is unwilling to 
grant decentralisation. Without institutional cooperation and central commitment, the 
province cannot achieve success in economic decentralisation and economic growth in a 
market economy. This uneven decentralisation produces uneven regional development, seen 
as rich-poor division across the country, which obviously is a danger to China's social well-
being, national unity and political stability. 
Therefore the thesis extends the argument on the sustainability of Chinese partial reform 
from the purely institutional respect discussed by Qian and Weingast, to the combination of 
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both institutional and geopolitical respects, and deepens the argument on and complicates the 
possibility and the solution of China's central government in prolonging the reform. 
In some poor inland regions it can be seen as a purely institutional problem, for example, 
institutional inflexibility that caused economic recession in North East China, a traditional 
heavy industrial centre established since Mao's era. However with increasing marketisation 
and the need for economic growth, it is possible to envisage the more profound revolution of 
the decentralisation of the ownership of property to the local level, maybe even including the 
strategic resources and sectors. But to a minority region like Xinjiang, institutional 
inflexibility is not just a matter of the state ownership of local property but also political 
control over the region's non-Han population. This political factor makes the decentralisation 
of ownership less likely here because of fears of fuelling secessionism. 
Using Xinjiang as a case, the thesis has found that Xinjiang' s geo-politics, including her 
ethnicity, determines her position in China's whole transitional framework and that 
institutional reform has to be handled cautiously and differently from other Han or Ran 
dominated minority regions. Beijing sees Xinjiang' s Muslim minorities and her close 
connection with the central Asian countries as factors that could easily generate self-
determination of minority people toward territorial independence from China's institutional 
relax. Therefore Beijing has decided not only not to relax political control but also to 
reinforce single-party domination over the region. However, this seriously affects the 
region's economic development in terms of economic institutional decentralisation and 
creates the problems like undefined property rights for the locality and consequently no 
incentive for marketisation. Both non-relaxed political and economic institutions shape the 
performance of local government in examining its bureaucratic administration and economic 
management of the region. 
Political control ensures that local government in Xinjiang has strong bureaucratic 
administration and leadership. This seriously undermines its economic administrative role. 
Undefined property rights bring no incentives and resources for the key economic actor --
local government to consider local interest, to take a risk on economic reform and to make 
appropriate development policies for the region's economy. This is seen by North as 
"political predation" in his institutionalism (North, 1990). In order to maintain economic 
growth in Xinjiang and bail the local government out of its poor performance in managing 
Xinjiang's economy, the central government uses subsidies. This does not improve the 
performance of local government but contrarily it enhances the incapability of local 
government. This has been explained by Komai's SBC theory (Kornai, 1986, 1989; Komai, 
Maskin and Roland, 2002). The poor performance oflocal government of Xinjiang 
invalidates the explanation of the success of China's partial reform by Qian, Weingast, 
Roland and others in their theory of Market Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style and 
challenges the stability of China's reform as a whole. The case ofXinjiang' s partial reform 
support the argument by Kornai (1990) in considering that partial reform is not ideal but is 
only prolonging fundamental problems such as political protection against economic natural 
selection which will eventually result in economic shortage that lead to the final collapse of 
social economy. North (1990) also explains that in partial reform property rights are not 
defined and there is a potential danger for political predation. As a result, the economic 
actors might lose incentives to pursue economic wealth, and therefore economic success can 
be easily lost or not protected. Xinjiang provides a good case study of North' s argument. 
Xinjiang's partial reform not only challenges whether China can continue or deepen her 
partial reform in general but also challenges whether China can maintain her national unity. 
The non-relaxed political institutions constrain economic institutional liberalisation, which 
produces a poor performance of Xinjiang' s economy. Beijing' s political tight control over 
the region fuels local minority discontent towards and violent action against the Han political 
administration, and results in local minorities seek support from people who share the same 
Islamic values on the other side of the western border. This puts China into a dilemma 
between institutional decentralisation and political control. If the central government grants 
more institutional relaxation, there is no doubt that it could secure and accelerate economic 
growth. But the institutional relaxation definitely brings in more political decentralisation, 
which not only threatens China's current single party regime, but also ushers in opportunities 
for secessionism, which many among the minority populations are seeking. Beijing seems 
determined to keep a tight control over her political administration and retain an unchanging 
one-party polity. As a result, economic growth will be held back or reversed. From the 
analysis above, we can say that China's partial reform creates a vicious circle, and the 
solution sought by China's CCP to consolidate its control may ultimately be 
counterproductive. 
Secondly the sheer scale and variation of China's reform makes it difficult to have a single 
unified theoretical framework to capture a full explanation of its evolution. The theory of 
Market Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style by Qian and Weingast (1996, 1997); Qian and 
Roland (1998) tries to give such an explanation of the reform's success, but their emphasis 
on the coastal regions does not capture the full picture. The fundamental argument in the 
theory of Market Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style is the state's commitment to granting 
decentralisation to the locality. However, Xinjiang's ethnicity and her geo-politics determine 
that this commitment has not existed. Without such a commitmen.t, no matter how capable 
the local government and how much talent the region possesses, Xinjiang's partial reform 
cannot achieve the same success as in the coastal regions. On examining Xinjiang's 
governmental bureaucratic administration and economic management, the "representative 
middle agent" (see chapter 2 section 2.2.1) acting for local interests, described by Qian and 
his fellow researchers as required features for constructing the central argument of the theory, 
is missing. Instead, Xinjiang's government and leaders are in particular required to act as 
political guardians of the interests of Beijing. Therefore there is no vertical decentralisation 
in the relation between the state's and Xinjiang's governments. Without local government 
action against central predation and without vertical decentralisation in Xinjiang's partial 
reform, Chinese-Style Market Preserving Federalism cannot be applied in Xinjiang's case. 
The realities of Xinjiang and other provinces challenge the interpretation of this theory. As a 
result, we consider the theory to be incomplete and geographically biased in describing the 
whole picture of China's partial reform. And the theory cannot be used uncritically to explain 
whether China's partial reform is or would be sustainable or not. 
Therefore, on examining Xinjiang's partial reform, the theories of Komai and North are still 
valid and helpful in explaining the difficulties of decentralisation in this minority region and 
also for questioning the sustainability of the partial reform nationally. As long as the 
problems remaining in Xinjiang's partial reform is not solved, the China's partial reform 
cannot be regarded as stable, as the associated problems can generate violent separatism 
among the minorities, which challenges China's unity and security, and could cause the 
disintegration of the region from the rest of China. That might lead to the final collapse of 
China's partial reform as a whole. 
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8.3 Importance of the Research to China's Development 
It is far beyond the scope of this research to predict whether China can work out a strategy 
that will enable her reform to operate successfully in all circumstances. But I have pointed 
out the problems faced by Xinjiang and China's central state, and the analysis does provide 
some lessons that could profitably be considered by China's reformers. 
Firstly, a profound decentralisation of both economic and political institutions to this region 
is still needed and it is the job of China's central government and the CCP to make 
commitment to granting the decentralisation and find a means of balancing decentralisation 
and political control, and to construct a mechanism to ensure the termination of central 
discretion and the growth of regionalism, to divide the wealth and decision-making power 
fairly between the centre and the locality, and to produce justified development plans with 
the consideration of all legitimate interests. 
Secondly in considering the problems in Xinjiang's regional development, as we know she 
has her own economic attractions and development strengths but finding a dynamic role for 
local government is crucial. Considering the province's geo-political and ethnic special 
features, and her stagnation relative to the coastal regions, a strong and skilful local 
government is needed to maximise the opportunities. Before the "Cultural Revolution" the 
regime of Wang Enmao was a good example of successfully taking political control of the 
issues of ethnicity and integrating the region economically and socially with the rest of 
China A genuine decentralization under the present reform could allow local government to 
be still more proactive. 
Thirdly, Xinjiang's local government must be able to gain vital power through financial self-
reliance by increasing budgetary revenue and eliminating deficits. They could possibly use 
their bargaining leverage through exploiting the sensitivities of ethnicity to lobby Beijing for 
more economic favours, such as 1) maximising ownership transformation of local or state's 
SOEs or productive sectors, maximising the locally-retained profits of the state's enterprises; 
2) exploiting state preferential policies, especially toward minority regions for bargaining or 
managing bank loans and public funds, in order to promote industries controlling non-state 
core resources; 3) taking measures, such as making practical politics or establishing 
governmental agents to promote or help with the development of private or TVEs in the 
352 
region; 4) disciplining the local government's financial behaviour in pursuit of financially 
efficient management. These approaches will train the local government to be more 
entrepreneurial and to become an economic agent, which meets the requirement of the reform 
for a new role to be adopted by governmental administration. Government's involvement in 
local economies is a special point made by Walder (1996a, p.16-17): "A transitional 
economy must alter incentives not merely for individuals and firms but for government 
agencies and government officials themselves, for the behaviour of the latter can have 
enormous economic consequences .... the task is not to revile state involvement but to 
change it". 
Fourthly, local government should take action to improve its own organisational bureaucratic 
administration and personnel recruitment. In this respect, a few matters can be considered: I) 
training the current administrators and recruiting new highly qualified administrators 
regardless of gender and race from China's outstanding universities and the governmental 
organisations of other provinces; 2) increasing the intake of technocrats in local 
governmental staff teams. 
Fifthly, improving the relations between Han and non Han, especially the Uyghur population 
is the key. Chinese scholars think l30 that the emphasis on the improvement of the relation 
between Han and non Han popUlation will be more effective in tackling the escalating anti-
Han movements than simply promoting a policy such as "strike hard", which will only 
worsen the situation. On this point, Wang Enmao did well before the CR period. His "soft 
but firm" manner, seen as paying respect to minority cultures, religious faiths and customs 
and establishing rapport between nationalities, convinced most minority peoples willingly to 
work with their Han colleagues. So, the preservation of Muslim culture and respect from the 
Han, equal rights granted to the religious beliefs and customs, will all help with local 
governmental efficiency, rational administration and political control. 
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